1. Appellant herein has been convicted by the Sessions Court, Trichur under S.302 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Since he has no counsel of his own Sri. P. V. Chandramohan, a member of this Bar, has been appointed State Brief. We have heard learned counsel and the learned public prosecutor.

2. Appellant was living with his wife, now deceased Thanka, his mother and children including pw. 3 in his house in Thoravu Village. He had a job in a tile factory. About two years previously, be disappeared from the village and returned only a couple of months before the occurrence. He had no employment. He entertained suspicion about the chastity of his wife and used to quarrel with her. On 3-4-1982, almost throughout the day, he was sitting in the adjoining compound of pw. 4. In the afternoon, he told pw. 4, and others that there was somebody inside his house and wanted them to verify. On the persuasion of pw. 4, pw. 12 and another boy, Mohandas, looked inside the house and not finding anybody came and reported so to the appellant. At about 3 p. m., appellant rose and went inside bis house. At that time, his wife, Thanka, was in the northern courtyard. Appellant came out from the kitchen with M.O.1 chopper and inflicted cut injuries on the neck of Thanka who cried out. Appellant chopped off her head, went east and entered the panchayat road holding the bead in his left hand and bloodstained chopper in bis right hand and walked along the road. The occurrence or at any rate the major part of it was witnessed by pws. 1,2, 3 (who turned (hostile) and 4. pws. 5 to 8 saw the appellant going away holding the head of his wife and the chopper followed by a crowd. pw. 8 also followed. pw.1 proceeded to the Pudukad Police Station on a cycle and gave Ext. P1 statement at 3.30 p.m. That was recorded by the S.1. of Police, pw. 16 and he registered a case as Crime No. 75/1982 against the appellant under Ext. P1(a) RI R. By the time the case was registered, appellant reached the police station. As instructed by pw. 16, appellant placed the head on the steps of the station and the chopper by the side of the wall. pw. 16 arrested the appellant and seized M O.1 chopper and the blood-stained mundu worn by the appellant, M. O.2, under Ext. P3 mahazar attested by pw. 8.

3. pw. 17, C. I. of Police, took up investigation. He held inquest over the head of Thanka in the presence of pw. 9 and other Panchayatdars, questioned pw. 8 and prepared Ext. P4 inquest report. He proceeded to the scene of occurrence, held inquest over the headless trunk of Thanka in the presence of pw. 11 and other Panchayatdars, questioned pws. 1, 3 and other children of the appellant, seized M Os. 3 to 6, clothes found on the body, and M.O.7 sample of blood-stained earth from the scene and prepared Ext. P6 inquest report. The head and the trunk were sent to the Pudukad Government Hospital through police constables, pws. 14 and 15 respectively, for post-mortem examination. Appellant was sent for medical examination. pw. 10, who examined him, issued Ext. P8 certificate. Post-mortem was conducted by pw. 10 on 4-4-1982. Other witnesses were questioned. Material objects were caused to be sent for chemical examination. Plan of the scene was got prepared through the Village Assistant, pw. 13. Investigation was completed by pw. 17 and his successor, pw. 18 laid the charge.

4. When questioned by the trial court, appellant pleaded ignorance of the occurrence. However, cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses was directed to establish that before and at the time of the occurrence the appellant was a person of unsound mind and was protected under S.84 IPC. On behalf of the defence, Dws.1 to 4 were examined and Exts. Dl to D6 were marked. Trial court accepted the prosecution case as proved beyond reasonable doubt and rejected the defence under S.84 IPC. and convicted and sentenced the appellant as stated above.

5. Learned counsel did not seriously challenge the prosecution case to the effect that it was the appellant who inflicted cut injuries and killed Thanka on 3-4-1982 in the north-western corner of the courtyard of bis bouse. The evidence has been read before us and we are satisfied, on the strength of the prosecution evidence, that the finding of the court below that Thanka was killed by the appellant in the manner alleged by the prosecution is sustainable.

