Rowland, J.The appellant, Lal Babu was the holder of a decree for money. The decree was obtained in a suit in which Lal Babu, who is a minor, appeared through his maternal grandfather as his next friend and a decree was passed for Rs. 2,366-8-0. The same next friend acting for the minor decree-holder put the decree in execution and during the pendency of that execution a petition was presented to the Court apparently signed by the judgment-debtor and also by the next friend on behalf of the minor decree-holder reporting to the Court that the claim and decree had been satisfied by mutual agreement on the judgment-debtor executing in favour of the decree-holder a certain sale deed. On this petition the Court passed an order under Order 21, Rule 2, Civil P.C, directing satisfaction of the decree to be noted and striking off the execution. Thereafter an application was presented on behalf of the minor through the same next friend praying to the Court to vacate the above order, to set aside the entry of satisfaction and to restore the execution proceeding. At the hearing of this application Dhanukdhari denied that there had been any agreement between him and the judgment debtor to accept that sale deed in full satisfaction, denied that he had signed the compromise petition and alleged that a fraud had been practised on him. It was further stated that the sanction of the Court had not been taken to the compromise and adjustment of the decree and that the arrangement was against the interest of the minor. The Subordinate Judge did not record a definite finding as to the genuineness of Dhanukdharis signature, but held that assuming it to be genuine it must have been obtained by misrepresentation; he found in favour of the applicant on the remaining points and allowed the application in face of objections by the judgment-debtor both on the facts and on the question of law.

2. The judgment-debtor appealed to the District Judge who set aside the finding of the Subordinate Judge that there had been deception practised against the next friend of the minor. The District Judge found--and it is not disputed--that no consent of the Court had been taken to adjustment of the decree and he expressed no opinion as to whether the alleged agreement and adjustment was against the interest of the minor. In his opinion the procedure followed in making this application was incorrect, the proper remedy being by a separate suit. He reversed the decision of the Subordinate Judge and the result is the present appeal. In Order 32, Rule 7(2), Civil P.C. it is indicated that an agreement or a compromise entered into without the leave of the Court with reference to a suit in which a minor is concerned is voidable against all parties other than the minor; and the District Judge relied on the word "voidable" for the proposition that such an agreement or compromise is not void.

3. The proposition may be conceded: it is established by the authority in this Court in Ishan Chandra Kundu v. Nilratan Adhikari 1923 Pat 375 that a decree passed on such a compromise will stand until vacated in a proper proceeding. It may be that to set aside a compromise decree in a suit the proper remedy is a separate suit; but what we are dealing with here is an adjustment of a decree in the course of execution proceedings, and Section 47, Civil P.C, reserves for determination by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit all questions between the parties relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, the view of the District Judge cannot correctly apply to the facts of this case. It is clearly pointed out in Ramgulam Sahu v. Sham Sahai Das 1920 Pat 750 that Section 47 bars a fresh suit. It is there observed that the proper remedy appears to be either by application for review or by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Therefore, it seems that this application cannot be defeated and should not have been dismissed by the District Judge on the ground that the petitioner ought to have had recourse to a separate suit.

4. But Mr. Khurshaid Husnain for the respondent has taken a new objection which appears to have been raised for the first time in this Court. He contends that the provisions of Order 32, Rule 7 which require the consent of the Court to any compromise of a claim in a suit do not apply to any proceedings taken after the decree has been passed, and that after the decree has been passed the next friend or guardian for a minor can record satisfaction or enter into any arrangement on his behalf without asking the permission of the Court. This is a novel proposition which in my view is against both principle and authority. The broad principle is that a minor is incapable of entering into a contract and that valid contracts can only be entered into on behalf of a minor in very limited circumstances by persons whom the law especially authorises to act for the minor, and to the limited extent to which such persons have authority. Where there is no law giving a person authority to act on behalf of a minor such authority will not ordinarily be deemed to exist and the minor will not ordinarily be bound by the acts of such a person. Secondly, the Code itself makes it clear that the next friend or guardian acting for a minor in a litigation is in the exercise of his powers as such not exempted from restriction merely because a decree has been passed. O.32, R.6 debars him from receiving money or moveable property on behalf of the minor without the permission of the Court, and requires the Court to take security from him and give proper directions to protect the property from waste. Therefore, on a consideration of the pro visions of the Code I have little doubt that the powers of a next friend after decree are not intended to be wider than such powers before the decree. It has been held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Muthalakkammal v. Narappa Reddiar 1933 Mad 456 that Order 32, Rule 7 is applicable to agreements in execution proceedings; and in this Court it has been said in Ramgulam Sahu v. Sham Sahai Das 1920 Pat 750, that whether or not Order 32, Rule 7 applies in its terms, at any rate, the principle is applicable. Therefore, Mr. Khurshaid Husnains objection should, in my opinion, fail.

5. It was lastly contended by Mr. Khurshaid Husnain that, assuming the minor to be entitled to relief against the bargain entered into on his behalf without the consent of the Court, his remedy could only be given to him in a proceeding framed either as a suit or as an application for review. As above pointed out, the remedy by suit is not available to the minor by reason of Section 47 of the Code. Therefore, Mr. Khurshaid Husnain has argued that this application is not maintainable because it does not refer to Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code, but cites S.47 and S.151 of the Code, and invites the Court to use its inherent jurisdiction. The objection seems to me in this case particularly to be a very technical one. As regards the nature of the application what we have to consider is not so much what order or rule of the Code has been cited by the party, but what is the substance of the relief asked for. The prayer was to vacate an order which had obviously been passed by the Court under a misapprehension that the Court had power to pass it, whereas the Court had in fact no power to pass such an order in consequence of the minority of the decree-holder which was not at the time brought to the notice of the Court. This may have been a ground on which the Court could be moved to review its order; but I am also of opinion that in such circumstances as these the Court has power to take action independently of Order 47, Rule 1. In Jagannath v. Jaladhar 1918 Cal 551 it was held that an application similar to the present one came u/s 47, Civil P.C., and the Court had power to deal with it thereunder. I am of opinion that this is a matter in which the Court had power to act u/s 151 and that, therefore, no objection is sustainable against the procedure followed. I would allow the appeal and restore the order of the Subordinate Judge, awarding to the appellant his costs of the District Judges Court and of this Court.

Varma, J.

6. I agree.