1. This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 06.02.2013 passed by the learned Ad-hoc Additional District & Sessions Judge (FTC), Baripada in S.T. Case No.18/105 of 2012 convicting the appellant for offence punishable U/S 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the “IPC”) and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- in default whereof, to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.) for a further period of six months for offence U/S 302 of the IPC while acquitting him of the charge for commission of offence U/S 307 of the IPC.

2. The prosecution case as unravelled is that on 12.11.2011 at about 1.00 P.M. in the afternoon at village Andiasahi, while the deceased-Mangal Hansda was passing through the house of the convict Madan Hansda, the convict assaulted on the head of the deceased by giving successive blows with a ploughshare, and thereby killed him at the spot.

On this incident, P.W.4 Bangi Hansda, the wife of the deceased lodged an F.I.R. under Ext.1 being scribed by P.W.1 before OIC, Kaptipada P.W.9-Jayanta Kumar Behera, who took up the investigation of the case and accordingly examined the witnesses, prepared the spot map, seized two ploughshares from the possession of the convict after his apprehension, held inquest over the dead body of the deceased and sent it for post-mortem examination. P.W.9 also collected and seized the incriminating materials and got the convict medically examined after his arrest. On conclusion of investigation, P.W.9 submitted charge sheeted against the convict for commission of offence punishable U/Ss. 302/307 of the IPC for the charge of murder of Mangal Hansda and attempting to the life of P.W.8- Ghasia Hansda.

2.1 Finding sufficient materials, the learned S.D.J.M., Udala took cognizance of offences U/Ss. 302/307 of the IPC and committed the accused-convict to the Court of Sessions and the record being received on transfer, the learned Ad-hoc Additional District & Sessions Judge (FTC), Baripada proceeded with the trial by framing charge against the accused for the aforesaid offences, to which the convict pleaded not guilty. This is how the trial commenced.

3. In support of the charge, the prosecution examined P.Ws. 1 to 9 and proved the documents under Exts. 1 to 13 as against no evidence whatsoever by the defence. Of the witnesses examined by the prosecution, P.W.4 is the informant-cum-widow of the deceased as well as an eye witness to the occurrence, whereas P.W.1 is the scribe of the F.I.R. and also a witness to seizure. P.W.2 is the sister of the informant and claims to be an eye witness to the occurrence. P.W.8 is the person to whom the convict has attempted to kill with the ploughshare by chasing him. P.W.3 is the doctor, who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased. P.W.6 is another doctor, who had examined & furnished the injury report of the convict. P.Ws.5 and 7 are the post occurrence witnesses and lastly, P.W.9 is the Investigating Officer.

4. The plea of the convict in the trial was denial simplicitor and false implication.

5. After appreciating the evidence on record upon hearing the parties, the learned trial Court by its impugned judgment convicted the appellant for offence U/S 302 of the IPC while acquitting him of the charge for offence U/S 307 of the IPC by mainly relying upon the evidence of sole testimony of the eye witness-cum-P.W.4.

6. In assailing the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, Mrs. C. Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that the learned trial Court has, of course, failed to appreciate the evidence on record to ascertain any motive behind the crime and the impugned judgment is solely on the basis of testimony of P.W.4, who being the wife of the deceased can be considered as an interested witness and there being no evidence with regard to the motive behind the crime, it would hardly be believable as to why the convict would kill the deceased. It is also submitted by the learned Amicus Curiae that if the evidence of P.W.4 is eschewed, there would not be any evidence to bring home the guilt of the appellant for any offence and therefore, the evidence of P.W.4, the sole eye witness being doubtful, benefit of doubt must be extended to the appellant. In summing up her argument, learned Amicus Curiae has prayed to allow the appeal and acquit the appellant of the charge by setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court.

In reply, Mr. S.S. Mohapatra, learned ASC has, however, submitted that there is absolutely no rule of law that the sole testimony of eye witness cannot be acted upon, rather Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that no particular number of witness shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact and in this case, the evidence of P.W.4, the sole eye witness being not only trustworthy, but also credible and thereby, no reason can be assigned to reject such trusted evidence. It is further submitted by the learned ASC that since the offence is squarely established against the convict by the evidence in the standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt, there is absolutely hardly any scope to interfere with the impugned judgment of conviction. Mr. Mohapatra has accordingly prayed to dismiss the appeal by confirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence.

