1. This is an application for leave to appeal to His Majestyin Council from an order of the Court of appeal which has directed, in reversalof the order of the original Court, that a Receiver be appointed in respect ofthe subject-matter of an administration suit now pending in this Court. Thereis no room for controversy that the order in question does not fall withinclause (a) of section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because it has beenrepeatedly held that a "final order," within the meaning of thatclause, means an order which finally decides any matter directly at issue inthe case in respect of the rights of the parties, Secretary of State for Indiav. British India Steam Navigation Co. 13 C. L. J. 90 : 9 Ind. Cas. 183 [LQ/CalHC/1911/4] , and anorder appointing a Receiver is plainly not an order of this description. ChundiDutt Jha v. Pudmanund Singh 22 C 928. The only question, therefore, whichrequires consideration is, whether leave should be granted under clause (c) ofsection 109 of the Code. In this connection the learned Advocate-General hassuggested that the terms of clause (c) of section 119 of the Code of 1908 arewider than those of clause (c) of section 595 of the Code of 1882. A referenceto section 594, however, show that no mention was made of "orders" inclause (c) of section 595 by reason of the special definition of the term"decree" contained in section 594. We must take it, therefore, thatthe law in this respect has not been altered by the new Code. We may,therefore, usefully refer to decisions under the Code of 1882 to determinewhether we should certify the case before us to be a fit one for appeal to HisMajesty in Council, although it is not one comprised within clauses (a) and (b)of that section, Now, it was pointed out by Lord Hobhouse, in the case ofBanarasi Pershad v. Kasi Krishna Narain 28 I.A. 11 : 23 A. 227, that thecorresponding clause of the Code of 1882 was intended to cover specialcases--such, for example, as those in which the point in dispute was notmeasurable by money, though it might be of great public or private importance.To certify that a case was of that kind, though it was left entirely in thediscretion of the Court, was a judicial process which could not be performedwithout special exercise of that discretion, evinced by a fitting certificate.An illustration of a case dealt with under clause (c) of section 109 will befound in Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation v Dorabji C. Shroff 27 B. 415, whereleave was granted on the ground that the question raised affected not merelythe parties to the litigation but all Companies formed under the IndianCompanies Act. It must be observed, however, that this Court always verysparingly exercised its powers under clause (c) of section 595 of the Code of1882. To take one example, it is well-known that in the case of Moniram Kolitav. Kerikolitani 5 C. 776 : 6 C.L.R. 322 : 7 I.A. 115, in which a question ofconsiderable difficulty and importance, affecting the Hindu community, wasraised, leave was refused by this Court, and subsequently special leave wasgranted by Her Majesty in Council The view we take as to the scope of section109 clause (c) is also supported by the observations of the Judicial Committeein the case of Sadagopa Chariar v. Rama Rao : 34 I.A. 93, 30M. 185 at p. 188, 2 M.L.T, 204, 4 A.L.J. 333, 11 C.W.N. 585, 5 C.L.R. 566, 17M.L.J. 240, 9 Bom. L.R. 663; see also Clarke v. Brojendra Kissore: 13 C.W.N. 1127, 3 Ind. Cas. 786 [LQ/CalHC/1909/296] . We are not satisfied thatany question of special importance arises in this case, such as would justifythe grant of leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council under clause (c) ofsection 109. The question in controversy is, whether a Receiver should orshould not be appointed in respect of the subject-matter of the litigation. TwoCourts have taken divergent views upon this matter. It has been suggested thatthe order of the Court of appeal is based upon circumstances not proved by thematerials on the record, and further that it is not founded upon an examinationof the merits of the case. We are, however, not concerned with the propriety orotherwise of the order against which leave is sought; it is sufficient to saythat no special question arises, such as would justify an order under clause(c) of section 109 of the Code or under section 40 of the Letters Patent. Wemay add that, as was pointed out by the Judicial Committee in the case of MotiChand v. Ganga Prashad Singh 29 I.A. 40 : 24 A. 174, there is nothing toprevent the petitioner from applying to His Majesty in Council for specialleave. The application is, therefore, refused with costs.

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Mahomed Musaji Salejivs. Ahmed Musaji Saleji(21.03.1911 - CALHC)