Charanjit Talwar, J.

1. The settled position in law is that it is open to a Magistrate to take cognizance of offience upon a police report submitted under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure even when it does not include the report of experts. The question is shought to be re-agitated in the two connected petitions. The pleas urged before us in Cr. Writ No. 622/88 filed by Kishan Lal and Cr. M(M) No. 1132/88 filed by Gurdev Singh are that the investigation for the offences under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short the NDPS Act) cannot be held to be complete without obtaining the opinion of the expert and, therefore, the cognizance of the said offences under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) is not permissible.

2. The petitioners in two different cases were arrested for offences under various sections of the NDPS Act on two different dates. They were refused bail and remanded to judicial custody. The report under Section 173(2) of the Code in Gurdev Singhs case was filed on 90th day of his arrest and in the case of Kishan Lal, before the expiry of 90 days. Acting on those reports, the Magistrate concerned took cognizance of the offences and remanded the accused to judicial custody. The admitted fact is that opinion of the Central Forensic Science Laboratory by then had not been received by the Investigating Officer. It is the further admitted position that during the pendency of these two petitions before us, the reports of the Government Expert in the respective cases were received and filed before the Courts concerned. Those reports show that the samples from the seized commodity in the case of Gurdev Singh were of Poppy Straw and in the case of Kishan Lal, Charas, both falling within the ambit of the NDPS Act.

3. Gurdev Singh filed a petition (Cr. M(M) No. 1132/88) under Section 439 of the Code seeking bail on the ground that cognizance taken by the Magistrate on an incomplete report was vitiated and, therefore, as the investigation was pending, he was entitled as a matter of right to the grant of bail after 90 days of his arrest under Section 167(2) of the Code. The learned Single Judge before whom the petition was listed, was of the considered opinion that the question raised was of considerable importance and, thus, referred the matter to a larger bench.

4. Thereafter the other petitioner, Kishan Lal filed a separate petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus for his immediate release on the plea that his detention in judicial custody after 90 days of his arrest, was without the Authority of law. We issued Rule and directed that petition to be heard along with the bail petition of Gurdev Singh as the pleas in the two cases were common. This judgment disposes of both the petitions.

5. The question raised by the petitioners in a nut shell is whether the investigation of a case under the NDPS Act can be said to be complete in the absence of the report of the Scientific Officer and Chemical Examiner The contention is that where the accused person is allegedly found in possession of or transporting a prohibited drug or substance, mainly two facts have to be established by the prosecution viz , (1) that of recovery of the commodity or substance and (2) that the possession of the said recovered material is illegal under the provisions of the NDPS Act. It is submitted that the Investigating Officer would be unable to give his opinion regarding the second aspect till he obtains the report of the expert and, therefore, the report submitted by the Investigating Officer even if purported to be under Section 173(2) of the Code, must be held to be based on incomplete investigation.

6. The learned Single Judge in his reference order has noticed that the reported cases in which this question has been settled related to offences under the Indian Penal Code. It was urged before him that the principles enunciated in those cases are not applicable to cases involving an offence under the NDPS Act or the old Opium Act or the Excise Act. To appreciate the contentions raised in these petitions, we have to notice the case law to some extent to highlight the settled principles.

7. It has been held by the Supreme Court that although the police are not permitted to send an incomplete report under Section 173(2) of the Code, yet the investigation except for the report of an expert like the Serologist or Scientific Officer and Chemical Examiner is complete and, therefore, the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report which does not include the experts opinion. In Tara Singh v. State, AIR 1951 SC 441 [LQ/SC/1951/45] , the Police had in fact filed a report dated the 2nd October, 1949 terming it as an incomplete challan and on the 5th October they filed a report which they called a complete challan. Thereafter on the 19th October they filed yet another report which was termed as supplementary challan. The objection taken at the trial was that the Magistrate had no power to take cognizance of the case on 3rd October when the incomplete challan dated 2nd October, 1949 was placed before him. It was contented that Police are not permitted to file an incomplete report under Section 173(2) of the Code.