7. After having considered the rival submissions, this Court has of course carefully and meticulously gone through the evidence on record extensively vis-à-vis the impugned judgment of conviction in order to test the legality of the impugned judgment. Since the convict is found to have been convicted for offence punishable U/S 302 of the IPC, this Court considers it imperative at the inception to examine the testimony of the doctor, who had conducted the post-mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased and such doctor in this case is Dr.Anita Singh who being examined as P.W.3 had categorically stated in her evidence that she found (i) one lacerated injury on the scalp on the right temporal region of size 3” x 1” x full bone depth with exposure of brain matters, (ii) two cut injuries on occipital region two inch apart of size 3” x ½” x bone depth with one fissured fracture on occipital bone of size 3” extending up to right temporal bone. According to P.W.3, the injuries were ante-mortem in nature and the cause of death was due to shock and haemorrhage resulted by the injuries to vital organ like brain. On the other hand, nothing was elicited from the mouth of P.W.3 in the cross-examination to support the defence, rather the unsuccessful suggestion by the defence to P.W.3 with regard to the injuries on the head of the deceased being not possible by coming in contact with sharp bamboo splinter of the roof or by fall of a broken branch of tree on the head, would only lend assurance to the prosecution case which is strengthened by the evidence elicited from P.W.3 in the cross- examination that the injuries were possible by heavy and cutting weapons and the ploughshare has sharp cutting edge and both the sides thereof are not sharp cutting. In addition, the evidence of other witnesses also transpires that the deceased was killed due to assault made on him by a ploughshare. On a cumulative reading of evidence of the doctor-P.W.3 together with the evidence of other witnesses including P.W.4, the prosecution is quite convincingly found to have established the homicidal death of the deceased beyond all reasonable doubt.

8. Adverting to the next issue of culpability/ responsibility of the person as to the homicidal death of the deceased, there appears only the solitary evidence of P.W.4, as an eye witness to the occurrence, but the sole testimony of such witness is required to be appreciated with great care and caution, since the conviction of the appellant is for offence U/S 302 of the IPC in which, he has been sentenced to life. However, there is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a witness in view of the provisions of Section 134 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In fact, it is not the number, but the quality of evidence that is material and the evidence always has to be weighed, not to be counted. While appreciating the sole testimony of the eye witness, the Court should be very careful and circumspect in accepting the evidence of such witness, but when the Court finds the evidence of such eye witness to be reliable, credible and trustworthy as well as otherwise acceptable, there would not be any bar for accepting such evidence of truthful witness. Keeping in view the aforesaid principle, while the evidence of P.W.4 is adverted to, it is found that P.W.4 is none other than the wife of the deceased and her evidence transpires that when her husband passed by the side of the house of the convict, he (convict) assaulted on the head of her husband by means of a ploughshare and when her deceased-husband fell down, the convict gave further blows by means of said ploughshare and caused bleeding injuries to the deceased. Seeing the assault, when P.W.4 shouted, some of the villagers gathered there, but the convict did not allow them to reach to the injured and about 10 minutes after, the convict left the spot and P.W.4 along with others went near to the deceased and by that time, the deceased had already died. This is what the main substratum evidence of P.W.4 which was tested in the cross-examination by the defence counsel, but nothing was elicited from the mouth of P.W.4 to discredit her above evidence. In the cross-examination, the State defence counsel has only elicited from the mouth of P.W.4 that the houses of Chandra Hansda, Mahendra and that of the convict situate near by the spot and P.W.2 came to the spot lateron. What is most important is that the learned State defence counsel has explained in the cross-examination of P.W.4 that the accused-convict gave ploughshare blows on the left side head of her husband only to suggest the variance between her evidence and medical evidence. It is, however, true that P.W.3- Dr. Anita Singh has stated that one lacerated injury was found on the right temporal region with exposure of brain matters, but the aforesaid evidence will not come to the aid of the appellant to say that the medical evidence is at variance with ocular evidence, since P.W.4 says about assault on the left side of head of her husband and the medical evidence reveals that the deceased has not only sustained injuries on the scalp on the right temporal region, but also injuries on the occipital region with one fissured fracture of occipital bone. Further, the evidence of P.W.4 also transpires that after the deceased fell down, the convict had given further blows by means of ploughshare and thereby causing bleeding injuries to the deceased. It, therefore, clearly appears that the evidence of P.W.4 is not only reveal the glimpse of assault on the left side of the head of the deceased, but also the assault on the deceased when he fell down and it was not specifically disputed that the further blows given by the convict on the deceased had not hit on his right side of occipital region. It is also not expected from a rustic woman like P.W.4 to precisely state, where the blow struck and how many blows were given to the deceased. This Court, therefore, considers such plea of the appellant to be insignificant and found the evidence of P.W.4 free from any bias.

