1. The petitioner is a subscriber of a telephone bearing No.576240. He received demands under bills dated 11-11-1987, 11-01-1988, and 11-03-1988 for Rs.15,919/-, Rs.17,448/- and Rs.21,097/-, respectively. According to the petitioner, the demands were inflated to an extent of Rs.26,383/-. As the respondents persisted to recover the amounts demanded, the petitioner instituted a suit O.S.No.78 of 1998 in the Court of the III Additional District Judge, Vijayawada and initially sought for a declaration that the inflated amount as illegal and also sought for a consequential permanent injunction to restrain the defendants therein from disconnecting the telephone. The petitioner amended the plaint in I.A.No.670 of 1998 and thereby sought for a direction to refer the matter to an arbitrator for arbitration under Section 7-B of the Indian Telegraphs Act, 1885 (for brevity the). The Civil Court while declining to grant relief of declaration as to the legality of the demands, however, granted relief of permanent injunction. The suit was partly decreed by judgment dated 21-10-1998 by directing the 4th defendant to appoint an arbitrator and the defendants 1 to 3 to refer the dispute to the arbitrator so appointed. The court directed that the arbitrator should be appointed within one month from the date of the decree. The 2nd respondent, thereupon, issued orders No.13-2/24 to 36 (Arb)/2000-TR (25), dated 09-05-2000, and appointed the 1st respondent as arbitrator. Although as per the Civil Court decree dated 21-10-1998, arbitrator was required to be appointed within one month, appointment was made after a long lapse of time by orders dated 09-05-2000 which is apparently beyond the time stipulated in the decree. Therefore, the petitioner took an objection and called upon the respondents to recall the appointment of the 1st respondent. However, the 1st respondent proceeded with arbitral proceedings and passed an award dated 26-11-2001 and held the petitioner liable. The present writ petition is filed challenging the orders of the 2nd respondent, appointing the 1st respondent as arbitrator and the Arbitration Award passed by the 1st respondent as well.

2. Heard both sides.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the appointment of the 1st respondent as arbitrator by orders dated 09-05-2000, is invalid as opposed to the decree which required the appointment to be made within a month from the date of decree. The decree, since not appealed against and the same having become final, is binding on the respondents and the 2nd respondent, since failed to appoint the arbitrator within the stipulated time, waived his right to appoint the arbitrator. It is further submitted that the petitioner could not participate in the arbitration proceedings as he raised jurisdictional objection and awaited ruling on this issue, but the 1st respondent without ruling on the objection, passed the award. It is, therefore, in the alternative contended that the award is violative of the principles of natural justice.

4. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, contended that the arbitrator could not be appointed within the time stipulated in the decree for valid reasons. According to the learned counsel, certified copy of the judgment and decree was applied for by the counsel on 16-12-1999 and it was delivered on 24-12-1999. The office of the respondents received it on 12-01-2001, whereupon, there was inter departmental consultation which resulted in the delay. It is further contended that the 2nd respondent, dehors the decree, is competent under Section 7-B of the Act, to appoint an arbitrator. It is therefore, contended that the appointment of arbitrator and the arbitration award as well are legal and valid.

5. The Act is an enactment dealing with law relating to "Telegraphs" in India. Under Section 4 of the Act, the Central Government is conferred with exclusive privilege of establishing, maintaining and working telegraphs. Under Section 5 of the Act, power is conferred on the Central Government to take possession of licence, the telegraphs and to order interception of messages in public interest. Under Section 6 of the Act, the Central Government is authorized to establish and maintain a telegraph upon any part of the land of the railway company. Section 6-A of theauthorizes the Central Government to notify the rates at which and the other conditions and restrictions subject to which messages can be transmitted to any country outside India. Under Section 7 of the Act, power is conferred on the Central Government to make Rules. Under Section 7-B of the Act, the Central Government is authorized to appoint arbitrator in relation to disputes concerning the usage of telegraphic lines etc., between the telegraph authority and the persons for whose benefit the line has been provided. Under Section 8 of the Act, the Central Government is conferred with power to revoke the licence granted under the. There are other provisions, which are not relevant for the purpose of the present case.The Act provides for grant of licence to use the telegraph lines, for levy of charges for using such lines and also provides for remedy for resolution of disputes arising out of the usage of the telegraphic lines, confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Central Government and the is thus self contained.

6. Section 7-B of thewhich is relevant to the present case is as under:

"(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telephone line, appliance or apparatus arises between Telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by an arbitration and shall, for the purpose of determination be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this Section.

