G.P. Singh, J.

1. Respondent No. 1, Heeralal was employed as a driver by the petitioner, the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation. By an order passed on 28th September 1966, the respondent was retired from service with effect from 1st October 1966 on the ground that he had attained 58 years of age. The respondent filed an application under section 31 (3) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960, in the Labour Court, Gwalior. Omitting the chequered history of this application which is now not relevant we may straightway state that the Labour Court, by its order dated 14th June 1976, held that the respondent was governed by the Standard Standing Orders made under the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961, in which a provision for superannuation was made only on 2nd November 1973 and therefore the respondent could not be retired on the ground that he had attained the age of 58 years on 1st October 1966. The Labour Court, however, refused the relief of reinstatement and directed payment of wages upto 2nd November 1973 on the ground that the respondent would have, in any case, retired on that date under the Standard Standing Orders. The order of the Labour Court was maintained by the Industrial Court in revision filed by the petitioner which was dismissed on 17th September 1976. The petitioner then filed this petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the orders of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court.

2. The Corporations contentions in this petition are that the respondent could be retired on completion of 58 years of age under Standard Standing Order 11 as construed by a Full Bench of three Judges in M.P.S.R.T.C. v. Ramchandra : 1977 M P L J 341 and that the respondent could also be retired under Regulation 59 of the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees Service Regulations made under section 45 of the Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950.

3. When this petition came up before a Division Bench of this Court, a doubt was raised as to the correctness of the decision of the Full Bench in Ramchandras case (supra) on the point that the Corporation can retire an employee on attaining 58 years of age as a matter of general policy under Standing Order 11. The Division Bench, therefore, referred the petition for decision by a larger Bench. This is how the petition has come up before us.

4. The petitioner Corporation was constituted under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. Section 45(1) of this Act provides that "a Corporation may, with the previous sanction of the State Government, make regulations not inconsistent with this Act and the rules made thereunder for the administration of the affairs of the Corporation". In particular, this section authorises the Corporation to make regulations to provide "the conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay of officers and servants of the Corporations other than the Chief Executive Officer or General Manager and the Chief Accounts Officer." It was in exercise of this power that the Corporation made the Employees Service Regulations. The Full Bench in Ramchandras case held that these regulations were enforced from 1st June 1970. Regulation 59 of the Regulations reads as follows:

Employees of State Transport are liable to compulsory retirement on the date of their completion of fifty eight years of age unless specifically permitted by the Corporation to continue in service for a specified period thereafter, but he must not be retained after the age of 60 years, without the sanction of State Government.

5. The Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961, is an act to provide for rules defining with sufficient precision in certain matters the conditions of employment of employees in undertakings in the State of Madhya Pradesh. This Act which received the assent of the President generally displaces the application of the corresponding Central Act No. XX of 1946 to industrial undertakings within the State. Section 2(2) of the Act, however, provides:

Nothing in this Act shall apply to the employees in an undertaking to whom the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil Services Regulations or any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf by the State Government in the Official Gazette apply.

The State Government under section 21 has power to make rules to frame standard standing orders. The expression "standard standing orders" as defined in section 3(b) means rules framed under section 21 relating to matters set out in the Schedule to the Act. Section 6 of the Act provides that the State Government may, by notification, apply standard standing orders to such class of undertakings and from such date as may be specified therein. This section also provides that the standard standing orders made amendments certified under the Act shall provide for every matter set out in the Schedule. Sections 7 to 10 contain procedure for certification of amendments in the Standard Standing Orders at the instance of the employer or representative of employees. The relevant items in the Schedule to the Act containing matters to be provided in Standard Standing Orders are items XI, XII and XIII which read as follows:

XI. Termination of employment otherwise than by way of punishment, and the notice thereof to be given to the employers and employees.

XII. Punishment involving warning, censure, fine and deductions in wages.

XIII. Suspension or dismissal for misconduct, and acts or omissions which constitute misconduct.

By notification dated 19th October 1973, published in the Gazette dated 2nd November 1973, the following additional matter was added as item No. XV in the Schedule--

XV-Age of Retirement.

