Thankerton, J.

1. Before dealing with the particular grounds of appeal, their Lordships consider it desirable to make some general observations as to Indian Income Tax law, which may-clear away a certain confusion of thought which would appear to affect certain of the contentions in the present case. In the first place, it is clear to their Lordships that under the express terms of Section 3 of the Indian Income Tax Act, the subject of charge is not the income of the year of assessment, but the income of the previous year. This is in direct contrast to the English Income Tax Acts, under which the subject of assessment is the income of the year of assessment, though the amount is measured by a yardstick based on previous years. The difference is well illustrated by the distinction that in England the source of income must still be extant in the year of assessment but that that is not of relevance in India. Their Lordships may refer to the able judgment of Rankin C.J. in Behari Lal Mullick v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bengal (1927) 2 Ind. T.C. 329, with which they agree. In the second place, it should be remembered that the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, as amended from time to time, forms a code, which has no operative effect except so far as it is rendered applicable for the recovery of tax imposed for a particular fiscal year by a Finance Act. This may be illustrated by pointing out that there was no charge on the 1938-1939 income either of the appellant or his daughters, nor assessment of such income, until the passing of the Indian Finance Act of 1939, which imposed the tax for 1939-1940 on the 1938-1939 income and authorized the present assessment. By Sub-section 1 of Section 6 of the Indian Finance Act, 1939, Income Tax for the year beginning on April 1, 1939, is directed to be charged at the rates specified in Part I. of Schedule II., and rates of super-tax are also provided for, and by Sub-section 3 it is provided that "for the purpose of this section "and of Schedule II., the expression total income means "total income as determined for the purposes of income-tax" or super-tax, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922." This can only refer to the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, as it stood amended at the date of the Indian Finance Act, 1939, and necessarily includes the alterations made by the Amending Act, which had already come into force on April 1, 1939.

2. In this view, the only question is whether the income arising from the properties settled by the four deeds under consideration falls within the terms of Section 16, Sub-section 1(c), of the Income Tax Act. The first question would naturally be whether under these four deeds the assets from which the income arose remained the property of the appellant, or whether they involved a transfer of assets, though clearly a revocable transfer. From the way in which the present case has been presented throughout, including the hearing before the Board, their Lordships find it unnecessary to consider this question or to express any view on the matter. In the question referred these deeds are regarded as involving revocable transfers of assets; in their judgment the High Court state "It is admitted," as it must be, that the deeds executed by the assessee operate "to transfer the assets" (1), and, at the hearing before the Board, both parties accepted the same view. The only argument left to the appellant was to found on the express insertion of the words "whether effected before or after the "commencement" of the 1939 Amendment Act in the first category of settlements, and their absence in the latter case of revocable transfers of assets, and to seek to derive therefrom an implied exclusion in the latter case of transfers effected prior to the commencement of the Amending Act, namely, April 1, 1939. Their Lordships can find no reason to justify such an alteration of the plain words of the section, which would involve the insertion after the words "a revocable" transfer of assets "of the limiting words," effected after "the commencement of the Indian Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1939."

Accordingly, their Lordships are of opinion that the decision of the High Court was right and should be affirmed, and they will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellant will pay the respondents costs of the appeal.