6. pw. 10, who conducted post-mortem deposed that he saw the severed head and the decapitated trunk of an adult female and the injuries were ante-mortem. He found as many as five incised injuries, a contused abrasion and two other abrasions. There was an incised injury around the upper part of the neck going through the entire thickness of the neck and severing it from the trunk. The other incised injuries were on the neck and the left shoulder. Evidence of pw. 10 shows that Thanks died of decapitation from the first incised injury and incised injuries 2 and 3 also were capable of causing death in the ordinary course. pw. 10 further deposed that the incised injuries could be caused with a weapon like M.O.1 and the abrasions could be caused by a fall.

7. pws. 4 and 12 are neighbours of the appellant. Of them, pw. 4 is the immediate neighbour on the west. She deposed that in the afternoon of the day of occurrence appellant who was sitting on a bench under a coconut tree near her bath room said that there was a man inside his house. She asked two boys to verify. They went to the appellants house, came back and said that there was nobody in the house. This evidence was corroborated by one of the boys, pw. 12.

8. The occurrence was spoken to by pws. 1,2 and 4 and the subsequent event was spoken to by pws. 5 to 8. pw. 3, the 10 year old daughter of the appellant, declined to support the prosecution and was cross-examined by the prosecutor with permission of the court. She was confronted with a portion of her C. D. statement where she had supported the prosecution version. This part of the C. D. statement was proved by the investigator. pws. 1, 2 and 4 to 7 are the immediate neighbours of the appellant. pws. 2 and 3 deposed that the appellant bad left the village and returned only two months prior to the occurrence. Evidence of pws.1 and 3 shows that appellant had no employment at that time. pws. 2,5 and 7 deposed that the appellant had a feeling that his wife was unchaste. pws. 5 and 7 deposed that appellant used to quarrel with his wife.

9. pw.1 was working in a shop 10 to 20 koles away. He heard a cry from the direction of the appellants house and ran up and saw the appellant inflicting cut injuries on the neck of his wife with the chopper, M.O.1 in the northern courtyard of his house. Head was severed in the process. Appellant took the head in one hand and the chopper in the other and proceeded east. Witness felt afraid, went to another shop and then proceeded to the police station and gave Ext. P1 statement at 3-30 p.m. He further deposed that later appellant reached the police station still holding the head and M.O.1 and kept them there on the direction of the S. I. of Police. He also deposed that during the occurrence pw. 2 was standing in the north paramba and crying out. Appellants children were also crying out. Practically, the entire occurrence was spoken to by pw. 2 who resides on the northern side. He had seen the appellant in the compound of pw. 4 at about 3 p.m. At that time, deceased Thanks was in the northern courtyard. Appellant entered his bouse, came out with M. 0.1 chopper and inflicted cuts on the neck of bis wife and the latter fell down. The witness cried out. Further cut injuries were inflicted by the appellant and the head was severed. Holding the bead in the left hand and the chopper in the right hand, appellant proceeded to the east and entered the road. pw. 4 who was inside her kitchen heard the cry and looked out and saw the appellant severing the head of his wife and with the head and chopper proceeding to the east. Being afraid, she did not come out. pw. 5, a resident on the eastern side, beard a cry when he was in the northern verandah of his house and went to the pathway leading to the house of the appellant and saw the appellant coming holding the head and the chopper and entering the road. In the road, some persons followed the appellant. Witness went to the scene and found the severed trunk of Thanks lying in the courtyard pws. 6 to 8 also had seen the appellant going to the road holding the bead and the chopper and proceeding along the road. pw. 8 was one of the persons who followed the appellant to the police station. He had witnessed the seizure of M. Os.1 and 2 and the arrest of the appellant. Chemical Examiners report shows stains of human blood in M. Os.1 and 2. The appellant was examined by a doctor, and blood-stains were found on his person.

10. The above evidence is of a convincing nature and appears probable, natural and cogent. We find that the learned Sessions Judge was justified in accepting the evidence and holding that Thanks was killed by the appellant in the manner spoken to by the witnesses.

11. The point seriously stressed by the learned counsel relates to the defence under S.84 IPC. Under this provision, nothing is an offence if the accused, at the time of doing the act, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what be was doing was wrong or contrary to law.