The standard standing orders were first made by a notification dated 26th December 1962 published in the Gazette dated 1st February 1963. Standard Standing Orders 11 and 12 dealt, respectively, with termination of employment and disciplinary action for misconduct. We are here concerned only with Standard Standing Order 11 which reads as follows:

11. Termination of employment and the notice thereof to be given by employer and employee.

(a) When the employment of a permanent employee is to be terminated, he shall be given one months notice or shall be paid wages for one month in lieu of notice. No employee other than a permanent employee shall be entitled to any such notice or wages in lieu thereof for termination of his service.

(b) The reason for the termination of service shall be recorded in writing and shall be communicated to the employee unless such communication may in the opinion of the manager directly or indirectly lay the company or the manager or the person signing the communication open to civil or criminal proceedings at the instance of the employee.

(c) Any permanent employee desirous of leaving the employment shall give one months notice to his departmental officer stating the reason for which, he is leaving but if he so requires he may be relieved earlier than the date on which the period of notice expires.

(d) No notice shall be necessary for the discontinuance of the employment of a permanent seasonal employee on the expiry of the season, but he shall have a lien on his post at the commencement of the next season.

On the insertion of item XV "Age of Retirement" as a matter in the Schedule to the Act, the Government, by notification dated 19th July 1973, published in the Gazette dated 2nd November 1973, made Standard Standing Order 14-A dealing with retirement, which reads as follows:

14-A. Retirement, (1) An employee shall retire from the service of the employer on the date he attains the age of 58 years. He may, however, be retained in service by the employer after the date of the attainment of the age of 58 years if his services are necessary in the interest of the undertaking but he shall not be retained in service after the age of 60 years:

Provided that nothing in this clause shall adversely affect the operation of the terms of any contract, agreement, settlement or award on this subject.

(2) For the purpose of clause (1), the age will be reckoned from the date of the birth as given by the employee at the time of his employment and accepted by the employer. The date of birth as given in the High School Certificate or equivalent examination certificate shall ordinarily be accepted.

(3) In the case of an employee whose date of birth cannot be ascertained from the certificates referred to in clause (2) or whose age has not been accepted by the employer at the time of his employment the age as determined by a registered medical practitioner not below the rank of a Civil Surgeon or the age declared by an employee in his declaration card for the purposes of the membership of the Employees Provident Fund shall be conclusive and final.

The standard standing orders as provided in section 6 apply to such class of undertakings as may be notified by the State Government under section 6 of the Act. It is not in dispute that the standard standing orders were applied to the petitioners undertaking from 6th July 1963. It may further be mentioned that there is also no dispute on the point that the standard standing orders apply only to an employee as defined in section 2(13) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960. It is also not in dispute that the respondent is an employee of that category.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner first submitted before us that Regulation 59 was effective from 1964 and the respondents retirement must be sustained under it. The learned counsel submitted that it was wrongly held by the Full Bench in Ramchandras case that the regulations were made and became effective from 1st June 1970. Paragraphs 22, 23, 25 and 28 (5) of the judgment in Ramchandras case are relevant on this point. We agree with the reasoning contained therein that the regulations were made on 1st June 1970 and were not effective from any earlier date. We do not think it useful to burden our judgment by reiterating the reasons given by the Full Bench. We reject the submission that the Regulations were effective from 1964 and not from 1st June 1970 as held in Ramchandras case.

7. It was then submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondents retirement was valid under Standard Standing Order 11. In support of this submission, the learned counsel relied upon para 34 of the judgment in Ramchandras case which, in so far as it is relevant, reads as follows:

In our opinion, the object and purpose behind the requirement under clause (b) of Standing Order No. 11 is to see whether the services have been terminated by way of punishment or victimisation. The expression reason for termination of service which is to be recorded and communicated, is a comprehensive expression. It envisages any reason which is not by way of punishment or victimisation and is reason which is rational, as opposed to arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. If the Corporation decided to retire all its employees on the attainment of the age of 58 years, an order passed in furtherance of such decision does not fall within such vice. To tell an employee that he is being retired because he has attained the age of 58 years, is a reason for termination of the service within the meaning of the rule and that reason is neither arbitrary, capricious nor whimsical.

