The suit was filed upon an insufficiently stamped promissory note. The question that was chiefly debated in the lower Courts was, whether or not the plaintiff could fall back upon the original cause of action; but on account of the turn the case has taken, that question becomes immaterial. The learned District Munsif, being of the opinion that in any event the promissory note could be relied on as containing an acknowledgment of liability, allowed the note to be filed in evidence and on the strength of it, passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. That decree of the District Munsif has been set aside by the lower appellate Court.

Mr. Sitarama Rao for the plaintiff (appellant) contends that the document having been once admitted in evidence, the original defect no longer operates as a hindrance. S. 36 of the Indian Stamp Act provides,

Where an instrument has been admitted in evidence, such instrument shall not, except as provided in S. 61, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped.

There is no force in the respondents contention that S. 36 does not apply to promissory notes or bills of exchange referred to in proviso (a) to S.

35. The words of S. 36 are perfectly general and are not restricted in their application to such documents only as can be received in evidence on payment of the stamp duty and penalty.

It is next contended that the ground on which the District Munsif allowed the document to be filed, being wrong, S. 86 cannot be invoked. This contention is clearly untenable and must be overruled.

In numerous cases, S. 36 was applied to instruments which formed the very basis of the claim made: Ramasami v. Ramasami (5 Mad. 220), Venkatrama Aiyar v. Chella Pillai (40 M.L.J. 479 (F.B.), Venkata Reddi v. Hussain Setti (39 L.W. 632).

Next the argument that the effect of S. 36 is that a mistake once committed becomes condoned, is beside the point, for it is the duty of the Courts to construe a provision in its plain and natural sense and to give proper effect to it.

Lastly, the section enacting, as it does, that the admission of the instrument shall not be called in question thereafter, necessarily implies that it must also be acted upon ; to hold differently, would be to nullify the section Alagappa Chetti v. Narayanan Chettiar (36 L.W. 599).

In the result, the decree of the District Judge is set aside and that of the District Munsif is restored with costs in this and in the lower appellate Court.