Das, J.This is a second appeal by the plaintiffs from a judgment of reversal passed by the learned District Judge of Cuttack. The facts out of which the appeal has arisen are shortly stated below. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the appellants before me. They belong to the same family, plaintiff 1 being the nephew of plaintiff 2. One Raghunath was the grandfather of plaintiff 1. Defendant 2 Mani Dei, is the widow of Raghunath being his second wife. Touzi No. 616 and other touzis of mahal Mrutanga, etc., belonged to the plaintiffs and some other co-sharers. Plaintiff 1 lost his father when he was a minor. On death of the father of plaintiff 1, Raghunath, the grandfather of plaintiff 1, was in possession. On the death of Raghunath, his interest in the said touzis devolved on plaintiff 1, who applied for mutation of his name in the revenue records. On this application a mutation case, No. 901/902 of 1926-27, was started. Defendant 2, Mani Dei, objected to the mutation of the plaintiffs name. There was, however, a compromise, the terms of which are mentioned in a document which is Ex. 3 in the record. By the compromise it was settled that Mani Dei would get about 10 acres of nijchas lands, appertaining to touzi Nos. 616 and 619, for the maintenance of herself and her daughter till her lifetime.

2. The compromise petition then stated as follows:

The objector (Mani Dei) will hold and enjoy the said properties during her lifetime, but the objector will not be competent to transfer the immovable property which is given to her.

3. It was further agreed that the name of plaintiff 1 would be recorded in the revenue records in respect of the property. Plaintiff 1 further agreed to bear the expenses of the marriage of the daughter of Mani Dei. Subsequent to the above compromise, there was a partition amongst the plaintiffs and their cosharers of the mahal. About 5 acres out of the land given to Mani Dei for maintenance were allotted to the share of the plaintiffs, the rest having gone to the share of other, cosharers. These 5 acres and odd have been described in Schedule ga of the plaint. There was again a partition as between plaintiff 1 and plaintiff 2 in respect of these 5 acres and odd, 3"08 acres described in Schedule gha of the plaint falling to the share of plaintiff 1 and 196 acres falling to the share of plaintiff 2. I had forgotten to mention before that the compromise petition was dated 12th March 1927. In 1936 Mani Dei executed a simple mortgage in favour of defendant 1, Onkar Mall Marwari, for a sum of Rs. 100 only, in respect of the said 5 acres and odd land. On the foot of this mortgage Onkar Mall Marwari obtained a decree against Mani Dei, and in execution thereof he purchased the said lands on 20th February 1940. The case of the plaintiffs was that the widow had only a personal right of enjoyment of the usufruct of the lands and that she had no power of alienation. The plaintiffs, therefore, asked for a declaration that Mani Dei had no right to transfer the land and that the sale of the land in execution of the mortgage decree be set aside. They further prayed for a permanent injunction against defendant 1, restraining him from taking possession of the disputed land.

4. The defence was that Mani Dei had the power of alienation; plaintiff 1 had agreed to meet the expenses of her daughters marriage, but the plaintiffs had not met the expenses of the marriage, and, therefore, Mani Dei had to raise money by mortgaging the lands. The defence contended that Mani Dei could mortgage the lands for justifying legal necessity.

5. The trial Court gave a decree in favour of the plaintiffs, holding that Mani Dei had the right to enjoy only the usufruct of the lands for her maintenance till her death and that she had no power of alienation in respect of the property. The trial Court repelled the contention that the restriction on alienation was invalid in law, and the further contentions that the compromise created a widows estate in favour of Mani Dei or an absolute gift in her favour. The Court of appeal below rightly pointed out that there was no question of a widows estate, inasmuch as Mani Dei did not inherit the property as a widow. The Court of appeal below found that the compromise involved a transfer of property from one person to another, and the compromise petition required registration; in the absence of registration the document was not admissible in evidence and no other evidence could be given as to the terms contained therein. Inasmuch as there was an admission in para. 4 of the plaint that the widow was in possession since March 1927, and the suit was brought in 1940, that is, more than 12 years after, the learned District Judge came to the finding that the widow had perfected her title by adverse possession and that title would pass to her successor in interest, namely, defendant 1. It is on this finding of adverse possession that the learned District Judge has disposed of the appeal.

6. On behalf of the appellants it has been contended before me that the finding of the learned District Judge regarding title by adverse possession is incorrect. In my opinion, this contention is correct. The learned District Judge has proceeded on the footing that the compromise of 1927 effects a transfer of property from one person to another. He has not, however, come to any finding as to the nature of the transfer, nor has he considered the question if the compromise can be treated as a family arrangement which involves no transfer. Even if the compromise petition be considered as a transfer of property from one person to another, it was necessary for the learned District Judge to come to a finding on the nature of the transfer. If the transfer was of the nature of a gift, which was not effected by a registered deed, then the question of perfecting title by 12 years possession would arise. As has been held in N. Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal AIR 1919 P.C. 44 where the donor did not effect a registered gift-deed but allowed the donee to enter into possession of the gifted property, and the donee thus remained in possession for over twelve years, the title of the donee became perfected as against the donors heirs.