8. Having given our anxious consideration, we are unable to accept that Standard Standing Order 11 permits retirement of an employee on attaining a particular age as held by the Full Bench in Ramchandras case. The conclusion of the Full Bench on this point is clearly opposed to the decision of the Supreme Court in U.P.E. Supply Co. v. T.N. Chatterjee : AIR 1972 S C 1201. It appears that though this case was referred to by the Full Bench on another point, attention was not drawn to the fact that it is also decisive on the question of construction of the word "termination" and the meaning to be given to that word as used in Standard Standing Order 11. In T.N. Chatterjees case, the Supreme Court considered the meaning of item 8 in the Schedule to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (Central Act XX of 1946). This item is in these terms: "Termination of Employment and notice thereof to be given by employer and workmen. "In construing item 8, the Supreme Court approved the view of the Orissa High Court in S.K. Ghosh v. Chairman, O.S.E. Board : AIR 1970 Ori 126 that retirement on attaining a particular age or superannuation is not included within it. The Supreme Court disapproved the decision of the Madras High Court in The Hindu v. Its Secretary A I R 1961 Mad. 107 that the expression "termination of employment" is wide enough to include retirement of an employee at the age of superannuation. The Supreme Court also referred to para 13 of the Model Standing Orders contained in Schedule I to the Central Act and observed that no provision was made therein for superannuation or retirement. The Supreme Court held that the word "termination" in item 8 in the context could not be construed to be so extensive as to include retirement on attaining the age of superannuation and is confined to such termination as is brought about by notice by either the employer or any employee. The Supreme Court also pointed out that it was for this reason that in Uttar Pradesh and Bombay the Schedule was amended to include superannuation and retirement. Now item No. XI in the Schedule to the Madhya Pradesh Act which relates to "termination of employment otherwise than by way of punishment and the notice thereof to be given to the employers and employees" corresponds to item No. 8 in the Schedule to the Central Act. Therefore, item No. XI in the Madhya Pradesh Act must, in our opinion, be construed in the same manner as item No. 8 in the Central Act was construed by the Supreme Court in T.N. Chatterjees case. The termination of employment covered by item No. XI is a termination which is brought about by an act of the employer or employee and does not automatically follow as in the case of retirement on attaining a particular age. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the words "otherwise than by way of punishment" occurring in item No. XI make it somewhat different from item No. 8 and, therefore, the word termination in item No. XI can be more widely construed. We are unable to agree. Even in the Central Act, item No. 8 does not include termination by way of punishment which is separately provided for in item No. 9 which corresponds to item No. XIII of our Act. Standard Standing Order 11 is confined to the matter of termination of employment and the notice thereof to be given to the employer or the employee as contained in item XI in the Schedule. Having been made in exercise of the power flowing from item No. XI read with section 21 of our Act, the scope of Standard Standing Order 11 cannot be widened by construction to include something which is not included in item No. XI. Retirement on attaining a particular age is beyond the purview of item No. XI and, therefore, it is also beyond the purview of Standard Standing Order 11. As earlier pointed out by us, it was only in 1973 that item XV referring to age of retirement was included as a matter in the Schedule and thereupon Standard Standing Order No. 14-A was made covering cases of retirement on attaining a particular age. Within the frame work of Standard Standing Order 11, as construed above, it was not possible for the Corporation to decide to retire all its employees on attaining the age of 58 years and to give effect to that decision. The contrary conclusion reached by the Full Bench in Ramchandras case is, in our opinion, erroneous and proceeds upon overlooking the decision of the Supreme Court in T.N. Chatterjees case.

9. The learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the respondent must be deemed to have retired when Regulation 59 made under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 came into force on 1st June 1970. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that this regulation cannot be given effect to being inconsistent with the Standard Standing Orders and having not been notified under section 2(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961.

