M.V. Muralidaran, Actg. C.J.

1. This contempt case has been filed by the petitioner to initiate appropriate contempt proceedings against the respondents for disobedience of the order dated 17.8.2019 passed in W.P.(C) No. 44 of 2019.

2. The petitioner has filed W.P.(C) No. 44 of 2019 challenging the order dated 11.12.2018 passed by the Commissioner (Hr. & Tech. Edn.), Government of Manipur, rejecting the claim of the petitioner for appointment under die-in-harness scheme and to direct the respondents therein to appoint the petitioner under die-in-harness scheme.

3. By the order dated 17.8.2019, this Court allowed the writ petition and directed the respondents therein to appoint the petitioner under die-in-harness scheme to any post commensurate to his educational qualification, subject to fulfilment of any other criteria under the relevant rules.

4. Mr. I. Denning, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that despite the direction of this Court for appointment of the petitioner under die-in-harness scheme to any post commensurate to his educational qualification, the respondents have failed to comply with such direction. He would submit that as against the order dated 17.8.2019 passed in W.P.(C) No. 44 of 2019, the respondent State has not prepared any appeal or application to review the same and, thus, the order is operating and the same is still in force. While so, the respondents have shown deliberate and willful disobedience and disrespect of the order dated 17.8.2019 passed in W.P.(C) No. 44 of 2019 and since the respondents have committed Contempt of Court by willfully and deliberately disobeying the aforesaid order, the respondents are to be punished suitably for the non-compliance of the order dated 17.8.2019.

5. On the other hand, Mr. Y. Nirmolchand, learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 1; Dr. RK Deepak, learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 2 and Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 3 submitted that there was no attempt on the part of the respondents to make a deliberate and willful disobedience of the order dated 17.8.2019 passed in W.P.(C) No. 44 of 2019. The learned counsel would submit that the Department of Personnel advised the Administrative Department of the Higher and Technical Education to reject the application of the petitioner for appointment under die-in-harness scheme as per paragraph 1(v) of the DP's Office Memorandum dated 1.4.20211(sic) as the petitioner has not attained the required 15 years of age at the time when his father expired. As advised by the Department of Personnel, the Commissioner, Hr. Tech. Education issued an order dated 5.7.2022 whereby rejecting the proposal for appointment of the petitioner under die-in-harness scheme, as he had not attained the required age of 15 years at the time when his father expired. Therefore, there is no flaw in the order dated 5.7.2022 issued by the respondent authority.

6. The learned counsel further submitted that while the order dated 5.7.2022 was issued in compliance with the order dated 17.8.2019 passed in W.P.(C) No. 44 of 2019, the order inadvertently omitted to mention that the said order was issued in compliance with the order dated 17.8.2019. To avoid any ambiguity in the matter, the Commissioner (Hr. & Tech. Edn.), issued another order dated 17.11.2022 in continuation of the earlier order in compliance with the order dated 17.8.2019 and the said order dated 17.11.2022 was issued rejecting the claim of the petitioner for appointment under die-in-harness scheme as he did not fulfil the eligibility criteria of being 15 years of age at the time of expiry of his father. Therefore, the question of disobedience of the order dated 17.8.2019 does not arise. Since the delay in complying the order is inadvertent, the learned counsel prayed for dismissal of the contempt case.

7. This Court considered the rival submissions and also perused the materials available on record.

8. It appears that the present case has had a chequered history. The petitioner's father, namely Khundrakpam Apabi Singh, who was serving as Lecturer (SG) in the Department of Economics, Oriental College, Imphal, died while serving in the said capacity on 25.7.2022 due to road accident. Under die-in-harness scheme, the petitioner's elder sister Khundrakpam Hemabati Dev has submitted an application for appointment and the said application was kept pending by the concerned authorities without any consideration. Again on 7.11.2007, the petitioner's sister filed an application to the Director of Education (U), requesting to appoint her under die-in-harness scheme and during the pendency of the application, the petitioner's sister got married. As such, she communicated to the concerned authorities to drop her from such process for appointment under the die-in-harness scheme and further informed that she has no objection for consideration and appointment of the petitioner under the die-in-harness scheme vide application dated 21.10.2016, which was duly acknowledged by the concerned officials.

9. On 21.10.2016, the petitioner submitted an application for consideration of such appointment under die-in-harness scheme in the place of his sister and the request of the petitioner was not considered. When the petitioner came to know that his application under die-in-harness was not included in the seniority list maintained by the authorities and being aggrieved by the non-consideration, he has filed W.P.(C) No. 985 of 2016 before this Court. By the order dated 7.12.2016, W.P.(C) No. 985 of 2016 was disposed of and directed the respondent authorities to consider the application of the petitioner dated 21.10.2016 for appointment under die-in-harness scheme under the relevant rules. Since the order dated 7.12.2016 was not complied with, the petitioner has filed Contempt Case No. 68 of 2017 and during the pendency of the said contempt case, the Director of University & Higher Education passed an order dated 4.7.2017 rejecting the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the application submitted by the petitioner's sister was beyond the stipulated time as per the Office Memorandum dated 6.6.2007 and, accordingly, the Contempt Case No. 68 of 2017 was closed.

10. Aggrieved by the order dated 4.7.2017, the petitioner has filed W.P.(C) No. 599 of 2017 and, by the order dated 21.6.2018, the said writ petition was disposed of and directed the State authority to re-examine the case of the petitioner in accordance with the rules within a period of two months from the date of passing of the order and to communicate the petitioner the result of such consideration. Since the order dated 21.6.2018 has not been complied with, the petitioner has filed Contempt Case No. 143 of 2018. During the pendency of the said contempt case, the Commissioner (Hr. & Tech. Edn.) issued an order dated 11.12.2018 thereby rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that on re-examination in the case of the petitioner, it was found to be contradictory to the provisions of the Office Memorandum dated 6.6.2007. As such, the application of the petitioner was rejected. Recording the passing of the order dated 11.12.2018, the Contempt Case No. 143 of 2018 was closed.

11. Aggrieved by the order dated 11.12.2018, the petitioner again filed W.P.(C) No. 44 of 2019 before this Court. This Court, by the order dated 17.8.2019, allowed the writ petition and directed the respondents therein to appoint the petitioner under die-in-harness scheme to any post commensurate to his educational qualification subject to fulfilment of any other criteria under the relevant rules. Since there was some typographical error in the order dated 17.8.2019 i.e. date of Office Memorandum dated 6.6.2007, MC (WP) No. 229 of 2019 came to be filed and the same was allowed on 13.9.2019. Alleging that the order dated 17.8.2019 has not been complied with, the petitioner has filed the present contempt case.

12. From the above narrated facts, it is clear that W.P.(C) No. 44 of 2019 is the third round of litigation. The fact also remains that the earlier two rounds of litigation and orders passed thereon were not complied with within the time stipulated therein by the respondent authorities and only after initiation of the contempt proceedings by the petitioner, the respondent authorities have passed orders rejecting the request of the petitioner, which would clearly prove that the respondent authorities have not complied the orders on their own giving respect to the direction issued by this Court. Passing orders after filing of the contempt cases and during pendency of the contempt cases is a bad practice adopted by the Government officials. The said practice has to be avoided by the authorities concerned against whom orders were passed. They should give respect to the orders/direction passed in the writ petitions and strictly speaking on their own the authorities have to comply the orders/directions without even waiting for filing the contempt cases.

13. Coming to the instant case, when the petitioner challenged the order dated 11.12.2018 in W.P.(C) No. 44 of 2019 and sought for direction on the respondent authorities to appoint him under die-in-harness scheme, this Court, by the order dated 17.8.2019, allowed the writ petition. On a reading of the order dated 17.8.2019, it is clear that considering the previous history of case, this Court allowed the writ petition and issued direction. On a further perusal of the order, it is clear that the learned Government Advocate took a plea that there was a clear stipulation in the Office Memorandum dated 6.6.2007 that those applicants who had applied for appointment under die-in-harness scheme had to apply afresh within two months from the date of issuance of the Office Memorandum dated 6.6.2007 and in the present case, the petitioner has submitted his application only in the year 2016 and, therefore, his case has been rejected. The said plea has been duly considered by this Court and came to the conclusion that the Office Memorandum dated 6.6.2007 was not published for information of the general public and, therefore, it is not expected that the general public would be aware of any stipulations contained in the Office Memorandum dated 6.6.2007. While observing so, this Court in paragraph 7 of the order dated 17.8.2019 held as under:

"[7] The order dated 11.12.2018 which is impugned in the present writ petition has also been considered by this Court. On a consideration of the same, it would clearly indicate that it is a repetition of the earlier order dated 4.7.2017. The order dated 11.12.2018 travels primarily on the premise of delay in submission of the application of the petitioner. It is to be borne in mind that the mother of the petitioner had made the first application as early as in the month of August, 2002. The sister of the petitioner had also made her application on 7.11.2007. it was only thereafter that the petitioner had made his application on 21.10.2016. Therefore, the application of the petitioner for appointment under the die-in-harness scheme was a continuing process from the year 2002 and therefore, the respondents cannot reject the case of the petitioner merely on the ground that he had submitted his application late and beyond the prescribed time in the Office Memorandum dated 6.6.2007. Further, the respondents ought to have considered the case of the petitioner in terms of the order dated 21.6.2018 passed by this Court in WP(C) No. 599 of 2017. This has not been done by the State respondents. The said order has not been reviewed nor appealed against and therefore, it has attained its finality. In that view of the matter, this Court has no other option but to direct the respondents to appoint the petitioner under the die-in-harness scheme to any post commensurate to his educational qualification subject to fulfilment of any other criteria under the relevant rules."

