1. These five appeals are directed against a consolidated order Govinda Pillai, J. passed in O.P. Nos. 46 to 50 of 1951 dismissing them. These Original Petitions were made by one Shri. S. Kumaraswamy, Manager, Pioneer Motor Service Limited, Nagercoil, under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash certain orders of the Transport Authority issuing Stage-Carriage Permits and the orders Government passed dismissing the appeals preferred by him against the grant of such permits. The petitioner in the Original Petitions is the appellant in all the five appeals. A.S. 657 arises from O.P. 46, A.S. 658 from O.P. 50, A.S. 659 from O.P. 49, A.S. 660 from O.P. 48 and A.S. 661 from O.P.

4

7. The circumstances under which the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court happened to be invoked and the main ground on which the applications were founded are set out as follows in the learned judges order:

"One Sri. Kumaraswami, Manager of the Pioneer Motor Service Ltd., Nagercoil, is the petitioner in all these cases. In O.P. 46, 47, 49 and 50 of 1951, the first counter-petitioner is the Transport Authority for Travancore-Cochin, and the third counter-petitioner is the Travancore-Cochin State. In O.P. 48 of 1951 the Transport Authority and the State are counter-petitioners 1 and

4. These petitions come under two groups, O.P. Nos. 46 and 49 go together. These petitions relate to the grant of permits for conducting services of stage coaches along some of the routes in South Travancore. The second counter-petitioner in O.P. Nos. 46 and 49 had applied for such permits. In spite of the petitioners objections permits were issued to them by the Transport Authority. The appeals filed by the petitioner before the Government objecting to the issue of such permits were dismissed. So in these two petitions, the prayer is for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the first and third counter-petitioners in the matter of the grant of permits to the second counter-petitioner. In the other three petitions O.P. Nos. 47,48 and 50 of 1951, the petitioner along with others had applied for permits to conduct the services along some other routes. The petitioners prayer was disallowed, whereas the prayer of the remaining counter-petitioners in the three cases had been allowed by the Transport Authority and confirmed by Government on appeal by the petitioner.

"2. The main contention of the petitioner in all the five cases was that the permit to the counter-petitioners had been given without a proper or valid application. Except the person who obtained the permit in O.P. 47 of 1951, all the others had filed their applications before the Transport Authority before 5.1.19

50. At the time when they had filed their applications, the Motor Vehicles Act in force was that of 111

7. That was repealed and the present Act X of 1125 came into law from the 5th January 19

50. It was under this Act that the Transport Authority had considered the previous applications and ordered the issue of permits. The petitioners argument was that unless an application under the new Act had been filed it would be incompetent for the Transport Authority to sanction the permit and so the orders sanctioning issue of the permit to the several persons in these cases were void. But the application referred to in O.P. 47 of 1951, was filed on 5.9.1950 and so no such objection could prevail as regards this case."

2. Though several additional grounds were urged before the learned judge, besides the ground referred to in the above extract the only other ground pressed before us was that in disposing of the various applications before the Transport Authority, considerations other than those warranted by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act were taken into account and that the appellate orders of the Government were also vitiated by the same wrong approach. The argument was that the impugned orders were bad on the ground of arbitrariness or, what in America they would call the application of wrong standards.



3. Govinda Pillai, J. gave his decision on 28.6.195

1. Since then (on 17th March 1952) in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. (A.I.R.) 1952 Supreme Court 192 the Supreme Court had occasion to lay down the principles to be borne in mind in dealing with writ applications to quash orders passed by statutory bodies like Regional Transport Authorities, Central Traffic Boards etc. That case also arose out of rival claims of different proprietor of Bus Transport Services for Stage-Carriage permits. We may with advantage refer to what Chandrasekhara Iyer, J., said in the judgment in that case which was one reversing the decision of the Madras High Court quashing certain proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority (Tanjore) and the Central Traffic Board (Madras) and an order of the Government of Madras and directing the issue of permits in favour of the petitioner before the High Court. For our present purpose it is enough if we refer to the relevant portion of the head-note of the case as given in the All India Reporter, It reads:

"The Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates new rights and liabilities and prescribes an elaborate procedure for their regulation. No one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the Transport Authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account There is a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had."

