AMITAVA LALA,J.

(1.) This writ petition is made by an individual who claims to be the sole proprietor of a business under the name and style of "Pratik Food Products", at No. 58, Jawaharlal Nehru Road, Calcutta-700 071. He is residing at a flat being No. 9C/9D, 87, Southern Avenue, Calcutta-700 029.

(2.) The petitioner alleged that on September 24, 2001, the Deputy Director of Income-tax (Investigation) along with other officers of the Income-tax Department initiated a search at the place of the petitioners business at No. 58, Jawaharlal Nehru Road, Calcutta-700 071. The search commenced at 8 a.m. of the day and ended at 1.15 a.m. of the next day. Therefore, no business was held on that very day. Respondent No. 1 prepared an inventory of bank accounts, demat accounts, foreign exchange, machineries, shares, finished goods, raw materials and packaging materials. They had seized Rs. 4,50,000 in cash, bunch of loose sheets, computer (C.P.U.) print outs and some documents relevant for preparing final books of account. The panchanama under Section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and list of inventories were served only on September 25, 2001. Simultaneously, with the aforesaid search and seizure on September 24, 2001, at around 8.30 a.m., a similar set of officers took out search and seizure proceeding under Section 132 of the Income-tax Act at the residence of the petitioner and after making an inventory of the articles, namely, credit card, jewellery, books of account, documents, cash and seized a bunch of loose papers, cash of Rs. 50,000 and jewellery estimated at Rs. 78,313. The panchanama in respect of such inventory was also served along with the list of inventories on the same day.

(3.) It is significant to note hereunder that both the panchanamas and the list of inventories are made in the name of Pratik Food Products (Pvt.) Ltd. but not in the name of Pratik Food Products, the proprietorship concern of the petitioner.

(4.) On September 26, 2001, the petitioner received letter from his two bankers that pursuant to the prohibitory order of respondent No. 1, dated September 26, 2001, under Section 132(3) of the said Act, the bankers are not in a position to allow the operations of the bank accounts of the petitioner along with bank accounts of some others.

(5.) On October 10, 2001, the petitioner made a request to respondent No. 1 to release all the bank accounts of other individuals as the petitioners have no personal connection with the other and they are individual assessees and their bank accounts are reflected in their respective balance-sheets and submitted by them along with the return. The petitioner further stated that those asses-sees have also individually applied to respondent No. 1 on September 11, 2001, for revocation of the prohibitory order but no action has been taken.

(6.) By two letters dated October 11, 2001, and October 17, 2001, the petitioner clarified that his concern "Pratik Food Products" is a proprietorship concern but not a private limited company against whom the search and seizure was conducted. It is also mentioned that the bank accounts under the prohibitory order are all disclosed bank accounts and explained the true legal ownership of the seized goods and prayed for copies of the seized documents. In response thereto, by a letter dated October 15, 2001, the petitioner had given details of the petitioners business, bank accounts, family members and their income-tax returns with balance-sheets and profit and loss accounts.

(7.) Upon being satisfied with the reply to the queries respondent No. 1 revoked the prohibitory order under Section 132(3) of thein connection with the bank accounts of Pratik Food Products but did not revoke such prohibitory order in respect of other assessees.

(8.) Under such circumstances, it is evident that the action on the part of the respondent authority is on the basis of assumption and without fulfilment of the test and requirement of search and seizure. Therefore, the search and seizure is wholly arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction. Fishing and roving enquiry in the name of search is not only illegal but also without jurisdiction.

(9.) The condition precedent for search and seizure is "reason to believe" under Section 132 of thewhich cannot be equated with "reason to suspect". The expression "reason to believe" postulates belief and the existence of reasons for that belief. The belief must be held in good faith. It cannot be merely a pretence. It is true to say that the expression "reason to believe" does not mean purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the authority in making the seizure but the reasons for the belief must have a rational connection or a relevant bearing for the formation of the belief, not extraneous or irrelevant for the said purpose.

