R. M. SAHAI, J.

1. The validity of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, 1961 (for brevity the) levying market fee on sale and purchase of agricultural produce in a market yard or sub-market yard was challenged by dealers for lack of legislative competence, violation of Articles 14, 19, 301 and 304 of the Constitution, absence of any quid pro quo in the fee paid and service rendered, illegal and arbitrary inclusion of manufactured articles such as khandsari, shakkar, gur and sugar as agricultural produce in the Schedule etc.

2. Acts of other States, for instance, Punjab and Haryana and U. P. were also assailed for similar infirmities. Whether these petitions, which appear to be identical, are reproductions of any of those petitions, which were pending in this Court from before is not relevant but various group of petitions of Punjab and Haryana dealers challenging the constitutionality and legality of the and its provisions including gur, khandsari and shakkar as agricultural produce in the schedule to the Punjab Act have been dismissed by different benches presumably because of decisions in Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab, Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar & Co. v. State of U. P., Rathi Khandsari Udyog v. State of U. P. and Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A. P.

3. Despite these decisions spelling out basic principles for determining the validity of marketing legislation dealing with agricultural produce the petitioners were not willing to take it lying down probably because none of these decisions dealt with sugar. It was urged that inclusion off sugar in the Schedule to the was arbitrary, primarily because it being a declared commodity of public importance under Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule the State legislature was precluded from legislating on it. Its inclusion in the Schedule was also assailed as it being a mill or factory produce it could not be deemed to be agricultural produce which is basically confined to produce of or form soil4. Sugar is one of the items which was included in the Schedule to the, statutorily, right from its inspection. Such inspection is found in Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal, Bihar etc. Whether it was subsequently deleted or re-included or re-grouped or it was added later was in material as Section 40 of theempowered State Government to amend or include any item in the Schedule of agricultural produce. Existence of such delegated power is a usual feature of the statutes. no illegality or infirmity could be pointed out in it. Any challenge, therefore, founded on excessive delegation of legislative power was misconceived.

5. Inclusion of sugar in the Schedule was urged to be arbitrary as it was not produced out of soil the basic ingredient of agricultural produce. The fallacy of the submission is apparent as it was in complete disregard of the definition of the word "agricultural produce" in the which includes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule. The legislative power to add or include and define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive neither excludes any item produced in mills or factories nor it confines its width to produce from soil. If that be the construction then all items of animal husbandry shall stand excluded. It further overlooks the expanse of the expression "or otherwise as specified in the Schedule". Nor switch over from the indigenous method of producing anything to scientific or mechanical method changes it character. Khandsari sugar, which is produced by open pan process and is not different form sugar produced by vacuum pan process except in composition, filterability and conductivity as held in Rathi Khandsari Udyog was held to be agricultural produce in some decisions. No distinction was made on the method of production, namely, by modern plant and machinery. To say, therefor, that sugar being produced in mill or factories could not be deemed to be agricultural produce is both against the statutory language and judicial interpretation of similar provisions of the in the statutes of other States. Rice or dal produced in mills have been held to be agricultural produce in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar & Co. v. State of U. P. and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Ganga Dal Mill and Co. Even in Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Edn. vol. 1, para 1414, the word agricultural produce for purposes of agricultural marketing schemes is understood as, including "any product of agriculture or horticulture and any article of food or drink wholly or partly manufactured or derived from any such product and fleeces (including all kinds of wool) and the skins of animals". In the same volume products covered by the provisions of the EEC Treaty as to agriculture (classified according to the Brussels Nomenclature of 1965) are mentioned in paragraph 1845. Sugar is one of them6. Another legalistic challenge regarding inhibition of State to legislate on sugar or oft-repeated argument of occupied filed was more attractive than of any substance. Reliance on Article 246 of the Constitution was academic only. As far back as 1956 Constitution Bench of this Court in Choudhary Tika Ramji v. State of U. P. examined the matter in detail and held sugar legislations to be within the scope of Entry 33 of Concurrent List. It was observed that all the Acts and the notifications issued thereunder by the Center in regard to sugar and sugarcane were enacted in exercise of concurrent jurisdiction. The effect of it was described thus, The Provincial legislatures as well as the Central legislature would be competent to enact such pieces of legislation and no question of legislative competence would arise. Any further discussion on clash between Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule with Entry 28 of List II in the circumstances is unnecessary. As regards the submission of occupied filed suffice it to say that there is no repugnancy in the Central and State legislation. At least none was made out. Even if there would have been any the having received the assent of the President it is fully protected by Article 254(2).

7. For these reasons these petitions fail and are dismissed with costs.