(Prayer: Petition (disposed of on 24-7-1950) praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith the High Court will be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records in C.M.A. No. 5 of 1949 on the file of the Subordiate Judges Court, South Kanara, and quash the order therein dated 5-4-1949.)

This is an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Subordinate Judge of South Kanara dated 5th April 1949 passed in C.M.A. No. 5 of 1949 under S. 12(1) of the Madras Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act. The application has been made under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. A preliminary objection was taken that the application was not sustainable because the order sought to be quashed became final long before Art. 226 came into force. The respondents Counsel relied upon the rule of law that a judicial order which has become final according to the state of the law at the time it was passed is not open to interference by way of appeal or revision or other proceedings by virtue of a subsequent amendment of the law. The respondent relied upon two rulings of this Court in Examiner of Local Fund Accounts v. Subramania Mudaliar (I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 501 [LQ/MadHC/1942/396] : 55 L.W. 778), and Abdul Rasak Rowther v. Abdul Rahim Rowther [1945] 1 M.L.J. 480: 58 L.W. 216]. In the former case there was a new rule providing for the right of appeal against an order relating to a surcharge passed by a Court under the surcharge rules framed under the Madras District Municipalities Act. It was held that no appeal lay against an order made by the Court in an application filed before the enactment of that rule. In the latter case the effect of Madras Act XV of 1943 which amended Act IV of 1938 and gave a right of appeal retrospectively in respect of orders passed from and after 27th October 1939 was declared to be that the right of appeal so conferred was not available to an order passed before that date. The learned Judges say that the right of appeal conferred by the new enactment could not take away the vested right which had accrued as a consequence of the final order passed before the prescribed date. Applying the principle laid down in these cases to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the respondent became entitled to the benefit of the final order of the Subordinate Judge passed on 5th April 1949. It is conceded that on that date there was no further appeal or revision or application by way of certiorari open to the petitioners. A subsequent enactment like Art. 226 of the Constitution cannot operate to take away a vested right which had accrued to the respondent under the order of the Subordinate Judge above mentioned.

We uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss the application with costs.