1. The present Special Civil Application impugns the judgment and award dated 4.10.2008 in Reference (LCB) No.324 of 2002 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.2, Bharuch whereby the respondent workman has been given full pay for the period from 7.5.2002 to 15.3.2003 along with reinstatement.
2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present Special Civil Application are as follows:-
2.1 It is the case of the respondent workman that he was appointed as an Assistant Executive on 1.4.1993 and was sincerely performing his duties in the petitioner company. From 19.12.2000, he was also given promotion to the post of Assistant Manager Accounts. It is further his case that in the month of April/May-2002, the General Manager called the respondent workman and asked him to submit his resignation when the respondent workman refused. The General Manager on 7.5.2002 had once again called him to his cabin and asked again for his resignation which was again refused by him and thereafter, he was illegally terminated from the services. It is alleged by the respondent workman that no due procedure of law was followed while relieving him from his services. He was further paid his outstanding monetary dues only in the month of June-2002 after repeated requests.
2.2 Aggrieved, the respondent workman raised an industrial dispute before the learned Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bharuch, who by order dated 28.11.2002 was pleased to refer the reference to the learned Labour Court, Bharuch for adjudication.
2.3 Both the parties subjected to the jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court, Bharuch. The parties led their oral and documentary evidence in support of their case. By judgment and order dated 4.10.2008, the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.2, Bharuch was pleased to allow the reference.
2.4 Aggrieved, the petitioner herein has preferred the present Special Civil Application. 3. By order dated 22.12.2008, Notice and interim relief came to be granted to the petitioner and thereafter, by order dated 15.7.2009, Rule came to be issued in the present Special Civil Application.
4. Mr. Sachin Vasavada, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner company submited that the respondent was not a workman as defined under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [“ID Act” for short]. It is submitted that the respondent was in a supervisory capacity and having a pay of more than Rs.1,600/- per month and therefore, he was not covered under the provisions of Section 2(s) of the ID Act. He would submit that the respondent was working as an Assistant Manager Accounts and he was having a few workmen under him. In the petitioner company, the post of Executive and Assistant Manager Accounts was in the management cadre and therefore, it could not be said that the respondent was a workman. He would further draw the attention of the Court with respect to the nature of duties being performed by the respondent. He would submit that the respondent was having some financial powers and was also authorized to represent on behalf of the petitioner company before certain authorities for certain compliances. It was also submitted that the respondent was being paid a salary of Rs.9,550/- per month and therefore also, he was in the management cadre and could not be said to be a workman. It is submitted that the learned Labour Court has not properly appreciated the documentary as well as oral evidence produced on record viz. the oral evidence of the witness for the company. He would finally submit that the impugned judgment and order ought to be set aside.
5. Per contra, Mr. P.H.Pathak, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent workman submits that there is no error of fact or law committed by the learned Labour Court. He would further submit that there is no jurisdictional error committed by the learned Labour Court. He submits that though the petitioner company has raised the issue of jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court, they had never challenged the reference made by the Assistant Labour Commissioner and also subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court for adjudication of the reference. He would submit that from the evidence brought on record, the petitioner company could not prove that the respondent was working in a supervisory capacity in managerial cadre. The witness for the petitioner company could not prove by oral or documentary evidence that the respondent was having managerial powers or was exercising powers similar to those employees who are in the management cadre of the company. He would submit that the petitioner company has miserably failed to prove that the respondent was working in a management cadre and therefore, the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Labour Court is just and proper.
6. Heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the record.
7. It transpires from the record that the respondent workman was working with the petitioner company from 1.4.1993 till 7.5.2002 following his termination. Nothing has been brought on record by the petitioner company to show that the provisions of Section 25(F) of the ID Act were followed while terminating his services. The main contention of the petitioner is that the respondent was working in supervisory capacity and hence, was not a workman as contemplated under Section 2(s)(iv) of the ID Act. However, from the evidence on record, it is seen that the petitioner company has neither by documentary evidence nor by oral evidence has been able to prove about the nature of duties of the respondent workman or the executive powers being exercised by him. Mere designation cannot per-se put the workman in a managerial cadre. Further, the witness for the petitioner company in his oral evidence has admitted that the respondent had no administrative powers as well as financial powers; that the respondent did not have any powers to allocate any work to other employees. He could not exercise any disciplinary powers in respect of the employees who were in the lower cadre. It has further come on record that the respondent workman was under the administrative control of the personal department of the petitioner company. Further, the petitioner company has not produced any documentary evidence on record to show that the respondent was working in a managerial capacity or in the executive cadre. Therefore, the stand taken by the petitioner company is not supported by any evidence on record with respect to the nature of duties being executed by the respondent. Therefore, the learned Labour Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the petitioner company could not prove that the respondent workman was working in a managerial or Executive cadre as claimed by the petitioner company. The evidence on record also does not prove that there was any person working under the respondent or that he had any independent decision making powers. Since the respondent was working in the Accounts Department, he was reporting to the Manager Accounts of the petitioner company.
8. Mr. Sachin Vasavada, learned advocate for the petitioner company has also relied upon the judgments of this Court as well as Hon’ble Supreme Court on the issue “whether the respondent is to be considered a workman or not”. However, the same will not be applicable in the facts of the present case when the petitioner company has not produced on record any cogent evidence to prove that the respondent was working in a supervisory executive cadre and exercising such powers in the company set-up. Further, the witness of the petitioner company has also not been able to support the case of the company by his oral evidence.
9. It has further come on record that from 15.3.2003, the respondent has been gainfully employed in another company which has been admitted by him in his cross-examination. Therefore, the learned Labour Court has rightly held that he is only entitled for remuneration for the period from 7.5.2002 to 15.3.2003.
10. In the premise and for the aforesaid reasons, the learned Labour Court has properly appreciated the evidence on record and decided the reference in accordance with law. No interference is called for.
11. The present Special Civil Application stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. Interim relief stands vacated forthwith.