P. VENKATARAMA REDDI, J.

(1) IN this writ petition, the petitioner questions the action of the respondents in levying and collecting the tax under Non-Agricultural Lands Assessment act (hereinafter referred to as the act) on the lands held by the petitioner on mining lease and seeks quashing of the order dated 20-5-1999 passed fay the R.D.O. Narsaraopet, confirming the demand notice dated 8-9-1997 issued by the Mandal Revenue Inspector, Durgi, Guntur District. The petitioner seeks a further direction to refund the amount of Rs.29,17,884/- paid by it under protest. The demand relates to the Faslis 1403 to 1407 (corresponding to the years 1993 to 1997).

(2) UNDER the Scheme of the Act, the Mandal Revenue Inspector is empowered to make the assessment. The Mandal Revenue Officer is the appellate authority and the R. D.O. is the revisional authority. In determining the tax and disposing of the appeals and revisions thereon against the demands raised by the primary authority, the three authorities concerned undoubtedly exercise quasi-judicial functions. The facts of the case reveal that the three authorities have made a mockery of this quasi-judicial function and betrayed the confidence reposed in them by the Legislature and turned a nelsons eye to the law laid down and the directions given by this Court. We have initiated contempt proceedings suo motu against the respondents 3 and 4 in the Writ petition.

(3) THE M.R., Durgi, issued a notice in Form-I under Rule 3 of A.P. Non-Agricultural lands Assessment Rules proposing to hold an enquiry in connection with the assessment under the said Act. The petitioner was required to furnish the documents relating to mining lease of lands in Polapalli village. No other details were mentioned in the notice. Strangely, the enquiry was posted to the second day after the date of issuance of the notice. The petitioners lawyer promptly replied to the notice. He brought to the notice of the Revenue inspector that the petitioner holds about 152 acres of mineral-bearing lands which serve as a source for providing raw material for Cement Industry. In the reply, the Revenue Inspectors attention was drawn to five-Judge Full bench decision of this Court in Mahabaleswarappa vs. Commissioner of Land revenue. The relevant passage was extracted. It may be mentioned that the full Bench of five-Judges held in that case that the lands held on mining lease cannot be subjected to tax under the Act unless the terms of the lease provide for payment of such tax. The Full Bench put it on the ground that the State legislature lacked competence to levy tax on the mineral-bearing lands covered by the leases granted under the Mines and Minerals (Randd) Act (Central Act ). It was pointed out by the petitioner that the lease agreement entered into between the petitioner and the Government of Andhra Pradesh did not provide for levy of NALA tax. Without dealing with the contentions of the petitioner and without even referring to the judgment of this Court, the demand was raised on 8-9-1997 in Form II in a cyclostyled proforma. In this, the extent, the location and the faslis for which the assessment made were only given. The total tax demanded was Rs.20,17,884/-, which the petitioner paid under protest on 16-7-1997. The learned Government Pleader for Taxes tells us that the said payment was made because the petitioners representative agreed before the Collector on 27-8-1997 to pay the tax. It is the assertion of the petitioner that it had no option but to pay the tax as the District Collector was not prepared to give no objection certificate for renewal of lease. This averment is not denied.

(4) THE petitioner promptly questioned the demand notice issued by the M.R. Durgi, in Writ Petition No. 22103 of 1997. It may be stated that the state of A.P., represented by the Secretary, Revenue Department and the M.R. Durgi, were parties in the said Writ Petition. This Court dismissed the writ petition on 15-9-1997 on the ground that the petitioner had an alternative remedy of appeal. However, an observation was made that the appeal if filed shall be disposed of "in accordance with law and taking note of the judgment of this Court referred to above",. i.e., the judgment in Mahabaleswarappa vs. Commissioner of Land Revenue (supra ).