10. The Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 under which the petitioner Corporation is established is an Act to provide for incorporation and regulation of Road Transport Corporations. Section 45 (2) (c) of the Act authorises the Corporation to make regulations to provide for the conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay of officers and servants of the Corporation. The Act in so far it provides for establishment of Road Transport Corporations is a special Act But the power conferred under section 45 (2) (c) on the Corporation to make regulations laying down conditions of service is a general provision which is often found in statutes creating statutory Corporations. A general provision of this nature is not intended to affect a law designed to lay down conditions of employment for a special class of employees such as industrial workers governed by the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, which is an Act to require employers in industrial establishments formally to define conditions of employment under them, or the corresponding Madhya Pradesh Act i.e. the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961. The Standing Orders Acts are special laws dealing with conditions of employment of industrial workers and so on principles of construction their provisions prevail over the general provision contained in section 45 (2) (c) of the Road Transport Corporations Act. The regulations made, therefore, cannot have any effect on matters contained in the Schedule to the Standing Orders Acts on which Standing Orders can be made under those Acts for industrial workers. The regulations can, however, be operative even in respect of industrial workers on matters not included in the schedule to the Standing Orders Acts. The only method by which the regulations can be applied to matters contained in the schedule to the Standing Orders Acts is either to notify them under section 13-B of the Central Standing Orders Act or section 2(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Act, as the case may be, or to have them certified as standing orders in accordance with the procedure laid down in those Acts. These conclusions are strongly supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in U. P. S. E. Board v. Hari Shanker A I R 1997 S C 65. The question in that case was as to how far the regulations nude under the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 would apply to industrial employees. It was held by the Supreme Court that the Central Standing Orders Act "is a special law in regard to matters enumerated in the Schedule and the regulations made by the Electricity Board with respect to any of those matters are of no effect unless such regulations are notified by the Government under section 13-B or certified by the certifying officer under section 5." In that case a regulation made by the Electricity Board in 1970 relating to age of superannuation was notified under section 13-B. The standing orders did not provide for any age of retirement. Age of superannuation was, however, added as a matter in the Schedule in 1959. The regulation, therefore, was on a matter which was mentioned in the Schedule yet it was given effect to as it was notified under section 13-B. It was held that the words "any other rules or regulations" as used in that section were not to be read ejusdem generis with the expressions "Fundamental and Supplementary Rules" etc., so as to confine them to Government establishments where the employees have the status of Government servants. The regulations made by the Electricity Board were therefore held to be covered by the words "any other rules or regulations" in section 13-B. It was further held that the words "nothing in this Act shall apply to an industrial establishment" as used in the said section are not to be interpreted too literally and that the only reasonable construction is that a rule or regulation notified by the Government excludes the applicability of the Act to the extent that rule or regulation covers the field. Now, the Central Standing Orders Act is replaced in our State by the Madhya Pradesh Standing Orders Act. The scheme of both the Acts is the same. Section 13-B of the Central Act is the same as section 2(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Act. The ruling of the Supreme Court in Harishankers case, therefore, fully applies in deciding the question whether on a particular matter regulations made under the Road Transport Corporations Act apply or the Standard Standing Orders apply. As earlier pointed out by us the general power of making regulations as a matter of construction is not intended to prevail over the matters mentioned in the schedule to the Standing Orders Act which in respect of industrial workers are to be regulated by Standing Orders. The regulations will, however, have application even to industrial workers in respect of matters not covered by the Schedule. Further regulations can also be effective on matters in the schedule and can apply to industrial workers on these matters when they are notified under section 2(2) by the Government or certified as Standing Orders under the Act. It has to be noticed that the requirement of notification under section 2(2), on a proper understanding of that provision, is only in respect of matters mentioned in the schedule which are to be regulated by Standard Standing Orders.

11. It is in the light of these principles that it has to be seen whether regulation 59 applied to industrial workers of the Corporation. Now we have already stated that till 1973 retirement on superannuation was not included as a matter in the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act and the Standard Standing Orders did not cover such a matter. Regulation 59 deals with compulsory retirement on the completion of 58 years or if specifically permitted on attaining the age of 60 years. The regulation thus deals with a matter which was not covered till 1973 by the Standing Orders Act and the Standard Standing Orders. When this matter was not at all covered by the Standing Orders Act and the Standard Standing Orders till 1973, there could be no-inconsistency between them and Regulation 59 and we find no difficulty in holding that the regulation when made became effective and applied to all employees of the Corporation. But when in 1973 the subject of retirement on superannuation was included in the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act and Standard Standing Order 14-A was made on that matter, the industrial employees ceased to be governed by Regulation 59. Standard Standing Order 14-A alone applied from 2nd November 1973 to industrial workers. The respondents retirement with effect from 1st October 1965 when he attained the age of 58 years was invalid as on that date there was neither any effective regulation nor any Standard Standing Order covering retirement on superannuation. However, when Regulation 59 came into force on 1st June 1970, it brought about the respondents retirement as he had already completed 58 years of age in 1966. The Labour Court and the Industrial Court allowed wages to the respondent till 2nd November 1973, when Standard Standing Order 14-A dealing with retirement was added. In our opinion, in holding so they omitted to take into consideration the operation of Regulation 59 from 1st June 1970. The respondent is thus entitled to wages only till 31st May 1970.

12. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent disputed that he attained the age of 58 years in 1966. The petitioner retired the respondent on the basis of the date of birth entered in his service record and the burden was on the respondent to prove that the service record which must be taken to have been prepared on his instructions or to his knowledge at the time when he entered service was wrong. The Labour Court framed an issue on the point and decided it against the respondent. It appears that the respondent did not pursue the matter any further and did not challenge the finding of the Labour Court on that point. We must, therefore, hold that the respondent had attained the age of 58 years in 1966 or at any rate before 1st June 1970.

13. Before parting with the case we desire to point out that in Ramchandras case the conflict between the regulations made under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 and the Standard Standing Orders made under the Madhya Pradesh Standing Orders Act was solved by recourse to Article 254 of the Constitution. It was held in that case that the Road Transport Corporations Act was enacted by Parliament in exercise of its powers under Entries 43 and 44 of the Union List and the Standing Orders Act by the State Legislature under entry 24 of the Concurrent List. The conclusion that one of the competing legislations pertained to a matter in the Union List, made Article 254 wholly inapplicable for now it is well settled that that Article applies only when the competing legislations, one made by Parliament and the other made by the State Legislature, both pertain to a subject in the Concurrent List. Article 254(2) is in terms limited to matters in the Concurrent List and although in Article 254(1) the language while referring to a law made by Parliament is not that specific, judicial decisions have confined its application to Concurrent List. In A.S. Krishna v. State of Madras : AIR 1957 SC 297 , p. 300 while dealing with section 107(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which was identically worded as Article 254(1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court observed; "For this section to apply, two conditions must be fulfilled: (1). The provisions of the provincial law and those of the Central legislation must both be in respect of a matter which is enumerated in the concurrent list and (2) they must be repugnant to each other." These observations were adopted as correct exposition of Article 254(1) Premnath v. State of J. & K. : AIR 1959 S C 749, p. 763 and Kerala State Electricity Board v. Indian Aluminium Co. A I R 1975 SC 1031, p. 1039. Further, in M. Karunnadhi v. Union of India A I R 1975 SC 1031, p. 1039 the Supreme Court again read Article 254(1) as confined to matters in the concurrent list. If a legislation made by Parliament, which in pith and substance is under the Union List, incidentally trenches upon a subject in the concurrent list or State list covered by a State legislation, the legislation made by Parliament whether before or after the State legislation will prevail in case of conflict not because of something contained in Article 254 but because of inherent supremacy of Parliaments power of legislation in respect of a matter in the Union List conferred by clause (I) of Article 245 of the Constitution which operates "notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (2) and (3)" which deal with legislations in the Concurrent and State lists and which clearly provide that the power of the State Legislature to legislate in matters contained in those lists is "subject to" Parliaments power of legislation in the Union list. A conflict of this nature is conceivable and can arise because of the doctrine of pith and substance which permits incidental encroachment in the domain of the rival Legislature. However, such a conflict must be inferred only as a matter of last resort when it is impossible to reconcile the competing legislations by recourse to the rules of harmonious construction which include the rule that a general provision is not intended to come in the way of or to supersede a special provision. We may only add that it is on this principle that regulations made under section 45 (2) (c) of the Road Transport Corporations Act are to be subordinated to Standard Standing Orders on matters specified in the schedule to the Standard Standing Orders Act unless the regulations are notified under section 2(2) or certified as Standing Orders in accordance with the procedure laid down in the said Act.

14. The petition is partly allowed. The orders of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court are quashed to this extent that the respondent shall be entitled to wages only up to 31st May 1970 as he must be taken to have retired on 1st June 1970. There shall be no order as to costs. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner.