Mookerjee, J.

1. The facts material for the determination of the questionof limitation raised in this appeal are no longer in dispute and may be brieflyrecited. The plaintiff-respondent, a Mahomedan gentleman, gave his daughter inmarriage to the defendant appellant. At the time of the marriage, the defendantexecuted and registered in favour of his wife a dower deed, on the 15th September,1908. The deed fixed the dower at Rs. 5,000; one half was prompt and payable ondemand; the other half was deferred. The lady died on the 18th September, 1909.On the 10th September, 1915, the plaintiff, as one of the heirs at law of hisdaughter, instituted the present suit against the son-in-law for recovery ofhis one-third share of the dower debt. The defendant pleaded, amongst otherdefences, the bar of limitation. The Court of first instance held that the suitwas governed not by the three years but by the six years rule of limitation anddecreed the claim. On appeal, this decision has been affirmed by the DistrictJudge. On the present appeal, that decree has been assailed on the ground thatthe suit is barred by the three years rule of limitation. The respondent hasurged that the six years rule is applicable as the dower was fixed by aregistered document.

2. Art. 103 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act,1908, provides as follows:-

103. A suit by a Mahomedan for exigible dower shall beinstituted within 3 years from the date when the dower is demanded and refused,or (where during the continuance of the marriage, no such demand has been made)when the marriage is dissolved by death Or divorce.

Art. 104 provides as follows:-

104. A suit by a Mahomedan for deferred dower shall beinstituted within three years from the date when the marriage is dissolved bydeath or divorce.

In the case before us, as there was no demand and refusalduring the continuance of the marriage, time ran, both as regards the promptand the deferred dower, from the date when the marriage war dissolved by death.Consequently, the suit should have been, prima facie, instituted within threeears from the 18th September, 1909, when the lady died. But the plaintiff hasurged and his contention been accepted by the Courts below-that as the dowerdeed was registered, he is entitled to the benefit of Art. 116.

Art. 116 provides as follows :-

116. A suit for compensation for the breach of a contract,in writing registered, shall be instituted within six years from the date whenthe period of Limitation would begin to run against a suit brought on a similarcontract not registered.

3. This plainly refers to Art. 115 which provides asfollows:-

115. A suit for compensation for the breach of any contract,express or implied, not in writing registered and not herein especiallyprovided for shall be instituted within three years from the date when thecontract is broken, or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach inrespect of which the suit is instituted occurs, or (where the breach iscontinuing) when it ceases.

4. The appellant has contended that even if we assume thatthe present suit for recovery of the dower debt may be treated as a suit forcompensation for the breach of a contract in writing registered within themeaning of Art. 116, that Article, which provides a general rule applicable tocontracts in writing registered, cannot be applied when there are specialArticles, namely, Articles 103 and 104, which precisely cover the case. Theappellant has, in fact, invoked the well-established principle that if thereare two Articles in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, which may possiblygovern a case, the one more general and the other more special, the moreparticular and specific Article should be regarded as the one governing thecase. Illustrations of the application of this doctrine may be found in thecases of Issur Chander v. Jibun (1889) 16 Cal. 25, Swarupdas v. Joggeswar(1899) 26 Cal. 564, Natesan v. Soundararaja (1898) 21 Mad. 141, Ranchordas v.Parvati Bai (1899) 23 Bom. 725, Narmada Bai v. Bhabani (1902) 26 Bom. 430, theprinciple, generalia specialibus nonderogaut, specialia derogant generalibus,has been recognised elsewhere, and illustrations of the doctrine that generalprovisions do not derogate from special provisions, but that the latter doderogate from the former are by no means rare; see Hunter v. Knockdds (1850) IMac. & G. 640 = 84 R.R. 217, Churchill v. Crease (1828) 5 Bing 180, De Wintonv. Greson Corporation (1859) 26 Beav. 533 (543), Pretty v. Solly (1859) 23Beav. 603 (610). The respondent has not denied that this argument carriesconsiderable weight; but he has urged that it is too late for this Court todepart from what has been recognised in a long line of cases as the true scopeof Art. 116, including the decision of the Judicial Committee in Trikamdas v.Gopinath (1917) 44 I.A. 65 = 44 Cal. 759. As will presently appear, from anexamination of numerous judicial decisions, Art. 116 has been held applicable,by reason of existence of a written and registered contract, in classes ofcases which are prima facie governed by special provisions contained in theschedule to the Indian Limitation Act.

