S.S. SANDHAWALIA, C.J.

(1.) This judgment is now a part of the triology, beginning with the Division Bench case of the State of Bihar v. Ram Daras Ahir, 1985 Cri LJ 584 : 1984 BBCJ (HC) 749, and expanded in the subsequent Full Bench decision in State of Bihar v. Maksudan Singh, AIR 1986 Pat 38 . It is, perhaps, illustrative of the poets hope of "freedom slowly broadening down from precedent to precedent." The significant issues, which necessitated this reference to the Full Bench in this set of two connected cases, may, perhaps, be precisely formulated as under : - (1) Whether the fundamental right to a speedy public trial enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution by presidential mandate is confined to only capital offences or is attracted to all offences generically (2) Whether the aforesaid right to a speedy trial is applicable only to the proceedings in Court stricto sensu or includes within its sweep the preceding Police investigations as well (3) Is a speedy trial equally mandated by both the letter and spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (4) Whether the ratios in Ramdaras Ahirs case (1985 Cri LJ 584) (Pat) (supra) and in Maksudan Singhs case (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (FB) (supra) are applicable equally to all offences and irrespective of the fact whether the proceedings are a trial or an appeal against acquittal (5) Whether an outer time limit to concretise the right to a speedy public trial is envisioned by principle or precedent

(2.) The matrix of the background giving rise to the issues aforesaid may well be noticed from Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 262 of 1985 (Madheshwardhari Singh v. The State of Bihar). The facts therein perhaps unfold a tale that may well harrow up our legal souls and make jurisprudential hair stand on end, like the proverbial quills on the fretful porcupine. The petitioner, Madheshwardhari Singh, is a Class-I Government servant and is at present Poultry Development Officer under the Animal Husbandry Department of the Government of Bihar. More than 20 years ago, during 1964-66, he was posted as the Assistant Director, Central Poultry Farm, Patna, and one Satya Narayan Sharma, a Store Keeper, was his subordinate on the said farm. On the basis of a written complaint (Annexure 1), made by the petitioners successor, Syed Jalal Ahmad, Assistant Director, Central Poultry Farm, Patna, a first information report dated the 20th November, 1966, in Gardanibagh Police Station Case No. 32(11) 1966, was lodged under Ss. 467, 409 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. In the said first information report, Satya Narayan Sharma alone was named as an accused. However, with the nature of the allegations made therein a cloud of suspicion was raised against the petitioner as well and the sword of damocles of being implicated therein hung perilously over his head. It was, however, not till as long as a passage of 9 years that it finally fell upon him. The Police investigation in the case dragged on, and, on the 29th September, 1975, the petitioner was also made an accused in the said case. It is averred on behalf of the petitioner, and repeatedly reiterated, that this was done with a mala fide intention in order to jeopardise the career and future promotion of the petitioner, so that he may not get promoted to the post of District Animal Husbandry Officer. It is highlighted that the supposed allegations rested, as they were sought to be, on official records, which were in the Police custody or within easy reach for all those 9 years, and, the belated stage at which he was implicated is thus by itself significant to indicate malice. The petitioner was arrested and produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Patna, and, was granted provisional bail on Sunday, the 29th April, 1975, and, after numerous adjournments and extensions, the same was confirmed on the 21st of November, 1975. Thereafter, it was on the 30th of January, 1976, that a charge-sheet was filed and after cognizance having been taken, the case was transferred to Shree P. N. Prasad, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Patna, for disposal.

(3.) Despite a decade of investigation, the proceeding in Court again moved with a speed which is remarkable in its tardiness. Eighteen dates and adjournments had to be gone through for over a year and a half from the 2nd March, 1976 to the 15th July, 1977, for the supply of documents, which was only partly done by the 15th July, 1977. The charges against the accused persons were framed on the 23rd July, 1977, and, thereafter, at snails pace, the examination of nearly 40 witnesses commenced. It is the petitioners case that those witnesses were officials and easily available at the beck and call of the respondent-State and as many as 7 of them were investigating officers in the case. Yet, for a period extending from the framing of the charges till the 19th February, 1979, only 8 witnesses were examined, and, for the next 9 dates no witness was eith6r examined or was in attendance till the 30th August, 1980. On that date one witness was examined and the Court gave the last opportunity to the prosecution to produce the rest of the witnesses by the next date. Unmindful of that directive, no witness was produced or examined on the 16th October, 1980, and, perhaps, oblivious of the earlier direction, after as many as 7 or more adjournments, the Court, on the 8th December, 1982, again gave a direction to produce the rest of the witnesses by the 11th of December, 1982. This order was again flouted and on that date no witness was present at all. A period of more than a year then elapsed, without any significant progress and the Court, on the 24th January, 1984, gave a fresh direction to produce the rest of the witnesses by the 20th March, 1984. On that date, a last opportunity was given to the prosecution to produce the rest of the witnesses by the 19th April, 1984, on which date the trial Court was compelled to close the prosecution case.

(4.) The prosecution, apparently unmoved by the delay of 16 years, preferred a revision against the aforesaid order of the closure of evidence, which was allowed, directing the Judicial Magistrate to examine the witnesses to be produced by the prosecution. Despite this opportunity, the prosecution again did not complete the examination of its witnesses, and, the learned Magistrate, by his order dated the 1st September, 1984, was again compelled to close the case of the prosecution.

(5.) Against the order aforesaid, the State again went in revision before the Sessions Judge, Patna, who, yet again, allowed the prayer of the prosecution to examine the witnesses on the 2nd January, 1985, and, in compliance therewith the prosecution examined only 1 witness on the 10th of January, 1985. Thereafter, no witness was examined by the prosecution and, ultimately, the case of the prosecution was closed on the 1st of May, 1985, and the accused-petitioner was examined under S. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

(6.) On the 20th of May, 1985, written notes of arguments were filed on behalf of the petitioner, inter alia, taking objection that there was no valid sanction for the prosecution, as required under the law. The prosecution then took up the stand that the sanction order was missing and time must be given to it for searching the same or for the reconstruction thereof in the event of the same being not traceable. Further time or delay in this context was naturally opposed and objected to on behalf of the petitioner. Nevertheless, the learned Magistrate granted further time, and, a direction to find out the sanction order, and numerous adjournments thereafter followed. Ultimately, on the 1st October, 1985, the petitioner was compelled to file a petition before the learned Magistrate, claiming that his fundamental right to speedy public trial had been denied to him by the passage of nearly 20 years in investigation and trial, and, reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision in State of Bihar v. Maksudan Singh, AIR 1986 Pat 38 . The learned Magistrate, however, rejected that petition, compelling the petitioner to knock at the door of this Court for quashing the whole proceeding for the blatant violation of the constitutional right of a speedy public trial by the prolongation of the proceedings for nearly 20 years.

(7.) In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent-State, the broad factual position is not denied barring some marginal discrepancies, which are of little or no consequence. It is, however, pointed out that departmental proceedings had also been started against the present petitioner and the said Satya Narayan Sharma, in which they were found guilty and Satya Narayan Sharma has already been dismissed by the Director, Animal Husbandry, Bihar. It is, however, stated that the petitioner being a gazetted officer, action against him can only be taken with the approval of the Bihar Public Service Commission, and the matter has been pending before it for a considerable time. Vague allegations are made that the petitioner is an influential person and even the delay of a decade in the Police investigation and of another decade in the trial, has in part been due to his conduct. It is not denied that during the course of nearly a decade in trial, the case had been transferred to as many as 7 different Magistrates, and the conclusion is still not in sight, and, time is still sought for tracing or reconstructing the threshold requirement of the sanction order.

