M.R. Jayakar, J.

1. On the question at issue in this case relating to the application of the Act to the present case, there is, as the High Court judgment observes, a series of Full Bench decisions of Indian High Courts covering this exact point. These have been reviewed in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court in Rajpali Kunwar v. Sarju Rat (1936) I.L.R. 58 A. 1041, 1046-48. It is therefore unnecessary for their Lordships to go over the same ground again. It will be sufficient to observe that their Lordships are in complete agreement with the views of the learned Chief Justice in that case, that, during the lifetime of the widow, the reversioners in Hindu law have no vested interest in the estate, but have a mere spes successions or a chance of succession, which is a purely contingent right which may or may not accrue, that the succession would not open out until the widow died, and that the person who would be the next reversioner at that time would succeed to the estate and the alteration in the rule of the Hindu law brought about by the Act would then be in full force.

2. In the argument before their Lordships reliance was placed on the words " dying intestate " in the Act as connoting the future tense, but their Lordships agree with the view of the Lahore High Court in Shrimati Shakuntla Devi v. Kaushalya Devi (1935) I.L.R. 17 Lah. 356, 357 that the words are a mere description of the status of the deceased and have no reference, and are not intended to have any reference, to the time of the death of a Hindu male. The expression merely means " in the case of intestacy of " a Hindu male." To place this interpretation on the Act is not to give a retrospective effect to its provisions, the material point of time being the date when the succession opens, namely, the death of the widow.

3. On the position of reversioners in Hindu law, opinions have been expressed by this Board from time to time, with which the views of the learned Chief Justice in Rajpali Kunwar v. Sarju Rai (1936) I.L.R. 58 A. 1041, 1046-48 mentioned above, are in agreement. It was said, for instance, that, until the termination of the widows estate, it is impossible to say who are the persons who will be entitled to succeed as heirs to her husband, Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga (1863) 9 Moo. I.A. 539, 604. The succession does not open to the heirs of the husband until the termination of the widows estate. On its termination the property descends to those who would have been the heirs of the husband if he had lived up to, and died at the moment of, her death: Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Kolitany (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 115, 154.

4. There is no vesting as at the date of the husbands death, and it follows that the questions of who is the nearest reversionary heir or what is the class of reversionary heirs, fall to be settled at the date of the expiry of the ownership for life or lives: Janaki Ammal and Narayanasami Aiyer (1916) L.R. 43 I.A. 207, 209. The death of a Hindu female owner opens the inheritance to the reversioners, and the one most nearly related at the time to the last full owner becomes entitled to possession. In her lifetime, however, the reversionary right is a mere possibility, or spes successionis, but this possibility is common to them all, for it cannot be predicated who would be the nearest reversioner at the time of her death. The Indian law, however, permits the institution of suits in the lifetime of the female owner to remove a common apprehended injury to the interests of all the reversioners, presumptive and contingent alike, Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal (1915) L.R. 42 I.A. 125, 128, 129. The reversioners rights during the lifetime of the female heir are merely of a protective character and nothing more, and whenever action is taken by the presumptive reversioner, it is in a representative capacity and on behalf of all the reversioners, and not on the footing that the person taking the action is in fact the next reversioner at the date of the suit. The decisions of Indian High Courts, on which the High Court has relied in this case, proceed on these principles and cover the precise point raised in this appeal.

5. For these reasons, their Lordships are of opinion that the judgment appealed from is right and ought to be affirmed, and this appeal ought to be dismissed with costs, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.