(5) THE petitioner then filed an appeal before the M.R.O. (R. 4 herein). The M.R.O., forsaking his independent status as an appellate authority sought for instructions of the District Collector as to the disposal of the appeal in the light of the contentions raised in the appeal. The Collector, Guntur, in his communication dated 24-6-1998 took an absurd stand that the judgment in Mahabaleswarappas case (supra) was not applicable to the petitioners case as it was not a party to the judgment. He even called for the explanation of the M.R. O. as to why the payment was accepted under protest. Obviously, based on this communication, the M.R.O. dismissed the appeal on 16-2-1999. The following are the four reasons given by him which are either irrelevant or palpably erroneous. The third reason given is in fact contemptuous as elaborated later. " (I) The Mandal Revenue Inspector has issued NALA demand approved by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Narsaraopet as per the orders of the full Bench of High Court, A. P. Hyderabad, in their ruling in W. P. No. 2965 of 1989, dated 29-4-1993. (ii) U/s. 12 (b) (1) NALA Act 1963, the lands leased out for any commercial, industrial or other than non-agricultural purposes are liable for NALA. (iii) The orders of the Honble High Court issued in W. P. No. 1364/87 and batch are not applicable to appellant Company as it is not a party in the above writ petition and batch. (iv) There is no provision in the NALA Act to refund the amount, once paid to the Government under NALA though the amount was paid under protest"

(6) REVISION was held under Section 6 of the Act before the Revenue divisional Officer (R.O herein). The Revisional authority also took the same untenable contemptuous stand in rejecting the revision petition on the ground that the petitioner was not a party to the Special Bench judgment in Mahabaleswarappas case (supra ). He also observed that the State Government was the competent authority to levy the tax under NALA Act which observation runs directly contrary to the Special Bench judgment of this Court in which it was held that the State lacks competence to levy tax on non- agricultural lands meant for mining operations and therefore, the levy and collection of tax under NALA Act was illegal unless mining lease deed itself provides for such payment. The R.D.O. reiterated the stand of the appellate authority (M.R.O.) that there was no provision for refund of tax paid under protest, which on the face of it is an utterly untenable plea. Such a stand exposes the attitude of the third respondent to deny the legitimate relief by hook or crook or betrays lack of comprehension of the basics of Law by which he is bound. If that reasoning is accepted, a law abiding citizen by paying tax and thereafter contesting in appeal would suffer irretrievable prejudice. He cannot hope to get back the money even if the tax was collected in blatant violation of law.

(7) THE question whether the tax is leviable under the Act in respect of the lands held on mining lease and exclusively used for mining purposes, is no longer res Integra. The Special Bench decision in Mahabaleswarappas case (supra) categorically lays down the legal position that the State has no legislative competence to levy tax on such lands and the authorities acting under the Act cannot assess and collect the tax on the lands granted on mining lese unless it is one of the terms of the lease deed itself that such tax is liable to be paid by the lessee. Admittedly, the lease deed has no such stipulation. In view of this position, the learned Government Pleader could not suppon the demand notice issued by the M.R. which was confirmed by the appellate and revisional authorities. There is one more aspect which we would like to point out. The M.R.O. and the R.D.O. who are invested with the appellate and revisional powers are supposed to discharge the quasi-judicial functions. They have ignored the basic and fundamental rule that the appellate or the revisional authority is to act independently and that they cannot surrender their discretion and faculty of judgment to an administrative superior. This basic principle which is firmly rooted in our legal system and which has become an integral part of the administration of la w, has been thrown to winds by respondents 3 and 4. The District Collector instead of refraining from giving advice in a matter falling within the realm of appeal/revision, thought it fit to give instructions as to the grounds on which the appeal could be rejected. While doing so, the District Collector found a convenient ruse to circumvent the judgment of this Court and failed to bear the distinction between the administrative subordination and the statutory functions. The District collector obviously thought that he could interfere with the method and manner of exercise of functions by appellate and re visional authorities, though the District Collector does not anywhere figure in the Scheme of the Act. The directions to ignore the decision of the Full Bench of this Court on the ground that the petitioner was not a party thereto and respondents 3 and 4 faithfully acting pursuant to such directions obviously amounts to contempt of Court for which action has been initiated by us. We have no hesitation in quashing the impugned demand notice issued by the fifth respondent and the orders passed by the third and fourth respondents confirming that illegal demand.