(10.) As and when places of persons of diverse activities and unconnected with each other are searched and their bank accounts are freezed by the authority to get or gather materials and information to form a belief that the assessee is avoiding tax it is wholly outside the scope of the search and seizure under the said Act. The bank accounts of persons unconnected with the petitioner and reflected in their return are kept under the prohibitory order even after 60 days which is bad, illegal and should be set aside. This attitude of the respondent authorities, in making fishing and roving enquiries reflects that the authorities are not in a position to form their opinion for search and seizure. On the other hand, it is to be remembered that by such activities, the authorities have interfered with the right of the petitioner protected under Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

(11.) Therefore, such search and seizure could be declared by this court as bad in law and the authorities and/or each of them or servants and agents could be directed to withdraw, rescind and/or cancel impugned search and seizure and consequential proceedings and release the seized articles. They could also be prohibited from taking steps in pursuance of the said search and seizure and consequential proceedings. They could also be directed to produce all documents in connection with this case to render justice and to quash the entire proceeding.

(12.) Before going into the case of the respondents, I clarify one part hereunder that although various statements are made in connection with the bank accounts and search and seizure of others but the court is no way concerned with such submission. No prohibitory order against any of the bank accounts or any premises of the writ petitioner were in force on the date of filing of the writ petition. Therefore, the court is only concerned with regard to search and seizure of the petitioner alone. The petitioner as an individual and sole proprietor of a concern made this writ petition but not under representative capacity.

(13.) The respondents by the pen of one Phague Oram, the Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax (Investigation) Unit-II(2), Calcutta, stated various facts in their affidavit-in-opposition. Firstly, the writ petition is not maintainable because it involves disputed questions of facts and no formal demand of justice has, been made. Secondly, the search and seizure was conducted at the residence and business premises of the writ petitioner who is a key person of "Haldiram Bhujiawala group" in Kolkata. The search and seizure was conducted along with his elder brother since both of them are running the business under the brand name of "Haldiram Bhujiawala". Allegation of tax evasion is there and the information gathered by the Department is that the group does most of the transactions in cash and does not record the actual transactions in the books of account. The petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling the products of "Haldiram Bhujiawala". Thirdly, the search and seizure was conducted at the business and residential premises of "Haldiram Bhujiawala Group". The petitioner is one of the key persons of the group. He is selling the goods along with other or others under the brand name of "Haldiram Bhujiawala". Fourthly, the panchanama was drawn up at the end of search proceedings on the day and a copy along with the annexures were given to the petitioner. Fifthly, satisfaction was recorded in writing by the competent authority prior to the issue of warrants of authorisation for such search. Sixthly, there is no dispute that "Pratik Food Products" is a proprietorship concern but due to inadvertent mistake "Pratik Food Product (Pvt.) Limited" has been incorporated. The panchanama has been drawn in the name of the proprietorship concern. The prohibitory order of the bank accounts of the said concern have already been revoked on November 9, 2001. Such mistake, omission or any clerical or technical error cannot vitiate the substance of the proceeding. Seventhly, the procedure for authorisation of search and seizure has been fully adhered to by the competent authority. Eighthly, the prohibitory orders were not renewed beyond 60 days of the date of issue. The prohibitory orders were served on September 24, 2001, and September 25, 2001, and lapsed on November 25, 2001, and November 26, 2001, respectively. Thus, when the writ petition was filed on December 12, 2001, no prohibitory order was extended by the authority beyond 60 days. Lastly, due to volume and papers although the verification took considerable time, i.e., till 1.15 a.m. on September 25, 2001, but the regular business of the petitioner was not stopped by such team. However, availability of the various books, papers, amount, jewellery, etc., is giving rise to a case of tax evasion.

(14.) In reply thereto, the petitioner has specifically stated that he has no business connection or nexus with his elder brother. He runs the proprietary business under the name and style of "Pratik Food Products" and sells under the brand name of "Haldiram Bhujiawala". The books of account were kept as per the provision of law. From the affidavit-in-opposition it is apparent that the search and seizure had been initiated merely on the basis of suspicion and hunch and there is no "reason to believe". The fishing and roving enquiry in the name of search is made only to gather information that there is evasion of tax which is unsustainable in the eye of law. No satisfaction was arrived at or before the initiation of search and seizure.

(15.) Against this factual background, learned counsel appearing for the parties argued at length on two very important aspects. Firstly, whether there was any "reason to believe" prior to the search and seizure or even without such "reason to believe" the authority concerned can proceed with the same. Secondly, whether the petitioners case is falling under the zone of block assessment or not.

