S.C. Das, J.This revisional application under Section 397 read with Section 401 of Cr.P.C. is directed against the judgment and order dated 09.09.2009 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in Criminal Appeal No. 22(3) of 2008, whereunder the learned Sessions Judge upheld the judgment and order of conviction and sentence of the accused petitioner under Section 304A of IPC passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala dated 10.09.2008 in Case No. G.R. 689 of 2007.

2. Heard learned counsel, Mr. D.C. Roy for the petitioner and learned public prosecutor, Mr. A. Ghosh for the State-respondent.

3. The prosecution case is that on 29.06.2007 at about 03-30 pm one Krishnarup Singha (aged about 65 years) was standing by the side of Assam-Agartala Road at Bridhinagar near his house and at that time a motorbike bearing No. TR-03-A 8949 being driven in an abnormal high speed coming from eastern direction of the road knocked down Krishnarup Singha and as a result Krishnarup Singha received bleeding injury on his head and other parts of the body and he was shifted to Ranirbazar hospital, wherefrom he was taken to G.B. hospital and he succumbed to his injuries on 30.06.2007 at about 08-30 am. Shri Sushanta Singha, son of Krishnarup Singha, lodged the FIR on 30.06.2007 at about 2205 hours and accordingly, Ranirbazar P.S. Case No. 32/2007 under Sections 279/ 304A of IPC was registered and after investigation, police submitted charge sheet against accused-petitioner, Mamin Hossen for commission of offence punishable under Sections 279/ 304A of IPC.

4. Cognizance was taken on the basis of the police report and in course of trial the accused was examined under Section 251 of Cr.P.C., to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

5. In course of trial, the prosecution examined 16 witnesses and also exhibited some material documents and considering the evidence on record the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate found the accused guilty of committing offence punishable under Section 279 and 304A of IPC and sentenced him to suffer R.I. for six months under Section 279 of IPC and further sentenced him to suffer R.I. for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default of payment of fine to suffer further R.I. for three months for the offence under Section 304A of IPC.

6. Aggrieved, the accused-petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No. 22(3) of 2008 and the learned Sessions Judge by impugned judgment dated 09.09.2009 dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence under Section 304A of IPC and set aside the conviction under Section 279 of IPC applying the provision of Section 71 of IPC.

7. Hence, this revisional application.

8. Learned counsel, Mr. D.C. Roy for the accused-petitioner has submitted that FIR was lodged after a substantial delay and on that ground the prosecution case is liable to be disbelieved. He has submitted that where the conviction and sentence under Section 279 of IPC has been set aside, the appellate Court would not upheld the conviction and sentence under Section 304A of IPC and this Court, therefore, in exercise of revisional power should set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 304A of IPC. It is also submitted by Mr. Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned trial Court and the appellate Court arrived at a perverse finding of the guilt of the accused-petitioner without any cogent evidence of rash and negligent riding of the motorbike. He has further submitted that Motor Vehicle Inspector has not been examined to prove the Vehicle Inspectors report and so the accused-petitioner is entitled to get the benefit of doubt.

9. Learned P.P., Mr. Ghosh, on the other hand, has submitted that the prosecution case has been proved with overwhelming evidence and the revisional application has no merit at all.

10. While exercising revisional jurisdiction, this Court is to see correctness, legality and propriety of the judgment/order passed by the inferior Court and to see the regularity of the proceeding. The power vested in this Court under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. is not required to be exercised to upset concurrent findings of fact recorded by two Courts below on proper appreciation of evidence. It is only in those rare and exceptional cases where the appreciation of evidence is found to be wholly unsatisfactory or the conclusion drawn from the same perverse in nature, causing miscarriage of justice that the Court may correct the course of justice and undo the wrong. Perversity in the findings, illegality or irregularity in the trial that results in injustice or failure to take into consideration an important piece of evidence are some of the situations in which this Court may reappraise the evidence adduced at the trial but not otherwise.

11. To prove the charges, prosecution examined 16 witnesses and according to the prosecution, PWs 1, 3 and 8 are direct eyewitnesses of the occurrence. PWs 2 and 5 rushed to the spot of accident hearing the sound at once and found the motorbike lying over the deceased Krishnarup Singha and the injured accused was also standing there.

12. To consider the submission of learned counsel, Mr. Roy, I have gone through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. P.W. 1 in his examination in chief though claimed to be an eyewitness of the occurrence, the material part of his statement that he witnessed the occurrence contradicted with his earlier statement recorded by the I/O. So, he cannot be considered as an eyewitness of the occurrence. But the other part of his evidence that he found his father-in-law, injured Krishnarup Singha, was lying on the road and that accused also having injuries present there has not been shaken in cross-examination. He identified the accused by name and face. He also stated the number of the motorbike, which caused the accident. PWs 3 and 8, as it appears, are the direct eyewitnesses of the occurrence. Their evidence has not been shaken in any manner. The trial Court as well as the appellate Court put implicit reliance on those witnesses. PWs 2 and 5 were very near to the place of accident and after hearing the sound of accident they rushed to the place and found that Krishnarup Singha lying injured in the road side and the motorbike lying over him. They also found the accused person there and they identified the accused in the dock. There is overwhelming evidence that Krishnarup Singha was knocked down by the speedily running motorbike on Assam Agartala road in the road side near the house of Krishnarup Singha at Bridinagar. P.W. 15 is the owner of the motorbike and the accused-petitioner is his nephew and he stated that his nephew Mamin Hossen took his motorbike on the date of accident. P.W. 1 stated that the accused also accompanied with Krishnarup Singha when he was taken to hospital. The evidence in respect of accident as well as the identity of the accused is overwhelming. I, therefore, find no merit in the submission of learned counsel that perverse finding has been recorded by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court.