(8.) However, on the material question of Art. 21, it is the stand that it only envisages that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty, except in accordance with the procedure established by law, and, it is curiously suggested that this delay of nearly in accordance with the established procedure, because the petitioner is neither imprisoned nor there is any danger to his life. The. specious pleading, which, indeed is surprising in this context, is in Paragraph No. 13 of the counter-affidavit, which deserves notice in extenso : -

"13. That American Constitution is a Constitution of affluence and so is the Constitution of Great Britain and that of other European countries, while the Constitution of India is a poor countrys Constitution, which is still developing and which requires special cares on the part of all the three wings of our Constitution for its further development. Imports of American decision under its Constitution or that judicial decision of other and developed countries in the interpretation of the provisions of the Indian Constitution may be suicidal for the growth of the society at large of this country."

(9.) In view of the aforesaid regressive pleadings in the counter-affidavit it becomes imperative at the very threshold to reiterate that in all criminal prosecutions the right to a speedy public trial is now an inalienable fundamental right of the citizen under Art. 21 of our Constitution. This cannot be allowed to be whittled down on any finical ground of the hoary origin of this right in the constitutional history of Great Britain and America, nor considerations of affluence of developed countries are even remotely relevant or germane in this context. That this right to speedy trial delves deeply into the soul and spirit of the Anglo-American jurisprudence, (which we have either inherited or borrowed from both in the fields of Constitution and the legal system) is indeed manifest. This cannot, perhaps, be better delineated than in the words of Chief Justice Warren, delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Peter H. Klopfer v. State of North Carolina, (1967) 18 Law Ed 2d 1 : 386 US 213 :

"We hold here that the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment. That right has its roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage. Its first articulation in modern jurisprudence appears to have been made in Magna Carta (1215), wherein it was written, We will sell to no man, we will not . deny or defer to any man either justice or right, but evidence of recognition of the right to speedy justice in even earlier times is found in the Assize of Clarendon (1166). By the late thirteenth century, justices, armed with commissions of gaol delivery and/or oyer and terminer were visiting the countryside three times a year. These Justices, Sir Edward Coke wrote in Part II of his Institutes, have not suffered the prisoner to be long detained; but at their next coming have given the prisoner full and speedy justice..........without detaining him long in prison. To Coke, prolonged detention without trial would have been contrary to the law and custom of England; but he also believed that the delay in trial, by itself, would be an improper denial of justice. In his explication of Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta, he wrote that the words We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right had the following effect".

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"And, therefore, every subject of this realme, for injury done to him in bonis, terris, vel persona, by any other subject, be he ecclesiasticall, or temporall, free, or bound, man, or woman, old, or young, or be he outlawed, excommunicated, or any other without exception, may take his remedy by the course of the law, and have justice, and right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any deniall, and speedily without delay."

Cokes Institutes were read in the American Colonies by virtually every student of the law. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson wrote that at the time he studied law (1762-1767), Coke Lyttleton was the universal elementary book of law students. And to John Rutledge of South Carolina, the Institutes seemed to be almost the foundation of our law. To Coke, in turn, Magna Carta was one of the fundamental bases of English liberty. Thus, it is not surprising that when George Mason drafted the first of the colonial bills of rights, he set forth a principle of Magna Carta, using phraseology similar to that of Cokes explication :

"In all capital or criminal prosecutions, the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 provided, a man hath a right..........to a speedy trial..... That this right was considered fundamental at this early period in our history is evidenced by its guarantee in the Constitutions of several of the States of the new nation, as well as by its prominent position in the Sixth Amendment. Today, each of the 50 States guarantees the right to a speedy trial to its citizens. The history of the right to a speedy trial and its reception in this country clearly establish that it is one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution."

(10.) The aforesaid view has then been reiterated by Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the United States Supreme Court in Robert Dean Dickey v. State of Florida, (1970) 26 Law Ed 2d 26 : 398 US 30, in the following words : -

"The right to a speedy trial is not a theoretical or abstract right but one rooted in hard reality in the need to have charges promptly exposed. If the case for the prosecution calls on the accused to meet charges rather than rest on the infirmities of the prosecutions case, as is the defendants right, the time to meet them is when the case is fresh. Stale claims have never been favoured by the law, and far less so in criminal cases. Although a great many accused persons seek to put off the confrontation as long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial."

In the aforesaid case, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, in their concurrent opinion dealt in great detail with the major problems that the courts must consider in defining the speedy trial guarantee.

(11.) Another aspect of the right to speedy trial was then highlighted in Barker v. Wingo, (1972) 33 Law Ed 2d 101 : 407 US 514 in these words : -

"The right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused. In addition to the general concern that all accused persons be treated according to decent and fair procedures, there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and, at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused."

Yet again, the basic principles underlying the right were concretised in the following terms in Richard M. Smith v. Fred M. Hooey, (1969) 21 Law Ed 2d 607: 393 US 374:-

"Suffice it to remember that this constitutional guarantee has universally been thought essential to protect at least three basic demands of criminal justice in the Anglo-American legal system: (1) to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial. (2) to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation, and, (3) to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself. "

(12.) Coming nearer home, it would seem that the right to a speedy public trial as a constitutional guarantee is of a somewhat recent origin in our country. However, by now it is so well settled by precedential mandate of the Final Court itself that the right to a speedy public trial is a part and parcel of the constitutional guarantee under Art.21, that it would be wasteful and unnecessary to examine the issue on principle afresh. In Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360 , which was yet one of the series of cases from our own State, arising from the heart rending delays in the context of under-trials, Bhagwati, J. (as he then was), after in terms quoting the Sixth Amendment to the American Constitution and also Art.3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, observed as under:-

"We think that even under our Constitution though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Art.21 as interpreted by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 . We have held in that case that Art.21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be reasonable, fair and just. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable, fair or just, such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Art.21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be reasonable, fair or just unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as reasonable, fair or just and it would fall foul of Art.21. There can, therefore be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Art.21."

In the succeeding case of the series Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1369 , it was again reiterated as under:-

"Speedy trial is, as held by us in our earlier judgment dated 26th February, 1979, an essential ingredient of reasonable, fair and just procedure guaranteed by Art.21 and it is the constitutional obligation of the State to devise such a procedure as would ensure speedy trial of the accused."

(13.) The aforesaid view has thereafter been unhesitatingly reiterated in later judgments of the Final Court, to which individual reference at this stage is unnecessary. It would suffice to mention that within this jurisdiction the issue was pointedly raised and considered in greater detail first in the State of Bihar v. Ramdaras Ahir, 1985 Cri LJ 584 (Pat) (supra). Tracing the development of the expanded right to life and personal liberty in Art.21, in paragraphs 9 to 15 of the report, it was concluded therein as under:-

"It is unnecessary to further elaborate and labour the point, because it seems manifest that now by precedential mandate the basic human right to speedy trial has been expressly written, as if with pen and ink, into the constitutional right of life and liberty, guaranteed by Art.21."