14. The aforesaid order/direction of this Court passed in W.P.(C) No. 44 of 2019 dated 17.8.2019 is a positive direction to appoint the petitioner under die-in-harness scheme and when positive direction has been issued by the Court, the respondent authorities are duty bound to obey the said order in the absence of any appeal or review against the order. The fact also remains that the respondent authorities have allowed the order dated 17.8.2019 to attain finality.

15. It appears that the order dated 17.8.2019 and the subsequent order dated 13.9.2019 making certain corrections qua date of Office Memorandum dated 6.6.2007 have been duly communicated to the respondent authorities through a legal notice dated 25.9.2019 itself. However, they have passed an order only on 5.7.2022 after a lapse of three years thereby rejecting the request of the petitioner that too pending Contempt Case No. 94 of 2022. Such an approach adopted by the respondent authorities is highly condemnable. Further, after passing the order dated 5.7.2022 which was not in compliance of the order dated 17.8.2019 passed in the writ petition, on 17.11.2022, the Commissioner, Hr. & Tech. Education, suo motu issued an order stating that the appointment of the petitioner under die-in-harness scheme to any eligible post commensurate to his education qualification cannot be countenanced. Such an order is contrary to the order/direction issued in W.P.(C) No. 44 of 2019 dated 17.8.2019.

16. In a contempt jurisdiction, the Court will not travel beyond the original order and direction; neither would it be permissible for the Court to issue any supplementary or incidental directions, which are not to be found in the original order. The Court is only concerned with the wilful or deliberate non-compliance of the directions issued in the original order.

17. In Prithawi Nath Ram v. State of Jharkhand and others, (2004) 7 SCC 261, [LQ/SC/2004/923 ;] the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that the Court exercising the contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the contemptuous act only and the contempt Court cannot take up upon itself and decide the original proceedings in a manner as if it was exercising the inherent powers. The following observation was made in the said judgment:

"5. While dealing with an application for contempt, the court is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has received its finality had been complied with or not. It would not be permissible for a court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision which had not been assailed and to take a view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. A similar view was taken in K.G. Derasari v. Union of India (2001) 10 SCC 496 [LQ/SC/1999/1225 ;] : 2002 SCC (L&S) 756. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If there was no ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for the party concerned to approach the higher court if according to him the same is not legally tenable. Such a question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher court. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. Though strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the State of Bihar on a three-Judge Bench decision in Niaz Mohd. v. State of Haryana (1994) 6 SCC 332 [LQ/SC/1994/900] we find that the same has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case the question arose about the impossibility to obey the order. If that was the stand of the State, the least it could have done was to assail correctness of the judgment before the higher court. The State took diametrically opposite stands before this Court. One was that there was no specific direction to do anything in particular and, second was what was required to be done has been done. If what was to be done has been done, it cannot certainly be said that there was impossibility to carry out the orders. In any event, the High Court has not recorded a finding that the direction given earlier was impossible to be carried out or that the direction given has been complied with."

18. In a recent decision in the case of Nalini Sunitha Devi v. Mangsatabam Harekrishna and another, this Court held as under:

"9. The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the directions in the judgment and order. If there was no ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for the party concerned to approach the higher Court if according to him the same is not legally tenable. Such a question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher Court. The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the Court passing the judgment or order. Right or wrong the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the Court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt, the Court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance of which is alleged. In other words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what should have been done. It cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot test the correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional directions or delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with petition for initiating of contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible."

19. At the cost of repetition, this Court clarify that though various arguments were advanced with regard to the merits of the matter by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, this Court cannot go into those aspects, inasmuch as this Court is exercising limited jurisdiction of contempt.

20. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the respondents ought to have given sanctity to the order passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 44 of 2019 dated 17.8.2019 when they allowed to attain finality of the said order. As stated supra, in the absence of any appeal before the appellate Court and its set aside, it is the bounden duty of the respondent authorities to comply with the order. In this case, admittedly, the respondents have failed to comply with the order and have deliberately and wilfully disobeyed the direction of this Court passed in W.P.(C) No. 44 of 2019 dated 17.8.2019. Therefore, the respondents have committed contempt of Courts order. Right or wrong, this Court passed an order and the respondents therein have to obey the order when they allowed the said order to attain finality. When glaring disobedience has been proved from the above narrated facts, there is no question of discharging the respondents from the contempt proceedings.

21. Thus, this Court is of the considered view that the respondents have willfully and deliberately disobeyed the order of this Court dated 17.8.2019 passed in W.P.(C) No. 44 of 2019. Hence, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the respondents are guilty of having committed contempt of order of this Court. The respondents shall remain present before this Court on 27.03.2023 for imposing punishment and would be heard on the quantum of punishment on the said date.