Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
1. The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing FIR No. 72/2019, dated 16.8.2019 for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 403, 407, 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of IPC. The matter was compromised between the parties and the statement of the informant was recorded on 11.9.2023, in which he stated that the matter had been compromised with the intervention of respectable persons of the society. The informant has no objection in case the FIR and consequent proceedings arising out of the FIR are quashed.
2. I have heard Mr. Amit Singh Chandel and Mr. Abhinav Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent no.1/State, and Mr Janak Raj, learned counsel for respondent no. 2.
3. Mr. Amit Singh Chandel, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that since the matter has been compromised between the parties, therefore, the FIR be quashed. He has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nikhil Merchant Vs. CBI 2008 (9) SCC 677, [LQ/SC/2008/1688] Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab 2012 (10) SCC 303, [LQ/SC/2012/838 ;] Narinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab 2014 (6) SCC 466 [LQ/SC/2014/327] and judgments of this Court in Honey Bhatia Vs. State of H.P., Cr.MMO No. 224 of 2017, decided on 27.7.2017 and Rahul Chauhan Vs. State of H.P., Cr.MMO No. 33 of 2012, decided on 23.7.2012.
4. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General submitted that offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC is a heinous offence and FIR should not be quashed.
5. I have given considerable thought to the rival submissions at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.
6. As per the FIR, the informant had booked a vehicle bearing registration no. RJ-04-GB-4692 with 769 boxes of apples on 10.8.2019 to Karad (Maharashtra). The driver disclosed his name as Rama Ram and produced the documents. The driver subsequently switched off his mobile phone. The police conducted the investigation and filed a charge sheet against the petitioner for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of IPC. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641 [LQ/SC/2017/1450] that where the settlement between the offender and the victim is regarding the offences against the society, the same will not justify the quashing of the FIR. The offences punishable under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC involve the forgery of the document and such offences cannot be quashed under Section 482 of the IPC. It was observed:-
"13. In State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi [State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29 [LQ/SC/2014/1010] : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 563], a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court explained the earlier decisions and the principles which must govern in deciding whether a criminal proceeding involving a non-compoundable offence should be quashed. In that case, the respondents were alleged to have obtained letters of credit from a bank in favour of fictitious entities. The charge sheet involved the offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. Bogus beneficiary companies were alleged to have got them discounted by attaching fabricated bills. Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) emphasised that the case involved an allegation of forgery; hence the Court was not dealing with a simple case where “the accused had borrowed money from a bank, to divert it elsewhere”. The Court held that the manner in which letters of credit were issued and funds were siphoned off had a foundation in criminal law: (SCC p. 42, para 26)
“26. … availing of money from a nationalised bank in the manner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly exposits fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi as narrated in the charge sheet cannot be put in the compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong and it has immense societal impact. It is an accepted principle of handling finance that whenever there is manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of these kinds of benefits it cannot be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates a hazard in the financial interest of the society. The gravity of the offence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation.”
The judgment of the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings was hence set aside by this Court.
14. The same principle was followed in CBI v. Maninder Singh [CBI v. Maninder Singh, (2016) 1 SCC 389 [LQ/SC/2015/1102] : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 292] by a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 quashed proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the appeal filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that the case involved allegations of forgery of documents to embezzle the funds of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled with the bank would not justify a recourse to the power under Section 482: (SCC p. 394, para 17)
“17. … In economic offences, the Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or theft of a trivial amount, but the offence with which we are concerned was well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders is not allowed to continue, the entire community is aggrieved.”
15. In a subsequent decision in State of T.N. v. R. Vasanthi Stanley [State of T.N. v. R. Vasanthi Stanley, (2016) 1 SCC 376 [LQ/SC/2015/1218] : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 282], the Court rejected the submission that the first respondent was a woman “who was following the command of her husband” and had signed certain documents without being aware of the nature of the fraud which was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission, this Court held that : (SCC p. 387, paras 14-15)
“14. … Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under criminal law is an offence and it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in CrPC relating to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the grounds of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender- neutral in this case. We say no more on this score.
15. … A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that matter the offence that has the potential to create a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is a delay in trial or the principle that when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on the system. …”
16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non- compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well- being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.
xxxxxx
18. The present case, as the allegations in the FIR would demonstrate, is not merely one involving a private dispute over a land transaction between two contesting parties. The case involves allegations of extortion, forgery and fabrication of documents, utilisation of fabricated documents to effectuate transfers of title before the registering authorities and the deprivation of the complainant of his interest in land on the basis of a fabricated power of attorney. If the allegations in the FIR are construed as they stand, it is evident that they implicate serious offences having a bearing on a vital societal interest in securing the probity of titles to or interest in land. Such offences cannot be construed to be merely private or civil disputes but implicate the societal interest in prosecuting serious crimes. In these circumstances, the High Court was eminently justified in declining to quash the FIR which had been registered under Sections 384, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 506(2) of the Penal Code.”
7. In the present case, the FIR shows that the vehicle booked by the informant did not reach the spot. The police found after the investigation that documents were forged and were used to induce the informant to deliver the property. Since the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468 & 471 of IPC cannot be quashed based on the compromise between the parties as per the judgment of Parbatbhai Aahir (supra). Therefore, it is not permissible to quash the FIR based on the compromise between the parties.
8. In Nikhil Merchant (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the matter was predominately civil which is not the case here. The judgments of Gian Singh (supra) and Narinder Singh (supra) are concerned with the power of the Court to quash the non-compoundable offence based on the compromise and do not deal with the question of quashing the FIR registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471 of IPC. The judgments of this Court cannot be relied upon in view of the specific judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with the matter.
9. Consequently, the FIR cannot be quashed based on the compromise.
10. List the matter for the final hearing in due course.