(14.) A challenge to the correctness of the above view was then exhaustively considered afresh by the Full Bench in the State of Bihar v. Maksudan Singh, (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (supra). Whilst affirming the ratio and reasoning in the aforesaid case, the Full Bench very elaborately came to the following finding:-

"To conclude on this aspect, the answer to the question posed at the very outset is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy and public trial in all criminal prosecutions now flowing from Art.21 of the Constitution by virtue of precedential mandate is identical in content with the express constitutional guarantee inserted by the Sixth Amendment in the American Constitution."

(15.) In the ultimate analysis learned Counsel for the respondent State had no choice but to veer over to the stand that in view of the unequivocal observations of the Final Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360 , Hussainara Khatoon v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1369 , The State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punfaji Shah, AIR 1981 SC 1675 , and T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1983 SC 361 (2). In all criminal prosecutions, the right to a speedy public trial is as much part of our Constitution under Art.21 as it is of the American Constitution. Therefore, the somewhat specious stand of the respondent State in the pleadings that we must in a way read down the right of speedy and public trial in India because of the fact that our society as yet is not as developed or affluent as the Anglo-American one, must be categorically rejected.

(16.) As stands highlighted at the very outset, this judgment is indeed a continuation of the earlier two in the State of Bihar v. Ramdaras Ahir, (1985 Cri LJ 584) (Pat) and the State of Bihar v. Maksudan Singh, (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (FB) (supra). Though, to maintain the homogenity of discussion herein, some overlapping is inevitable, yet, in order to avoid any wasteful treading of the beaten path already, it is better to notice the relevant foundational base of what was held in the aforesaid two cases, and, to proceed further therefrom. The ratios therein, somewhat precisely, lay down as under:-

(1) That, now by precedential mandate the basic human right to a speedy public trial in all criminal prosecutions has been expressly written as if with pen and ink in the constitutional right relating to life and liberty guaranteed under Art.21 of our Constitution. Further, that this right is identical in content with the express constitutional guarantee inserted by the Sixth Amendment in the American Constitution . (2) That the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of that Constitution would be equally attracted and applicable as persuasive on this facet of Art.21 of our Constitution as well. (3) That once the Constitutional guarantee on a speedy trial and the right to a fair, just and reasonable procedure under Art.21 has been violated, then the accused is entitled to an unconditional release and the charges levelled against him would fall to the ground. (4) That a callous and inordinate prolonged delay of ten years or more, which, in no way arises from the accuseds default (or is otherwise not occasioned due to any extraordinary and exceptional reasons), in the context of reversal of a clean acquittal on a capital charge, would be per se prejudicial to the accused and would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Art.21.

(17.) In the light of the above, and, before one adverts to the momentous legal issues involved, it is apt to clear the decks of any cobwebs of facts. Herein, it seems somewhat plain that the horrendous delay of nearly 20 years in investigation and trial is primarily the handiwork of the prosecution and in no way arises from the accused-petitioners fault, nor is it occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional circumstance. At the very threshold, there is a delay of 10 years betwixt the filing of the first information report in 1966 and the preferring of the charge-sheet in the Court a decade later in 1976. Plainly enough, this is due to the procrastination of the investigating agency. Both the accused-petitioner and the other named accused, Satya Narayan Sharma, were Government officials, and, plainly and easily within the comfortable reach of the long arm of the law. It is not even remotely the case that any one of them either absconded or was unavailable to the Police. The case was one of alleged defalcation rested on official records, which were easily available to the investigating agency in Patna. Barring some specious pleadings on behalf of the respondent State, it seems more than manifest that there seems no justification worth the name of dragging the investigation of the case alone for a period of a little more than 10 years. The blame therefore must unequivocally be laid at the door of the respondent State.

(18.) Equally the prolongation of the trial for 9 years in Court for the examination of prosecution evidence is entirely due to the prosecutions default. It is common ground that at no stage did the petitioner or even his co-accused jump their bail or absconded or attempted to be fugitives from justice. Throughout they remained diligently present in the Court proceedings and even insisting for the speedier conclusion thereof. It is not in serious dispute that by and large the prosecution case rested on official witnesses, including a number of investigating officers and on documentary records. All those were available and within easy reach of the prosecution. Nevertheless, the trial proceeded at the proverbial snails pace, with numerous adjournments in which no evidence was either produced or examined. The petitioner, or, his co-accused, did not at any stage prefer any revision or other Court proceedings to hamper or obstruct the trial. Indeed the boot is entirely on the other leg and it was the prosecution, which, despite repeated closure of the case by the trial Courts, went up a number of times to seek further opportunities for re-opening the matter and examination of more witnesses. Over the 9 long years in Court, the case was kicked around like a ball inasmuch as 7 different Courts. Even after the closure of the prosecution evidence and the examination of the accused, the prosecution still insisted on seeking time for either tracing out the alleged sanction order or reconstructing the same. It is unnecessary to labour the point, because, it seems to be more than plain that the delay of a decade in the Court proceedings itself is yet again of the prosecutions own making.

(19.) It is upon the aforesaid firm findings of fact that the significant issues of law posed at the outset have now to be tested on their anvil. Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner, rightly and forcefully contended that an unwarranted delay of 20 years in investigation and trial is manifestly a procedure which cannot be said to be reasonable, fair and just. Thus it plainly infracts the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Art.21 of the Constitution. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent State, faced with the uphill task of defending a protracted delay of two decades, sought to take shelter behind a somewhat specious plea that the right to a speedy public trial was confined only to serious and capital offences. It is not attracted in the case of minor offences, which do not directly imperil either the life or the liberty of the citizen. It was submitted that both Ramdaras Ahirs (1985 Cri LJ 584) (Pat) Singhs cases (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (FB) (supra) were cases pertaining to the capital offences of murder.

(20.) The aforesaid rival stands at once bring us to the core question, whether the fundamental right of a speedy public trial is available in all criminal prosecutions for all offences or is it confined to only the serious ones on a capital charge punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Even on principle it would seem somewhat obvious that on the plain language of the Sixth Amendment to the American Constitution, the fundamental right of a speedy trial is not confined to any particular category of offences. The language employed is unfettered and without any such restriction. In terms it says, "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial". Thus, it plainly covers the field of all criminal prosecutions, without exception. Plainly enough, such a criminal prosecution may be with respect to any offence and not necessarily the more serious and the capital ones. Learned Counsel for the respondent State, though not formally conceding, could point out nothing whatsoever to buttress his stand that the fundamental right to a speedy trial now incorporated in Art.21 was constricted to the Procrustean bed of serious crimes only, and, would not be applicable to the others.

(21.) Indeed the significance of the fundamental right to speedy trial might well come more meaningfully to the fore in relatively minor cases. There can be no rationale or public interest in prolongation of investigation or the trial in the relatively insignificant crimes. In fact, the prolongation of such trials leads to greater hardship and the accused may sometimes be made to suffer more than what the law provides by way of a sentence in the shape of either light imprisonment or fines. This aspect has rightly been highlighted in the Hussainara Khatoons cases (AIR 1979 SC 1360 and 1369). Instances, are not lacking within our State where, for relatively minor offences, accused persons have been kept on the leash and directed to appear before the police or the Court for decades or more. Whilst in capital crimes there may be some justification, because of the heinousness of the offence to carry the trial to its logical conclusion, in minor offences injustice is more patent when harassment and hardship is inflicted for waiting for trial for periods longer than what the law envisages as the maximum punishment.

