The petitioner held the post of village karnam of Kamakkapalayam village in Salem Dt. It was a post which was not governed by the provisions of the Hereditary Village Offices Act III of 1895. Charges were framed against the petitioner by the Revenue Divisional Officer, and after an enquiry, the Revenue Divisional Officer directed on 9th February 1953 that the petitioner should be dismissed from his post. The petitioner appealed to the Collector against the order of dismissal, but the appeal was dismissed on 23rd March 195

3. Further appeals to the Board of Revenue and to the Government also failed. The petitioner applied under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to set aside the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 9th February 1953, which was successively confirmed by the Collector, the Board of Revenue and the Government.

The grounds on which the validity of the order of dismissal was attacked by the learned Counsel for the petitioner were as follows:

(1) the provisions of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution were violated, and petitioner was not given the opportunity prescribed by Art. 311(2) to show cause against his dismissal. (2) The enquiry conducted by the Revenue Divisional Officer was itself vitiated, because the petitioner was not given a real and effective opportunity to defend himself in those proceedings

. (3) The charges as framed against the petitioner disclosed an offence of cheating punishable under S. 420 I.P.C. and the Revenue Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to initiate departmental proceedings to punish the petitioner.

The last of the grounds is easiest disposed of. Whether or not the ingredients of an offence punishable under S. 420 I.P.C. had been made out, whether or not the petitioner could have been prosecuted in a criminal Court, that did not affect the jurisdiction of the Revenue Divisional Officer to enquire into the truth of the charges against the petitioner in a departmental enquiry. The learned Counsel for the petitioner represented over and over again that the petitioner would welcome a trial in a criminal Court. But that is not an answer to the question whether the Revenue Divisional Officer had jurisdiction to frame charges, and if those charges were proved, to punish without recourse to a criminal Court.

The contention that the petitioner was not given a real and effective opportunity to defend himself in the proceedings before the Revenue Divisional Officer was supported by the averments in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 12 of the affidavit filed by the petitioner. On 8th July 1952, when the Revenue Divisional Officer enquired into the charges, the petitioner asked for permission to engage a Counsel to defend him. That was refused. I am unable to hold that amounted to a denial of real and effective opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself against the charges framed against him. There was no specific rule governing such departmental enquiries which provided for assistance of Counsel. Nor could any principle of natural justice be invoked in support of a claim, that in every charge leading to a departmental enquiry, assistance of Counsel must be given. Neither the nature of the charges framed against the petitioner, he was charged with having received sums from various people on the false representation that he would get them lands assigned on Dharkast-nor the nature of the evidence furnished by some of these persons made it impossible or even difficult for the petitioner to defend himself against those charges by cross-examining those witnesses without the help of a Counsel. Refusal at that stage to give the petitioner the assistance of a Counsel did not therefore vitiate the enquiry.

On 8th July, 1952 the petitioner, besides asking for assistance of a Counsel, also asked for an adjournment, and that was refused, and the witnesses in support of the charge were examined by the Revenue Divisional Officer that day. Here again I am unable to hold that there is any real basis for the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the petitioner had been denied a real and effective opportunity to defend himself. The petitioner had an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses, and he declined to avail himself of it. On 14th October, 1952, when the matter came up again before the Revenue Divisional Officer, the petitioner wanted the witnesses who had already been examined to be recalled for cross-examination. But that was refused. At that stage the Revenue Divisional Officer permitted the petitioner to be represented by Counsel. Here again, I am unable to hold that the refusal of the Revenue Divisional Officer to give a further opportunity to the petitioner at that stage to cross-examine the witnesses already examined amounted to denial of a real and effective opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself. Subsequent to 14th October, 1952 the petitioner availed himself of the opportunity to file his further representations, and on 16th October, 1952, he filed his written representation in answer to the charges framed against him and with reference to the witnesses already examined.

The first of the grounds put forward by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is however, well founded. After 16th October, 1952, the Revenue Divisional Officer by his order dated 9th February, 1953 directed the dismissal of the petitioner from service.

That the petitioner, who held the post of a karnam, held a civil post under the State of Madras, within the meaning of Art. 311(1) of the Constitution cannot admit of any doubt. Art. 311(2) runs:

No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed Until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.

The nature of the opportunity contemplated by Art. 311(2) has been explained in a number of cases, and the principles laid down in High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lall (A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 121) have been consistently followed. In one of the recent cases, Joseph John v. State of Travancore Cochin (A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 160), Mahajan, C.J. observed at pages 163-64:

The legal position in that respect and the nature of opportunity to be granted was stated by the Privy Council in the case of High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lall (A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 121)and it was held that when a stage is reached when definite conclusions have been come to as to the charges, and the actual punishment to follow is provisionally determined on, that the statute gives the civil servant an opportunity for which Sub-S. 3 of S. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935 (which corresponds to Art. 311) makes provision, and that at that stage a reasonable opportunity has to be afforded to the civil servant concerned.