12. An accused is presumed to be innocent till the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused. Prosecution has to prove the actus reus and mens rea. The general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. However, it has to be pointed out that there is a presumption of sanity though the presumption is rebuttable. Everyone is presumed to know the natural consequences of his acts. If a person deliberately strikes another with a deadly weapon which, according to common experience, is likely to cause an injury, sometimes even a fatal injury depending upon the nature of the weapon and the site of the injury, it should be reasonable to infer that what he did was with the intention, to cause the kind of injury which resulted from the act. In such a case, prosecution must be deemed to have discharged the burden resting on it to establish the mens rea i.e. the intention of the accused in inflicting the blow with a deadly weapon. Prosecution is ordinarily not required to establish that a person who strikes another with a deadly weapon is capable of knowing the nature of the act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law.

13. What S.84 IPC. provides is defence of legal insanity as distinguished from medical insanity. A person is legally insane when he is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law. Incapacity of the person on account of insanity must be of the nature which attracts the operation of S.84 IPC.

14. Under S.105 of the Evidence Act, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the exception contemplated under S.84 IPC. lies on the accused and the court has to presume the absence of such circumstances. Under S.4 of the Evidence Act, court has to regard the absence of such circumstances proved, unless, after considering the matters before it, it believes that such circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that they did exist. Accused has to rebut the presumption that such circumstances did not exist by placing material before court or relying on materials already before the court, sufficient to make it consider the existence of such circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them. In order to decide this question, court has to examine the available material such as oral and documentary evidence and should have due regard to admissions, presumptions and even the prosecution evidence. The burden which rests on the accused is however not higher than that which rests upon a party in a civil litigation. (See Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR. 1964 SC. 1563, [LQ/SC/1964/90] Bhikari v. State of U.P., AIR. 1966 SC 1) [LQ/SC/1965/59] .

15. Material so placed before the court may not sometimes be sufficient to discharge the burden under S, 105 of the Evidence Act; however, it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or the other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself, either actus reus or mens rea, If it raises a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court whether the accused had the mens rea required for the offence, accused would be entitled to the benefit of doubt. In such an event, prosecution must be taken to have failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. (See State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ahmadullah, AIR. 1961 SC. 998, [LQ/SC/1961/30] D. C. Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR. 1964 SC. 1563, [LQ/SC/1964/90] Ratan Lal v. State of M. P., AIR 1971 SC. 778 [LQ/SC/1970/487] , and S.W. Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra, AIR. 1972 SC. 2443) [LQ/SC/1972/361] .

16. The crucial point of time at which unsoundness of mind should be established is the time when the crime was actually committed. For this purpose, the state of his mind, both before and after the commission of the act, is also relevant. The court has to pay due regard to the circumstances which preceded, attended and followed the act. It would not be proper to assume that the investigating officer is to direct his attention only to the act but not to the mens rea. Of course, ordinarily attention of the investigator would be directed to the act, particularly in the absence of circumstances throwing any doubt on the sanity of the perpetrator of the act. But where the investigator comes across any suggestion or material throwing any such doubt, it would be his duty to investigate the mental condition of the accused also and place the material before court.

17. Learned counsel would contend that the appellant was rendered incapable by legal insanity at the time of the act committed by him. According to learned counsel, at least in 1977 and 1979 appellant was suffering from a mental disease known as paranoid schizophrenia. Learned counsel contended that a person with such a disease should be held to be suffering from legal insanity as contemplated in S.84 IPC.

18. At page 237 of Clinical Psychiatry by Mayer-Gross Slater and Roth, it has been observed:

"The symptoms interfere with the patients thinking, emotions, conation and motor behaviour, and with each in a characteristic way."