(22.) Coming now to precedent, it is well to recall that the fundamental right of a speedy public trial is in a way a legacy from the letter and spirit of the American Constitution. It is, therefore, significant to notice that in that jurisdiction it has throughout been extended to all criminal prosecutions, irrespective of the nature of the offences and the charges levelled. In Richard M. Smith v. Fred M. Hooey, (1969-21 Law ed 2d 607) (supra) the charge levelled against the accused was merely one of theft. In Peter H. Klopfer v. State of North Carolina, (1967-18 Law ed 2d 1) (supra), the charge, far from being a serious one, was that of a misdemeanour of a criminal trespass, alleging no more than that the accused-defendant had entered a restaurant, and, after being ordered to leave the said premises, he had wilfully and unlawfully refused to do so, knowing that he had no licence therefor. In Robert Dean Dickey v. State of Florida, (1970-26 Law ed 2d 26) (supra) the allegation against the accused was that of robbery. It is unnecessary to multiply individual cases, and, it suffices to recall that of the many other American decisions, referred to in the cases of Ramdaras Ahir (1985 Cri LJ 584) (Pat) and Maksudan Singh (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (FB) (supra), the right had been extended to innumerable non-capital offences as well. It is plain that the American precedent, which, as has been pointed out earlier, is the fountainhead of the concept of speedy public trial, has now consistently extended it without limitation to all offences and all criminal prosecutions.

(23.) Adverting now to our own precedent, it appears to me that the argument that the right to a speedy public trial is confined to capital crimes stems from a plain misconstruction and misapprehension of the true ratio in State of Bihar v. Ramdaras Ahir, (1985 Cri LJ 584) (Pat) (supra) and State of Bihar v. Maksudan Singh, (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (FB) (supra). Therein both the Division Bench and the later Full Bench rightly noticed that they were breaking fresh ground and, therefore, narrowly confined themselves to the specific issues before them, namely, the reversal of acquittal on a capital charge. It was rightly held therein that in constitutional matters it is safer not to stray into academic field, but to remain on the terra firma of a particular case and the facts thereof. Consequently, in both the cases, the Court focused itself on the right of a speedy public trial in the context of capital crimes and more particularly with t . However, this cannot remotely be any warrant for even suggesting, far from holding, that this right has any limitation with regard to the nature of the offences. Indeed in the State v. Maksudan Singh (supra), S. Shamsul Hasan, J., in his concurring judgment expressly noticed and observed as follows:-

"As regards application of the aforesaid principle to the trial for lesser offences Honble the Chief Justice has rightly not entered into any discussion in this appeal. I may, however, add that if a situation arises, then within the ambit of those sections, the principle of speedy trial can certainly be applicable but that will be for some other occasion."

That occasion has now expressly arrived. As noticed earlier, what otherwise is plain on principle and American precedent, seems to be manifest from the decisions of our own Supreme Court as well. It is first well to recall that in the very beginning in Hussainara Khatoon v. The State of Bihar, (AIR 1979 SC 1360 and 1369) (supra), in which Art. 24 of the Constitution was in a way precedentially expanded to include the right of speedy trial within its sweep, the offences were not at all capital ones, but pertained to petty and minor offences, for which the under-trials were allowed to rot in the jails in Bihar for a long time. Their Lordships enunciated the whole concept of speedy trial not in the context of a capital offence, but indeed for minor offences. Therefore, from the very inception this fundamental right has been extended to all offences by the Final Court and not restricted to either serious or the capital ones. In this context, reference may again be made to State of Bihar v. Uma Shanker Kotriwal, AIR 1981 SC 641 , which pertained to a case far from being a capital offence, and was indeed an offence under S.7 of the Essential Commodities Act. Equally, S. Guin v. Grindlays Bank Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 289 , which will call for somewhat elaborate notice hereafter, was also a case of a wholly minor offence under S.341 of the Indian Penal Code, read with S.36-AD of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949.

(24.) To conclude on this aspect, both on principle and precedent, it has to be held that the fundamental right to a speedy public trial extends to all criminal prosecutions for all offences generically, irrespective of their nature. It is not confined or constricted to either serious or capital ones only. The answer to Question No.(1) posed at the very outset is rendered in these terms.

(25.) Coming now to Question No.(2), the core issue is as to what does a speedy public trial in a criminal prosecution truly connote Does it include within it the preceding Police investigations in the case also or is it confined only to the period of time when the portals of the court are entered in a regular trial On principle I am clearly of the opinion that in the majestic sweep of the fundamental right of a speedy public trial in the context of a criminal prosecution, initiated at the States instance, it necessarily connotes all the period from the date of the levelling of the criminal charge to the date of the rendering of the judgment in Court. Unless it is so held, the cherished fundamental right herein would be whittled down to a teasing mirage, where the investigation of the offence itself may protract on for years (as is well manifested in the present case), and, thus rendering the very concept and purpose of a speedy trial purely illusory. Therefore, a speedy trial in a criminal prosecution herein includes within it both the police investigation of the crime and the later adjudication in Court based thereon. By way of analogy, a reference in this context may again be made to the case of Ramdaras Ahir (1985 Cri LJ 584) (Pat) (supra). Therein it was held that the word trial in this concept is not technically confined to the completion of the proceedings in the original trial Court alone, but, equally includes the subsequent substantive appeal therefrom. Thus, if the word trial herein includes the later appeal as well, then on a parity of reasoning, it must equally include the preceding police investigation. In a criminal prosecution initiated by the State, the trial is primarily an adjudication on the basis of the result of the preceding investigation. Herein, it appears to me that in a criminal prosecution launched by the State the preceding investigation and the trial are a closely intertwined integral whole, which is not to be hypertechnically bifurcated.

(26.) Because of the somewhat recent origin of the constitutional right of a speedy trial in our country, there is as yet a paucity or indeed a total absence of precedent on the point. However, American judgments on this issue are wholly unequivocal. In Robert D. Dickey v. The State of Florida, (1970-26 Law ed 2d-26) (supra), Mr. Justice Brannan and Mr. Justice Marshall, in their concurring opinion, observed as under:-

"Does the speedy trial guarantee apply to all delays between a defendants arrest and his sentencing The view that it does is not without support in the wording of the Sixth Amendment. The Constitution says that an accused is entitled to a speedy trial in all criminal prosecutions. Can it be that one becomes an accused only after he is indicted, or that the Sixth Amendment subdivides prosecution into various stages, granting the right to speedy trial in some and withholding it in others In related contexts involving other clauses of the Sixth Amendment, we have held that the prosecution of an accused can begin before his indictment; for example, in Escobedo v. Illinois, (1964) 378 US 478, 490, 12 Law Ed 2d 977, 986, 84 SCT 1758, we spoke of the time when investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect. And as regards realization of the purposes of the Speedy Trial Clause, the possibility of harm to interests protected by the clause is certainly great whenever delay occurs after arrest."

