1. In this revision petition, filed under Section 115, C.P.C., order dated 16.07.2009 passed by the Addl. District Judge, Sriganganagar in Civil Execution Case No.6/09 is under challenge, whereby, application filed by the decree-holder respondent for condonation of delay was allowed and objection raised by the judgment-debtor petitioner has been rejected.

2. Brief facts of the case are that in the suit for specific performance of contract filed by respondent in the year 1982 bearing No.117/1982 the trial court decreed the suit on 05.11.1988 and decree for specific2 performance was allowed in the following terms : "

LANGUAGE

3. In pursuance of the above decree, the petitioner-defendant was to get the sanad within three months of the decree from the competent authority; and, thereafter, was to execute registered sale-deed of the land situated in murabba No.79 (at present No.74) of Chak 1C Bari, measuring 6.04 bigha, kila No.1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7, failing which, the decree holder was given liberty to get the sanad and sale-deed executed through the Court.

4. The decree was passed on 05.11.1988. Thereafter, as per the petitioner-defendant, the respondent-plaintiff kept mum for almost 18 years and preferred execution application for decree dated 05.11.1988 on 25.02.2007 along with an application under Section 5, Limitation Act. The petitioner-defendant submitted detailed reply to the application filed under Section 5, Limitation Act, so also, raised objection to the maintainability of the execution proceedings before the executing Court. The executing Court, after hearing both the parties upon the application filed under Section 5, Limitation Act as well as objection raised by the petitioner-defendant, dismissed the objections and held that execution proceedings initiated by the decree-holder is well within limitation. The said order dated 16.07.2009 is under challenge in this revision petition.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the executing Court has committed grave error of law and, so also, jurisdictional error while treating the execution proceedings within limitation, therefore, the order deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is contended by learned counsel for the4 petitioner that the petitioner raised cogent objection that the provisions of the Limitation Act are clear that any appeal or any application other than application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code may be admitted after prescribed period, if the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had satisfied the cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the law of limitation is not applicable to the execution proceedings but, still, the learned executing Court proceeded to deal with the application and registered the execution proceedings while treating the same as filing of the execution after two years of the order, therefore, the finding of the learned executing Court is perverse and it amounts to manifest injustice with the petitioner.

6. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act, it is crystal clear that an application for execution can be filed within 12 years from the date when the decree or order becomes enforceable and, here, in this case, decree was passed by the trial Court on 05.11.1988 and became enforceable after three months of the decree. Therefore, the instant execution application filed on 26.02.2007 for executing the decree dated 05.11.1988 is apparently beyond limitation and it was not to be entertained by the executing Court; but, while doing so, the learned executing Court has committed jurisdictional error and initiated the execution proceedings while condoning the delay and rejecting the objection raised by the petitioner which is totally untenable and contrary to law.

7. While inviting attention towards operative part of the decree, it is submitted that as per the decree if the judgment-debtor fails to get the sanad of the land in question from the competent authority, the decreeholder cannot get the sanad and get the sale-deed registered through the Court; but, it has not been done by the non-petitioner decree-holder and he has kept mum for almost 18 years; and, now, he has filed execution proceedings on the ground that the judgment-debtor has got the sanad in his favour in the year 2005. When limitation of 12 years is prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, then, obviously the learned executing Court has committed gross error and illegality in entertaining the application for execution of the decree while condoning the delay and6 rejecting the objections raised by the petitioner. In this view of the matter, there is no question of executing the decree dated 05.11.1988 after expiry of the period of 12 years. Therefore, it is prayed that while quashing the order impugned dated 16.07.2009 passed by the learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge No.1, Sriganganagar may be quashed and set aside and it may be held that proceedings are barred by limitation. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention towards following judgments :

(1) AIR 2007 Bombay (NOC) 272,

(2) AIR 2007 Rajasthan 117,

(3) AIR 2006 Madhya Pradesh 162, and

(4) AIR 2005 Supreme Court 2564.

While citing the above judgments, it is submitted that as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act, the limitation prescribed commences from the date of decree, therefore, the order under challenge is patently illegal and, hence, the same may be quashed.