(2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under Sub-S.(1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court."

7. The petitioner raised dispute and challenged the correctness of the demand, apparently, on the ground of malfunctioning of the telephone line. Such a dispute is an arbitral dispute falling under the provisions of Section 7-B of the. It provides for a remedy to resolve such a dispute by an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government under the provisions of Section 7-B of theand the award of such an arbitrator is conclusive between the parties to the dispute. The award passed under Section 7-B of theshall not be questioned in any Court, thus giving finality to the Award.

8. Under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Courts subject to the other provisions of the Code have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature, but, however, not competent to try matters of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.

9. In view of the fact that the dispute, as noted above, falls within the provisions of Section 7-B of thewhich also provides for statutory remedy of referring the dispute to the arbitrator, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred impliedly and the Civil Court is not competent to deal with the matters falling under Section 7-B of the. The Supreme Court after referring to various decisions, held in Chief Engineer, Hydel Project and Others Vs. Ravinder Nath and Others 2008 (2) S.C.C. 350 that where a statute provides for a special remedy, the Civil Courts jurisdiction is excluded. In that case a suit was filed in the Civil Court for declaration to the effect that orders of termination/retrenchment of services of plaintiffs were null and void and that they should be reinstated with backwages. The suit was decreed and confirmed in the appeals. The Apex Court, however, held that the relief sought for was an industrial dispute and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction. The ratio of this judgment applies to the case on hand. Therefore, in the instant case, the direction of the Civil Court to appoint an arbitrator is liable to be held as without jurisdiction. The Civil Court being conscious of the fact, has also observed that it is not competent to appoint arbitrator in view of the provisions of Section 7-B of the.

10. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that the Civil Court has, in fact, not appointed the arbitrator, but instead, directed the 2nd respondent to make the appointment. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that such a direction is within the competence of the Civil Court.

11. It is to be noted that when the Civil Court is held to be incompetent to deal with the matter, a decree passed by such Court is a coram non judis. When the principal relief itself cannot be granted by the Court, as a necessary corollary, no relief ancillary thereto also cannot be granted. In the present case, not only the Civil Court directed appointment of arbitrator, but it mandated that such appointment should be made within a particular time limit. Section 7-B of thedoes not place any such fetters on the exercise of jurisdiction by the Central Government. The Court by directing the appointment within a time frame acted, without jurisdiction. Thus the appointment of arbitrator which has been made after the time stipulated by the Civil Court cannot be held to be invalid.

12. A perusal of the order dated 09-05-2000 whereby the arbitrator has, in fact, been appointed would disclose that such appointment has been made in exercise of powers conferred under Section 7B of the. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that the order refers to the Civil Court decree and hence appointment should be understood as made pursuant to the decree. It is true that the said order also refers to the decree of the Civil Court. But the same cannot be construed as excluding the power of the 2nd respondent conferred by the statute under Section 7-B of the. Merely because a reference is made to the decree of the Civil Court, the appointment cannot be construed as having been made under the decree of the Civil Court. Therefore, it is to be held that the impugned order to the extent of appointing the 1st respondent as an arbitrator is legal.

13. The petitioner, however, did not participate in the arbitration proceedings. As soon as he received the orders dated 09-05-2000 appointing the 1st respondent as an arbitrator, under the bona fide belief that the appointment is violative of the decree, made a representation dated 19-05-2000 and requested for recalling the appointment. He further appeared before the 1st respondent and also raised objection dated 06-09-2001 as to his jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings. The 1st respondent in all fairness should have responded to the objection raised by the petitioner and informed him one way or the other which would have enabled him to participate in the proceedings and to defend his case on merits. The 1st respondent should have ruled his jurisdiction and called upon the petitioner to enter his defence. As the 1st respondent failed to do so, it is to be held that the petitioner had no opportunity to defend his case on merits. In this view of the matter, the arbitration award dated 26-11-2001 is liable to be set aside.

14. In the result, the writ petition is allowed in part in the following terms:

1. The order of the 2nd respondent No.13-2/24 to 36 (Arb)/2000-TR (25), dated 09-05-2000, is held to be legal and valid;

2. The arbitration award passed by the 1st respondent dated 26-11-2001 is set aside;

3. The respondents 1 and 2 are at liberty to proceed with the arbitral proceedings afresh after due notice to the petitioner, and

4. There shall be no order as to costs.