8. It appears from paragraph 14 of the reported judgment that the witnesses named by the police in the second report, i.e., the report of 5th October, 1949 were not the witnesses who were acquainted with the circumstances of the case but merely formal witnesses who had either examined the injured or recorded the dying declaration. It further appears that vide the report dated 19th October, 1949 which was termed as supplementary challan, the reported of the Imperial Serologist and the drawing of a sketch map of the occurrence were sought to be placed on the record. Negativing the contention that the Magistrate had not taken proper cognizance, it was held that the police report dated 2nd October, 1949 was a complete report within the meaning of Section 190(1)(b) of the Code as the investigation was complete. Thus the challan dated the 5th October, 1949 and the supplementary challan dated the 19th October, 1949 did not vitiate the first report which had been termed as an incomplete challan. It is useful to quote paragraph 14 of the reported judgment:

When the police drew up their challan of 2.10.1949 and submitted it to the Court on the 3rd, they had in fact completed their investigation except for the report of the Imperial Serologist and the drawing of a sketch map of the occurrence. It is always permissible for the Magistrate to take additional evidence not set out in the challan. Therefore, the mere fact that a second challan was put in on 5th October would not necessarily vitiate the first. All that Section 173(1)(a) requires is that as soon as the police investigation under Chap. 14 of the Code is complete, there should be forwarded to the Magistrate a report in the prescribed form :

Setting forth the names of the parties, the nature of the information and the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case.

All that appears to have been done in the report of 2nd October which the police called their incomplete challan. The witnesses named in the second challan of 5th October were not witnesses who were acquainted with the circumstances of the case. They were merely formal witnesses on other matters. So also in the supplementary challan of the 19th. The witnesses named are the 1st Class Magistrate, Amritsar, who recorded the dying declaration, and the Assistant Civil Surgeon. They are not witnesses who were acquainted with the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the challan which the police called an incomplete challan was in fact a completed report of the kind which Section 173(1)(a) of the Code contemplates. There is no force in this argument and we hold that the Magistrate took proper cognizance of the matter.

9. A Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in State of Haryanav.Mehal Singh and Another, AIR 1978 Punjab and Haryana 341, after surveying the case law including a judgment of a Single Judge of this Court in Harichand and Raj Palv. State,ILR (Delhi) 1977 Vol. 2 at page 367 on which case, petitioners have placed great reliance, has also held that the investigation of an offence cannot be considered to be unconclusive merely for the reason that the Investigating Officer when he submitted his report in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code, still, awaited the report of the expert. It was further observed that even if the Investigating Officer failed to append to the Police report, the statement under Section 161 of the Code or the opinion of the experts although available with him, yet the investigation was complete and the report filed before the Magistrate was proper. In the said case the accused were seeking bail on the ground that the investigation had not been completed within sixty days of their arrest and the cognizance taken by the Magistrate was vitiated as it had been taken on an incomplete report. Thus, although the offence involved was different but the plea was exactly the same as is before us.

10. A Division Bench of this Court in Tej Singhv. State,Criminal Law Journal 1988 at page 1635 has taken the same view as that of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. In that case also the contention was that it was obligatory on the Investigating Officer to forward to the Magistrate along with the police report the opinion of the Central Forensic Science Laboratory and in the absence of the experts report, the investigation could not be said to be complete and therefore the cognizance taken not being valid, the accused was entitled to be ordered to be released on bail under Section 167 (2) of the Code. In support of the argument it was submitted that Sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the Code cast an additional duty on the Investigating Officer to forward to the Magistrate the experts opinion. It was unsuccessfully urged that without that opinion, the report could not be termed as a complete report.