13. The accident was occurred on 29.06.2007 at about 03-30 pm. Krishnarup Singha was first taken to Ranirbazar hospital and thereafter in the evening he was shifted to G.B. hospital, where he died on 30.06.2007. After the death of Krishnarup Singha in the hospital, on 30.06.2007 at 2205 hours the written FIR was lodged by PW 11, son of Krishnarup Singha. In the FIR he stated that they were busy in connection with the treatment of his father and, therefore, there was delay in lodging the FIR. However, in his evidence he did not make any such statement that for that reason there was delay in lodging the FIR.

14. Law has not fixed any particular time for lodging FIR. A delayed FIR itself is not illegal. A prompt and immediate lodging of FIR is the ideal as that would give the prosecution a twin advantage. First is that it affords commencement of the investigation without any time lapse. Second is that it expels the opportunity of any possible concoction of a false version. The delay in lodging FIR results embellishment which is a creature of an afterthought. But delay itself is not enough to reject the prosecution case unless there are clear indications of fabrication.

15. In the present case Krishnarup Singha died due to motor vehicle accident is not disputed. Evidence of PW7, Dr. Ranjit Kumar Das, Autopsy Surgeon, makes it abundantly clear that Krishnarup Singha died because of head injury suffered in road traffic accident. The prosecution case is that the accused petitioner was riding the motorbike with abnormal high speed and he knocked down the deceased Krishnarup Singha in the road side.

16. The trial Court and the appellate Court considered the point raised by the defence regarding delay in lodging the FIR and discarded with positive finding that there is nothing to show that the prosecution cooked up a false story regarding the fact of accident and falsely involvement of the accused-petitioner. Both the Courts below arrived at a finding that the delay in lodging FIR did not affect the credibility of the prosecution case. The accused did not adduce any defence evidence. No defence case suggested at the time of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. Except denial nothing also stated in his examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. There is nothing to even suggest that the prosecution witnesses made false statement against the accused for any ulterior purpose. The delay in lodging FIR, therefore, has no consequence on the authenticity of the prosecution case. This argument advanced by learned counsel, Mr. Roy, therefore, has no merit at all and hence, rejected.

17. The offending motorbike was examined by Motor Vehicle Inspector at the instance of the I/O during investigation. Report of the Motor Vehicle Inspector was submitted by the I/O with the charge sheet, which is on record. In his evidence, the I/O has stated that he collected the motor vehicle report and placed it on record. There is no plea from the side of the accused that the accident occurred for the mechanical defect of the motorbike. In the absence of any such plea of the accused, there is nothing to hold that the prosecution case is doubtful simply because the motor vehicle report has not been exhibited. The report itself shows that there was no mechanical disorder of the motorbike at the time of accident.

18. It is in the evidence of witnesses that deceased Krishnarup Singha was in the road side when the motorbike being driven in abnormal high speed knocked down the deceased. It is also in the evidence that accident occurred when the motorbike was trying to overtake another vehicle. Therefore, rash and negligent riding of the motorbike is proved with sufficient evidence on record and the Courts below decided the point very rightly.

19. The trial Court found the accused-petitioner guilty of committing offence both under Sections 279 and 304A of IPC. The learned Sessions Judge by the impugned judgment upheld the finding of the trial Court in respect of offences both under Sections 279 and 304A of IPC, but while considering the punishment the learned Sessions Judge has held that the basic ingredients of Sections 279 and 304 of IPC are same and, therefore, pursuant to Section 71 of IPC he set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 279 of IPC. This finding of the learned Sessions Judge appears to be absolutely wrong and contrary to law. Section 71 of IPC limits punishment of offence made up of several offences. Section 279 of IPC prescribes punishment for rash and negligent driving or riding, whereas Section 304A of IPC prescribes punishment for causing death by rash and negligent act. Both are independent in nature though some of the ingredients are same. The learned Sessions Judge misconstrued the provision of Section 71 of IPC and arrived at a wrong finding. However, the State-respondent did not challenge that finding and the finding stands good. I do not like to interfere in that finding in this revisional application. The argument of learned counsel, Mr. Roy that since punishment under Section 279 of IPC has been set aside, the accused is liable to be acquitted under Section 304A of IPC has no basis at all.

20. For the discussion made above, I find no merit in the revisional application and the revisional application, therefore, stands dismissed.

21. Send back the lower court record along with a copy of this judgment.