In fact, the Court went further to observe that the speedy trial guarantee even covered a delay prior to the arrest or indictment of the accused in the following words:-

"Accordingly, some of the interests protected by the Speedy Trial Clause can be threatened by delay prior to arrest or indictment. Thus, it may be that for the purposes of the clause to be fully realized, it must apply to any delay in the criminal process that occurs after the Government decides to prosecute and has sufficient evidence for arrest or indictment."

The Court went on further to hold-

"The police and prosecutor are not the only Governmental officials whose conduct is governed by the Speedy Trial Clause; it covers that of Court personnel as well, e.g., Pollard v. United States, (1957) 352 US 354 (supra), Marshall v. United States, (1964) 119 US App DC 83, 337 F.2d 119. And the public officials responsible for delay may not even be associated with law enforcement agencies or the Courts. Delay, for example, may spring from a refusal by other branches of Government to provide these agencies and the judiciary with the resources necessary for speedy trials. See e.g. King v. United States, (1959) 105 US App DC 193, 195, 265 F 2d 567, 569."

Then, finally, on this aspect, it was concluded as follows:-

"Arguments of some force can be made that the guarantee attaches as soon as the Government decides to prosecute and has sufficient evidence for arrest or indictment; similar arguments exist that an accused does not lose his right to a speedy trial by silence or inaction, that Governmental delay that might reasonably have been avoided is unjustifiable, and that prejudice ceases to be an issue in speedy trial cases once the delay has been sufficiently long to raise a probability of substantial prejudice. In so far as these arguments are meritorious, they suggest that the speedy trial guarantee should receive a more hospitable interpretation than it has yet been accorded."

(27.) To conclude on this aspect, the answer to question No.2 is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that the right to speedy public trial is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in Court but includes within its sweep the preceding police investigation in a criminal prosecution as well.

(28.) Mr. Chandramauli Kumar Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner in Cr.W.J.C. No.22 of 1986, rightly and painstakingly highlighted that the concern for a speedy trial is not merely an inherited mandate from the American jurisprudence but equally is the inarticulate premise underlying our own Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was pinpointed that both as regards the investigation as also with regard to trial the need for speed is under-written in express terms or by unequivocal necessary implication and, indeed, permeates the whole gamut of the Code in the said context.

(29.) The contention aforesaid is plainly meritorious. Indeed a look back into the legislative history would also indicate the concern of the law epitomised in the adage that justice delayed is justice denied. Even as regards the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 the same was virtually overhauled by the amendment of 1955 to ensure speedier investigations and trials. Particularly with respect to the trials of sessions cases the commitment procedure was virtually abolished and in any case simplified in order to quicken up their pace. The subsequent 41st Report of the Law Commission, which is the foundational base upon which the changes in the present Code of Criminal Procedure , 1973, have been wrought, is clearly indicative of the need for speed in this context in modern times.

(30.) Focusing oneself on the existing Code our attention was drawn to S.157(1) thereof, which is in the terms following:-

"157. Procedure for Investigation- (1) If, from information received or otherwise, an officer-in-charge of a police station has reasons to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under S.156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender:"

(31.) It is plain from the above that these provisions mandate that in cognizable offences, the investigating officer must forthwith proceed to the spot and without delay take all necessary measures for the discovery and arrest of the offenders. The language herein is peremptory and far from envisaging any delay it seems to brook none whatsoever in both informing the Magistrate of the crime and on launching upon the investigation immediately. Even as regards the completion of the investigation, the insertion of sub-sec.(2) of S.167 is a clear pointer to the legislative mandate in this context. It plainly envisages that the investigation in cases other than those punishable with 10 years or less, must be completed within 60 days and in more serious crimes at best within 90 days. This mandate is on the pain of the sanction that unless this is done, there would be virtually an automatic grant of bail to the accused persons. It is true that the Code does not in terms say that inordinate delay in investigation beyond this period would vitiate the investigation, but, it does be-speak of the legislatures concern about the speedy conclusion of the investigation. That this was the rampant evil, which the legislature wanted to remove by bringing in the amendment in the provisions of S.167(2) in 1973, is well highlighted by the Law Commissions Forty-first Report and the notes on the clauses of the Bill by the Select Committee. It is unnecessary to burden this judgment with the relevant extracts therefrom, but, mere reference thereto would leave no manner of doubt about the legislatures concern and mandate for an expeditious completion of the investigation. At the behest it is visualised in days and months and never at all in terms of years.

(32.) The completion of the investigation is then again mandated by S.173 of the Code, the relevant part whereof reads as under:-

"173. Report of Police Officer on Completion of Investigation- (1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay. (2) (i) As soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating- xxx xxx xxx (ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given. xxx xxx xxx It is obvious from the above that the emphasis on speed is the underlying premise with regard to the completion of the investigation. This is directed to be done without unnecessary delay and no further time gap is allowed to the forwarding of the report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence."

(33.) Now what appears to be the spirit of the Code with regard to investigation stands concretised by statutory rules issued under Ss.7 and 12 of the Police Act, 1861. The Bihar Police Manual, 1978 consisting of three volumes and containing exhaustive provisions framed under the aforesaid Act, has been expressly declared to be binding on all police officers and is an authoritative guide to other concerned officers of the Government. Rule 173 in volume I of the said Police Manual pertains to the mandatory direction with regard to the completion of investigation. Appendix 3 in Volume III thereof then classifies offences into categories A and B. So significant are these statutory mandates that it seems necessary to quote the relevant part of R.173:-

"173. Completion of investigation.- (a) Investigation shall be completed with the least possible delay. Where cases are unimportant, where prima facie insertion of Chapter XXXVI in the Code a further highlighting of the importance of speed in this context is brought in by prescribing a period of limitation in the trial of offences as well. This enshrines the principle that delay would bar a prosecution, irrespective of the merits of the case. Thus, delay in a way is recognised as the denial of justice and beyond the prescribed period it would entitle the citizens to claim his freedom and to remove the overhanging sword of Damocles over his head. It is true that, as a beginning, the limitation is confined to offences punishable up to 3 years and not beyond, but, the principle enshrined therein is clear and categorical that the same is applicable to all offences of this class. It recognises the golden rule that the passage of long time by itself (without going into the niceties of the question whether it was caused by the prosecution or the accused) would free the citizen from the shackles of an overly delayed investigation.

(38.) The aforesaid discussion would manifest that the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Bihar Police Manual not only embody the spirit of a speedy public trial but, in fact, epitomise it by express provisions mandating speedy and expeditious disposal within specified time limits. The somewhat curious argument of Mr. Mani Lall, the learned counsel for the respondent State, that giving teeth to the fundamental right of speedy public trial under Art.21 would in a way conflict with the statutory provisions of the Code seems to me as wholly illfounded and has to be rejected.

(39.) To sum up on this aspect, the answer to question No.3 is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that speedy investigation and trial are equally mandated by both the letter and the spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(40.) One may now advert to question No.4, namely, whether the ratio in Ramdaras Ahirs case (1985 Cri LJ 584) (Pat) (supra) and Maksudan Singhs case (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (FB) (supra) are applicable equally to all offences and irrespective of the fact whether the proceeding is a trial or an appeal against acquittal. A substantial ground under this question stands already covered by the discussion on question No.1. Therein it has already been held that the fundamental right to speedy public trial is equally attracted to all offences generically and is not confined to only capital offences. Once that is so, then a fortiori whatever was said in Ramdaras Ahirs and Maksudan Singhs cases in the context of capital offences would be mutatis mutandis attracted to other offences in criminal prosecutions as well. Therefore, as regards the nature of the offence, namely, whether it is punishable with death or imprisonment for life alone no distinction as to the applicability of speedy trial rule can be drawn.