11. Before us Bawa Gurcharan Singh on behalf of the petitioner Kishan Lal and Mr. K.K. Sud on behalf of the petitioner Gurdev Singh have also contended that in the old Code, provisions like the one contained in Sub-sections (5), (7) and (8) in the 1973 Code were not there and, therefore, the judgments of the Supreme Court following the law laid in Tara Singhs case (supra), decided under the old Code, are not applicable in the context of the new provisions incorporated in the 1973 Code. This Court in Tej Singhs case (supra) and the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Mehal Singhs case (supra) have negatived that contentions.

12. The learned Counsel laid great stress on the fact that the investigation could not be said to be complete in cases where the experts opinion was still awaited as in its absence the Investigating Officer would neither be in a position to form his opinion nor would he be able to furnish to the accused copy of that opinion. In the said two decisions this very contention was repelled. In Tej Singhs case (supra) it was held that:

This contention does not appear to be correct for the reason that Sub-section (5) of Section 173 appears to cast on the Investigating Officer only an additional duty of sending along with the report documents or extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely and this additional duty cannot be construed as in any manner prejudicing the police report envisaged in Sub-section (5) of Section 173 and this additional duty appears to have been necessitated to enable the Magistrate taking cognizance of the case to comply with the mandatory provisions of law contained in Section 207 of the Code for the purpose of furnishing to the accused, free of cost, a copy of such document.

13. In Mehal Singhs case (supra), the Full Bench on this aspect held

In the new Code the incorporation of Sub-section (5) in Section 173 of the Code has in no manner changed or affected the content or concept of the police report envisaged in the unamended Code in Sub-section (1) of S. 173 and, therefore, the ratio of Tara Singhs case (AIR 1951 SC 441 [LQ/SC/1951/45] ) (supra) applies to the facts of the present case with full force. The incorporation of Sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the amended Code was necessitated by the fact that under Section 207 of the amended Code a duty was cast additionally on the Magistrate to make available to the accused free of cost copies of the police report and inter alia the documents and statements referred to in Sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the Code. In the unamended Code Sub-section (4) of Section 173 cast that duty on the police. The object of such provisions, whether the duty is cast on the police or on the Magistrate, is merely to see that the accused has in his hand the copies of statements and documents which were going to be produced or referred to in evidence against him so that he can offer whatever explanation or defence that he has to the incriminating material against him. If such statements and documents that are referred to in Sub-section (5) of S. 173 of the Code are not appended to the police report, the result would be that at a later stage if they are sought to be produced, then apart from the fact that copies of such statements and documents shall have to be made available to the accused, it would be purely in the discretion of the Magistrate whether to allow such documents and statement to be produced or not and the prosecution cannot, as a matter of right, have them, placed on the record....

14. It may be noticed that the old Sub-section (4) of Section 173 of the Code has been replaced by Sub-section (5). The old Sub-section (5) is renumbered as Sub-section (6) and has been re-drafted. However, Sub-sections (7) and (8) are newly inserted. The old Sub-section (4) cast a duty on an Investigating Officer to furnish or cause to be furnished to the accused before the commencement of the inquiry or trial, free of cost a copy of the report, a copy of the FIR, copies of documents relied upon and copies of the statements of the witnesses. The amendments by way of Sub-sections (5) and (7) of Section 173 of the Code do not imply that the prosecution is prevented from calling any witness at the trial whose name had not been included in the police report or whose statement had not been furnished to the accused.The additional duty under Sub-section (5) as has been noticed in Tej Singhs case (supra) has been necessitated because of the mandatory provisions under Section 207 of the Code whereby it is the duty of the Magistrate to furnish to the accused the documents and the statements mentioned therein. The amendments have not at all affected the concept or content of a police report.

15. We respectfully agree with the earlier decision of this Court in Tej Singhs case (supra). The decision in Hari Chand and Raj Pal v. State (supra) by a Single Judge of this Court wherein it has been held that an incomplete challan is not a police report within the ambit of Section 173(2) of the Code does not support the case of the petitioners. From the reported judgment it is not clear where all the witnesses or some of them acquainted with the circumstances of the case were yet to be examined when the report was filed. The reason for calling it incomplete is not discernible. But it is safer to assume from the reading of the judgment that the investigation was not complete. Thus the report as envisaged under Section 173(2) of the Code could not have been filed.