Art. 57 provides as follows:-

57. A suit for money payable for money lent shall beinstituted within three years from the date when the loan is made.

It has been repeatedly held that a suit on a registered bondfor recovery of a specific sum of money is governed not by Art. 57 but by Art.116; see Nava Kumar v. Siru Mullick (1891) 6 Cal. 94, Kahit Ram v. Lala Dhanudi11 C.L.R. 311, Shama Charan v. Debya Sing (1901) 21 Cal. 872, Kate v. Ruxton(1906) 4 C.L.J. 510, Nistarni v. Chandi (1910) 12 C.L.J. 423, Ram Narayan v.Ahindra Nath (1912) 15 C.L.J. 17 = : 17 C.W.N. 369, Chaliphoov. Banga Behary (1913) 22 C.L.J. 311 = 20 C.W.N. 408, Hussain Ali v. Hafiz Ali(1881) 3 All. 600, Khunni v. Nasimuddin (1885) 4 All 255, Susil v. Gauri (1916)39 All. 81 = 14 A.L.J. 873, Ganesh Krishna v. Mudhava Rao (1884) 6 Bom. 75,Magaluri v. Narayan (1881) 3 Mad. 359, Viswanath v. S.L. Bank (1917) M.W.N. 879= 6 M.L.W. 712.

Art. 64 provides as follows:-

64. A suit for money payable to the plaintiff for moneyfound to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff on accounts stated betweenthem shall be instituted within three years from the date when the accounts arestated in writing signed by the defendant or his agent duly authorised in thisbehalf, unless where the debt is by a simultaneous agreement in writing signedas aforesaid, made payable at a future time, and then when that time arrives.

Art. 106 provides as follows:-

106. A suit for an account and a share of the profits of adissolved partnership, shall be instituted within three years from the date ofthe dissolution.

5. With reference to these Articles, it was ruled in RangaReddi v. Chinna Reddi (1891) 14 Mad. 465 that where a registered partnershipcontract binds the parties to pay the loss according to their respectiveshares, a suit to recover the defendants share of the loss, on a settlement ofaccounts between the plaintiffs and the defendants, is governed, neither byArt. 64, nor by Art. 106, but by Art. 116. It is to be noted, however, that inViravan v. Ponaya (1899) 22 Mad. 14 the Court expressed its unwillingness tohold that Art. 116 could be stretched to cover every case in which the suitmight in its origin be referred to a contractual relationship expressed in aregistered agreement. Art. 74 provides as follows:- "74. A suit on apromissory note or bond payable by instalments shall be instituted within threeyears from the date of the expiration of the first term of payment as to thepart then payable; and for the other parts, the expiration of the respectiveterms of payment." With reference to this provision, it has been ruledthat if the instalment bond has been registered, the suit is governed, not byArt. 74, but by Art. 116; Dindayal v. Gopal Saran (1891) 18 Cal. 506, RupNarayan v. Gopi Nath (1905) 11 C.W.N. 903.

