RAJESH TANDON, J

(1) .By the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the award dated December 23, 1999 passed by respondent No. 1 i.e. the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Dehradun. Facts: Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition according to the case of petitioner are that he worked with respondent No. 2 since

(2) .June 1, 1980 till June 4, 1988. He worked as a muster roll employee "Baildar". He was not given any notice of termination of services prior to June 5, 1988, the day on which he was dispensed from his services and that he had completed 240 days of continuous service in 12 calendar months. On June 5, 1988 his service was illegally terminated without following the provisions contained under Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.

(3) . The petitioner has raised the dispute and the State Government made a reference under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and referred the matter to Labour Court, Dehradun for its adjudication and the reference was as follows:

" Vernacular matter omitted" After hearing both the parties, following points arise for determination: (i) Whether the findings of the Labour Court with regard to the petitioner so far as 240 days are concerned is correct (ii) The calculation of continuous service of 240 days should be in any 12 calendar months or in the immediately preceding 12 calendar months.

(4) . Finding on point No. (i): The counsel for the petitioner has stated that the Labour Court has not considered the calculations of 52 Sundays and 17 other paid holidays while calculating the continuous period of service of the petitioner-workman. The relevant portion of the findings of the Labour Court with regard to the continuous period of service of the petitioner workman is quoted below:

" Vernacular matter omitted"

(5) . So far as 52 Sundays and 17 other paid holidays are concerned, the Apex Court has observed that while taking into consideration 240 days worked by the employee concerned, Sundays and other paid holidays have to be taken into consideration.

(6) . In the case of Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 458 : 1985 (4) SCC 71 : 1985-II-LLJ-539 it has been held as under at p. 542 of LLJ:

"4. The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human rights legislation are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian dimension. In constructing these legislations the imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must be recognized and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the colour the content and the context of such statutes (we have borrowed the words from LORD WILBERFORCES opinion in Prenn. v. Simmonds 1971 (3) ALL E. R.). In the same opinion LORD WILBERFORCE pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island of literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond the language, un-isolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set, the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguists considerations. In one of the cases cited before us, that is, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court AIR 1981 SC 422 : 1980 (4) SCC 443 : 1981-I-LLJ-386 we had occasion to say. "Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of "bread and butter" statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the Court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions."

"5. Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act is plainly intended to give relief to retrenched workmen. The qualification for relief under Section 25-F is that he should be a workman employed in an industry and has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer. What is continuous service has been defined and explained in Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the present case, the provision which is of relevance in Section 25-B(2)(a)(ii) which to the extent that it converts us, provides that a workman who is not in continuous service for a period of one year shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which the calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days. The expressions which were required to construe is "actually worked under the employer". This expression, according to us, cannot mean those days only when the workman worked with hammer, sickle or pen, but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which he was in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc. The learned counsel for the Management would urge that only those days which are mentioned in the Explanation to Section 25-B(2) should be taken into account of the purpose of calculating the number of days on which the workman has actually worked though he had not so worked and no other days. We do not think that we are entitled to so constrain the construction of the expression "actually worked under the employer". The explanation is only clarificatory, as all explanations are, and cannot be used to limit the expanse of the main provision. If the expression "actually worked under the employer" is capable of comprehending the days during which the workman was in employment and was paid wages, and we see no impediment to so construe the expression. To give it any other meaning than what we have done would bring the object of Section 25-F very close to frustration. It is not necessary to give examples of how Section 25-F may be frustrated as they are too obvious to be stated."