9. One more issue that has been flagged up by the learned Amicus Curiae is that P.W.4 is an interested witness, but by no stretch of imagination, it can be considered that P.W.4 being the wife of the deceased would normally be reluctant to spare the real assailant by falsely deposing another name. Further, a related witness cannot always be considered as an interested witness, unless his evidence is found to have an embroidery of interestedness on the ground that he would like to secure the punishment of the accused only to settle his own vendetta or bias, but when the evidence of witness, which is found not only to be credible, reliable and acceptable, but also trustworthy, such evidence cannot be taken out of the purview of consideration, while ascertaining the truth. There cannot be any cavil of doubt that in a murder case, the evidence of a truthful witness can be rejected on ground that he is somehow related to the deceased.

10. Another point which has been flagged up by the learned Amicus Curiae is that the absence of motive would render the conviction of the appellant vulnerable, but law has been well settled that when there is direct evidence regarding the assault on the deceased which is credible as well as believable, the question of motive becomes pale and only academic in nature. In this case, the evidence of P.W.4, who is an eye witness to the occurrence reveals as to how the deceased died due to the assault of the accused and therefore, whether there was any motive behind commission of the crime is irrelevant and it would become insignificant because direct evidence clearly incriminates the convict in this case.

11. In addition to the credible evidence of P.W.4 with regard to the assault by the accused on the deceased, there is also the evidence of P.W.2 which speaks about the convict killing the deceased, of course P.W.2 is found to have reached to the spot immediate after the occurrence and other persons had gathered there and the deceased had already died. However, her evidence suggests that the accused was the author of crime. The learned Amicus Curiae has also tried to demolish the evidence of P.W.4 by taking this Court through the cross- examination of P.W.2 that at the time of assault on the deceased, herself and the informant (P.W.4) were inside the house of the deceased, but the evidence of P.W.4 with regard to the assault on the deceased remained un- demolished in cross-examination, since it has been explained in her cross-examination that the accused gave ploughshare blow on the left side head of her husband and no suggestion was given to her that she had not seen the occurrence, rather the defence has intended to contradict the whole evidence of P.W.4 by unsuccessfully suggesting to her that whatever she had deposed has not been stated before the Police, but when P.W.9-the I.O. was examined, no specific suggestion was made to P.W.9 by drawing attention to the statement of P.W.4 that she has not stated the same and therefore, such effort of the learned counsel for the appellant to suggest that the evidence of P.W.4 is contradictory and not believable appears to be not acceptable, rather a casual look at the evidence of P.W.4 and on careful comparative assessment with evidence on record, it appears to have passed the test or reliability. Further, P.Ws. 5 and 7 were found to have stated that they came to know from the village source that the accused had killed the deceased by assaulting him with a ploughshare. It is of course true that the witnesses being hearsay in nature, their evidence cannot be considered independently to find out the guilt of the appellant, rather the hearsay evidence of P.Ws.5 and 7 and the other witnesses only lend assurance to the evidence of P.W.4, who is the sole eye witness to the occurrence and no valid reason has been ascribed to disbelieve the evidence of P.W.4. Moreover, the evidence of doctor-P.W.3 corroborates the evidence of P.W.4 with regard to assault on the deceased by the convict with a ploughshare inasmuch as, it appears from the evidence of P.W.9 that he had produced the seized ploughshare before P.W.3 with a query which was answered by P.W.3 affirmatively that the injuries on the deceased could be possible by that weapon and P.W.3 has also proved her report to the query under Ext.5 which was never disputed in the cross-examination.

12. A careful conspectus and reassessment of evidence on record together with the discussion made hereinabove leaves no manner of doubt in the mind of the Court that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt that he had killed the deceased and therefore, the present appeal by the appellant merits no consideration.

13. In the result, the appeal being devoid of any merit, stands dismissed, but there is no order as to costs. Consequently, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the passed by the learned Ad-hoc Additional District & Sessions Judge (FTC), Baripada in S.T. Case No.18/105 of 2012 are hereby confirmed.

14. Since the appellant is on bail, his bail bonds upon appeal stand cancelled and he is directed to surrender to serve out the remainder of sentence.