It was not denied by the respondent that opportunity was not given to the petitioner. It was true he was given an opportunity to defend himself against the charges in the enquiry that followed the formulation of the charges. I have already referred to that aspect of the case, and to the contentions of the petitioner that at that stage he had not been given a real and effective opportunity to defend himself. That contention I have negatived. But the requirements of Art. 311(2) would be satisfied only, if after the conclusion of that enquiry when findings based on the material covered during the enquiry have been reached and recorded those conclusions are communicated to the civil servant, that is the petitioner, and he is given an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him, that is, to show cause against the dismissal which the competent authority, the Revenue Divisional Officer, proposed to inflict upon the petitioner. As I said, the respondent did not deny that such an opportunity at that stage was not given by the Revenue Divisional Officer, that is, at any stage between the conclusion of the enquiry on 16th October, 1952, when the petitioner lodged his written representation, and 9th February, 1953, when the order of dismissal was passed.

The learned Government Pleader contended that there was a substantial compliance with the requirements of Art. 311(2), because even at the initial stage, when charges were framed against the petitioner, he was called upon to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. But such a contention has been repeatedly negatived by the Court. The stage at which the opportunity for which Art. 311(2) provides should be given is after the conclusion of the enquiry and the findings have been recorded and before the action proposed to be taken, that is, dismissal in this case, is to follow as a result of those findings. That opportunity, as I said, the petitioner was not given.

It is true there were no statutory rules regulating the procedure to be followed in the case of disciplinary enquiries against village officers, who were not governed by the provisions of Madras Act III of 1895. Statutory rules were framed under Madras Act III of 1895, and they were amended in 195

1. The amended R. 8(3) ran:

The Revenue Officer ..shall arrive at a provisional conclusion in regard to the punishment it is proposed to impose and the village officer, shall be called upon to appear on a certain day to be fixed by him to show cause against the particular punishment proposed to be imposed. On that day the Revenue Officer shall record his plea and ask him to state if he wants to resummon and to re-examine any of the witnesses in his presence. If the village officer desires that any of the prosecution witnesses or defence witnesses should be re-examined or any new witness should be examined, the Revenue Officer. shall do so in the presence of the village officer who shall be allowed to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. The Revenue Officer may refuse to call a witness for reasons to be recorded in writing.

Though this rule did not in terms apply to the petitioner, it was conceded by the learned Government Pleader, that as early as 1946, the Board of Revenue declared that the procedure applicable to Hereditary Village Officers, should be followed in cases of original enquiries for punishment of non-statutory and non-hereditary village officers also. A copy of the Boards resolution Misc. 1384 dated 29th October, 1946 was placed before me. But, as the learned Government Pleader pointed out, that order of the Board did not have any statutory effect.

I have referred to the amended R. 8 framed under Madras Act III of 1895, only to show that it conforms to the requirements of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. A village officer, whether he is a hereditary village officer or a non-hereditary village officer, is a civil servant, who holds the post under the State of Madras within the meaning of Art. 311(1), and as such entitled to the protection guaranteed by Art. 311(2). If the Government framed rules to provide for the opportunity which the Constitution guarantees, the rules must conform to the requirements of Art. 311(2). If no rules have been framed still the requirements of Art. 311(2) must be satisfied. That requirement could be satisfied only by giving an opportunity to the civil servant after the findings have been recorded and before the punishment is awarded. That opportunity, as I said, the petitioner did not have; and that was conceded by the respondent. That vitiates the order of dismissal passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 9th February, 195

3. Since the constitutional guarantee has been violated, the order of dismissal cannot be allowed to stand.

I must, however, guard myself against being understood to say that the entire proceedings conducted by the Revenue Divisional Officer were without jurisdiction. Nothing was said to invalidate the charge being framed, apart from the plea that the charges disclosed an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code by a duly constituted criminal Court. The validity of the charges could not be assailed. The validity of the procedure down to 16th October 1952 was no doubt attacked by the petitioner, but I have declined to accept the petitioners plea. It was the final order dated 9th February 1953 that has to be set aside, because it contravened Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. Nothing that I have said in this order should be construed to mean as a bar to the resumption of the proceedings against the petitioner, if the departmental authorities find it necessary. All I can say is that the validity of the order dated 9th February, 1953 and that of the orders which confirmed that cannot be upheld.

This petition is allowed. The rule is made absolute. The order of the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 9th February 1953 and the further orders of the Collector and the Board of Revenue and the Government confirming the order dated 9th February 1953 are not set aside.

No order as to costs.