(7) . In H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India and others AIR 1986 SC 132 : 1985 (4) SCC 201 : 1986-I-LLJ-127 the following observations is as under at p. 131 of LLJ:

"11. That takes us to the question the appellant had qualified himself to sustain his claim to the benefits of Section 25-F. The appellant, as we will presently see, has given the number of days on which he worked, in his claim statement. The first respondent-bank arranged posting Tikka Mazdoors, like the appellant, in such manner that they were denied the benefits of the Industrial Disputes Act. Since the first respondent-bank disputed the fact that the appellant had worked for sufficient number of days to entitle him to claim remedies under the, we think it necessary to refer to the facts as disclosed in the records. The Advocate who appeared for the appellant before the Tribunal, Shri R.N. Srivastava, has filed an affidavit in this Court stating that he had filed written argument before the Tribunal explaining the mistake committed by the bank in the computation made by it of the numbers of working days of the appellant. From this affidavit, it is seen that the first respondent-bank put forward a case that the attendance register for the month of July, 1976 had been destroyed and that Sundays and other holidays were not taken into account in computing the number of days that the appellant worked. We have also a supplementary affidavit filed by the appellant himself which throws further light about the number of days. In this affidavit, it is seen that he worked for 4 days in 1974, 154 days from January, 1975 to December, 1975 and 105 days from January, 1976 to July, 1976. The appellant was denied work from July, 1976. His affidavit shows that he had worked for 202 days from July, 1975 to July, 1976. According to him if we add 52 Sundays and 17 holidays the total number of days on which he worked comes to 271 days. The appellant charged the bank with having tampered with the records. To contradict the appellants case, the first respondent-bank did not produce its record. The appellant wanted the relevant records to be filed but they were not produced. Grounds 18 to 20 of the special leave petition make mention of this plea of appellant. These grounds are met by the first respondent-bank in their counter-affidavit filed in this Court by stating that when the matter was before the Industrial Tribunal the registers in question were filed in another case before the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court and produced in that Court. However, I submit that now attendance register has been destroyed but the payment registers are available with the respondent-bank as proof of the number of days in which the appellant worked. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we have necessarily to draw the inference that the appellants case that he had worked forever that 240 days from July, 1975 to July, 1976 is true."

(8) . From the above findings it is clear that the Labour Court has specifically recorded the findings that the petitioner has worked for 203 days in twelve preceding months from the date of his termination but it has erred in not calculating 52 Sundays and 17 other holidays while calculating the total number of days of his continuous service and had it been so the number of days of continuous service of the petitioner-workman would have definitely been more than 240 days.

(9) . Finding on point No. (ii): Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that Labour Court has also erred in giving its finding that the workman has not worked for more than 240 days in 12 calendar months. The findings of Labour Court are as follows:

" Vernacular matter omitted"

(10) . Honble Apex Court, in the case of U. P. Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Company Limited v. Ramanuj Yadav and others AIR 2003 SC 3337 : 2003 (8) SCC 334 : 2003-III- LLJ-1064 has held as under at p. 1068 of LLJ:

"70. Under the aforesaid legislative background, the question involved is required to be considered. Section 2(g) of the U.P. Act does not require a workman, to avail the benefit of the deeming provision of completion of one year of continuous service in the industry, to have worked for 240 days during preceding period of 12 calendar months. The word preceding has been used in Section 25-B of the I.D. Act as incorporated in the year 1964. Section 2(g) does not use the word preceding. The concept of preceding was introduced in the I.D. Act so as to give complete and meaningful benefit of welfare legislation to the working class. The approach to be borne in mind while interpreting the welfare legislation is illustrated in Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and another AIR 1981 SC 422 : 1980 (4) SCC 443 : 1981-I-LLJ-386 where this Court has observed that symantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of bread and butter statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief the Court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions."

(11) . Thus, I am of the view that in view of the aforesaid judgment of Honble Apex Court, the findings of Labour Court that the workman has not completed 240 days in 12 calendar months is totally illegal.

(12) . Conclusions: The workman was working as a Baildar with respondent No. 2 since June 1, 1980 till June 4, 1988. He has completed 240 days of the working in 12 months and the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 have not been complied with by the employer, therefore, retrenchment of the petitioner was wholly illegal.

(13) . In view of the findings recorded above, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned award dated December 23, 1999 is quashed and the respondent No. 2 is directed to reinstate the petitioner and to pay him full wages from the date of this order. No order as to costs.