(41.) Learned counsel for the respondent State, Mr. Mani Lall had, however, strenuously contended that Ramdaras Ahirs case (1985 Cri LJ 584) (Pat) and Maksudan Singhs case (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (FB) are confined only to the reversal of acquittals in appeal and, therefore, are not attracted to the original trials as yet in process. It was submitted that the rule therein was applicable only where either life because of a sentence of death or liberty because of the sentence of imprisonment for life was directly endangered by reason of the reversal of an earlier acquittal. Reliance was placed on the Full Bench judgment in Ajaib Singh Lehna Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 Punj 309 for a constricted construction of procedure established by law.

(42.) With respect, it seems to me that the stand taken on behalf of the State in this context is both tenuous and finical. The Division Bench in Ramdaras Ahirs case (1985 Cri LJ 584) (Pat) rightly took notice of the fact that since it was breaking new ground, the observations in the judgment would be confined to the parameters of a reversal of a clean acquittal on a capital charge punishable with death or life imprisonment alone. This aspect was elaborated later in the Full Bench in the case of Maksudan Singh, (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) wherein in no uncertain terms it was clarified in both the concurring judgments that the principles enunciated were not to be pointlessly constricted or confined. It was pointedly observed as under:-

"Since the issue in Ramdaras Ahirs case had arisen only in the context of a capital charge and the reversal of an acquittal thereon, the examination and the adjudication of the question was confined to a case of that nature. From that it does not follow that some part of its rationale or the ratio itself would not be equally attracted in cases other than those on a capital charge or ones not directly involving the reversal of an acquittal. However, these are issues which can only be justifiably examined when they properly arise in a case and cannot be pronounced upon in an academic vacuum."

(43.) It is manifest from the above that the Full Bench itself clarified and visualised the applicability of the ratio therein in a larger field. However, for the hallowed reasons of judicial restraint it rightly declined to pronounce on issues which did not directly arise, considering the fact that it was treading the sensitive field of constitutional adjudication. Learned counsel for the respondent State, therefore, are on the weakest wicket in contending that Maksudan Singhs case (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (FB) is a bar to the extension of the principles enunciated therein when in fact it clearly observed to the contrary as aforequoted. It is plain that the issues which the Full Bench had visualised have now expressly arisen and are no more in an academic vacuum and consequently have not only to be justifiably examined but have to be lucidly adjudicated upon. Once it is held as it has been in no uncertain terms that the fundamental right or speedy public trial is attracted to all offences and the trials therefor, it is a logical corollary therefrom that the ratios of Maksudan Singhs and Ramdaras Ahirs cases (1985 Cri LJ 548) (Pat) would be automatically extended to be applicable. In this context also it is well to recall that the innumerable American precedents referred to above have drawn not the least distinction betwixt the original trial or any acquittal therein and reversal thereafter. The attempt of the respondent State to evade the applicability of the ratio in the twin case aforesaid must, therefore, be repelled. Learned counsel for the respondent States reliance on the observations in Ajaib Singh Lehna Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 Punj 309 (FB) is ill-placed in view of the subsequent binding precedent of the Final Court. It is significant to notice that the concept of Art.21 stands precedentially expanded. After Maneka Gandhis case AIR 1978 SC 597 and the long line of precedents thereafter. AIR 1950 SC 27 (Gopalan A.K. v. State of Madras), on which reliance had been placed by the Full Bench has now been overriding, and this development has already been noticed with some detail in Ramdaras Ahirs case (1985 Cri LJ 584) (Pat). It is unnecessary to traverse that ground and in view of a catena of Supreme Court decisions expanding and virtually re-writing Art.21, it is vain on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent State to hearken back to the position more than 34 years earlier, which was noticed by the Full Bench in AIR 1952 Punj 309 (supra). That case in no way gives aid to or advances the case of the respondent State.

(44.) To sum up on this aspect, the answer to question No.4 is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that the ratio in Ramdaras Ahirs (1985 Cri LJ 584) (Pat) and Maksudan Singhs case (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (FB) are mutatis mutandis applicable equally to all offences and irrespective of the fact whether the proceedings are a trial or an appeal against acquittal.

(45.) That brings us to the last but not the least of the significant issues, namely, whether an outer limit to concretise the right to speedy trial is envisioned by principle or precedent. Much ado was indeed raised on behalf of the respondent State that laying down any time limit, even an outside one, in this context would be tantamount to legislation in the thin guise of interpretation. I am unable to agree. Unless the fundamental right to speedy trial is to be whittled down into a mere pious wish, its enforceability in Court must at least be indicated by an outer limit to which an investigation and the trial in a criminal prosecution may ordinarily extend. Holding otherwise would, to my mind, be merely paying lip service to a precious right whilst denuding it of the benefits of its actual enforceability. As concretely in the present case, the investigation and trial have already extended to over nearly 20 years and the end is not yet in sight. To still say that even in such a fact-situation no time-limit can be suggested appears to me as doctrinaire, and an attitude remote from reality. Perhaps our State of Bihar is symptomatic of the heartrending delays in investigations and trials and the consequential failure of justice occasioned thereby. It is here that even trials on capital charges may drag on and on whilst an indigent accused unable to furnish bail may suffer imprisonment more than the maximum prescribed by law. It is here that investigations sometimes drag on in the dossiers of the police, which may well be called archives and not police records, because cases have languished without any charge-sheet or final report for decades on. It is, therefore, perhaps symbolic that it should be here as well that remedies have to be fashioned to give teeth and a meaning to the right of speedy public trial now enshrined in Art.21 of our Constitution. It is here more than elsewhere that it should be ensured that the meaningful words of the Constitution are not rendered an idle mockery whilst men sit and hear each other groan in sub-human conditions which are called our jails.

(46.) Now apart from principle, it appears to me that the petitioners are on so sound a footing on precedent, both persuasive and binding, that any further elaboration is not called for. A similar argument against a time-frame was raised in Ramdaras Ahirs case (1985 Cri LJ 584) (Pat) and noticed and repelled as under:-

"That brings us to the crucial but somewhat sensitive question of reasonably quantifying the delay which would ordinarily infract the fundamental right to a speedy trial. I am not unaware that it is no easy task to precedentially lay down a somewhat inflexible rule about the precise quantum of delay which would entitle the accused for invocation of the constitutional right. Yet, however great be the difficulties, this significant duty cannot be shirked."

The aforesaid view has then been reiterated in Maksudan Singhs case (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (FB) and it is unnecessary to traverse the whole ground over again. It would suffice to recall that more than 30 years ago in Machander v. Hydearabad State, AIR 1955 SC 792 it was observed-

"While it is incumbent on us to see that the guilty do not escape it is even more necessary to see that persons accused of crime are not indefinitely harassed. They must be given a fair and impartial trial and while every reasonable latitude must be given to those concerned with the detections of crime and entrusted with the administration of justice, limits must be placed on the lengths to which they may go."