Art. 89 provides as follows:-

"89. A suit by a principal against his agent formoveable property received by the latter and not accounted for, shall beinstituted within three years from the date when the account is, during thecontinuance of the agency, demanded and refused, or, (where no such demand ismade) when the agency terminates." With reference to this Article, it wasruled in Mali Lal Bose v. Amin Chand (1905) 1 C.L.J. 211, that a suit for anaccount by a principal against his agent on the basis of a registeredagreement, is governed, not by Article 89 but by Article 116, the cause ofaction arising from the date when the contract to render accounts is broken.This view is identical with that taken in Harendra Kishore v.Administrator-General (1885) 12 Cal. 357, and was followed in Easin v. BarodaKishore (1910) 11 C.L.J. 43, Joges Chandra v. Binode Lal (1908) 14 C.W.N. 122,and Bhagirath v. Prem Chand (1913) 17 C.L.J. 201. The current of judicialopinion, however, upon this question has been by no means uniform; see DebendraNath v. Esha Heque (1908) 14 C.W.N. 121, Sib Chandra v. Chandra Narain (1905)32 Cal. 719 = 1 C.L.J. 232, Marthu Sudan v. Rakhal Chandra (1916) 43 Cal. 248 =22 C.L.J. 552, Nabin v. Chandra Madhab (1917) 44 Cal. 1 (P.C.), modifyingChandra Madhab v. Nabin (1913) 40 Cal. 108, Bhabatarini v. Sheik Bahadur (1919)30 C.L.J. 90, Jogindra Nath v. Debnath (1903) 8 C.W.N. 113, Hafizuddin v. JaduNath (1908) 35 Cal. 298 = 7 C.L.J. 279, Madhub Chandra v. Debendra Nath (1905)1 C.L.J. 147, Jhapajennessa v. Rash Bihari (1912) 16 C.L.J. 288, Premram v.Jagadis Nath (1922) Cal. 355 [LQ/CalHC/1921/133] = 49 Cal. 250 [LQ/CalHC/1921/133] = 35 C.L.J. 111 = 26 C.W.N. 61.These cases, however, struggle, in most instances, to escape the application ofArticle 116, not so much because the Article should not be applied to casescomprised within the scope of special Articles, but rather because a suit by aprincipal against an agent for the relief mentioned in Article 89 cannotproperly be regarded as a suit for compensation for the breach of a contract inwriting registered. This, however, does not apply to the decision in Pran Ramv. Jagadis Nath (1922) Cal. 355 [LQ/CalHC/1921/133] = 49 Cal. 250 [LQ/CalHC/1921/133] = 35 C.L.J. 111 =: 26 C.W.N. 61, where the twofold contention was acceptedthat (a) Article 89 excludes the operation of Article 115, which is applicableonly to cases not specially provided for; and (b) Article 116 must be readalong with Article 115 and be deemed restricted in operation in the samemanner. This view, as will presently appear, is opposed to that indicated inVythilinga v. Thetchana 3 Mad. 76 [LQ/MadHC/1980/405] , and Dindayal v. Gopalsaran (1891) 18 Cal.506, and accepted by the Judicial Committee on Trikamdas v. Gopi Nath (1917) 44I.A. 65 = 44 Cal. 759. It will be observed that the expression "not hereinspecially provided for" which finds a place in the first column of Article115 does not appear in the first column of Article 116. But this plainly doesnot conclude the matter, and the expression "similar contract notregistered" which finds a place in the third column of Article 116 doesrequire interpretation. Does it refer only to the first column of Article 116and consequently mean a contract in writing not registered or, does it refer tothe first column of Article 115 and signify a contract not in writingregistered and not herein specially provided for." The first alternativewas adopted in Vythilinga v. Thetchanda 3 Mad. 76 [LQ/MadHC/1980/405] , and Dindayal v. Gopalsaran(1891) 18 Cal. 506, and apparently found favour with the Judicial Committee inTrikamdas v. Gopi Nath (1917) 44 I.A. 65 = 44 Cal. 759. The second alternativewas adopted in Pranram v. Jagadis Nath (1922) Cal. 355 [LQ/CalHC/1921/133] = 49 Cal. 250 [LQ/CalHC/1921/133] = 35C.L.J. 111 = : 26 C.W.N. 61. The conflict, consequently, isbetween two opposing views; one maintains that Article 116, like Article 115,applies where there is no special provision; the other maintains that Article116 supersedes all provisions including those covered by special Articlesunaffected by Article 115. In this connection, reference may also be made tothe decision in Kandaswamy v. Avayambal (1911) 34 Mad. 167, where it was ruledthat a suit by an agent to recover money spent by him on account of hisprincipal, is governed by Article 61 and not by Article 116, even though therewas a registered contract of agency; the obligation was deemed as no part ofthe contract in writing registered, and the earlier decisions in Krishnan v.Kunnan (1898) 21 Mad. 8, and Seshachala v. Varada (1902) 25 Mad. 55, weredistinguished though they were clearly authorities for the proposition thatobligations not expressed in writing, but imported by the law in the case ofsales, might be treated as in writing for purposes of limitation, when the salewas made by a written instrument.