16. It is unnecessary for us to notice other judgments cited by the learned Counsels in support of their plea that the investigation in a case like the present is to be held to be incomplete. In our view the Supreme Court decision in Tara Singhs case (supra) holding, inter alia, that a police report which is not accompanied by the experts opinion, is to be held to be complete report as long as the witnesses who are acquainted with the circumstances of the case have been examined, continues to be law in spite of amendments in Section 173 of the Code.

17. Now to advert to the main plea. It is contended that for offences under the NDPS Act, the report under Section 173(2) of the Code, which in law is complete (the Investigating Officer having carried out all his mandatory duties), is to be considered incomplete in the absence of the opinion of of the expert. In our view the submission is entirely misconceived. Apparently the power of the Magistrate to take cognizance of offences upon police report is being related to the duty of the S.H.O. to forward a report on completion of investigation. The duty of the Investigating Officer under the Code is to complete the investigation without unnecessary delay. On its completion which necessarily means that the witnesses acquainted with the circumstances of the case have been examined, the officer incharge of the police station has to forward a police report in a prescribed form to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. However, no duty is cast on the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence on a report which although complete except for the experts opinion, does not make out an offence. While exercising his judicial discretion it is open to the Magistrate to seek a copy of the experts opinion. There may even be cases under the NDPS Act where no public witnesses have been cited but that fact by itself would not show that till such time the Government experts opinion is received, the investigation is incomplete. The police report if filed in accordance with the provisions of Section 173(2) of the Code would be complete report but the Magistrate in his judicial discretion may not take cognizance of the offence. Thus the provisions of Section 173(2) of the Code have to be considered separate and distinct from Section 190(1)(b) of the Code.

18. As far as the experts report is concerned, we may note that by virtue of Sub-section (4) of Section 293 of the Code, any document purporting to be report under the hand of the Director or a Deputy Director or Assistant Director of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or State Forensic Science Laboratory can be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code. It is true that it is open to the Court where it thinks fit to summon and examine the Government scientific expert. But he is not a formal witness and, therefore, no duty is cast upon the Investigating Officer to cite him as a witness.

19. We thus hold that under Section 173(2) of the Code there is no mandate that a police report must enclose the document purporting to be a report under the hand of a Government Scientific Expert. In the present cases, as cognizance of the offences taken by the Magistrate was proper and valid, no order releasing the petitioners on bail under Section 167(2) of the Code was required to be passed.

20. There is another aspect which needs to be considered. In the petition filed by Kishan Lal, a miscellaneous application was moved seeking that the petitioner be released on interim bail during the pendency of the petition on the ground that the ailments from which he was suffering, could not be treated while he was in judicial custody. Mr. Teja Singh Sodhi, learned Counsel for the State frankly conceded before us that the grievance of the petitioner was correct. We summoned the medical record of Deen Dayal Upadhya Hospital where the petitioner while in judicial look up was being periodically sent for check up and treatment. It was found that the petitioner a heart patient, was suffering from Pulminary Tuberculosis and his diabetes was not under control. We were informed that it was not possible for the State to ensure straight away admission of the petitioner in the All India Institute of Medical Sciences or in any other Government hospital for specialised treatment which admittedly was immediately required. We, therefore, directed the release of the petitioner on interim bail. We were prima facie of the view that this Court has jurisdiction to do so. In our detailed order of 15th December, 1988, we recorded so.

21. During the course of arguments it was pointed out to us that Section 37 of the NDPS Act stood amended but the amended provision had yet not been enforced. We were further informed on 20th April, 1989 that gazette notification enforcing the amended provisions of the was likely to be issued within a week or so. We were of the opinion that while deciding these cases, the ambit of the amended provisions which have added two limitations on grant of bail, required to be looked into. Learned Counsel for the parties sought time and thus the cases were adjourned as part heard to be listed after the summer vacation.

