Ramesam, J.

The first question in this appeal is whether a Subordinate Court in British India has power to restrain by injunction a party from prosecuting a suit in a Foreign Court (though within the British Empire). The Chartered High Courts have such power, not by reason of O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2 of Civil Procedure Code but by reason of the equity jurisdiction they inherited from the old surpreme Courts. [ Rash Behary Dey v. Bhowani Churn Bose (I.L.R., 34 Cal., 97) [LQ/CalHC/1906/116] and Mungle Chand v. Gopal Ram (I.L.R., 34 Cal., 101) [LQ/CalHC/1906/96] . Those decisions were followed in Uderam Kesaji v. Hyderally (I.L.R., 33 Bom., 469) though the remarks of Woodroffe, J., in Hukum Chand Boid v. Kamalanand Singh (I.L.R., 33 Cal., 927) [LQ/CalHC/1905/59] about the inherent powers of a Court (now governed by Sect. 151 Code of Civil Procedure) were also relied on. But it is noteworthy that Woodrofee, J., himself in Rash Behary Dey v. Bhowani Churn Bose (I.L.R., 34 Cal., 97) [LQ/CalHC/1906/116] does not rely on the inherent powers of a Court but only on the equity jurisdiction inherited from the Supreme Court. The decisions in Tikamchand Santokchand v. Santokchand Singhi (59 I.C. 218.) and Mulchand Raichand v. Gill & Co. (I.L.R., 44 Bom., 283) [LQ/BomHC/1919/82] do not carry the matter further. Mr. Patanjali Sastri the learned vakil for the respondent admits that he has not got a case in which it has been held that a Subordinate Court can exercise such a power.

But assuming that the Subordinate Judge has such a power, the question arises whether this is a fit case for the exercise of it. In this case the appellants suit in the Supreme Court of Ipoh was the first suit and though this fact is not conclusive in favour of his bona fides , certainly the burden on the respondents of showing that the prosecution of the suit at Ipoh is vexatious and acts oppressively towards him is heavier.

In the present case, of the two respondents, the 2nd respondent was not a party to the Ipoh suit. The 1st respondent was impleaded as the 1st defendant but did not file a written statmentthe 2nd and 3rd defendants only filing a written statement alleging that the agency and partnership of the plaintiff terminated in October, 192

3. The suit in the Devakottah Court is filed on 25th November, 1926. But these facts are not enough to satisfy the tests laid down in Cohen v. Rothfield (1919) 1 K. B., 410 at p. 415) by Scrutton, L. J., where he says:

Unless the appellant satisfied the Court that no advantage can be gained by the defendant by proceeding with the action in which he is plaintiff in another part of the Kings Dominions the Court should not stop him from proceeding with the only proceedings which he as plaintiff, can control. The principle has been repeatedly acted upon.

The same principle was enunciated by Lord St. Leonards in Carron Co. v. Maclauren (1885) 5 H.L.C., 416). In the face of this statement of the law, it is futile to argue that Nattukotai Chetties whose home is in Southern India have no business to file a suit in the Court of Federated Malay States. The grounds given by the Subordinate Judge do not satisfy the tests laid down by Scrutton, L. J., in Cohen v. Rothfield (1919) 1 K. B., 410 at p. 415) and by Lord St. Leonards in Carron Co. v. Maclaren (1885) 5.H.L.C., 416).

We allow the appeal and dismiss the petition of the respondents with costs throughout (costs including typing of papers).