(16.) Mr. Mihirlal Bhattacherjee, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended before this court that search and seizure of "Pratik Food Products (Pvt.) Limited" having no existence is void ab initio. The provision of search and seizure is made under Section 132 of the. For the purpose of "reason to believe" three tests are to be satisfied which are given under Subsection (1), Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the same are as follows : "(a) any person to whom a summons under Sub-section (1) of Section 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or under Sub-section (1) of Section 131 of this Act, or a notice under Sub-section (4) of Section 22 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or under Sub-section (1) of Section 142 of this Act was issued to produce, or cause to be produced, any books of account or other documents has omitted or failed to produce, or cause to be produced, such books of account or other documents as required by such summons or notice, or (b) any person to whom a summons or notice as aforesaid has been or might be issued will not, or would not, produce or cause to be produced, any books of account or other documents which will be useful for, or relevant to, any proceeding under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or under this Act, or (c) any person is in possession of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing and such money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing represents either wholly or partly income or property which has not been, or would not be, disclosed for the purposes of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or this Act (hereinafter in this section referred to as the undisclosed income or property)."

(17.) The case of the respondent authorities are falling under Clause (c). No test has been satisfied in respect of such "reason to believe". A reason is objective when a belief is subjective. Therefore, when no reason has been shown and no record has been produced it can be construed that there was no reason. A block assessment is a subsequent event to search and seizure. If the search and seizure fails due to the test of law then the block assessment will have no leg to stand. I record hereunder that Mr. Dipak Kumar Shome, learned senior counsel, appearing for the income-tax authorities, very fairly conceded that if the first test fails to satisfy the second test cannot stand, Therefore, the court is eager to know the first test.

(18.) Mr. Bhattacharjee relied upon in Ganga Prasad Maheshwari v. CIT [1983] 139 ITR 1043, at its page 1050, whereunder a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the "reason to believe" is a common feature in taxing statutes. It has been considered to be the most salutary safeguard on the exercise of power by the officer concerned. It is made of two words "reason" and "to believe". The word "reason" means cause or justification and the word "believe" means to accept as true or to have faith in it. Before the officer has faith or accepts a fact to exist there must be a justification for it. The belief may not be open to scrutiny as it is the final conclusion arrived at by the officer concerned, as a result of mental exercise made by him on the information received. But, the reason due to which the decision is reached can always be examined. When it is said that reason to believe is not open to scrutiny what is meant is that the satisfaction arrived at by the officer concerned is immune from challenge but where the satisfaction is not based on any material or it cannot withstand the test of reason, which is an integral part of it, then it falls through and the court is empowered to strike it down. Belief may be subjective but reason is objective. In ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das [1976] 103 ITR 437 [LQ/SC/1976/144] , the Supreme Court, while interpreting a similar expression used in Section 147 of the Act, held (page 446): "The expression reason to believe does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the Income-tax Officer. The reason must be held in good faith. It cannot be merely a pretence",

(19.) Thereafter he cited ITO v. Seth Brothers. It appears from there that the Supreme Court held that Section 132(1) does not confer any arbitrary authority upon the Revenue officers. The Commissioner or the Director of Inspection must have, in consequence of information, reason to believe that the statutory conditions for the exercise of the power to order search exist. He must record reasons for the belief and he must issue an authorisation in favour of a designated officer to search the premises and exercise the power set out therein. The condition for entry into and making search of any building or place is the reason to believe that any books of account or other documents which will be useful for, or relevant to, any proceeding under the may be found. If the officer has reason to believe that any books of account or other documents would be useful for, or relevant to, any proceedings under the, he is authorised by law to seize those books of account or other documents, and to place marks of identification therein, to make extracts of copies thereform and also to make a note or an inventory of any articles or other things found in the course of the search. Since by the exercise of the power a serious invasion is made upon the rights, privacy and freedom of the taxpayer, the power must be exercised strictly in accordance with the law and only for the purposes for which the law authorises it to be exercised. If the action of the officer issuing the authorisation or of the designated officer is challenged, the officer concerned must satisfy the court about the regularity of the action. If the action is maliciously taken or power under the section is exercised for a collateral purpose, it is liable to be struck down by the court. If the conditions for exercise of the power are not satisfied the proceeding is liable to be quashed.

(20.) Then he cited Shyam Jewellers v. Chief Commissioner (Administration) [1992] 196 ITR 243 at its pages 264 and 265 whereunder the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) held that Section 132 of the Income-tax Act empowers the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax or the Commissioner of Income-tax to pass an order for search and issue a warrant authorising a particular officer when he has reason to believe that any of the three conditions mentioned in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 132 of the Income-tax Act exists. If either of these conditions is not satisfied or has not been adhered to, then the authority is precluded from invoking the powers under this section.

