1. The plaintiff' brings this suit alleging in effect that on the death of the late Maharaj Shri Purshottam Prasadji Keshaw Prasadji he was installed on the gadi of the God Shri Nar Narayan and claiming that he, as its gadipati, and nobody but himself has any right to the same.

2. He charges, however, that a will purporting to be that of the late Acharya Maharaj Shri Nar Purshottam Prasadji, is wrongly being set up, and that the defendants "relying on the aforesaid will, which is fruitless and invalid, are without any authority or any right attempting to place some other person on the gadi, and that there is great likelihood of injury to his rights in respect of the Acharyaship, which he therein described."

3. Accordingly he seeks in effect (1) a declaration that a will set up by the defendants as having been executed by the late Acharya was not executed by him, and that, if it be established, it is not binding; (2) a declaration that the right to become Acharya is his, and he is the owner of the gadi; (3) an injunction restraining the defendants from obstructing or causing obstruction to the plaintiff in occupying the gadi; and (4) an injunction restraining the defendants from placing any other person on the gadi.

4. His suit, however, has been dismissed, both Courts thinking it was barred by section 42 of the Specific Belief Act.

That section is in these terms:--

Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or Interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may, in its discretion, make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not ill such suit ask for any further relief.

Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.

5. Nothing is said here about dismissing his suit: all that is enacted is that no Court shall make a declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief, omits to do so.

6. But the prayer in this suit is not limited to one for a declaration; an injunction is sought and that is described in section 52 of the Specific Relief Act as a form of relief, so that even if the words of section 42 could be given the meaning that the plaintiff must ask for all the relief that he is entitled to--a view opposed to the decision of this Court in Farasram v. Bhimbhai (1903) 5 Bom. L.R. 195--still there is no warrant for the conclusion that a plaintiff merely by seeking a declaration becomes disentitled to such relief as he has prayed, provided he makes a case showing his right thereto.

7. On examination it will be seen that the plaint, though meagre and wanting in precision, is not so far beside the mark as has been supposed. The plaintiff's view is that the temple's inams and other property said to be involved in this suit are the endowed property of the deity to whom they have been dedicated, and that to this deity the endowed property belongs, though the affairs of the endowment have to be administered by human agency, and this, the plaintiff claims, is vested in him as the Acharya. The suit, therefore, in the plaintiff's view is not one for the possession of land, but to determine who is to occupy the gadi, and thus as gadinashin become the human agent of the deity.

8. If that be so, then an injunction restraining all interference with the occupancy by the plaintiff' of the gadi secures in the most complete manner to him the rights he claims. We do not say that the plaintiff might not in terms have asked for possession of the office he says is his; we will assume he could, but how would practical effect be given to an award of possession of an office otherwise than by preventing interference with the rights of which it is made up

9. We therefore cannot see why the relief of an injunction should not be given if the right claimed be established.

10. But if the plaintiff is able to make out a case entitling him to an injunction, it means that he will have established (1) that he has a title to succeed Purshottam as gadipati and (2) that Purshottam's alleged will is of no avail against that title.

11. From this it becomes apparent that, the declarations sought are merely a statement of the grounds on which he is able to succeed, the declaration in respect of the will being in anticipation of the plea founded on the will.

12. Therefore the awarding of the injunction would actually involve findings by the Court in the terms of the declaration sought, so that at present we fail to see why any construction should be placed on section 42 other than that expounded in Farasram v. Bhimbhai (1903) 5 Bom. L.R. 195.

13. But this point hardly arises at present; we are only concerned with the dismissal of the suit, and that (in our opinion) cannot be supported on the ground that has prevailed in the lower Courts.

14. It has been suggested that this is an attempt to evade the Court Fees Act, but if a plaintiff can evade that Act, he may; the remedy for that lies not in withholding a relief to which he is entitled as of right, but in procuring an amendment of the Act. If it is within the discretion of the Court whether it will grant a plaintiff's prayer or not, then it may be legitimate to consider whether an evasion of the Court Fees Act has been attempted. This suggestion of attempted evasion, however, proceeds on a misconception of the position. Though the property is of great value, it will not, on the theory propounded by the plaintiff, become his, and we will not presume that by malversation he would make it his. If he acts improperly in his office he can be called to account.

15. The Advocate General has suggested that there is no allegation of obstruction, but mofussil pleadings are not construed strictly, and though the plaint is imperfect as a statement of the plaintiff's case, we think obstruction is involved. The defendant's written statement goes a long way to remedy this defect and the matter is made still clearer by the attitude assumed by the defendants here.

16. To avoid any question, however, it will be better that the plaintiff should amend his plaint in this respect, and also by-defining more precisely the terms of the injunction he seeks.

17. We, therefore, reverse the decree and remand the case for re-trial. Thy costs will abide the result.