At page 264, it is observed:

"Bleuler found the splitting within the thinking itself, though the loosening in the association of ideas was the primary and fundamental disturbance. Through the loosened links in the chain of associations instinctual desires and unconscious gain the upper hand and can entirely rule his life and behaviour. The result is the disruption or distortion of his personality. He is at the mercy of his emotions and withdraws from reality whenever it is opposed to the whim of his complexes"

At page 265, it has been observed:

"The lowered mental activity may prevent the making of a clear distinction between what is real and what is imaginary, so that the schizophrenic indulges in delusional ways of thinking and behaving Other authors have used as a comparison the half-waking state of the normal person going to sleep A person in this state may have similar difficulties in thinking clearly and in distinguishing between reality and imagination."

At page 269. it has been observed as follows:

"Blunting of emotion and other primary emotional disturbances are partly or wholly responsible for callous and apparently motiveless crimes of violence which sometimes are the first sign of a beginning schizophrenia. They include homicide, suicide, sexual attacks or self-mutilation. The lack of feeling removes civilized restraining; but a delusional mis-interpretation or hallucinatory command may also contribute to the antisocial act."

In Comprehensive Text Book of Psychiatry by Freedman Kaplan at pages 625 and 626 it is observed:

"The one feature common to all manifestation of Schizophrenic thought disorder is that the schizophrenic patient thinks and reasons on his own autistic terms, according to his own intricate private rules of logic. The schizophrenic may be highly intelligent, certainly not confused, and very considerate in his deduction. But bis though processes are strange and do not lead to conclusions based on reality or universal logic

Another characteristic symptom of schizophrenia is the abrupt blocking of the stream of thought or sometimes of all psychic activity, in some aspects resembling epileptic (temporal lobs) phenomenal. The patients thoughts seem to stop suddenly and without warning. He ceases to speak in the middle of a sentence. After such a blocking episode, which may last seconds or minutes, he is perplexed and has difficulties in coordinating his behaviour "

At page 639, it is observed:

"It is exceedingly difficult to prevent most schizophrenic homicides, since there is usually no clear warning. Most of them come as a horrible surprise."

19. We now turn to the evidence before the court. It was suggested to pw 4 that the appellant was mentally ill and she denied the suggestion. However, appellants daughter, pw 3, stated that in the locality appellant was called a mad man. It may be that she, having lost her mother, was trying to help her father. Appellants sister, examined as dw. 4, stated that appellant was mentally ill and had been treated in two hospitals, that on account of mental illness he left his employment. He was indulging in unusual behaviour. He would not take food, He suddenly left the village. Even when he came back his position was the same. He was not sociable. He was spending roost of his time in the western compound. In a way, this statement was corroborated by the resident of the western compound viz., pw. 4. He used to quarrel with and assault his wife suspecting her chastity. People used to call him mad. He was not showing any affection towards his wife or children. It may be that dw. 4 was also trying to help her brother. However, evidence of pws. 3 and 4 and dw. 4 has to be examined in the light of the evidence given by Dws.1 to 3 and Exts. D4, D5 series and D6 series.

20. dw.1 has been working as an Assistant Surgeon in the Government Mental Hospital, Trichur. He deposed that on 10-12-1977 be examined the appellant in response to Ext. D4 reference letter from Dr. Meenakshi of the E. S. I. Hospital, Alagappa Nagar. Ext. D5 was the case-sheet relating to the appellant. Appellant mentioned symptoms as head ache, burning sensation in the abdomen, sleep-lessness and aching sensation at the back of the neck for two months. Appellant told him that he was worried about the behaviour of his wife as she was having relation with other people. Witness could not verify because appellant had come alone. The provisional diagnosis made was "reactive depression" and he was put on two drugs, Librosar and Tryptalon and he was sent back to the E. S. I. doctor. The two drugs were Psychotropic drugs. Witness further deposed that he had examined the patient later. In cross-examination he stated that the symptoms indicated minor mental illness or could be mental depression. The second examination was in early 1978 when some improvement was seen.