(21.) By showing L.R. Gupta v. Union of India [1992] 194 ITR 32 [LQ/DelHC/1991/734] he contended that a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that a search conducted under Section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is a serious invasion into the privacy of a citizen. Section 132(1) has to be strictly construed and the formation of the opinion or reason to believe by the authorising officer must be apparent from the note recorded by him. The opinion or the belief so recorded must clearly show whether the belief falls under Sub-clause (a), (b) or (c) of Section 132(1). No search can be ordered except for any of the reasons contained in sub-Clause (a), (b) or (c). The satisfaction note should itself show the application of mind and the formation of opinion by the officer ordering the search. If the reasons which are recorded do not fall under Clause (a), (b) or (c), then the authorisation under Section 132(1) will have to be quashed. In Dwarka Prosad Agarwalla v. Director of Inspection Justice Sabyasachi Mukherjee (as his Lordship then was) has also taken the similar view.

(22.) In addition to the aforesaid judgment the petitioner has relied upon an unreported judgment of this court in W. P. No. 18191 (W) of 2001 along with the other connected matters in Sugandha Industries (Pvt.) Limited v. Chief Commissioner of Customs, delivered by this court on March 6, 2002, on the selfsame point.

(23.) So far as the subsequent point is concerned, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the judgment reported in Dr. C. Balakrishnan Nair v. CIT at its page 82 and contended that if the proceedings taken under Section 132 of thefail and/or are declared invalid the block assessment, if any, will automatically fail. However, I do not want to go to such controversy for the simple reason that Mr. Shome, learned senior counsel appearing for the authorities, has supported the contention.

(24.) Mr. Dipak Kumar Shome, learned senior counsel, appearing for the income-tax authorities, contended before this court that it is true to say that the reasons are objective but the belief is subjective. There should be a nexus in between "reason" and "belief". This cannot be construed as an absurd proposition of law. But it has to be read with its true prospective. There cannot be any straight-jacket formula. It has to be done in good faith. The Clauses (a), (b) and (c) under Sub-section (1) of Section 132 are disjunctive. Section 132(1A) has been inserted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, with effect from October 1, 1975, postulates a power of the authority to proceed on the basis of the "reason to suspect" in consequence of opinion that any books of account, other documents, money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing in respect of which an officer has been authorised can take an action. Therefore, "reason to suspect" cannot be an absolute bar unlike the Customs Act or the Central Excise Act, etc. Therefore, the ratio of the unreported judgment of this court in Sugandha Industries (Pvt,) Ltd, (supra) cannot be applied herein. That apart there is a factual difference in between such case and the present one. In the referred case, there was a serious lapse on the part of the Central Excise authority in not disclosing the documents before the court to prove that there was a "reason to believe" of the authority to make of the enquiry, investigation and/or search and seizure. But in the instant case the documents have been produced by the Department before this court for the purpose of perusal and passing necessary orders. Therefore, either factually or legally such judgment cannot stand in the way of the action of the Department.

(25.) He has further drawn my attention to Sub-section (4A) of Section 132 of the. There also I find that by way of amendment in the year 1975 such subsection inserted. Such provision says where any books of account, other documents, money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing are or is found in the possession or control of any person in the course of a search it may be presumed that such documents or articles belong or belongs to such person or persons. The contents of books of account and other documents are true. Signatures and handwritings, stamp, execution or attestation have been done by such person from whose possession or custody these documents were found available. Therefore, when "reason to suspect" is not exclusive bar and when certain things are found available from the custody of the petitioner, the law does not prohibit the income-tax authorities from proceeding in accordance with law.

(26.) He has further drawn my attention to Section 132(1)(c)(B)(i) and stated that the officer so authorised is entitled to enter and search any building, place, vessel, vehicle or aircraft where he has reason to suspect that such books of account, other documents, money, bullion, jewellery or other available article or thing are kept.