7. In the same case, it has been held that even if the document were not admissible to prove a gift, it may nevertheless be referred to as explaining the nature and character of the possession held by the donee. In Janki Kuer v. Brij Bhikan Ojha AIR 1924 Pat. 641 it has been held that a document which is inadmissible in evidence for the purposes mentioned in Section 49, Registration Act, may nevertheless be admitted for a collateral purpose, as for example, to explain why a transferee, under a deed imperfect through lack of registration, was in possession, or to prove the nature of that possession. Therefore, the compromise petition (Ex. 3) even though it be accepted as an imperfect title deed for lack of registration may be considered for the collateral purpose of explaining the nature of the possession of the widow. If so considered, it is clear to me that the possession of the widow was in no sense adverse possession. The widow was allowed to possess the land during her lifetime for her maintenance, with no right of alienation. If the compromise creates only a life interest, or if it operates not as a transfer but as an admission that the widow has no right to alienate, and creates in her favour a restricted interest, which u/s 6, T.P. Act, is not transferable then it can hardly be said that the widow has got an absolute title by twelve years possession. In coming to his finding on the question of adverse possession the learned District Judge has not considered the document from these aspects. He has merely stated that the compromise involves a transfer of property without indicating the nature of the transfer, and has then come to the finding that the widow has perfected her title by adverse possession inasmuch as the compromise is not registered. I am of the view that the finding of the learned District Judge on the question of adverse possession, cannot be supported. Adverse possession was not pleaded by the defendants; and even if the document (Ex. 3) is considered for the collateral purpose of showing the nature of the possession of the widow, then it is clear to me that, whether it be a family arrangement or a transfer, the possession which it gives is not adverse possession.

8. I am, however, prepared to go further, and hold that on a proper construction of the compromise petition (Ex. 3) it is nothing but a family arrangement which does not involve any transfer. On behalf of the respondent, it has been contended before me that Section 10, T.P. Act, hits the condition restraining alienation contained in the compromise petition, and reliance has been placed on the case in Dhup Nath Upadhya and Others Vs. Ram Charitra Upadhya and Others, . Section 10, T.P. Act, would only apply if the compromise involves a transfer or creates a life interest for the widow, coupled with a repugnant condition which prohibits alienation absolutely. In the view which I take of the compromise petition, it does not involve any transfer at all. It is merely an admission of an interest of the widow in the property, the interest so admitted being a restricted interest, such as that of enjoyment of the usufruct only, which would not be alienable u/s 6, T.P. Act. The compromise petition is to be read as a whole for its proper interpretation. It no doubt states that the widow, who was the objector in the mutation case, would become the rightful owner in possession of 10 acres of land. It further recites, however, that the widow will hold and enjoy the said property during her lifetime for her maintenance and that of her daughter, and that she will not be competent to transfer the property. Bead as a whole, the compromise petition does not involve any. transfer of property, nor does it create any life interest in favour of the widow, coupled with a repugnant condition prohibiting alienation absolutely. It merely operates as an admission that the widow has the restricted right of enjoying, the usufruct of 10 acres of land during her lifetime and that she has no power of alienation. It is significant that in the compromise petition it is stated that the property will be recorded in the name of the plaintiff in the revenue record, though 10 acres are being given to the widow for the enjoyment; of the usufruct thereof for the purpose of maintenance. In this view of the matter Section 10, T.P. Act, will not apply, and the interest of the widow under the compromise petition is an interest restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally within the meaning of Section 6, T.P. Act, which interest will not be transferable: see in this connexion the cases in Mt. Hiran Bibi v. Mt. Sohan Bibi AIR 1914 P.C. 44 and AIR 1939 157 (Privy Council) .

9. There is a further question which requires consideration. The question is if the compromise petition requires registration even as a family arrangement, I must say that this question is not entirely free from difficulty. A family arrangement not involving a transfer may be a settlement in which each party takes a share of, or interest in, family property by virtue of an independent title which is to that extent admitted by the other parties. Such an arrangement may, however, involve a declaration of right u/s 17(1)(b), Registration Act. Whether the family arrangement involves a declaration of right or not will depend on the facts of each particular case. If it involves a declaration of right, it will require registration. In a Pull Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ramgopal Vs. Tulshi Ram and Another it has been laid down that a binding family arrangement, in which there is no exchange or other transfer of ownership, can be made orally: if such arrangement is followed by a writing containing a reference to it, then the question is whether thereby the terms of the arrangement have been "formally recorded in a document" with the purpose-that they should be evidenced by that document, and that is a question of fact in each case to be determined upon a consideration of the nature and phraseology of the writing and the circumstances in which, and the purpose with which, it was written. If the reference to the family arrangement was merely for the purpose of informing the Court of" the arrangement which is arrived at, the document would not require registration, and it can be used as a piece of evidence or as an admission of the family arrangement. If on the contrary the document is intended to be a formal record of the arrangement, in other words if it is intended as a document of title, it will require registration. The principles laid down in the, aforesaid Full Bench decision were followed in the subsequent case in Mt. Mahadei Kunwar Vs. Padarath Chaube and Another . I have already stated that the question whether the compromise petition requires registration or not even as a family arrangement is not entirety free from difficulty. There is a recital in the compromise petition that the dispute between the parties has been settled by respectable persons, which settlement has been accepted by both parties.

10. The facts of the present case appear to me to be more or less similar to the case in Bakhtawar Vs. Sunder Lal and Others in which it has been held that where a bona fide dispute between the parties is composed, each party recognising an antecedent title in the other, and the parties make a petition to the Court informing the terms of the agreement, there is no necessity to have such a petition registered as it does not purport to create, assign, etc., any right in immovable property within the meaning of Section 17(1)(b), Registration Act; it is merely a recital of fact by which the Court is informed that the parties have come to an arrangement. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that the compromise petition in this case did not require registration, it merely amounted to an admission of the rights of the parties by virtue of a prior settlement, and informed the Court of the terms of the settlement.

11. The family arrangement arrived at between the parties was a vaild arrangement legally binding on the parties. The widow was given a restricted right of enjoyment of the usufruct, and she had no power of alienation. In this view of the matter, the appellants are entitled to succeed.

12. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is allowed and the decree of the learned District Judge is set aside and that of the Munsif is restored. The appellants are entitled to costs throughout.