22. In the meanwhile as expected, vide Notification of the 29th May, 1989 the amended provisions of the NDPS Act were brought into force. Section 37 of thereads as under:

37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable:

(1) Not with standing anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),

(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable;

(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail on his own bond unless:

(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.

23. It was brought to our notice that on coming into operation of the above provision, a learned Single Judge of this Court during the summer vacation while dealing with the application seeking interim bail of an accused, who had been arrested for an offence under Section 21 of the NDPS Act has held that the added limitations in Section 37 of thehave necessarily to be read as limitations on the powers of the High Court under Section 439 of the Code. In that case (Cr. Misc. (M) 888/89 entitled Satish Kumarv. UOI, the petitioner who was on interim bail granted by this Court and was to surrender on 13th June, 1989, sought extension of the period to enable him to look after his wife who had not yet recovered from the major operation and who, it was to averred, had been recommended another operation. The learned Single Judge after analysing the provisions of the said Section 37 concluded that:

Since the Court has no power to grant bail on the ground of illness of the wife, certainly the Court has no power to grant interim bail or extension of the period of the interim bail as already granted by this Court. Therefore, the bail petition in such circumstances is not maintainable.

24. Learned Counsel for the petitioners as well as the Counsel for the State and also Mr. D.R. Sethi, Advocate who was appointed amicus curiae is submitted that under the scheme of the NDPS Act, no fetters had been placed on the power of the High Court. Their plea was that the interpretation given by the learned Single Judge was wrong and, therefore, that judgment in Cr. Misc. (M) No. 888/89 dated the 7th June, 1989 required reconsideration.

25. We may note that at that stage of arguments, Mr. J.S. Aurora, Advocate on behalf the Narcotics Control Bureau sought our permission to address us on the question of power of the High Court under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to grant bail for offence under the NDPS Act. He told us that he had appeared before the learned Single Judge in opposition to the said interim bail application, In the interests of justice, we granted him the opportunity sought for. According to him also, the power of the High Court to grant bail under Section 439 of the Code has not been taken away by the amended provisions but his plea is that the two limitations restricting the power of the Trial Court, i.e., the Special Court are equally applicable to the High Court. He urged that the judgment in Satish Kumars case (supra) is being read out of context. He maintains that it is a correct decision.

26. Mr. Auroras contention is that under the scheme of the NDPS Act, the offences have now to be tried by Special Court notwithstanding any contained in the Code, as per its Section 36- A Judge of the Special Court, however, is to be a Sessions Judge or an Addl. Sessions Judge immediately before such appointment. The powers of remand of an accused under the NDPS Act are vested in the Special Court and it is this Court which is empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a perusal of a police report or upon a complaint made by an officer of the Central Government or a State Government as the case may be. Thus the committal proceedings by a Magistrate have been bye-passed.

27. Mr. Auroras submission is that the Special Court is deemed to be a Court of Sessions as per Section 36-C of the NDPS Act. Therefore, that Court by virtue of being a Court of Sessions is to exercise power vested in it under Section 439 of the Code for the purposes of bail. According to him the limitations added under Section 37 of the NDPS Act are admittedly limitations placed on the powers of the Special Court which being a Sessions Court, while granting bail is to act only under Section 439 of the Code. A fortiori he submits that those limitations have necessarily to be read as limitations on the concurrent powers of the High Court under Section 439 of the Code.

28. At this stage we may note that all the Counsels in support of their contentions are relying on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Usman Bhaiv. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 922 [LQ/SC/1988/171] . That was a case under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. One of the questions which fell for consideration in that case was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail of a person accused of an offence under that Act, in exercise of its powers under Section 439 or Section 482 of the Code. In that Act there was no express provision excluding the applicability of Section 439 of the Code although by virtue of Section 20(7) of the said Act, the power of the High Court or the Court of Sessions to grant anticipatory bail had been specifically excluded. The offences under that Act are to be tried by Designated Court, which is to be presided over by a Judge who is a Sessions Judge or an Addl. Sessions Judge immediately before such appointment.