(8) COMING now to the suo motu contempt proceedings, we have no manner of doubt that respondents 3 and 4 by refusing to apply the law laid down by this Court in Mahabaleswarappas case (supra) and virtually brushing aside the judgment on the ground that the writ petitioner was not a party thereto, have committed civil contempt and they are liable to be punished under the contempt of Courts Act.

(9) IT is significant to note that the writ petitioner questioned the very same demand notice in Writ Petition No. 22103 of 1997. This Court relegated the petitioner to the alternative remedy while making a specific observation that the M.R.O. shall dispose of the appeal "in accordance with law taking note of the judgment". In this order, the respondents 3 and 4 herein are not parties. Only the Mandal Revenue Officer (R.5 herein) was a party. It is not clear from the record " whether respondents 3 and 4 were apprised of the order passed in Writ Petition No. 22103/1997. In the objections filed or in the appeal grounds, there was no reference to this order. Though there is a strong possibility that a copy of the order would have been made available to the respondents by the Revenue Inspector, there, is no clinching proof to the effect thai respondents 3 and 4 were aware of the observations made in Writ Petition no. 22103 of 1997 filed by the very same petitioner. If they were aware of the same, the contempt would have been in an aggravated form. But in view of the doubt prevailing in our mind, we proceed on the premise that the order in Writ Petition No. 22103 of 1997 was not brought to the notice of R.3 and R.4. Even then, as already observed, the said officials cannot extricate themselves from the charge of contempt. The very fact that the law laid down by this Court in Mahabaleswarappas case (supra) in categorical terms was not followed on the ostensible ground that the petitioner was not a party thereto itself amounts to wilful disobedience of the authoritative pronouncement of the High Court and amounts to civil contempt within the meaning of Section 2 (b) of the Act. It may even amount to criminal contempt falling under clause (iii) of Section 2 (b) (sic. 2 (c)). It is to be noted that the law laid down by the this Court is of general application. It is not confined to the determination and application of law between the parties in a particular case. The question as to competence of the State Legislature to legislate on the subject and the competence of the designated authorities under the Act to demand tax on the mining lands came up for consideration before the Full bench. The binding nature of this judgment cannot be whittled down in the manner in which respondents 2 to 4 sought to do it. When this Court declared that the instrumentalities of the State have no competence to levy and demand tax, the respondents are duty bound to follow it and the judgment declaring the law cannot be swept aside on the flimsy ground that the law was declared in the case of some other party.

(10) THE attitude adopted and the stand taken by the respondents 2 to 4 impels us to restate certain fundamental principles of law of contempt and remind them of their duties and obligations towards the judgment of this constitutional Court. As there is growing tendency to ignore the pronouncements of this Court by the executive and quasi-judicial authorities, we feel that time has come to reiterate the well settled legal position with reference to the judgments of the Supreme Court.

(11) AS long back as in 1962, in East India Commercial Company vs. Collector of Customs, Subba Rao,. (as he then was) had this to say on the binding nature of the law laid down by the High Court within its territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction: "section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act can be invoked only if an order issued under Sec. 3 of the Act was infringed during the course of the import or export. The Division Bench of the High Court held that a contravention of a condition imposed by a licence issued under the Act is not an offence under Sec. 5 of the Act, This raises the question whether an Administrative Tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest court in the State and initiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared. Under Art. 215, every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Under Art. 226, it has a plenary power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Art. 227, it has jurisdiction over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a Tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that Court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a Tribunal can do so, all the subordinate Courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate Courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior Tribunal that all the Tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working: otherwise, there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably suffer. We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest Court in the State is binding on authorities or Tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either in initiating a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. If that be so, the notice issued by the authority signifying the launching of proceedings contrary to the law laid down by the High Court would be invalid and the proceedings themselves would be without jurisdiction"

(12) THE dicta of the Supreme Court in the extracted passage should dispel any misgivings about the need to give effect to and apply the law laid down by the High Court in all cases that arise before the concerned authorities, but not merely to the cases of particular party in whose case the decision was rendered.

(13) IN 8. Mishra vs. B. Dixit, it was observed:"contempt of Court is disobedience to the Court, by acting in opposition to the authority, justice and dignity thereof. It signifies a wilful disregard or disobedience of the Courts order; it also signifies such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the Court and the administration of law into disrepute".

