Das, J.

(1) This is a second appeal by the plaintiffs and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 6-2-1952, passed by the learned 3rd Subordinate Judge of Patna, by which he reversed the judgment and decree of the learned 1st Additional Munsif of Patna, dated 21-7-1951, in a suit for a declaration of title and for possession in respect of 9 dhurs of land. The material facts are the following. The present appellants, who were plaintiffs in the Court of first instance, had a plot of land, numbered plot 85, in village Mosimpore Kurtha. The area of the plot was about 1 katha and 5 dhurs only. Adjacent west of the said plot was plot No. 86, which belonged to the respondents, defendants in the action. The appellants alleged that their father had purchased plot No. 85 by means of a sale deed dated 24-5-191

7. Their case further was that their father built a kuchcha house on 16 dhurs of land and left about 9 dhurs as khund towards south and west; about 15 or 16 years ago the kuchcha house was demolished and in its place a pucca building was constructed. Some piece of land was left at the back of the house on which there was a latrine. The appellants alleged that the respondents, who had their plot No. 86 adjacent to west of plot No. 85, began to interfere with the possession of the appellants over the latrine and the parti piece of land. It was further alleged that a criminal case was fought between the parties in which there was a compromise by which the present respondents admitted the title of the appellants to the latrine and the parti piece of land, the area of which was about 9 dhurs only. On these allegations the appellants asked for a declaration of their title and confirmation of possession. The defence of the respondents was that the parti piece of land, measuring about 9 dhurs3 was part of plot No. 86 and belonged to and were in their possession for a long time. The respondents denied that any piece of land out of plot No. 85 was left at the back of the house constructed by the appellants.

(2) The suit was first tried by Mr. A. K. Sinha, an Additional Munsif of Patna, who dismissed the suit on the finding that the present appellants had failed to prove that the disputed land was part of plot No. 8

5. There was an appeal, and the learned Additional Subordinate Judge who heard the appeal remanded the case for giving an opportunity to the appellants for getting the land measured. After the order of remand three commissioners, one after the other, went to the locality but were unable to come to any definite decision as to whether the disputed land formed part of plot 85 or plot 86: this was because the configuration of the plots had undergone considerable change and it was not possible to relay the survey man by reason of the change in the locality.

(3) Be that as it may, the Additional Munsif, who dealt with the suit after remand, gave a decree to the present appellants on the finding that by reason of the compromise effected on 13-3-1947, between the appellants on one side and the respondents on the other, the appellants had proved their title and possession over the disputed land. There was again an appeal, which was heard by the learned 3rd Subordinate Judge of Patna. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the present appellants had failed to establish their title or possession over the land in dispute and in that view of the matter, he reversed the decision of the learned Munsif and dismissed the suit of the appellants with costs. The present second appeal is directed against the aforesaid decision of the teamed 3rd Subordinate Judge of Patna.

(4) Learned Counsel for the appellants has contended before me that the finding of the learned 3rd Subordinate Judge is vitiated by reason of his failure to give the compromise arrived at between the parties in the criminal case on 13-3-1947, its true and proper legal effect. Learned Counsel for the appellants has submitted that the compromise between the parties constituted an admission by the respondents of the title of the appellants and gave rise to an estoppel under the provisions of Section. 115, Evidence Act.

(5) To appreciate the point urged on behalf of the appellants it is necessary to state a few more facts. The learned Additional Munsif who dealt with the suit in the first instance made the following observations with regard to the compromise :

"The defendants had brought a criminal case alleging that on 18-2-46 the plaintiffs assaulted him and continued damaging the latrine. That criminal case was compromised on 13-3-4

7. The plaintiffs have filed the petition of compromise. By this compromise the plaintiff was to keep a wall 20 inches away to the east of the defendants house and the defendant was to have no concern with the latrine and khund. There was one more clause at the end. It shows that the complainant Bhageran will have 6 feet of land to the north of the old wall over which he will have his latrine."

I have examined the compromise petition and I find that the terms were as have been stated by the learned Munsif. The learned Munsif accepted the compromise as a genuine compromise and held on its basis that the present respondents had admitted the title of the appellants to the disputed land of 9 dhurs over which stood the latrine. He further held that the appellants had given the respondents land to the North to the extent of 6 x 23. The respondent, defendant 1 in the action, though he denied the story of compromise, did not have the hardihood to deny that some lands were-given to him by the appellants as a result of the said compromise. The learned Munsif further found that the latrine and the khund, referred to in the compromise, constituted the 9 dhurs of disputed land of the present case.

(6) The learned Subordinate Judge seems to have ignored the compromise on the following grounds; firstly, he pointed out wrongly as I shall presently show, that the title pleaded in the plaint did not refer to the compromise; secondly, he expressed the view that the compromise did not create any title and could not alter the legal position. He did not consider at all whether it raised any estoppel against the present respondents.

(7) I agree with learned Counsel for the appellants that the learned Subordinate Judge did not give the compromise its true legal effect. The learned Subordinate Judge was in error in thinking that the title pleaded in the plaint by the present appellants did not refer to the compromise at all. I have examined the record of the case and find that the appellants amended the pleadings by a petition dated 19-1-1948, by which the appellants referred specifically to the compromise and said that the respondents (defendants in the action) had accepted the appellants title in respect of the suit land in the criminal case. After the amendment of the pleadings, the present respondents filed an additional written statement in which they alleged that the compromise was fraudulent and not binding on them. The Courts below have concurrently found that the compromise was a genuine compromise and was not vitiated by fraud. That being the position, the compromise clearly raised an estoppel in favour of the present appellants and against the respondents. Section 31, Evidence Act, lays down that admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but they may operate as estoppels under the provisions hereinafter contained. Section 115, Evidence Act, lays down, inter alia, that when one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative to deny the truth of that thing. In the case before us the defendants respondents accepted the position that the latrine and the khund belonged to and were in possession of the present appellants; in other words, they accepted the title of the appellants to the disputed land and on that declaration they caused the appellants to give some land to them. The finding of the Court of first instance which has not been disturbed in appeal by the learned Subordinate Judge, is that the respondents got that land from the appellants. Having got that land from the appellants, it is not now open to the respondents to say that the appellants have no title to the disputed land of 9 dhurs. My view is that the respondents are now estopped from denying the title of the appellants to the disputed land, which title they had admitted and accepted in the compromise effected in the criminal case in 194

7. The learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in thinking otherwise.

(8) The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge are set aside and those of the learned Munsif are restored. The appellants will be entitled to their costs throughout.