Art. 110 provides as follows :-

"110. A suit for arrears of rent shall be institutedwithin three years from the date when the arrears become due." It has beenruled in a long series of decisions that a suit for arrears of rent, based upona registered lease is governed, not by Article 110 but by Article 116Vythilinga v. Thetchena 3 Mad. 76 [LQ/MadHC/1980/405] , Umes Chandra v. Adamant (1888) 15 Cal. 221,Iswariprasad v. Crewdy (1890) 17 Cal. 461, Raneeguny Coal Association v. JaduNath (1892) 19 Cal. 489, Umrao Bibi v. Mahomet Rojabi (1900) 27 Cal. 205, Ambabranav. Vaguran (1896) 19 Mad. 52, Chengiah v. Umarai 7 M.L.T. 419, Sundaramier v.Muttoo 17 M.L.T. 276, Kannan v. Muthalfuri 11 Mad. L.W. 328, Mahommed Hanif v.Moorat Mahotoon 4 Pat. L.W 146, Mackenzie v. Rameswar 1 Pat. L.J. 37 = 2 Pat.L.W. 446, Lal Chand v. Narain (1913) 37 Bom. 656 [LQ/BomHC/1913/66] . The contrary view, adopted inRamaswamy v. Sokkunatha (1891) 1 Mad. L.J. 137 = 2 Mad. L.J. 69, and Ram Narainv. Kalla Narain (1904) 26 All. 138, has now been expressly disapproved of bythe Judicial Committee in Trikumdas v. Gopi Nath (1917) 44 I.A. 65 = 44 Cal.759. Suits for rent under the Bengal Tenancy Act have, however, escaped thisfate; they have been held to be governed by the special rule contained in theschedule to that statute, which remains unaffected by Article 110 and Article116; see the decision of the Full Bench in Mackenzie v. Haji Sahed Mohammed(1892) 19 Cal. 1.

6. We have not given above an exhaustive enumeration of allthe judicial decisions relevant to the points mentioned; but we have statedenough to show that Article 116 has been repeatedly interpreted; in the mostdiverse connections, as if it were a generalised exception engrafted upon allArticles which might, by stretch of language, be regarded as applicable tosuits comprehended within the description of " a suit for compensation forthe breach of a contract." One of the earliest of these decisions, NabaKumar v. Siru Mallik (1891) 6 Cal. 94, goes back to 1880, and the judgment inthat case as also the judgments delivered by the Full Bench in 1881 in HusseinAli v. Hafiz Ali (1881) 3 All. 600, were based upon a historical review of theprevious legislation on the subject; but it may be observed parentheticallythat some of the judgments delivered by the Full Bench also referred toinadmissible materials, such as what happened in the Legislative Council;Administrator-General v. Premlal Mullik (1895) 22 I.A. 107 = 22 Cal. 788. Yet,the construction then placed upon Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1877, mustbe taken to have found favour with the legislature, as it has been reproducedwithout alteration in the Limitation Act, 1908. The legislature is presumed toknow not only the general principles of law, but also the construction whichthe Courts have put upon particular statutes; where a section of an Act whichhas received a judicial construction is re-enacted in the same words, suchre-enactment is treated as a legislative recognition of that construction;Jogendra Chandra v. Syam Das, (1909) 36 Cal. 543, Kamini Debi v. Pramatha Nath(1912) 39 Cal. 33, Nagendra Mohan v. Peary Mohan (1916) 43 Cal. 103 theJudicial Committee in Trikumdas v. Gopi Nath (1917) 44 I.A. 65 = 44 Cal. 759felt impressed by this consideration, and Lord Sumner emphasised the fact thatwhen the Limitation Act of 1877 was replaced by the Limitation Act of 1908, thelanguage and arrangement of the relevant Articles were left unaltered. In suchcircumstances, no useful purpose Will be served by an attempt to examine thefoundations of the long series of decisions which the Judicial Committee foundthemselves bound to recognise.

7. In answer to the contention that claims of this charactersound in debt and not in damages, it may be pointed out, however, that the termused in Article 115 and Article 116 is not damages but compensation, which alsooccurs in Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act. As Lord Esher observed inDixon v. Calcraft (1892) 1 Q.B. 458 (463) the expression compensation is notordinarily used as an equivalent to damages, although as remarked by Fry, L.J.in Skinners Co. v. Knight (1891)2 Q.B. 542 compensation may often have to bemeasured by the same rule as damages in an action for the breach. The termcompensation as pointed out in the Oxford Dictionary, signifies that which isgiven in recompense, an equivalent rendered. Damages, on the other hand;constitute the sum of money claimed or adjudged to be paid in compensation forloss or injury sustained; the value estimated in money, of something lost orwithheld. The term compensation etymologically suggests the image of balancingone thing against another; its primary signification is equivalence, and thesecondary and more common meaning is something given or obtained as anequivalent. The derivative meaning was familiar to the Roman Jurists andreappears in the modern codes founded on the Civil Law. (Sohm, institutes ofRoman Law, 3rd Edition, pp. 458-463).

8. The term compensation, as used in Arts. 115 and 116 isthus, perhaps not sufficiently precise, while the technical distinction betweendebt and damages may be too refined for the purpose.