(14) THAT was a case in which a Judicial Officer functioning as a commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, declined to follow a direct decision of the Orissa High Court on the question of appointment of interim Trustee, while disposing of a revision petition. The Supreme Court found him guilty of contempt and found no bona fides in his plea that the pendency of the petition for leave to appeal to Supreme Court gave him an impression that the decision need not be followed. The Supreme Court referred with approval the observations of Subba Rao,. in East India Commercial company Case (supra) and observed:"under Art. 227 of the Constituion, the High Court is vested with the power of superintendence over the Courts and Tribunals in the State. Acting as a quasi judicial authority under the Orissa Hindu Religious endowments Act, the appellant was subject to the superintendence of the High Court. Accordingly the decisions of the High Court were binding on him. He could not get away from them by adducing factually wrong and illegitimate reasons". The conduct of the appellate in not following the previous decision of the high Court was commented upon in the following words :"the conduct of the appellant in not following the previous decision of the High Court is calculated to create confusion in the administration of law. It will undermine respect for law laid down by the High Court and impair the constitutional authority of the High Court. His conduct is therefore comprehended by the principles underlying the law of contempt. The analogy of the inferior Courts disobedience to the specific order of a superior Court also suggests that his conduct falls within the purview of the law of contempt. Just as the disobedience to a specific order of the Court undermines the authority and dignity of the Court in a particular case, similarly, any deliberate and mala fide conduct of not following the law laid down in the previous decision undermines the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court. Indeed, while the former conduct has repercussions on an individual case and on a limited number of persons, the latter conduct has a much wider and more disastrous impact. It is calculated not only to undermine the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court generally, but is also likely to subvert the Rule of law and engender harassing uncertainty and confusion in the adinistration of law". Their Lordships further clarified:"our view that a deliberate and mala fide conduct of not following the binding precedent of the High Court is contumacious does not unduly enlarge the domain of contempt. It would not stifle a bona fide act of distinguishing the binding precedent, even though it may turn out to be mistaken". The above observations of the Supreme Court together with what we have said above should serve as warning bells to the executive or statutory authorities who are inclined to find an excuse to circumvent the decision of the High Court or the law laid down therein in exercise of the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. They must note that if the judgment of the High Court is not acceptable or they feel aggrieved of the judgment, the remedy lies in questioning the judgment according to law in the apex Court or taking resort to such other remedy as is open to them as per law. So long as the judgment holds the field and the said judgment is not distinguishable, the law declared therein is binding on all the persons and instrumentalities of the State and the failure to follow the law as interpreted and expounded by the High Court would amount to contempt. Not only that, the rule of law which is the bedrock of our democratic Constitution will face a grave threat and there will be chaos in the administration of justice.

(15) WE, therefore, find the Mandal Revenue Officer and the Revenue divisional Officer guilty of contempt of Court. They appeared in the Court on the date of first hearing of the contempt case and expressed regrets for what had happened. They have tendered unqualified apology in the counter- affidavit. As observed supra, there is no definite indication that they were aware of the Division Bench judgment in Writ Petition No. 22103 of 1997 filed by the petitioner-Company. Moreover, as already noted, the contemptuous stance of these officials has emanated to a large extent from the illegal instructions given by the then District Collector. In these circumstances, we would not like to impose the sentence of imprisonment or fine. We admonish them and warn them to be careful in future. We further direct that the said two officials should pay exemplary costs of Rs.1,000/- each. These amounts shall be remitted to the credit of the District Legal Services Authority, Guntur, within two weeks. The said amount shall be paid from out of their own funds.

(16) IN the normal course, we would have thought of initiating proceedings against the District Collector who by his illegal instructions put the respondents 3 and 4 on a wrong track. But in view of the fact that nearly two years have elapsed from the date on which the District Collector sent the offending communication and in view of the period of limitation prescribed in Section 20, we refrain at this stage to take action against the District Collector under Contempt of Courts Act

(17) THE contempt case is disposed of accordingly.

(18) THE writ petition is allowed with costs quantified at Rs.2,000/- and the respondents are directed to take steps for the refund of the tax paid by the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this judgment.