21. dw. 2 was also working as Assistant Surgeon in the Government Mental Hospital, Trichur in 1979. He deposed that be examined the appellant on 7-6-1979 and made a record in Ext. D5, the portion being marked Ext. D5(a). Ext. D5(a) does not contain the details. Witness has a register at his house from which he made notes. He further deposed that on examination it was found that the appellant bad a thought that others were talking about him. Technically, this would be called idea preference. Appellant had auditory hallucination, that is a false perception, thinking that be was hearing a voice. Witness prescribed Eskazine 5 gms., tablet Kemdril 5 gms, tablet B complex for 15 days. Witness again examined the appellant on 23-6-1979 at the hospital and made a record and advised continuation of medication and rest for two weeks. Appellant was again examined by the witness on 24-9-1979. On that occasion, it was found that the appellant was suspicious about his wife. He was advised to come for review with his wife and brother. At that time also, he bad a psychiatric symptom that other people were talking about him. The same medicines were continued for one more week.

22. Witness further deposed that on 21-7-1979 appellant was examined by him at his residence. The duration of illness was recorded as two years. It was found that he had a feeling that other people were talking about him. He had auditory hallucination and delusion of poison with suicidal ideas. He came with his relations on 2-10-1979 and complained that "one of the persons who accompanied him has responsibility, his own father and sister give support, that his parents believe his wife and if and when proved he would kill." It was revealed that it was his second marriage. He was found depressed and sad. Appellant asked the doctor whether appellants wife was poisoning him. On 16-10-1979, appellant was given electro convulsive treatment at the hospital. He was examined again on 9-11-1979 at the witnesss residence and it was recorded that the appellant had do ideas of reference and insight had been regained. On that occasion also medicines had been given. Opinion of the witness was that the appellant was suffering from a major illness, paranoid psychosis and in that condition he would not be in a position to know the consequences of his act or what he was doing was either contrary to or against law.

23. Cross-examination brought out that everything he stated was not found in Ext. D5. He had prepared notes from the register kept in bis residence. He bad not been summoned to produce the same. He gave two contradictory answers viz., on 9-11-1979 appellant was completely cured and that it was not a cure, that is, if the appellant fails to take medicine he will again develop the condition. He did not remember whether thereafter he had seen the appellant.

24. dw. 3, the Insurance Medical Officer of the ESI. Hospital, Alagappa Nagar produced Ext. D6 series, medical cards relating to the appellant which, according to him, were maintained regularly in the office. The cards would show the days on which the appellant availed of leave on medical grounds. Records show that the appellant was treated for "reactive depression" for the periods from 12-12-1977 to 27-2-1978, 6-4-1978 to 8-4-1978 and 10-4-1978 to 15-4-1978. He also deposed that, according to records, the appellant was treated from 6-3-1979 to 4-1-1980 for "paranoid Schizophrenia." According to him, the entries in the cards were made by Dr. Meenakshi. We have examined Ext. D6 series. They indeed show that the appellant was treated for paranoid schizophrenia in 1979 and 1980 as deposed to by the witness. The learned Sessions Judge brushed aside the evidence of dw.1 on the ground that the disease mentioned by him was a very minor mental defect. Evidence of dw. 2 was brushed aside on the ground that be gave evidence with reference to his notes. Evidence of Dw. 3 was brushed aside on the ground that he had no personal knowledge about Ext. D6 series. We do not think the learned Sessions Judge was justified in ignoring these valuable materials which the investigator made no attempt to collect. Prosecution proceeded as if the appellant was a person of perfect sound mind. Prosecution would have the court believe that there was no background of mental illness at all. This stand is totally destroyed by the evidence of dw. 1. The minor ailment noticed by dw.1 in 1977 developed into a major ailment viz., paranoid psychosis in 1979 and 1980 when dw. 2 was treating the appellant. It is true that dw. 2 stated that he was giving evidence with reference to notes prepared by him from a register kept in bis house. We fail to see how this would destroy the admissibility of the evidence or the credibility of the witness. If it was a case of the witness giving evidence, from refreshing his memory, he was entitled to do so, in terms of S.159 of the Evidence Act. Thereupon, in terms of S.161 of the Evidence Act. prosecution could have required him to produce the notes or the register and cross-examined him with reference to the same. Prosecution did not avail of this opportunity. dw. 2 is a professional witness committed to professional standards. We do not find any justification for ignoring bis evidence. Ext. D6 series contain entries maintained in the ordinary course of business and came from proper custody. The Sessions Court was not justified in ignoring it. Formal proof was available in the shape of evidence of dw. 3.