29. Sub-sections (8) and (9) of Section 20 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 also lay down similar limitations as are provided under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. For purpose of comparison Sub-sections (8) and (9) of Section 20 of the said Act may be quoted:

(8)Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder, shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless:

(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and

(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

(9) The limitations on granting of bail specified in Sub-section (8) are in addition to the limitations under the Code or any other law for for the time being in force on granting of bail.

30. It is not necessary for us to analyse that judgment in detail as under that Act the High Courts have been completely bye-passed. It is sufficient for our purpose to notice that one of the arguments urged before the Supreme Court was that the source of power of a Designated Court to grant bail was not derived from Section 20(8) of that Act (quoted above) but Section 439 of the Code which was still preserved because otherwise the Designated Court would have no power to grant bail.

31. In this context, while discussing the nature of the restraint placed on the power of the Designated Court to grant bail to an accused in view of the limitations placed on such power under Section 20(8) of the said Act. Their Lordships held (in paragraph 19 of the reported judgment) that:

19. Though there is no express provision excluding the applicability of S. 439 of the Code similar to the one contained in Section 20(7) of thein relation to case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence punishable under the or any rule made thereunder, but that result must, by necessary implication, follow. It is true that the Source of power a Designated Court to grant bail is not Section 20(8) of theas it only places limitations on such power. This made explicit by Section 20(9) which enacts that the limitations on granting of bail specified in Section 20(8) are in addition to the limitations under the Code or any other law for the time being is force under. But it does not necessarily follow that the power of a Designated Court to grant bail is relatable to Section 439 of the Code. It cannot be doubted that a Designated Court is a Court other than the High Court or the Court of Sessions within the meaning of S. 437 of the Code. The exercise of the power to grant bail by a Designated Court is no only subject to the limitations contained therein, but is also subject to the limitations placed by S. 20(8) of the..

(Italics supplied)

32. The limitations placed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act which are exactly similar to the ones under Sub-sections (8) and (9) of Section 20 of The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, thus, are applicable to Special Courts. Learned Counsel are not doubting that legal position. Mr. Auroras argument, however, that the Special Court being presided over by a Sessions Judge and by virtue of having been given the status of a Sessions Court under Section 36(C) of the NDPS Act exercises the power under Section 439 of the Code to grant bail, is to be negatived. In view of the above observations of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that the Special Court is a Court other than the High Court or the Court of Sessions within the meaning of Section 437 of the Code. Thus it is not vested with the power under Section 439 of the Code regarding bail. As noticed above, it is admitted by Mr. Aurora that the special powers of the High Court regarding bail under Section 439 of the Code have been specifically preserved. This submission is based on the provisions contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 36-A of the NDPS Act which is to the following effect:

Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect the special powers of the High Court regarding bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and the High Court may exercise such powers including the power under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of that Section as if the reference to Magistrate in that section included also a reference to a Special Court constituted under Section 36.

33. Mr. Auroras effort was to read the two added limitations in Section 37(2) of the NDPS Act in the above provision. That is not permissible in view of the clear intention of the Legislature. The limitation placed on the Special Court cannot be read as fetters in exercise of powers under Section 439 of the Code. We reject Mr. Auroras contention.

34. The upshot of the above discussion is that the petitions stand dismissed. The petitioner, Kishan Lal in Cr. Writ Petition No. 622 of 1989 is on interim bail, which is expiring on 22nd September, 1989. In the interests of justice, we extend his interim bail by another two weeks to enable him to make an appropriate application before the learned Single Judge.

35. As the only question raised us on behalf of the petitioner Gurdev Singh in Cr. M (M) No. 1132 of 1988 was that cognizance by the Magistrate had not been taken validly and other arguments on merits could not be urged before us, that petitioner is, also at liberty to move an appropriate application advised.