Again in a case from our State - State of Bihar v. Uma Shankar Kotriwal, AIR 1981 SC 641 - their Lordships have reiterated:-

"It may well be that the respondents themselves were responsible in a large measure for the slow pace of the case inasmuch as quite a few orders made by the trial Magistrate were challenged in higher Courts, but then there has to be a limit to the period for which criminal litigation is allowed to go on at the trial stage."

Then again in Hussainara Khatoon v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1379, Bhagwati, J., as his Lordship then was, indicated a time frame in these words:-

"Even a delay of one year in the commencement of the trial is bad enough, how much worse could it be when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7 or even 10 years. Speedy trial is of the essence of criminal justice and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice."

(47.) It appears to me that the view this Court took in Ramdaras Ahirs case (1985 Cri LJ 584) and Maksudan Singhs case (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (FB) now stands sanctified and fortified by the recent judgment of their Lordships in S. Guin v. Grindlays Bank Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 289 . The facts thereof may call for a somewhat pointed notice. The accused persons therein were charged under S.341 I.P.C. read with S.36 AD of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 for an offence allegedly committed by them on the 31st of October 1977. There was no delay in investigation and trial and the Magistrate, by his judgment dated the 27th of June, 1978 (i.e., after barely eight months), acquitted the accused persons. An appeal against the acquittal was taken before the Calcutta High Court which was apparently admitted but could not come up for final hearing till nearly six years thereafter. On the 19th December; 1984, the High Court set aside the acquittal and remanded the case for re-trial afresh. On appeal by the accused appellants their Lordships set aside the HC judgment and restored the acquittal with the following unequivocal and categoric observations:-

"We are of the view that having regard to the nature of the acts alleged to have been committed by the appellants and other attendant circumstances, this was a case in which the High Court should have directed the dropping of the proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under S.482, Criminal Procedure Code even if for some reason it came to the conclusion that the acquittal was wrong. A fresh trial nearly seven years after the alleged incident is bound to result in harassment and abuse of judicial process."

and again-

"We are of the view that following the above principle the High Court should have dismissed the appeal before it even if it disagreed with the view taken by the trial Court with regard to the gist of the offence punishable under S.341 Indian Penal Code, having regard to the inordinate delay of nearly six years that had ensued after the judgment of acquittal, the nature and magnitude of the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellants and the difficulties that may have to be encountered in securing the presence of witnesses in a case of this nature nearly 8 years after the incident."

(48.) In the light of the above and on in-depth analysis of the judgment there remains no manner of doubt that the inarticulate premises of the right to speedy trial and the necessity of spelling out an outer limit beyond which a prosecution in original trial cannot be allowed to trespass have been spelt out in the brief and yet categorical judgment. Indeed, when viewed in the larger prospect their Lordships seemed to have spelt out that delay of years even dehors any question of default would defeat justice and, therefore, a trial beyond a period of 7 years from the date of the offence is not to be at all countenanced. Delay was by itself the ground for setting aside the order of the High Court without any attempt to apportion the causes thereof or any blame in this context appertaining to the accused. Indeed on facts of the case there was no delay whatsoever in the investigation and the trial which was completed within eight months. The default, if any, could only be laid at the door of the High Court wherein the appeal against acquittal had remained pending for six years. Indeed, it was expressly noticed as follows:-

"The pendency of the Criminal Appeal for six years before the High Court is itself a regrettable feature of this case. In addition to it, the order directing retrial has resulted in serious prejudice to the appellants."

Nevertheless their Lordships in no uncertain terms took the view that they would not countenance the prolongation of the trial of the accused beyond a period of seven years from the date of the offence.

(49.) I am inclined to the view that the aforesaid authoritative enunciation saves us the difficult task of determining a time-frame in this context. Without more, I take that as the firm guideline or the outer time limit spelt out by their Lordships themselves in this situation. Indeed, they did not enter into either the peculiarity of the case or other factors nor the necessities of balancing the apportionment of blame for the delay. In my view, they have rightly held that the mere passage of seven years and the hanging of the sword of Damocles over the accuseds head entitled him to be released from the travail of the prosecution. The violation of the fundamental right to speedy public trial seems to be the underlying silent rationale of the judgment. Therefore, without independently investigation and looking for a date (dead) line, I would read the judgment in S. Guin v. Grindlays Bank Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 289 as a prescription by the final Court of an outer limit of seven years for concluding of the original trial in offences other than the capital ones.

(50.) A sharp note of caution must be sounded. The aforesaid finding must not be misunderstood or misconstrued to mean that a delay of less than seven years would not in any case amount to prejudice. Indeed, what is sought to be laid down is the extreme outer limit whereafter grave prejudice to the accused must be presumed and the infraction of the constitutional right would be plainly established. Really, I am somewhat hesitant in spelling out even the aforesaid outer time limit which, perhaps, errs on the side of strictitude. But since we are following binding precedent, the same has to be unreservedly accepted. Nor is it sought to be laid down that in a lesser period than seven years an accused person would not be able to establish circumstances pointing to the patent prejudice which may entitle him to invoke the guarantee of speedy public trial under Art.21. That is a question which can be properly considered and adjudicated where it may expressly arise. In both the cases before us the delay is admittedly even far beyond the outer limit of seven years. What indeed is sought to be laid down here is that beyond this period of seven years the continuation of the investigation and trial would bring in the weightiest presumption that the enshrined right of speedy public trial is violated and the prosecution should be halted in its tracks. This would per se be indicative of prejudice. Thereafter the burden would automatically shift heavily on to the shoulders of the State to show that such grave delay was either entirely the handiwork of the accused himself or was occasioned by such special and exceptional circumstances so as to merit condonation thereof. A criminal prosecution by the State cannot be allowed to become an inquisitorial persecution of the accused. Nor can a fair speedy trial be allowed to become an unending travail for him. 50A. In this context it is equally apt to harken back to the state of the law in America. In response to the United States Supreme Court decision in Barker v. Wingo, (1972-33 Law ed 2d 101) the Speedy Trial Act, 1974, was enacted by the legislature. In defining the right to speedy trial, the time period to be considered is the period between trial and either arrest or indictment, whichever comes first. The time-frame laid out in the aforesaid Speedy Trial Act of 1974 must be noticed in the words of Herman Pritchett, in his well-known treatise on the American Constitution (TMH Edn. 1977, at page 468):

"The Sixth Amendment spells out certain other protections of trial procedure. An accused is entitled to speedy and public trial. Of necessity speed is a relative concept, subordinate to the broader protections of the amendment. The Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, adopted over opposition of the Department of Justice, requires that a person arrested be charged within thirty days of the arrest and arraigned within ten days of being charged and that trial begins within sixty days of the arraignment. The Act provides for some circumstances under which elapsed time would not be counted towards the 100 day period. Charges would be dismissed against any defendant who moved for dismissal after the speedy trial period had elapsed and trial had not begun. Kbnpfer v. North Carolina, (1967 18 Law ed 2d 1) held that the speedy trial provisions is also applicable to the States."

