Dixit, J.

1. This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of writ in the nature of mandamus or any other direction or an order or a writ against the non-applicants declaring an order passed by the Jagir Commissioner on 12-9-50 and affirmed by the Madhya Bharat Government on 14-5-52 as illegal and ultra vires and for an order restraining the non-applicants No. 1 to 3 from taking any action against the applicant in the event of his failure, to comply with those orders.

2. The Petitioner states that he is a Jagirdar of Harsi Jagir; that he was not required under any law to introduce within his jagir either Zamindari or Raiyatwari system of land administration and that, therefore, he had leased out in 1909 lands to, the non-applicant tenants No. 4 to 31 under separate contracts. The Petitioner further states that in 1938 these leases were revised and the rents enhanced and that since the revision of the leases the tenants paid enhanced rents until 1949. In this year on complaint by the tenants to the Madhya Bharat Government the Jagir Commissioner passed an order directing the applicant to realise the rents according to the pattas issued in 1908 and to refund the tenants the excess amount realised from them since the revision of the rent in 1938. The Petitioner then appealed to the Madhya Bharat Government against the said order of the Jagir Commissioner and the order was upheld in appeal.

3. After hearing Mr. Anand Bihari Misra learned Counsel for the applicant, I think this application must be dismissed. In so far as the non-applicant-tenants are concerned, it is clear that the Petitioners right to realise from them rent at a certain rate is based on a contract. If any of the tenants refuses to pay rent according to the contract of tenancy entered by him, the Petitioners obvious remedy is to file a suit for the recovery of rent on the basis of the contract. A writ of mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus cannot be issued for enforcing a right arising out of a contract. It is well-settled that mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus will not be issued for the enforcement of a private right. I need only refer to the cases reported in - B.K. Banerjee v. Simonds : AIR 1947 Cal 307 ; - Carlsbad Mineral Water Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Jagtiani 87 C LJ 149. As a matter of fact as the Petitioner himself has stated, suits have already been filed by the applicant against the non-applicant-tenants for the recovery of rents at the stipulated rates.

4. A writ or an order prayed for cannot also be issued against the Raj Pramukh or the Madhya Bharat Government or the Jagir Commissioner. It is not the case of the applicant that the Madhya Bharat Government is empowered under any law to make an order under certain circumstances directing a Jagirdar to realise rents from his tenants at a particular rate and that such an order when passed is a quasi judicial order. The Petitioner also does not allege that the Madhya Bharat Government is bound under some law to see that the tenants of a Jagirdar pay rent to him at the rate agreed to by them, that is, by the tenants. In fact the Petitioner says that the non-applicants No. 1 to 3 cannot under any law intervene in any dispute between a Jagirdar and his tenants as regards the rent. The orders complained of are in my opinion, purely executive orders. In the order dated 14-5-52 of the Government by which the Jagir Commissioners order was maintained it has been distinctly stated that the order passed by the Jagir Commissioner was an administrative order passed by him in exercise of his powers of supervision and control over the Jagirdars. No doubt, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this Court has jurisdiction to issue an order against even an executive officer who has issued an administrative order in order to safeguard the fundamental rights of a citizen and to prevent injuries being caused to the rights of a citizen by the order. But then the Petitioner has not been able to show that any real injury has already been caused to him or about to be caused by the order of the Government. The orders of the Government and the Jagir Commissioner challenged by the Petitioner do not oust the jurisdiction of the subordinate Courts to determine the rent cases already instituted by the applicant against his tenants. Again, the orders have not the effect of a juridical determination of the question of the rent payable by the tenants to the Petitioner. If in the rent-suits filed by the applicant, the tenants plead in defence, the orders of the Jagir Commissioner and the Madhya Bharat Government, it is open to the applicant to say in those suits that the said orders are of no validity and are not binding on the Court. Learned Counsel for the applicant urged that if he does not comply with the orders of the Government his Jagir might be placed under a Court of Wards by the Government. The apprehension that Government might assume the superintendence of the Jagir of the applicant in the event of his failure to obey the orders of the Government, cannot in my opinion, be a good ground for the issue of a writ in favour of the applicant. If and when the Government passes an order placing the management of the Jagir of the applicant under Court of Wards, the Petitioner can come up to this Court challenging the validity of that order. At present, no right of the Petitioner has been infringed or about to be infringed by the orders of the Government.

5. The application in so far as it seeks relief against the Raj Pramukh is wholly incompetent. Under Article 361 the Raj Pramukh is not "answerable to any Court for the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers and duties." It is clear from this Article that it affords complete immunity to the Raj Pramukh not only in respect of the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of the office but also in respect of "any act done or purporting to be done by him" in the exercise or performance o those powers and duties. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner sought to argue that as the order dated 14-5-52 passed by the Raj Pramukh as the Head of the Madhya Bharat Government was altogether unauthorised and outside the Constitution, it did not fall within the protection of Article 361. I am unable to accede to this argument. The words "purporting to be done" are of very wide scope and even though the act done is outside or in contravention of the Constitution, but if it is one professed to be done under the Constitution, then it would come within the protection of Article 361. As observed by the Calcutta High Court in a recent case - Biman Chandra v. Dr. H.C. Mukerjee : 56 CW N 651 dealing with Article 361 that "if the act is ostensibly done in exercise of the power given under the Constitution and it is not established that the act is done dishonestly or in bad faith or in other words, out of any improper motive, the immunity attaches to the exercise of the power. The protection is intended to be real and not merely illusory." I am in respectful agreement with these observations of the Calcutta High Court with regard to the extent and scope of Article 361 of the Constitution of India.

6. Before I conclude I must observe that counsel making applications under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would do well to study the nature of the various writs before making the prayer in their applications for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus or certiorari or prohibition or a suitable writ. I fully endorse the observations of Banerjee J. in - Union of India v. Elbridge Watson : AIR 1952 Cal 601 by which he protested against prayers being couched in applications under Article 226 in such general words as the Court may be pleased to grant such writs as it may think fit and said that the prayer must be specific and precise.

7. For the above reasons, I would dismiss this petition.

Chaturvedi, J.

8. I agree that the petition be dismissed.