The earlier portion of the head-note refers to the rules Courts have forged for themselves to guide them in dealing with application under Art. 226 and it is as follows:

"Such writs as are referred to in Art. 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of Appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made."

Keeping these general considerations before us we do not hesitate to say that there is absolutely no substance in these appeals. Strenuous efforts were made by the appellants learned counsel to bring the case within the rule of permissible interference by Courts as laid down in the above case. We need only say that it is impossible to hold that our brother Govinda Pillai, J. was wrong in refusing to interfere with the orders sought to be impugned.



4. It was contended that to grant Stage-Carriage permits pursuant to applications filed under the defunct Motor Vehicles Act was beyond the competence of the Transport Authority constituted under the new Act and that the grant of such permits should therefore have been quashed as grants made without jurisdiction. When the new Act came into force the due formalities to be observed with respect to applications under the old Act had already been complied with by persons to whom permits were since granted. At the open sittings of the Transport Authority the objections the appellant had to the grant of permits to his rivals were heard. All concerned treated the old applications as pending disposal and without objection the appellant allowed them to be heard on the merits. Want of applications under the new Act was at best an irregularity and putting the appellants case at its highest all that could be said in his favour is that there was an irregular assumption of jurisdiction by the Transport Authority in granting permits to those who had not renewed their applications under the new Act. "Where there is jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but non-compliance with the procedure prescribed as essential for the exercise of the jurisdiction, the defect might be waived". Pisani v. Attorney General, Gibraltar (1874) L.R. 5 P.C. 51

6. See also Ledgard v. Bull (1887) I.L.R. 9 Allahabad 191; Meenakshi v. Subramania (1888) I.L.R. 11 Madras 26; Jang Bahadur v. Upper India Bank A.I.R.1928 Privy Council 162; and Mariam Mathew v. Ittoop Poulo 1952 K.L.T. 116 (F.B.)

5. Undoubtedly on a proper application the Transport Authority had jurisdiction to issue Stage-Carriage permits. The appellant without objection joined issue with those to whom permits were since granted and raised his objections. He cannot afterwards question the jurisdiction of the tribunal concerned upon the ground that there were irregularities in the initial procedure which if objected to at the time would have led to the dismissal of their applications. The appellant not only did not question the authority to issue permits persuant to the old applications but raised his objections on the merits. He cannot afterwards be heard to question the jurisdiction of the Transport Authority. Had the present objection been raised in good time the rival claimants could have remedied the defect. It is practically on the above ground the learned judge repelled the argument raised before him of want of competence or jurisdiction in the Transport Authority. We respectfully affirm his decision on the point.



6. On the other point urged before us that the grant of permits was vitiated on the ground of arbitrariness, or the application of wrong standards. We are likewise emphatic in our view that that point is also devoid of merit. What was urged was that instead of taking into account the considerations laid down by the Motor Vehicles Act, the Transport Authority and the Government had a set policy for issuing State-Carriage permits. It was pointed out that the orders passed by the Transport Authority and the Government refer to a policy that they did not desire to encourage any monopoly in the matter of bus transport. All that those words seem to mean is what it was against the interests of the travelling public, for whose convenience and need stage carriage are provided, not to afford equal opportunities for all bus owners and proprietors of bus transport services. In other words what the impugned orders state is that the interests of the public generally demand that healthy competition in the business should be encouraged. We are unable to agree that there was any application of wrong standards or any arbitrariness in the matter of disposing of the concerned applications. What we find in this argument is not an attempt to apply the law as laid down by decisions to a given set of facts but to read or try to interpret the facts in such a way as to bring them within the scope of certain decisions. We repeat what we said earlier that there is no merit in the argument.



7. No other point was urged before us. The appeals fail in the result and we dismiss them with costs. Advocates fee is fixed at Rs. 75/- in each appeal of which one half will go to the Transport Authority and the State and the remaining one-half to the other respondents.

Dismissed.