Mahesh Pal Singh v. Pooran Singh Tewari And State Of Uttar Pradesh

Mahesh Pal Singh v. Pooran Singh Tewari And State Of Uttar Pradesh

(High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad)

Criminal Revision No. 1796 Of 1983 | 04-05-1987

B.L. YADAV, J.

(1.) This revision is directed against the order purported to have been passed under section 101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short the Code). After bearing the parties on 4.5.87 the revision was dismissed, but detailed reasons were to follow. These reasons are set out below.

(2.) The sequence of events leading to the present revision may be set out below. The opposite party No.1 alleged to be the owner of Bus No. UTM 410, which was stolen from Farrukhabad lodged an F.I.R. on 12.1.81 It was alleged that while the Bus was standing near Bus Stand, Farrukhabad, it was taken by Suresh Kumar, Santosh Kumar and Siya Ram etc. The bus was in fact, seized from Mainpuri district. A search warrant was issued by the Magistrate at Farrukhabad. The said bus was recovered by the police at Mainpuri District from the possession of the present applicant, who was produced before the III Additional Munsif Magistrate, Mainpuri. A photostat copy of the registration certificate of Bus No. UTM 410 with its chassis and engine number was filed. The registration of the vehicle appeared in the name of the applicant. There appears to be no application made on behalf of the opposite party or the prosecution that search warrant was issued from the Magistrate, Farrukhabad District. There was accordingly nothing to deny the version of the present applicant that the bus was registered III his name nor there was any objection about jurisdiction of court at Mainpuri, and on executing a personal bond of Rs. 50/00/- and furnishing two sureties in the like amount by order dated 19.5.83, the bus was directed to be released in favour of the present applicant.

(3.) Against the order dated 19.5.83, Pooran Chand Tewari, opposite party No.1 preferred a revision (being Criminal Revision No. 135 of 1983) before the Sessions Judge, Mainpuri. The present applicant who was allegedly holding registration in his name, was served and was represented. Being faced with difficulty, in view of the language of Section 101 of the Code as search warrant was executed at Farrukhabad and recovery was made within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, Mainpuri, the present applicant (who was opposite party in revision before the Sessions Judge, Mainpuri), prayed for some time to enable him to obtain an appropriate order from the appropriate court at Farrukhabad. This prayer was accepted by the impugned order dated 12.8.83 and the present applicant was granted one monthTs time. The order passed by the Magistrate, Mainpuri, directing release of the bus was to come to an end on 12.9.83. The present applicant instead of getting an order from appropriate court at Farrukhabad, has preferred the revision before this Court.

(4.) Learned counsel for the applicant urged that in view of the provisions of Section 101 of the Code the Magistrate at Mainpuri has got the jurisdiction and not the Magistrate at Farrukhabad, hence the impugned order dated 12.883 cannot be sustained. Learned counsel for opposite party No. 1, on the other hand, urged that Section 101 was clear in terms and it provides that when in pursuance of the execution of a search warrant at any place beyond the local limits of the jurisdiction of a court issuing the same, anything is found outside the jurisdiction of that court (issuing search warrant), a list of things recovered shall be prepared and sent immediately to the court issuing the search warrant. Unless such place is nearer to the place having jurisdiction therein, the Magistrate shall make an order directing the particular thing to be taken to the said court. Further in pursuance of the directions contained in the impugned order dated 12.8.83 in which an undertaking was given on behalf of the applicant, to obtain an order from the court at Farrukhabad, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Farrukhabad at Fatehgarh, has decided the matter, after hearing both the parties, by order dated 14.9.83 and held that as there was a dispute pending decision in Crime No. 195/83, P.S. Kotwali, District Farrukhabad, in which the present applicant was an accused in a case under sections 379/462/420, I.P.C., the vehicle need not be released in favour of the applicant against whom a case was pending, rather the vehicle was to be seized by the Kotwali Police of Farrukhabad and must be kept in custody. That order dated 14.9.83 became final and the present applicant did not challenge the same and he was bound by it, and now he cannot wriggle out of it. The present revision was accordingly without any substance.

(5.) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the point for determination is that in case the search warrant has been issued by the Magistrate at Farrukhabad and the bus has been recovered at Mainpuri, in such circumstances whether the court at Mainpuri has got jurisdiction to pass an order for the release of bus or the said bus must have been taken to the court at Farrukhabad which had issued the search warrant. In order to decide this controversy the relevant provisions as contained in Sections 93, 94, 99, 100, 101 and 451 of the Code may be looked into. Section 93 enacts the procedure as to when search warrant may be issued. Section 94 provides search of a place suspected to contain the stolen property. Section 99 enacts the directions to be contained in the search warrant and makes the provisions of Sections 38, 70, 72, 74, 77, 78 and 79 of the Code in respect of search warrant issued under sections 93, 94, 95 and 97 applicable. Section 100 provides that the person in-charge of the place would permit the search to be made.