9. We must hold that the decision of the Judicial Committeein Trikamdas v. Gobi Nath (1917) 44 I.A. 65 = 44 Cal. 759, though concerneddirectly with the applicability of Article 110 and Article 116 to a suit forarrears of rent, instituted upon a registered lease, must be regarded as offar-reaching application. We cannot ignore the principle which lies at the rootof that decision and must govern the applicability of Article 116 to casesother than those covered by Article 110, wherever the position may reasonablybe maintained that the claim sought to be enforced is a claim for compensationfor breach of a contract in writing registered. We must consequently examinewhether a claim for eligible dower and a claim for deferred dower fall withinthis category.

10. The nature of dower debt was examined by this Court inthe case of Mir Maharat v. Amani 2 B.L.R. 306, and it was ruled that, accordingto Muhammadan Law, when the heirs of a Muhammadan worn in claim from her husbanddower which was not due or payable until her death, their claim is a simplemoney claim, founded solely on the contract entered into by the husband. TheLimitation Act then in force was Act XIV of 1859. Clause 9 of Section Iprovided a period of three years for the institution of a suit brought torecover money lent or interest or for the breach of any contract. Clause 10 ofSection 1 provided a period of three years for a suit brought to recover moneylent or interest or for the breach of any contract in a case in which there wasa written engagement or contract and in which such engagement or contract couldhive been, but had not been registered within six months from the date thereof.Clause 16 of Section 1 provided a period of six years for all suits for whichno other limitation was expressly provided. The Court held that the suit fordower was a simple suit for the breach of a contract, within the meaning ofClauses 9 and 10 of Section 1. Reference was made to the decisions in MahomadFaiz v. Oomdah Begum 6 W.R. 111 and Woomantal Fatima v. Mirun Murnissa 9 W.R.318, the first had been cited as an authority for the position that a suit fordower was not founded on the contract, but on the with-holding of the widowsestate from the heirs. The second had been relied upon to support thecontention that the claim to recover the dower debt was in essence to enforce alien upon the estate of the deceased as against those entitled as heirs Thesedicta were explained away, and it was held that the dower, like any other debt,must be paid before the estate divisible among the heirs can be ascertained,and that the suit to recover the dower debt is nothing more or less than a suitto enforce a simple money claim founded solely on the contract entered into bythe husband, see also Wafesh v. Saheeba 8 W.R. 307, Janee Khanu v. AmatoolFatima 8 W.R. 51, Mahabu Bibi v. Amina 10 Bom. H.C 430 A.C. The view taken inthese cases is supported by the observation of Sir Montague Smith inKhajooroonisa v. Ryeesoonissa 2 I.A. 235 = 15 B.L.R. 306 [LQ/PC/1875/11] = 24 W.R. 163, namely,that prompt or exigible dower may be considered a debt always due anddemandable, and certainly payable upon demand, with the result that upon aclear and unambiguous demand and refusal, a cause of action would accrue andthe statute would begin to run. To the same effect is the remark of Lord Parkerin Hamira v. Zubaida (1916) 43 I.A. 294 = 38 All. 581, that the dower ranks asa debt, and the right of the wife is no greater than that of any otherunsecured creditor of her husband, subject to the reservation that if shelawfully, with the express or implied consent of the husband or his otherheirs, obtains possession of the whole or part of his estate to satisfy herclaim with the rents and issues accruing therefrom, she is entitled to retainsuch possession, unless it is satisfied; see also Nurunnessa v. Kazi Mahomed(1920) 47 Cal. 537, and Abidunnissa v. Fatih Mahomed (1919) 41 Mad. 1026. Inview of the principles expounded and applied in the long series of decisionswhich have now met with the approval of the Judicial Committee in Trikumdas v.Gopi Nath (1917) 44 I.A. 65 = 44 Cal. 759, there is thus no escape from theconclusion that Article 116 applies to suits for recovery of dower debt whenthere is a registered dower deed, although Articles 103 and 104 would applywhen there is no such registered instrument. We are not unmindful that thecontrary view was, without argument, assumed to be correct in Fulchand v. NazabAli (1908) 36 Cal. 184. The view which we are constrained to adopt coincideswith that taken in the case of Asiatulla v. Danis Mahammad (1922) 36 C.L.J.379, which was brought to our notice after the arguments had been closed, andhas been reported since then.

11. The result is that the decree made by the District Judgeis affirmed and this appeal is dismissed with costs.

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Mahamed Mozaharal Ahadvs. Mahamed Azimaddin Bhuinya(14.11.1922 - CALHC)