S.B. Sanyal, J.
1. This miscellaneous appeal, has been listed on the question of its maintainability. The point involved is, whether the appeal filed on 29.6.87 in this Court valued at Rs. 13,100/- is maintainable in view of the jurisdictional value of High Court having been raised from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs, 50,000/- by section 3 of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts (Bihar Amendment) Ordinance 1987 published in the Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) on 26.5.87. The answer depends upon the interpretation of section 3 of the Ordinance referred to above.
2. FACTS: A suit bearing Title Suit No. 56 of 1985 was instituted by plaintiff-respondent. The suit was decreed ex parte on 11.10.86 and the decree was signed and sealed on 15th December, 1986. An application for setting aside the ex parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the defendant-appellant which was rejected on 27.5.87. This miscellaneous appeal is directed against the said order refusing to set aside the ex parte decree.
3. According to Mr. Rama Kant Verma, the forum to enter the superior Court is a vested right and is governed by the law prevailing on the date of the Institution of the suit; this Ordinance having come into force from its publication in the Bihar Gazette on 26.5.87, it cannot affect or take away the vested right of the appellant to enter this Court on the basis of unamended provision where the valuation required was only Rs. 10,000/-. Learned Counsel submits that there is no express and/or implied intendment from the Ordinance to show that it operates retrospectively. On the contrary, section 1 (3) of the Ordinance envisages that it shall come into force at once.
4. It is well known that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure but a substantive right. The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit, The right of appeal being a vested right, the right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced, such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. I am fortified in my view aforesaid by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Messrs Hoosain Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others (A. I. R. 1953 Supreme Court 221) as well as a decision of the Supreme Court in Gorikapati Veeraya v. N. Subhiah Choudhry and others (A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 540) as also by the decision of this Court in Damodar Prasad v. State of Bihar reported in 1978 B. B. C.J. 309: 1978 PLJR 584. I sitting along with Honble the Chief Justice in C. W. J. C. No. 4611 of 1978 and analogous case decided on 3rd September 1986, took the same view, the point being more or less the same. The position would be different if by express or implied intendment of the legislative provision, the amended law could be said to be retrospective in operation taking away the vested right. In my opinion, no such legislative intention is discernible. On the contrary, the amended law comes into effect from the date of its publication. I am, therefore, of the opinion that section 3 of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts (Bihar Amendment) Ordinance 1987 is prospective. The present appeal, is maintainable being of the value of more than Rs. 10,000/, which was the permit to enter this Court as the law stood when the suit was first instituted. The appeal is accordingly held to be maintainable.