The Order of the Court was as follows : Plaintiff in O.S. 230 of 1996 on the file of District Munsif Court, Hosur is the revision petitioner herein. 2. Petitioner is aggrieved by the order in I.A. 220 of 1999 an application filed by him whereby he wanted direction against Respondents 1 and 2 to file their counter- statement to I.A. 785 of 1998 in the suit by complying Order 6, Rules 14 and 15 of Code of Civil Procedure. 3. The material facts which necessitated filing of such application could be summarised thus: The suit filed by plaintiff was one for grant of decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining defendants and their men from interfering with plaintiffs possession and enjoyment of suit property until the plaintiff is evicted by due process of law. According to plaintiff, she entered into a contract of sale on 26-10-1985. In part performance of that contract, she was put in possession of scheduled property. According to her, time is not essence of the contract. While she was in possession, Respondents 1 and 2 committed trespass in the suit property and they attempted to dispossess petitioner and under those circumstances, she filed the suit for permanent prohibitory injunction. 4. Petitioner also moved for issue of Commission to inspect suit property and to note down the physical features in and around the suit property. 5. Third respondent filed a detailed counter-statement opposing the said petition. 6. Respondents 1 and 2 prayed for time for filing counter time and again and on 22-12-1998, counsel for Respondents 1 and 2 filed a memo stating that the counter filed by third respondent may be treated as counter-affidavit of Respondents 1 and 2 also. It is said that Respondents 1 and 2 have not signed the memo but only the counsel for Respondents 1 and 2 alone signed the same. Lower Court accepted the memo and treated as counter for Respondents 1 and 2 also. 7. According to petitioner, memo filed by counsel for Respondents 1 and 2 is not binding on Respondents 1 and 2 when the same is not signed by the parties. It is said that there is no procedure to admit this case merely on the basis of memo filed by counsel. Established practice of law is that pleadings are to be signed by parties and the same should be verified by parties under Order 6, Rules 14 and 15. Filing of memo in Court with the signature of counsel is not the procedure established by law and it is serious error in procedure. Merely because it is signed by counsel, it will not be binding on Respondents 1 and 2. Respondents 1 and 2 also must be directed to file their counter statement to the application filed by plaintiff. The application was, therefore, filed for the relief stated above. 8. For the said application serious objection was raised by respondents and by the impugned order lower Court held that the memo filed by advocate is sufficient. The same is challenged in this revision petition. 9. After hearing counsel for petitioner, I do not think that there is any merit in this revision petition. 10. Advocate is considered to be the agent of the parties and his acts and statement made within the limits of authority given to him are the acts and statement of party who has engaged him. Respondents 1 and 2 do not disown the memo and by filing counter to the interim application it is clear that advocate acted only within his authority. Even without such counter, what is the authority of counsel came for consideration before Honourable Supreme Court in the decision, reported in (Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India). After Code of Civil Procedure was amended in 1976, a consent decree was passed which was signed only by counsel and not by the parties. The validity of that settlement came for consideration before the Honourable Supreme Court and the question urged by counsel was that unless it is signed by the party, decree will not be binding on him. This argument was repelled by the Honourable Supreme Court. In paragraph 9, onwards of the Judgment, their Lordships considered the authority of counsel at length and thereafter in para 15 their Lordships considered what is the role of an advocate so far as India is concerned. In paras 26 and 27, after extracting the legal position their Lordships considered this question after approving the decision of Kerala High Court, reported in 1968 Ker LT 1 : 1968 AIR(Ker) 213) (FB) (Chagan Souri Nayakam v. A. N. Menon), wherein it is held thus : "26. Courts in India have consistently recognised the traditional role of lawyers and the extent and nature of their implied authority to act on behalf of their clients. Speaking for a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Chengan Souri Nayakam v. A. N. Menon 1968 AIR(Ker) 213), K. K. Mathew, J. (as he then was) observed (AIR p. 215) : "The construction of a document appointing an agent is different from the construction of a vakalat appointing counsel. In the case of an agent the document would be construed strictly and the agent would have only such powers as are conferred expressly or by necessary implication. In the case of counsel the rule is otherwise because there we are dealing with a profession where well known rules have crystallised through usage. It is on a par with a trade where the usage becomes an additional term of the contract, if not contrary to the general law or excluded by express agreement." About the special position of the advocate, the learned Judge stated (AIR p. 216) : ". . . . . .Counsel has a tripartite relationship; one with the public, another with the Court, and the third with his client. That is a unique feature. Other provisions or callings may include one or two of these relationships but no other has a triple duty. Counsels duty to the public is unique in that he has to accept all work from all clients in Courts in which he holds himself out as practising, however, unattractive the case or the client." See also Jiwibai v. Ramkumar Shriniwas Murarka Agarwala, 1947 AIR(Nagpur) 17; Govindammal v. Marimuthu Maistry, 1959 AIR(Mad) 7, and Laxmidas Ranchhoddas v. Savitabai Hargovindas Shah, 1956 AIR(Bom) 54. 