1. The appellant, Kehar Singh instituted a suit for ejectment of the respondents from a premises inter alia on the allegation that respondent No. 1, Yash Pal was his tenant and he had sub-let the premises to respondents 2 and 3, who are father and son. A claim for arrears of rent etc. was also made. The suit was contested by the respondents on various grounds; one of them being that respondents 2 and 3 were not subtenants of Yash Pal but were direct tenants of the appellant himself. After taking into consideration the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial Court repelled the various pleas raised in defence on behalf of the respondents and decreed the suit. Aggrieved, the respondents preferred an appeal which was decided by the Additional District Judge, Jullundhar. It appears from paragraphs 7 and 8 of his judgment that the only point which was pressed before him was that respondents 2 and 3 were not sub-tenants of respondent No. 1 but they were direct tenants of the appellant. The Additional District Judge agreed with the trial Court on this point and affirmed its findings that respondents 2 and 3 were the sub-tenants of respondent No. 1 and not direct tenants of the appellant. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, except with slight modification.

2. The matter was taken up by the respondents before the High Court in a second appeal. It appears that in the meantime by a notification dated 20th March, 1979, Malsian where the premises in suit are situate was declared to be a notified area committee with the result that the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restrictions Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the) became applicable to the said area. That notification was, however, cancelled by a subsequent notification dated 7th October., 1980 issued under Sec. 244 of the Punjab Municipal Act. The validity of the said S. 244 was challenged before the High Court and it was held that the said section was ultra vires Relying on the said decision the High Court, in the second appeal preferred by the respondents, took the view that the notification dated 7th October, 1980 cancelling the earlier notification dated 20th March, 1979 was invalid. As a consequence there of Malsion continued to be a part of the notified area committee to which the was applicable. According to the High Court, in this view of the matter, the only remedy available to the appellant-landlord was under Sec. 13 of the said Act and the -present suit was not maintainable. The second appeal was allowed on this short ground and the concurrent decrees of the Courts below were set aside.

3. During the pendency of the present Civil Appeal in this Court the said Sec. 244 has been held to be valid in Sub-Divisional Officer v. Dr. Mehar Singh, 1988 (3) JT 470 : 1989 AIR(SC) 206). It has not been disputed before us that as a result of S. 244 having been held to be valid the notification dated 7th October, 1980 would be valid, as a consequence whereof the earlier notification dated 20th March, 1979 stood superseded and the provisions of the would not apply to the premises in question.

4. What has, however, been urged by the learned Counsel for the respondents is that the matter has now to be remanded to the High Court for decision of the other points involved in the case. In the normal course that may have been necessary but on the facts of the instant case we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to do so. As seen above, the only point which was urged on behalf of the respondents before the first appellate Court, which was the last court on facts, was as to whether respondents 2 and 3 were the sub-tenants of respondent No. 1 or direct tenants of the appellant. On this point the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court recorded a concurrent finding that they were sub-tenants and not direct tenants of the appellant. In our opinion the said finding is essentially a finding of fact based on appraisal of evidence and on that finding no. substantial question of law arises which can appropriately be gone into a second appeal.

5. In the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and the decree passed by the High Court are set aside and of the first appellate Court affirming that of the trial Court restored. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties shall bear their own costs.

6. A prayer has been made by the learned Counsel for the respondents for grant of some reasonable time to the respondents to vacate the premises in question.

7. Having regard to the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that six months time may be granted to the respondents for this purpose. The decree for their eviction, consequently, shall not be put in execution for six months from todays date subject to the condition that the respondents pay to the appellant or deposit in the trial Court the entire up-to-date arrears of rent or mesne profits as the case may be, within four weeks from today and file an undertaking in this Court containing usual terms within the same period. In case of default the decree shall become executable forthwith after four weeks.