Sat Pal, J.

1. This is an application filed by the plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC. In this application it has been prayed that the respondent through its proprietor or partners, servants, agents, dealers, representatives and all others acting for and on its behalf be restrained from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, directly and indirectly dealing in parts and fittings of bicycles, cycles parts and other cognate under the trade mark SAINICO or any other trade mark as may be identical with and/or deceptively similar to applicants registered trade mark SONICO. The application has been opposed by the respondent in their reply to this application.

2. Mr. Ghiraiya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff is the registered owner and proprietor of the trade mark SONICO with device of a BUST under registration No. 234098 dated 9th March, 1966 in class-12 in respect of bicycle and cycle parts. He further submitted that the plaintiff had adopted the trade mark SONICO with device of BUST in the year 1958 and the aforesaid trade mark SONICO has been continuously used in the course of trade and thus have come about to identify and recognise as exclusively belonging to the plaintiff. Learned counsel further submitted that by virtue of prior adoption, long and established user coupled with vast publicity given to the said trade mark, the plaintiff got the registration and exclusive right to the use of said trade mark SONICO. He further submitted that the defendant who is also engaged in the business of manufacturing and marketing of parts and fittings of the bicycles, has adopted identical and deceptively similar trade mark SAINICO. He further submitted that the defendant has adopted the above mentioned trade mark SAINICO to cause confusion and deception to pass off their goods and business as and for the goods of the plaintiff and to create an impression as its goods of bicycle parts and fittings under the trade mark SAINICO are connected with the plaintiff in one or the other manner. He therefore, contended that the defendant should be restrained as prayed in this application.

3. Mr. Bhalerao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant raised a preliminary objection that plaintiffs and defendant both are residents of Ludhiana and no cause of action has arisen in the territorial limits of Delhi, as such this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit. He further submitted that defendant has adopted the trade mark SAINICO honestly and bonafidely knowing fully well that there was no such trade mark in use and existance in respect of the parts and fittings of cycles and they had adopted thus trade mark in 1983.

4. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and I find that the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the defendant has no merits in view of the fact that the defendant has already moved an application for registration of its trade mark SAINICO for sale of its goods through out India. Coming to the merits of the case, I find that the mark of the defendant is on the face of it deceptively similar to that of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had filed a number of documents to show that he had adopted the trade mark SONICO in the year 1958 whereas as per averments made in the written statement the defendants had adopted the trade mark SAINICO in the year 1983. Keeping in view these facts, I am of the opinion that the defendant must be restrained from using the trade mark SAINICO. The view I have taken finds support from a judgement of this Court reported in the case of M/s. R.P. Lock & Co. v. M/s. Sehgal Lock Company, 1988 PTC 10. In this case it was held that the trade mark HARICON was deceptively similar to the trade mark HARRISON.

5. In view of the above discussion, I restrain the respondent through its proprietor or partners or its servants, agents, dealers and representatives from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, advertist, and the negative ties are only those which are incidental and normal to the positive commercial arrangements at which the contract aims, even though those ties exclude all dealings with others, there is no restraint of trade within the meaning of the doctrine and no question of reasonableness arises. If, however, the contract ties the trading activities of either party after its determining, it is a restraint of trade. In other words, the doctrine of restraint in trade never applies during continuance of the contract of employment (or collaboration or franchise agreement); it applies only when the contract comes to an end. "The court, therefore, view with disfavour a restrictive covenant by an employee not to engage in a business similar to or competitive with that of the employer after termination of contract of his employment [See Suprintendence Company of India (P) Ltd. v. Krishan Murgai (supra) Pr. 62]

19. Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Anr., 1986 AIR(SC) 1571, 1986 (2) SCR 278 [LQ/SC/1986/114] , 1986 (3) SCC 156 [LQ/SC/1986/114] , 1986 (1) SCALE 799 [LQ/SC/1986/114] , 1986 (60) CC 797, 1986 (2) CCC 335, 1986 (53) FLR 523 [LQ/SC/1986/114] , 1986 (2) LLN 382 [LQ/SC/1986/114] , 1986 (1) Scale 799 [LQ/SC/1986/114] , 1986 (2) UJ 171, 1986 [LQ/SC/1986/114] (2) LLJ 171, 1986 SCC(L&S) 429, 1986 LIC 1312, 1986 ATC 103, 1971 Ch 591, 9861 (69) FJR 171, 1986 (3) CompLJ 1 [LQ/SC/1986/114] has also been referred to. But that relates to term of contract of employment in a Government company and public policy and does not deal with the question of restraint of trade; that relates to question of termination of service only, not to restraint of trade.

20. Hukum Chand Ice and Oil Mills, 1980 AIR(Raj) 155 was also referred to by the learned counsel. But that case related to sale of goodwill and the matter related to Section 65(3) of the Partnership Act. Sub-Sec ing, dealing in parts and fittings of bicycles, cycles parts and other cognate and allied goods under the trade mark SAINICO during the pendency of the suit. The respondent is, however, given two months time commencing from today to after its trade mark so that it does not offend or violate the injunction being issued by this Court. It is, however, made clear that the observation given by me hereinabove are only for the purpose of deciding this application. With this order IA stand disposed of.