8. It is not contended that the plaintiffs claim is for anything more than her prima facie rights in Ebrahimjis estate, but three points are taken for the appellants. It is said (1) that the suit had come to an end by reason that it had abated as against Sakinaboo, (2) that it is barred by limitation, and (3) that defendants 9 to 19 can make no claim against the appellants in respect of Safarallys interest in Jelumboos estate as this would be contrary to the agreements of 13th July 1923, and 23rd September 1924, and to the decree of the Court made (11th June 1926) in the suit of 1924 which gave effect to these agreements. On the first point their Lordships are of opinion, that it is impossible to hold that the suit for administration of Ebrahimjis estate came to an end by reason of abatement; as against Sakinaboo. Sakinaboo and her daughter Rukhiaboo are persons having the same interest as the plaintiff and though the plaintiff by reason of laches may be supposed in certain circumstances to lose her rights as against them, it is paradoxical to suppose that the plaintiffs laches have deprived them of rights. There is nothing in Order 22 to take away their interest in the estate of Ebrahirnji and they could (so far as that order is concerned) have brought art administration suit of their own, notwithstanding any abatement of the plaintiffs suit. The presence of someone to represent Sakinaboos interest was very proper and. highly desirable in the interest of every other party, but it is putting it too high to say that the suit could not possibly go on without her. It not uncommonly happens, in a suit for administration, that for one reason or another a particular interest is not represented before decree, but is either provided for by the decree, or is asserted at a later stage under the decree, or is given effect by a party being permitted to attend certain accounts and inquiries so as to be bound by the result.

9. Still, it would have been very bad practice if in the present case Rukhiaboo had not been joined as a party and this was properly done by Barlee J. on her own application under Order 1,R. 10. Their Lordships are of opinion that it is open to the Judge in his discretion under Order 1, Rule 10, to add as a party to the suit the representative of a person against whom the suit has abated for the purpose of giving effect to the rights of the parties. The contention that the plaintiffs suit had abated as a whole is fundamentally mistaken. It involves that the plaintiff was claiming relief against Sakinaboo, that because Sakinaboos heirs were entitled to resist the grant of this relief in the present suit by reason of the plaintiffs laches, the plaintiff could not be given relief against the present appellants. No step in this reasoning can be justified.

10. It was not contended before the Board that the plaintiffs suit is of the character mentioned in Article 106, Limitation Act. It is a suit against certain Mahomedan coheirs by a person entitled to part of the interest of an heir and the High Court on appeal rightly held that to such a suit neither Article 106 nor Article 123 is applicable. The heirs of a Mahomedan succeed to his estate in specific shares as tenants in common and, the plaintiffs suit against the son and daughters of Ebrahimji for due administration of what came to their hands as property left by their father is governed as regards immovable property by Article 144 and as regards moveables by Article 120: 20 IA. 155;(94) 21 Cal 157, Mahomed Riast Ali v. Hasin Banu 59 IA 74.(32) 19 AIR 1932 P.C. 81 Ghulara Muhammad v. Ghulam Husaln Upon the proper application of Article 120 as between tenants in common, it will be sufficient to refer to 57 IA 325 (30) 17 AIR 1930 P.C. 270 Mt. Bolo v. Mt. Koklan and 45 Mad 648 [LQ/MadHC/1922/17] .(22) 9 AIR 1922 Mad 150, Yerukola v. Yerakola. It does not appear that the widow, son or daughters of Ebrahimji received what was to come to thorn under the agreement of 24th September 1924 until the suit of 1924 had been decreed in 1926 which is well within six years of the filing of the present suit on 23rd July 1930. But their Lordships think its right to add that on the evidence they find no reason for holding that there had. been an ouster or exclusion of the plaintiffs prior to 23rd July 1924: indeed there are concurrent findings of the Courts in India which are inconsistent with any such contention.

11. The third point taken by the appellants is in their Lordships opinion good against those claiming under Safarally an interest in Jelumboos one-sixth share of Ebrahimjis estate. As the suit of 1924 resulted in a decree there is an element of estoppel by record but the matter may be put sufficiently as resting on agreements made in 1923 and 1924 between Sarafally and Sarafallys heirs on the one part and the widow and children of Ebrahimji on the other. Defendants 9 to 19 cannot claim to make the present appellants liable on the footing that Sarafally was entitled to more than these agreements gave him, though it be true enough that since 1912 he had been entitled to a half of his mothers one-sixth share. If the plaintiff by her suit had challenged the rights of Sarafallys heirs under the agreements of 1923 and 1924, it may well be that she could have required Sarafallys heirs to account upon a footing which would have made it impossible to give any effect to these agreements even as between the parties to them. But the plaintiff by her suit has not sought relief upon any such basis and the agreements have their effect between Sarafally (and his representatives) and the children of his brother.

12. Their Lordships are of opinion that on this point the appeal succeeds but only as against defendants 9 to 19 (respondents 5 to 15). The decree of the High Court dated 8th September 1936 should be varied (a) by limiting the second of. the declarations therein made to a declaration that the plaintiff and defendants 7 and 8 are entitled to a one-twelfth share in the estate of Ebrahimji Esmailji Bhagat, the plaintiff and defendant 8 being each entitled to one-quarter of the said one-twelfth share and defendant 7 being entitled to the remaining half thereof; (b) by adding to the order for administration the words "so far as regards the one-twelfth share to which the plaintiff and defendants 7 and 8 are entitled as aforesaid." Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. They see no need to disturb the High Courts order as to costs. As regards the costs of this appeal the appellants must pay one-half of one set of costs to the contesting respondents -- that is respondents 1, 3 and 5 to 12 who have joined in resisting the appeal.