(27.) He relied upon various judgments in support of his case. Firstly, he relied upon Sriram Jaiswal v. Union of India [1989] 176 ITR 261 in its pages 265 and 266 whereunder a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that merely on the basis of the denial of the petitioner, the respondents cannot be called upon to disclose the information they received for having acted under Section 132(1) of the. If it is taken from another angle it can be seen that certain amounts of assets were acquired from undisclosed sources as per the order under Section 132(5). The question is whether, on these facts, it will be proper or just to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. When already the Income-tax Officer has found in the order passed under Section 132(5) that the petitioner had acquired the seized assets from undisclosed sources and when the petitioner has an alternative remedy under Sub-section (11) of Section 132 by way of filing objections before the Commissioner, the writ court should be loath in interfering with the same.

(28.) He further relied upon Rugmini Ram Raghav Spinners (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India and contended that it is well-settled that the adequacy or sufficiency of the materials cannot be the subject matter of scrutiny of the court. He also relied upon Balwant Singh v. R.D. Shah, Director of Inspection [1969] 71 ITR 550 [LQ/DelHC/1968/44] at its page 562 whereunder a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that "reason to believe" does not mean a purely subjective on the part of the Income-tax Officer. The belief must be held in good faith; it cannot be merely a pretence. To put it differently, it is open to the court to examine the question whether the reasons for the belief have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the section.

(29.) He further relied upon B.K. Nowlakha v. Union of India [1991] 192 ITR 436 [LQ/DelHC/1991/586] , 440 whereunder the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that the order of restraint may not be continued indefinitely. Sub-section (8A) of Section 132 of theprovides that the restraint order can be continued for a period not exceeding 60 days from the date of the order. But before the expiry of 60 days, for reasons to be recorded, the Commissioner may extend the period.

(30.) Therefore, by and large the judgment is based on the incidental point in respect of keeping the seized articles, etc., and renewal of the period of 60 days to get attraction of the prohibitory order. However, the respondents have contended that no prohibitory order is directed to be continued. Those were already lapsed much prior to the filing of the writ petition.

(31.) Mr. Shome further contended that in view of the reasons given in the affidavit-in-opposition is entitled to make a search and seizure. The notice for block assessment has already been served.

(32.) In reply thereto, Mr. Bhattarcharjee contended that when there is non-fulfilment of condition prescribed under Section 132(1) of theprecised by Clause (c), no proceeding shall lie under Sub-section (1A). The question of block assessment cannot arise if search and seizure of a company known as "Pratik Food Products (Pvt.) Limited" appears to be wrong or erroneous.

(33.) I have carefully considered the respective submissions of counsel appearing for the parties. I have gone through the records produced by the respondents in this court. I am very much candid to say that steps of the income-tax authorities to make "Haldiram Bhujiawala" block to get attracted an individual assessee and then proceeded for search and seizure is misconceived in nature. Block assessment is made for the block period. As because one is running business of selling products of "Haldiram Bhujiawala" in the name of "Pratik Food Products" cannot be said that he will be liable for block assessment. If the brand name "Haldiram Bhujiawala" is taken for judicial notice then whosoever is selling the product either in India or abroad under such brand name is to be assessed under the block. Flourishing of business under the brand name cannot be the reason to believe of evasion of tax law. I am sorry to say this is not the true import of the law. One cannot put the cart before the horse. Even requirement of block assessment ipso facto cannot be the "reason to believe" under Section 132 of the. Section 132 has its independent face value. If one is attracted by such section he can be assessed in a proper manner under the prescription of law. If one is not attracted under Section 132, then there is no question of any block assessment on the basis of search and seizure; Therefore, let me confine to the question as to whether search and seizure was made following the prescription of law or not. According to me prescription of law about "reason to believe" in between the Income-tax Act and the Central Excise Act or the Customs Act is different. In the cases of the Central Excise Act or the Customs Act "reason to believe" is the sole requirement. But under the Income-tax Act, "reason to suspect" is also available but subject to "reason to believe". Mr. Shome brought to my notice the scope and ambit of Sub-Sections (1A) and (4A), etc., related to "reason to suspect" at first to impress upon the court that "reason to suspect" is not an absolute bar. But there is a fallacy of such argument. One is to be testified by the test of "reason to believe" under Section 132(1). One cannot travel beyond such sub-section to get attracted by Sub-section (1A) or Subsection (4A) made for "reason to suspect" independently. Therefore, "reason to suspect" in such sub-sections are subject to satisfaction of the primary test of "reason to believe" under Section 132(1) of the. In other words, unless one successfully crosses the hurdle of "reason to believe" under Section 132(1) of thethere is no scope to get attracted by Sub-sections (1A) and (4A) of the. Therefore the "reason to believe" is the mandatory requirement of law for search and seizure.

