Dawson Miller, C.J.The only question raised in this appeal is whether the learned Judge was right in holding that the parties in this case were governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law. The plaintiffs sued for a declaration of their title to and recovery of possession over the estate of Charan Mahto who died childless in the year 1817. Upon his death some dispute appears to have taken place between his two sisters and his mother and grand-mother on the one hand and the descendants of a brother of his grandfather on the other. The matters in dispute appear to have been left to the decision of a neighboring zemindar and he decided what he thought would be the proper solution of the dispute between the parties. He decided apparently that Charan Mahtos mother Fulmani Mahatani and her mother in-law Radhamani Mhatani should remain in possession of the property in dispute for their lifetime as maintenance but that after their death the property should go to the defendants branch of the family, fulmani Mahatani remlined in possession of this property from that time up to the time of her death in 1919, the mother-in-law having predeceased her. It appears that she made a gift of the property in 1901 to her daughters, sisters of Cnaran Mahto, and two of the plaintiffs in the present suit. The main question in contention between the parties in J his case was whether they were governed by the Hindu Law or whether they were governed by the laws and customs of the aboriginal tribe to which they originally belonged. If they were governed by the custom of the aboriginal tribes then undoubtedly the property would go to the defendants branch of the family on the death of Charan Mahto. If they were governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law then it is equally clear that the property would go to the plaintiffs branch of the family. This was the main question in dispute between the parties.

2. Both Courts found that they were governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law. We are asked to say in this appeal that (sic) Judge was not justified in arriving at the conclusion that even if the parties were undoubtedly governed by Hindu Law they were still governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law and it is contended that he has not properly considered that, question but has assumed that because the parties lived in Manbhum where; apparently there area number of Bengalees the Da yabhaga School of Hindu Law prevailed throughout that locality and, therefore, the parties in this case were governed by that; School of Hindu Law. The only question, really which the learned Judge had to decide was whether the parties were Hindus or not, for it appears from his judgment that it was not disputed by the learned Vakil who argued the appeal that if the parties were Hindus the plaintiffs would succeed to the property left by Charan. There was an admission by the learned Vakil who appeared on, behalf of the defendants that if the parties were Hindus it was unnecessary to go into the question whether the Dayabhaga or the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law applied, because in that case he conceded that they could not succeed to this property. In these circumstances it seems to me that we cannot send the case back again to the learned Judge to determine the very question of fact which was conceded by the learned Vakil who appeared on behalf of the defendants and that is the only question which was raised in this appeal.

3. It was suggested that the learned Judge was wrong in failing to consider the effect of what has been called family arrangement, which I have already referred to, made on the death of Charan Mahto. It does not appear to me that this was a family arrangement in the ordinary sense of the term. It was merely a dispute between the mother as to her maintenance and the other branch of the family who were claiming throughout that the property ought to go direct to them. The zemindar who settled that dispute for them considered that the mother ought to be entitled to remain in. possession of the property during her lifetime and that afterwards it should go to the defendants branch of the family. I do not think that anybody else was bound by that arrangement. This appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Macpherson, J.

4. I agree. As a result of the astonishing admissions made at the Bar in the Court of the District Judge this second appeal manifestly cannot succeed.

5. By way of supplement to the judgment which has just been delivered by my Lord the Chief Justice, it seems expedient to make some observations on certain misconceptions which arose in the course of the litigation.

6. The parties are kurmi-mahtos of the Manbhum Pargana of the Manbhum Dis

(Tiff missing 798/799 & 800)