(51.) Ere I come to a close, I cannot help expressing some surprise at the somewhat vehement stand taken on behalf of the respondent State against very right of a speedy public trial. It has been repeatedly asserted, and, in our view rightly, that a prompt trial is in the interest of the prosecution itself. Inordinate delays only tend to fade memories and bring in a host of factors which militate against the successful culmination of a criminal prosecution. One would, therefore, have imagined that the respondent State would, in its own interest, be solicitous of speed in criminal prosecutions launched by it. Equally it seems to me that a prompt trial is in the interest of the accused and a fair defence as well. Though not unoften an attempt is even made on behalf of the accused persons to gain time and protract the proceedings, it is axiomatic that an accused may also be hampered in his defence by too long a passage of time. Equally a speedy trial avoids the stigma of a long pending accusation and the obloquy of a criminal against the citizen if he happens to be innocent. However, as has been authoritatively stated, even leaving out the interest of the prosecution or the defence, there is a societal interest in ensuring a speedy public trial. Indeed, public weal cannot be allowed to be whittled down for considerations of any private advantage.

(52.) To conclude on this aspect, the answer to question No.5 is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that an outer time limit to concretise the right to speedy public trial is envisioned both by principle and precedent. It is further held that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones plinly violates the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Art.21.

(53.) To finally sum up, the answers to all the five questions formulated at the outset are rendered in the terms below and it is held-

(i) That both on principle and precedent the fundamental right to a speedy public trial extends to all criminal prosecutions for all offences generically, irrespective of their nature. It is not confined or constricted to either serious or capital offences only. (ii) That the right to a speedy public trial is applicable not only to actual proceedings in Court but includes within its sweep the preceding police investigation in a criminal prosecution as well. (iii) That a speedy investigation and trial are equally mandated both by the letter and spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (iv) That the ratios in Ramdaras Ahirs (1985 Cri LJ 584) (Pat) and Maksudan Singhs cases (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (FB) are mutatis mutandis applicable equally to all offences and irrespective of the fact whether the proceedings are a trial or an appeal against acquittal. (v) That an outer limit to concretise the right to speedy public trial is envisioned both by principle and precedent. A callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Art.21.

(54.) Now applying the above, it is common ground that in Cr.W.J.C.262/85 the first information report was recorded as far back as the 20th of November, 1966. The list has thus entered its 20th anniversary. The petitioner has borne the harrowing burden of a prolonged investigation and trial for nearly two decades and if the prosecutions plea of further time to either prove or reconstruct the alleged sanction order is to be allowed, one cannot easily forsee the further delays in the matter. It is the admitted position that the petitioner who is a public servant of gazetted rank has lain under the shadow of a criminal charge all this while which has wrecked his service career. It is not even remotedly established that the delay in the investigation and the subsequent trial can at all be laid at the door of the petitioner. Indeed the boot is entirely on the other leg. The prosecution despite the closure of the case a number of times by the trial Court went up in revision and had the issue reopened. There has been no absconding or any other obstructive tactics by the petitioner herein which could even remotely point an accusing finger at him. On the facts no extraordinary or exceptional reason for the delay could be pointed out by the prosecution and indeed the tardiness and nonchalance with which the prosecution has been conducted appear manifest on the record. It is thus plain that the case herein comes squarely within the rules enunciated above. The constitutional right to speedy trial by a fair, just and reasonable procedure now recognised under Art.21 of the Constitution stands plainly violated. As has been authoritatively laid down in Maksudan Singhs case (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (FB), the petitioner is entitled to an unconditional release and the charges levelled against him would necessarily fall to the ground. The petition is consequently allowed and the investigation and the trial against the petitioner are hereby quashed. It is, however, made clear that this in no way would affect any departmental proceeding or penalties already instituted or contemplated against the petitioner.

(55.) What has been said above applies mutatis mutandis to Cr.W.J.C.22/86 (Dilip Kumar Dey v. The State of Bihar). Admittedly therein the case was registered against the petitioner on the 6th of September, 1975 nearly 11 years ago on charges under Ss.409, 420, 467, 468 and 471 I.P.C. After an unwarrantedly prolonged investigation a charge-sheet was submitted in Court on the 19th of December, 1980. It is common ground that thereafter despite the passage of more than five and a half years the trial has proceeded at so tardy a pace that there appears no sign of a conclusion in the foreseeable future. The petitioner herein admittedly was a responsible officer of the nationalised Punjab National Bank, who has laboured under the cloud of indignity occasioned by a criminal prosecution for more than a decade. Nothing whatsoever could be pointed out, far from being established, to indicate that all this delay was in any way due to the petitioners default. No extraordinary or exceptional circumstances could be shown on behalf of the prosecution which could possibly condone the prolongation of the investigation or trial beyond its 11th year. On this record, therefore, the consequent delay with prejudice is intolerable as a matter of fact and impermissible as a matter of law. Herein as well the constitutional right of a speedy public trial stands plainly violated. The Writ Petition has, therefore, to be allowed and the proceedings against the petitioner are hereby quashed.

(56.) S. SHAMSUL HASAN, J.:- I cannot but agree entirely with what has been found and held by the Honble C.J. and virtually nothing is left for me to add but I am tempted to say a few words of my own. In my concurrent judgment in the case of Maksudan Singh (AIR 1986 Pat 38 ) (FB) (supra) I had expressed the hope that the principles on which that case was decided would be extended to criminal trials also and I had hoped that generally as in the context of Government appeal the period would come down to two years, instead of ten years, as fixed in that decision. This decision is the fulfilment of that hope, though not in full measure, because speedy decisions in appeals pending in the appellate Courts, wherever they may be, have still to be dealt with on an appropriate occasion.

(57.) Astonishing spectacle was the action of the State defending the action of the investigating and prosecution agencies, who, it has been held, were responsible for the delay. The basic concept of any criminal jurisprudence, modern or ancient, based on the norms fixed and set by the rules of law and justice , has never countenanced the delay in the disposal of an indictment against a person. In this country, where Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence still holds the field, it has never justified unwarranted delay in investigation and/or trial. If the State authorities are proceeding on an unwarranted and preconceived impression that a person against whom they submit an indictment, is guilty, then it is incumbent upon them to provide necessary machinery, infrastructure and other requistes, including an efficient properly manned investigating and prosecuting agency, in order to get the matter decided one way or the other, as early as possible, otherwise trials tend to become punishment in themselves, as is the picture apparent in the present applications, when a person in one case has stood suspended for the last 20 years from his job, facing the hardships that it entails, and for no fault of his, but, entirely to the inadequacies of the State and investigating and prosecution agency.

(58.) I wish to reiterate that even without relying on the principles of American Constitution speedy investigation and trial are the right of all persons accused of having committed an offence, a right that is fundamental and inherent. It has now become more so by the adoption of the 6th Amendment of the American Constitution by the precedential mandate of the Supreme Court. The days are gone and certainly in India where prisoners were consigned to the dungeon and forgotten till they came out as corpses. The sooner the State authorities realise the situation and take necessary steps in this regard the better it would be from all points of view whether it is the prosecution or the defence. The talk of rule of law and social justice in regard to those, who are consigned to jails, pending trials or those, who are facing protracted trials, the protraction being due to no fault of theirs will become fantacy and a myth.

(59.) Before concluding, I may draw the attention of the trial Courts to the fact that this court has also handed down several decisions indicating the steps they should take to avoid protraction of trials. They will not be blame free if they do not observe those procedures and control the proceedings. RAMNANDANPRASAD, J. :- I entirely agree with my Lord the Chief Justice. Order accordingly.