(34.) The next question is rigidity or flexibility of the "reason to believe". From the analysis of different judgments I find that since the exercise of power a serious invasion is made upon the rights, privacy and freedom of taxpayer, power must be exercised strictly in accordance with law and only for the purpose for which the law authorised it to be exercised. If either of the conditions under Sub-section (1) of Section 132 is not fulfilled then the authority is precluded from invoking any powers under this section. "Reason to believe" is a common feature of taxing statutes. It has been considered to be the most salutory safeguard on the exercise of the power by the authorities. On the other hand, adequacy or sufficiency of the materials cannot be the subject matter of scrutiny of the court. The belief must be held in good faith. Therefore, there should have to be a balance. Against this background when I go through the record, being satisfaction notes, I find it more difficult to construe that there was a reason to believe. The purported reason is in the form of statement. Some of the examples are given hereunder. Although the petitioner and his brother are doing business separately but both are doing under the same brand name. The business of No. 58, Jawaharlal Nehru Road is closely monitered by the petitioner. The entire affairs are controlled by the petitioner along with his brother. As per information gathered documents, papers, undisclosed cash, jewellery and other assets are likely to be found at his residence. Therefore, both the place of business and residence are covered for action under Section 132(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The petitioner transferred his place of busi- ness. He is running a proprietorship concern by the name of "Pratik Food Products". There is all likelihood that papers relating to his unconnected income and assets may be found at his residence. Can it be said that the aforesaid recordings form satisfaction of "reason to believe". It is a known fact that the petitioner is doing similar business like his brother separately under the same brand name. It is also known what is the business place. He is a regular assessee. Change of residence ipso facto cannot be an offence. This is not a case of absconding. Therefore, what are the "reasons to believe". Likelihood of getting undisclosed things at best can be a "reason to suspect" but does not form any "reason to believe". The respondent authorities have failed to follow such subtlety of the provision of the. Therefore an obvious result is (a) release of the prohibitory orders about bank accounts, and (b) return of maximum seized articles even at the date and time of search, leaving aside token of it to substantiate the case of appropriate search and seizure by them. This is not the true import of Section 132(1)(c) of the. It says money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing represents either wholly or partly income or property which has not been, or would not be, disclosed, for the purposes of the. Where is the "reason to believe" that such things are not disclosed or would not be disclosed Even in the list of inventory of jewellery amounting to Rs. 7,18,867, why the jewelleries for an amount of Rs. 78,313 only seized and others are released is not known. Similarly, out of Rs. 78,500 why Rs. 50,000 was seized leaving aside Rs. 28,500 is not known. This is also similarly placed with the showroom. Therefore can it be safely said that there was a "reason to believe". It is mere pretence. The question of good faith will arise when the authorities are confirm that the income has not been or would not be disclosed. The petitioner is a regular assessee. There is no bar for regular assessment. An impression about his elder brother or others may not be similar. There might have been cause for the same. Each case has to be independently established within the room of "reason to believe" under Section 132(1)(c) of the. Thereafter, the question of nexus or connection with others will arise.

(35.) Therefore, the ratio of one of the cited decisions of Mr. Shome does not help him. The ratio speaks it is open to the court to examine the question whether the reasons for the belief have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the section.

(36.) Against this background even if remedy lies before the authorities under Sub-sections (5) and (11) of the Section 132 of theas per the respondents but the writ court cannot avoid its responsibility to adjudge the merits in view of the question of serious invasion of the personal right of a citizen.

(37.) Lastly the 60 days period provided under Section 132(8A) is mandatory in nature which shall not be in force after the expiry of the period. It is an admit- ted position that such period has expired before filing of the writ petition. There is no indication as to whether such seized articles or things handed over to the Assessing Officer within a period of 60 days from the date on which the last of the authorisation for search was executed. Therefore continuance of proceeding of search and seizure is absolutely illegal after the expiry of the period, The authorised officer has no jurisdiction to withhold the seized articles.

(38.) Hence, taking into the totality of the matter I am of the view that the search and seizure proceeding has to be quashed and accordingly quashed without affecting any assessment by the Assessing Officer independently. Seized articles will be returned to the writ petitioner within a period of fortnight from the date of making application on his behalf. Thus the writ petition stands disposed of. Interim orders, if any, stand confirmed. However, no order is passed as to costs.