(6.) Section 101 enacts detailed procedure in respect of disposal of the things found and search made beyond jurisdiction of the court issuing search warrants. In view of Section 101, in case, a thing has been recovered in pursuance of the search warrant by a court which has got no jurisdiction in respect of the place where the thing has been recovered, in that event a list of things shall be prepared by the Magistrate where the things have been recovered and the same shall be sent immediately to the court which has issued the search warrant unless such place is nearer to the Magistrate having jurisdiction therein than to such court in which case the list and things shall be immediately taken before such Magistrate, and unless there be good cause to the contrary, such Magistrate shall make an order authorizing them to be taken to such court. In the present case the bus was recovered at Mainpuri whereas the search warrant was issued by the court at Farrukhabad. Immediately after recovery of the bus the same must have been sent along with a list of things recovered, to the court at Farrukhabad and the necessary orders for release could have been passed only by the court at Farrukhabad. On behalf of the prosecution it appears that full and. correct facts were not brought to the notice of the court nor any application appears to have been made, consequently, on the application of the present applicant, who produced a Photostat copy of the registration certificate in his name, the bus was released in his name. But in fact, the court at Mainpuri has no jurisdiction to pass any order in such matters except to send it back to the court issuing search warrant (the court at Farrukhabad).

(7.) At this stage it is proper to ascertain the intention of the Parliament in enacting Section 101, as it is the sacred duty of a court to ascertain the intention of the Parliament while interpreting a particular section or part of an enactment. But the intention has to be ascertained as expressed from the language, which the Parliament chose to employ. The following observation in Salomon v. A. Salomon and Company Limited, 1987 A.C. 22. Intention of the legislature is a common but very slippery phrase, which, popularly understood may signify any thing from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it. In a court of law or equity, what the legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately meant from what it has chosen to enact; either in express words or by seasonable and necessary implication. See Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales, 1950 S.C. 233 at 307.

(8.) The intention of the Parliament in enacting Section 101 appears to be that if certain things have been recovered in a different district then the district from which the search warrants were issued, the things recovered in pursuance of the search warrants have to be taken to the court which issued to search warrant so that details of the case as given in the F.I.R. might be ascertained and further investigation can be made, if so necessary. As in the instant case the details of the case were not available at Mainpuri and the applicant has prima facie managed to obtain a registration certificate of the bus in his name. The calc of Pooran Chand Tewari, opposite party No.1 was that by playing a mischief, the registration of the bus was obtained by the applicant in his name and the applicant has committed a theft. To facilitate the investigation proceedings and to ascertain correct facts, it has been enacted under section 101 that in case certain things have been recovered in a place outside the jurisdiction of the court issuing search warrants, the things have to be taken or sent immediately after preparing a list to the court issuing search warrants. In the present case it was obligatory on the part of the III Additional Munsif Magistrate, Mainpuri, to see as to which court has issued the search warrants, and in view of the provisions of Section 101, he must have prepared a list of things recovered and sent it to the court issuing search warrants (i.e. court at Farrukhabad). It was a mistake committed by the court and for that I am reminded of a maxim ACTUS CURIAE NEMINEMGRAVABITT, which obviously connotes that an act of the court shall prejudice no man. There is yet another maxim ACTUS LEGIS NEMENI EST DAMNOSIS EMNANOSUS which ccnnotes that an act in law shall prejudice no man.

(9.) As the bus was required in a case under sections 379, 460, 420 I.P.C. which has not as yet been decided, the provisions of Section 4T I are relevant, which enacts the procedure for passing an order for custody and disposal of property pending, trial in certain cases. As the case was still pending, it was for the court at Farrukhabad to pass an incidental or appropriate order for the custody of the bus keeping in view that if the property was subject to speedy and natural, decay, the court would pass an order that the said article may be sold or otherwise disposed of. In the present case as it was a bus and there was a dispute about the title of the same, the present applicant against whom the aforesaid criminal case was registered including a case under section 420I.P.C. has correctly not been given possession of the vehicle. In view of the order of the Sessions Judge, as on behalf of the applicant an undertaking was given that he would obtain an appropriate order from a competent court at Farrukhabad. It would have been fair to act strictly in accordance with the terms of the undertaking. I am accordingly of the view that the Magistrate at Mainpuri has no jurisdiction to pass an order about the release of the bus in favour of the applicant.

(10.) There is yet another aspect of the matter. Annexure-3 has been filed along with an affidavit filed in support of the application to vacate the interim stay order dated 13.9.83 granted by this Court. A copy of the said application and affidavit was served on the learned counsel for the applicant. But he did not challenge the said affidavit by filing any counter affidavit. It was not even stated that the order dated 14.9.82 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Farrukhabad at Fatehgarh, was not correct. It appears that ill pursuance of the order of the Sessions Judge both the parties appeared before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Farrukhabad at Fatehgarh. An application for release of the bus was made by the applicant. After hearing both the parties, the Chief Judicial Magistrate considered it proper that as the investigation was still in progress, it was not proper to release the bus in favour of the applicant and, consequently, Kotwali police at Farrukhabad was directed to seize the bus and keep it in its custody. That order appears to be correct under the circumstances of the case and the said order dated 14.9.83 not having been challenged by the present applicant, has become final.

(11.) In view of the discussions made herein before the present revision has got no merits and the same is here by dismissed.

(12.) Office is directed to send back the record of the court below immediately.

Advocate List
Bench
  • HON'BLE JUSTICE MR. B.L. YADAV
Eq Citations
  • 1987 (11) ACR 685
  • LQ/AllHC/1987/268
Head Note

A. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 93, 94, 99, 100, 101 and 451 — Search warrant issued by Magistrate at Farrukhabad and bus recovered at Mainpuri — Jurisdiction of Magistrate at Mainpuri to release bus — Release of bus in favour of applicant — Proper course of action — Intention of legislature while enacting S. 101 — Maxims, Actus curiæ neminem gravabit and Actus legis nemini est damnosis emnanosus — Applicability — Custody and disposal of property pending trial — Appropriate course of action — Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 379, 460 and 420