27. These principles were affirmed by this Court in Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlal Gulabchand. Referring to a number of decisions on the point, V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. observes (SCC p. 619, para 16): ". . . . .Those who know how Courts and counsel function will need no education on the jurisprudence of lawyers position and powers. Of course, we hasten to enter a caveat. It is perfectly open to a party, like any other principal, to mark out in the vakalat or by particular instructions forbidden areas or expressly withhold the right to act in sensitive matters, the choice being his, as the master. If the lawyer regards these fetters as inconsistent with his position, he may refuse or return the brief. But absent speaking instructions to the contrary, the power to act takes in its wings the right and duty to save a client by settling the suit if and only if he does no bona fide in the interests and for the advantage of his client." See also Monoharbahal Colliery Calcutta v. K. N. Mishra. And finally in paras 30 and 38 to 43 their Lordships held thus : 30. There is no reason to assume that the Legislature intended to curtail the implied authority of counsel, engaged in the thick of proceedings in Court, to compromise or agree on matters relating to the parties, even if such matters exceed the subject matter of the suit. The relationship of counsel and his party or the recognised agent and his principal is a matter of contract; and with the freedom of contract generally, the Legislature does not interfere except when warranted by public policy, and the legislative intent is expressly made manifest. There is no such declaration of policy or indication of intent in the present case. The Legislature has not evinced any intention to change the well recognised and universally acclaimed common law tradition of an ever alert, independent and active bar with freedom to manoeuvre with force and drive for quick action in a battle of wits typical of the adversarial system of oral hearing which is in sharp contrast to the inquisitorial traditions of the Civil Law of France and other European and Latin American countries where written submissions have the pride of place and oral arguments are considered relatively insignificant (See Rene David, ENGLISH LAW and FRENCH LAW - Tagore Law Lectures, 1980). The Civil Law is indeed equally efficacious and even older, but it is the produce of a different tradition, culture and language; and there is no indication, whatever, that Parliament was addressing itself to the task of assimilating or incorporating the rules and practices of that system into our own system of judicial administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38. Considering the traditionally recognised role of counsel in the common law system, and the evil sought to be remedied by Parliament by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, namely, attainment of certainty and expeditious disposal of cases by reducing the terms of compromise to writing signed by the parties, and allowing the compromise decree to comprehend even matters falling outside the subject-matter of the suit, but relating to the parties, the Legislature cannot, in the absence of express words to such effect, be presumed to have disallowed the parties to enter into a compromise by counsel in their cause or by their duly authorised agents. Any such presumption would be inconsistent with the legislative object of attaining quick reduction of arrears in Court by elimination of uncertainties and enlargement of the scope of compromise. 39. To insist upon the party himself personally signing the agreement or compromise would often cause undue delay, loss and inconvenience, especially in the case of non-resident persons. It has always been universally understood that a party can always act by his duly authorised representative. If a power of attorney holder can enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of his principal, so can counsel, possessed of the requisite authorisation by vakalatnama, act on behalf of his client. Not to recognise such capacity is not only to cause much inconvenience and loss to the parties personally, but also to delay the progress of proceedings in Court. If the Legislature had intended to make such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated. 40. Accordingly, we are of the view that the words in writing and signed by the parties, inserted by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, must necessarily mean, to borrow the language of Order III, Rule 1, C.P.C. : "any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader, appearing, applying or acting as the case may be, on his behalf: Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directed be made by the party in person." (Emphasis supplied as in the original) 41. In the present case, the notice issued under Order XXI, Rule 22 was personally served on the defendant, but he did not appear or show cause why the decree should not be executed. The notice was accordingly made absolute by order dated January 23, 1990 and leave was granted to the plaintiff to execute the decree. The decree passed by the High Court on June 18, 1984 in terms of the compromise was a valid decree and it constituted res judicata. As stated by this Court in Shankar Sitaram Sontakke v. Balkrishna Sitaram Sontakke: ". . . . .It is well settled that a consent decree is as binding upon the parties thereto as a decree passed by invitum. The compromise having been found not to be vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, misunderstanding or mistake, the decree passed thereon has the binding force of res judicata." 