Trevelyan, J.

1. This case has come before me on settlement of issues. Theissue which I have now to decide is as to whether this Court has anyjurisdiction be try this suit. The remaining issues will have to be determinedhereafter.

2. The suit is brought by the vendor of a patni taluksituate in the Burdwan district to enforce specific performance of thecontract. A portion of the contract was made in Calcutta, and leave to sue hasbeen obtained. The title is accepted in the contract. All the plaintiff reallywants is the money for which he has contracted to sell the patni, though ofcourse the relief is mere complicated than in a mere suit for money. I willonly now consider the (a) and (c) portions of the prayer of the plaint. Thefirst seeks the ordinary relief in a suit for specific performance, viz., thatthe agreement may be specifically performed, that a proper transfer may besettled, and that upon the execution and registration of the transfer thedefendant may be ordered to pay the money. The (c) portion asks for damages.

3. The question is whether this is a suit for"land" within the meaning of the Letters Patent.

4. A great many authorities have been cited to me, but I donot think that, so far as their application to the present case is concerned,there is any difference between them. The chief cases cited before me wereRamdhone Shaw v. Sreemutty Nobumoney Dossee (Bourke, 218) The Delhi and LondonBank v. Wordie. I.L.R. 1 Cal 249 [LQ/CalHC/2000/401] Kellie v. Fraser I.L.R. 2 Cal. 445 [LQ/CalHC/1967/116] SreenathRoy v. Cally Doss Ghose I.L.R. 5 Cal. 82 and Holkar H.H. Shrimant MaharajYashvantrav v. Dadabhai Cursetji Ashburner I.L.R. 14 Bom. 353. Ramdhone Shaw v.Nobumoney Dossee (Bourke, 218) has not been very accurately reported, but Ihave referred to the original judgment, and I think it clear that in that caseMr. Justice NORMAN held that a suit for specific performance would lie. Thatwas a purchasers suit.

5. It seems to me that, having regard to the expressionsused in Kellie v. Eraser I.L.R. 2 Cal. 445 [LQ/CalHC/1967/116] and The Delhi and London Bank v.Wordie I.L.R. 1 Gal. 249 as to the meaning of a "suit for land," thatthere is a distinction between a vendors suit and a purchasers suit forspecific performance.

6. The question as to whether a purchasers suit would lieis one which I need not decide here.

7. In The Delhi and London Bank v. Wordie I.L.R. 1 Cal. 249 [LQ/CalHC/2000/401] Garth, C.J. at page 263 of the Report, defines a "suit for land" as asuit for the purpose of acquiring title to or control over land. In Kellie v.Fraser I.L.R. 2 Cal. 445 [LQ/CalHC/1967/116] the same learned Judge says: "It will beobserved, however, that in all, or almost all, the cases upon which theappellant relies, the suit was brought for the purpose of acquiring possessionof, or establishing a title to, or an interest in, property which is subject todispute."

8. In Sreenath Roy v. Cally Doss Ghose I.L.R. 5 Cal 82 Mr.Justice PONTIFEX held that a suit for specific performance was a suit for landwithin the meaning of the Letters Patent. But that was a purchasers suit, andas the object of a purchasers suit is to get possession of the land, it mightbe properly described as a suit for land.

9. The Bombay case to which I have been referred goes muchfurther than it is necessary for me to go in this case. That was practically apurchasers suit and was put upon the authority of Paget v. Ede L.R. 18 Eq.118. Mr. JACKSON has cited a decision of Mr. Justice LAWRANCE and Mr. JusticeWRIGHT, decided on the 20th of February last [DeSousa v. British South AfricanCompany Times Law Reports Vol. VIII, p. 369). That case, there is no doubt,shows the present tendency of the English Courts to abstain from interferingeven in personam where the matter concerns land outside their jurisdiction, ButI do not think, myself, that this case depends on those English cases. Itdepends entirely on what is a "suit for land" within the meaning ofthe Letters Patent.

10. So far as the paragraphs of the prayer of the plaint inthis case under the headings (a) and (c), I do not think that this is a suitfor land. It is not a suit to sell or acquire possession of or title to land inany sense. Clearly it does not come within the definitions given by Sir R.Garth. I decline to hold that wherever land has anything to do with a suit itis therefore a "suit for land." I must go so far as that to acceptMr. Jacksons argument.

11. If the framers of the Letters Patent had intended toexclude the jurisdiction of this Court in the way suggested, they would haveused different words.

12. I hold that, having regard to everything exceptparagraph (b) of the prayer of the plaint, this is not a suit for land. I aminclined to hold that, so far as that paragraph is concerned, this is a suitfor land, but it is not necessary to determine that question now, as the rightto relief under that prayer cannot be determined until the facts are found.

13. The case must be set down for final disposal fordetermination of the remaining issues, which are--

(1) Was there a concluded and binding arrangement for thesale of the property mentioned in the plaint

(2) If so, what is the legal effect thereof

(3) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled

14. The case must go to the bottom of the remanet list. Thecosts of the settlement of issues will be costs in the cause.

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Land Mortgage Bankvs. Sudurudeen Ahmed (06.04.1892- CALHC)