8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the order under challenge is perfectly in accordance with law. It is contended by learned counsel for the respondents that the learned trial Court while passing the decree dated 05.11.1988 has7 specifically ordered that the defendant shall complete the proceedings of taking sanad before the competent authority and after obtraining sanad execute the decree in favour of the plaintiff and, further, it is ordered that if the defendant failed to do so, then, the plaintiff will be at liberty to get the sanad in accordance with law through the Court and will be entitled to get registered sale-deed in his favour through the Court. Admittedly, the defendant did not proceed to take sanad in his favour and, ultimately, he got sanad after completion of the proceedings before the competent Court. When this fact came to the knowledge of the decree-holder, for execution of the decree for the purpose of executing the sale-deed in his favour, therefore, limitation is required to be commenced from the date when decree became enforceable against the defendant-petitioner. Therefore, no error has been committed by the Court below while entertaining the application for execution and rejecting the objection raised by the petitioner.

9. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently argued that although as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act, limitation is prescribed 12 years for execution of the decree; but, here, in this case, the execution proceedings has been initiated within two years from the date the decree became enforceable when sanad was obtained by the judgment-debtor; thereafter, the decree became enforceable. In this view of the matter, the learned trial Court has rightly arrived at the finding, therefore, there is no error in the order impugned.

10. Learned counsel for the respondent invited my attention towards following judgments :

(1) (2000) 6 SCC 259 [LQ/SC/2000/623] , and

(2) 2001 (3) RLW (SC) 376.

While citing the above judgments, it is submitted that no interference is required in this case.

11. I have considered the rival submissions made by both the parties and perused the judgments cited before me.

12. First of all, it is the admitted position of the case that the learned trial Court passed the judgment and decree on 05.11.1988. As per the decree, it was obligation cast upon the petitioner judgment-debtor to get the sanad and execute the sale-deed in favour of the non-petitioner plaintiff but, until 2005, he did not make any effort to get the sanad. On 29.09.2005, sanad was issued by the competent authority in favour of the petitioner-defendant in accordance with law for the land in question. Then, obviously the non-9 petitioner-plaintiff decree-holder filed application for execution of the sale-deed in pursuance of the decree passed in his favour. It is true that as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act, limitation of 12 years is prescribed for execution of any decree other than decree granting mandatory injunction or an order of any civil Court. In the Limitation Act, it is specifically provided as to the time from which the period of limitation begins to run. Article 136 of the Limitation Act runs as under :

"Time from which period begins to run.-When the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods when default in making the payment of delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place :

Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation."

13. Upon perusal of the above provision, it is abundantly clear that the time from which the period of limitation begins to run from the date when the decree or order becomes enforceable. Here, in the instant case, the decree passed by the trial Court is required to be read in two parts. One part of the decree is with regard to obtaining sanad from the10 competent Court and, thereafter, execute the sale-deed in favour of the decree-holder non-petitioner.

14. Upon perusal of the facts of the case, it is obvious that decree-holder non-petitioner filed the execution proceedings for executing the sale-deed in his favour upon obtaining sanad on 29.09.2005 by the petitionerdefendant from the competent Court. Therefore, the factum of obtaining sanad on 29.09.2005 is relevant for the purpose of condonation of delay as well as counting the period of limitation. In my opinion, the learned executing Court has rightly observed that limitation in this case for the purpose of execution of decree commences from the date of issuance of sanad on 29.09.2005. In accordance with the latter part of the decree, of course, the decree-holder is entitled for execution of the sale-deed in his favour upon obtaining sanad by the petitioner judgment-debtor, therefore, I am in full agreement with the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner that under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation prescribed for execution of the decree is 12 years; but, at the same time, such period commences from the date when the decree becomes enforceable and, in the instant case, upon perusal of the earlier part of the decree, it is11 abundantly clear that limitation for the purpose of execution of the sale-deed in consonance with final part of the decree has to be reckoned from the date the final decree becomes enforceable. In this case, the circumstances loudly speak that for near-about 17 years the petitioner did not care to obtain sanad in his name and on 29.09.2005 he finally obtained sanad; and, now, he is raising the objection that limitation prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, which is 12 years, has expired. In my opinion, it is not so because the decree in question became enforceable for the purpose of execution of the sale-deed on 29.09.2005 when the petitioner obtained sanad. Therefore, the judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner would not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case because when the decree in question is specific with regard to enforceability, then, the date of passing of the decree cannot be considered for commencement of the time of limitation.

15. In this view of the matter, I am of the view that the learned executing Court has not committed any error while treating the execution proceedings within limitation for the purpose of executing the sale-deed. The petitioner himself has obtained sanad in his favour12 on 29.09.2005. Therefore, there is no force in this revision petition.

16. This revision petition is accordingly dismissed.

Revision Petition Dismissed.