42. S. R. Das, C. J., in Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. State of Orissa, states (AIR p. 351) : ". . . . .a judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the Court exercises its mind on a contested case. . . . ." 43. A judgment by consent is intended to stop litigation between the parties just as much as judgment resulting from a decision of the Court at the end of a long drawn out fight. A compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment. As stated by Spencer-Bower and Turner in res judicata, (2nd edn., page 37): "Any judgment or order in other respects answers to the description of a res judicata is nonetheless so because it was made in pursuance of the consent and agreement of the parties. . . . . . .Accordingly, judgments, orders, and awards by consent have always been held no less efficacious as estoppels than other judgments, orders, or decisions, though doubts have been occasionally expressed whether, strictly, the foundation of the estoppel in such cases is not representation by conduct, rather than res judicata. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . See also Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee." 11. In the decision, reported in 1968 Ker LT 1 : 1968 AIR(Ker) 213) (FB) (Souri Nayakam v. A. N. Menon), learned Judge K. K. Mathew (as he then was) who pronounced majority of judgment held thus : "An advocate in India has inherent implied authority to enter into a compromise on behalf of his client and the compromise so entered into would be binding on him. The implied authority is an actual authority and not an appendage to his office or dignity added by the Court to the status of the advocate. The implied authority can always be countermanded by the client and if in a particular case it is found that the implied authority has been expressly limited, then counsel has only that authority as limited by the client. No advocate has got actual authority to settle a case against the express instructions of his client. Order 3, R. 4, C.P.C. requires the appointment of a counsel to act in Court by a document in writing. There is no distinction between the power of counsel in England, Scotland and Ireland and advocates in India who are not required to file a power. Order 3, R. 4 makes no difference. The only requisite it lays down is a written authority of appointment. When that is given it leaves counsel so appointed free to act, and draws no distinction between various kinds of acting. If the Legislature draws no distinction there is no justification for the Court to make one. The vakalat in the case did not give express authority to counsel to compromise the suit or confess judgment, but there was no express limitation on the implied power of counsel to compromise the suit or confess judgment. When counsel is appointed under a document the enumeration of certain powers in it would not exclude the implied powers necessarily inherent in the appointment. However, exhaustive the enumeration of the powers might be in a vakalat, it would be impossible to enumerate all the powers necessary for the proper discharge of the work of counsel in Court. The construction of a document appointing an agent is different from the construction of a vakalat appointing counsel. In the case of counsel we are dealing with a profession where well-known rules have crystallised through usage. It is on a par with a trade, where the usage becomes an additional term of the contract, if not contrary to the general law or excluded by express agreement. That counsel is not a mere agent of the client would be made clear on looking at the nature of his duties and relationship with the public and the Court. Counsel has a tripartite relationship; one with the public, another with the Court, and the third with his client. This is a unique feature. The functions and duties of an advocate are not those of an agent simpliciter, and his authority cannot be confined to specific powers which might be enumerated in the vakalat by which he is appointed to act. Although there is no reason to limit or restrict the implied authority of counsel to compromise an action or confess judgment unless expressly done so by the client, both in the interest of the client and the good reputation of counsel, it is always advisable that he should get specific instructions before taking such a radical step. Here there is no case that the implied power of counsel to compromise the case or confess judgment was limited or taken away by the client expressly, and therefore, it has to be assumed that counsel had implied authority to compromise the action or confess judgment. Although the vakalat in the case did not expressly authorise counsel to compromise the suit or confess judgment, we are not satisfied, there was express prohibition in his doing so. It follows that the application to set aside the decree on the ground that counsel had no authority to make the endorsement, has to be dismissed." 12. It is not the case where client is challenging the authority of counsel, but an opposite party is questioning the right of counsel in filing memo. If client himself cannot withdraw from the concession given by the counsel, I do not think that the position of opposite party will be still worse. The opposite party cannot question the authority of counsel in signing the memo on behalf of this client and cannot insist that party also should sign it. I do not think that this is a case where revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is maintainable since it is not a case decided. 13. Either way, the revision petition is without any merit and consequently the same is dismissed. No costs. C.M.P. 421 of 2000 is also dismissed. Revision dismissed.