25. It is difficult for us to accept that in the course of investigation in which neighbours and close relatives of the appellant were questioned, the investigator got no hint about the background of appellants mental illness. Any reasonable and efficient investigation would have disclosed this fact. We would have expected the investigator to pursue the same and collect whatever evidence was available. Prosecution cannot take advantage of the failure of the investigating machinery in this behalf. The appellant, who could not engage a lawyer on his own and was assisted by counsel appointed as State Brief, who, we are happy to record, did his best for the appellant and tried to marshal! the available evidence, was placed under disadvantage by the manner in which the investigation was conducted. We have no hesitation in accepting the evidence of Dws.1 to 3 in the light of Exts. D4, D5 series and D6 series and in concluding that the appellant was suffering from mental illness from 1977 onwards. He was suffering from a minor mental illness which developed into paranoid psychosis and later into paranoid schizophrenia. Medical evidence shows that if not properly treated the condition will persist and even aggravate. Evidence of dw. 4 would indicate that the appellant was not taking medicines properly. In fact, be disappeared from the village for a period of nearly two years and returned two months prior to the occurrence. His conduct thereafter, as spoken to by dw. 4 and the reputation he acquired, as spoken to by pw. 3, were fully corroborated by medical evidence.

26. Prosecution led no evidence to show that the deceased Thanka was an unchaste woman. From what the appellant told dw. 2, it is evident that even appellants parents bad full faith in her. Yet, appellant had a delusion that his wife was unchaste. He was given to leaving his house and even staying away from his house, as could be seen from his conduct in spending most of his time in the open compound of his neighbour pw.4 sitting under a coconut tree. Shortly before the occurrence, be told pw. 4 and others that there was somebody in bis house, evidently suggesting that somebody in his bouse was dallying with his wife, a statement which was verified by pw. 12 and found to be absolutely untrue. Even a perfectly normal person could entertain unfounded suspicion about his wifes chastity. But in the background of the medical evidence placed before the court, we are justified in coming to the conclusion that in the instant case it was only a paranoid delusion on the part of the appellant. We have no reason to doubt the evidence to the effect that be was a person of unsound mind suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. The disease leads to disintegration of personality and dis-orientation of mind as well as emotional disturbances, though for all outward purposes the patient would appear to be normal.

27. The manner in which appellant killed his wife is also relevant. We are not suggesting that the brutal and callous way in which a murder is committed, by itself, is indicative of a diseased mind. But that has to be taken along with the medical evidence and the authorities quoted above to the effect that a schizophrenic patient may have homicidal or suicidal tendencies. There was no attempt on the part of the appellant to hide his crime or to keep away from people or to hide himself. After the occurrence, in a very unusual and abnormal manner, holding the head and the chopper in each of his hands, he walked down the road and ultimately reached the police station, This, by itself, would not be sufficient to come to any conclusion but taken along with the other circumstances of the case would clearly point to the validity of the defence put forward on behalf of the appellant.

28. Having considered the circumstances preceding, attendant and following the occurrence in the light of the medical evidence available as also the evidence of pw. 3 and dw. 4 we hold that at the time of the occurrence appellant was a person of unsound mind and by reason of such disease he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act. He is therefore entitled to acquittal by virtue of S.84 Indian Penal Code.

We therefore set aside the conviction and sentence entered against him under S.302 IPC. We acquit him of the charge against him. He is suffering from a disease which led to homicidal tendencies in him. Therefore, we are of opinion that it is dangerous to set him at liberty. He has to be detained in safe custody under S.335 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (2) of S.335 states that the order of detention shall be in accordance with the Rules framed by the State Government under the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912. We therefore direct the appellant to be detained in one of the mental hospitals in the State in accordance with the Rules, if any, framed by the State Government. It is open to the Government to direct the appellant to be delivered to any of his relatives or friends. Crl. Appeal is thus allowed.

A copy of this judgment will be sent to the State Government with report. Allowed.