AMARBIR SINGH GILL, J.

Petitioners are legal representatives of Sumer Mai Kothari, deceased, who was tenant in a portion of the house in mohalla Qazipura, city Bahraich and was running the business by the name and style of Rajasthan Tent House. The petitioners have challenged the order, dated 13-3-1988 passed by Munsif Bahraich (Annexure-5) and the judgment dated 13-12 1988 of the District Judge, Bah raich by which both the authorities under U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Let ting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U. P. Act XIII of 1972) have allowed the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972.

2. The brief facts of the case are that Smt. Janki Devi, owner/landlady of the portion of the house in occupation of tenant Sumer Mai filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 for ejectment of Sumer Mai, tenant, on the ground of bona fide requirement for her own occupation and for the purposes of extension of the business being run by her grand son. The landlady claimed that she alongwith her widowed daughter, her son alongwith wife and children are residing in the upper portion of the house and her family consists of seven persons and is de pendent upon the business of her grand son Ravi Prakash Goel which is not sufficient for the survival of the entire family. She herself is too old and she is being looked after by Ravi Prakash Goel, her daughters son who are living with her and there is no proper place for Ravi Prakash Goel to run his business and he is using a wooden plat form to place upon few household articles for sale. She wants to extend her business and wants to install flour mill etc.

in the portion in occupation of the tenant for the survival of her family. She claimed that her tenant has built a big house in Chowk Bazar where he is carrying on the business in the name of "raj Hans Lodge" which was subsequently changed to "sarika Lodge" where he can shift his tent house business. Besides, the tenant is carrying on business near Ohkar Talkies in the name of his eldest son and he has sufficient accommodation to shift if eviction is ordered. The tenant is harassing her by filing false complaints and cases. .

3. Sumer Mai, tenant contested the claim in his written statement and denied the allegation of personal need or requirement and claimed that there was sufficient accommodation with the landlady even to install flour mill etc. because there were two rooms immediately behind wooden plat form where Ravi Prakash is selling general merchandise which can be used for the purpose mentioned in the petition. The tenant respondent further claimed that he was carrying on his business initially of cloth business and thereafter tent house in the disputed premises and his business has ac quired a goodwill and there is no accommodation in which he can carry on the aforesaid business. He also denied if Ravi Prakash Goel was grand son (Nati) or a member of her family. He also denied if the landlady was dependent on the earnings of Ravi Prakash Goel, and claimed that the landlady does not require the premises for any business 3 because she is already receiving sufficient rent for her livelihood. Ravi Prakash Goel and his family are living independently although in the same house. The landlady has no concern with his business. He denied if there was any sufficient accommodation with him in the Sarika Lodge about which he had claimed that he has let out the same to his own sons Pradeep Kumar and Pramod Kumar, besides, the rooms are quite small. It is claimed that one son is living independently and the other son Madan Lal is living in the city separately and his second son Mool Chand is carrying on business of tent house in the disputed premises. He himself is residing in a rented house and there is no other accommodation available for him to shift his business of tent house.

4. Learned Prescribed Authority (Munsif Bahraich) considered the case of the parties and the evidence and came to the conclusion that the landlady is aged widow, besides her widowed daughter and her family are residing with her and looking after her needs and Ravi Prakash Goel being the son of her widowed daughter is living and sup porting the entire family. It was held that Ravi Prakash was selling goods etc. outside the house on a wooden platform and income is not sufficient for the survival of the entire family and the landlady intends to extend her business by installing a flour mill alongwith rice and pulses thrashing machines to augment her source of income. It was also found that the tenant- respondent has sufficient accommodation with him i. e. Sarika Lodge which although is ostensibly let out to his own sons on payment of rent. However, they were living with the tenant and he is supporting them because, according to the tenant himself, their business is not having any profit. Besides, there was no evidence if the rooms in the Sarika Lodge were not sufficiently big to accommodate the business of tent house. The Prescribed Authority also considered the comparative hardship and came to the conclusion that the landlady was in dire need of the accommodation which is bonafide one and the tenant has alternative accommodation to shift and continue his business. Application for eviction of the tenant was thus allowed.

5. In appeal the learned District Judge has also affirmed the findings referring to the entire evidence on the issues and has given a finding of fact that the landlady bona fide required the premise for her own use and occupation besides that Ravi Prakash Goel was not stranger to the family and dismissed the appeal filed by the tenant.

6. Learned counsel for both the parties have been heard at length.

7. Sri Pradeep Kant, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two material contentions before this court to challenge the eviction order of the tenant who is being represented by his legal representatives in this petition. Firstly, whether the son of a widowed daughter is a member of the family and secondly, the landlady had sufficient accommodation for the purposes for which ejectment was sought. At the very outset, it is observed that the writ petition is not in the nature of appeal, so when a question of fact is duly considered and decided, High Court cannot reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion different from that of the District Judge and the Prescribed Authority. In this case both the courts below have given concurrent findings on the question of bona fide need as well as the comparative hardship of landlord and tenant which findings are findings of facts. It would not be open for this court to reappraise the evidence in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Muni Lal and others v. Prescribed Authority and others, AIR 1978 SC29.

8. Sri Pradeep Kant, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the definition of family, as given in section 3 (g) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 does not include the son of a widowed daughter as member of the family in relation to the landlady and, as such, the ground on which the ejectment has been sought i. e. for extension of the business of Ravi Prakash Goel by installing a flour mill etc. was not available under the law. He has referred to the petition filed by the landlady, copy of which is annexure- 1 wherein it is mentioned that there is no proper accommodation with Ravi Prakash Goel, grand son of the landlady and to accommodate him and his business, the eviction of the tenant from the premises under his occupancy was sought. In order to appreciate the argument of the learned counsel, the definition of family, as given in section 3 (g) of the aforesaid Act, is given below:

"3 (g ). "family", in relation to a landlord or tenant of a building means, his or her -

(i) spouse,

(ii) male lineal descendants,

(iii) such parents, grand parents and any unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant, as may have been normally residing with him or her, and includes, in relation to a landlord, any female having a legal right of residence in that building. "

9. It is no doubt true that the son of a widowed daughter is not specifically included in the definition of family. However, the intention is not to consider every relation in isolation. If a widowed daughter in relation to a landlady is member of the family and her children are also living with her, they cannot be- strangers to the family. In the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, we find that the landlady is very old and widow lady. She has no other relations except her widowed daughter who alongwith her family including her son Ravi Prakash Goel is living with the landlady since long and the entire family is dependent upon the earnings of Ravi Prakash Goel who is not running any independent business but, ac cording to the case set up by the petitioner, he is doing the sale of household articles to support the family meaning thereby that the landlady is running her business for her survival through her widowed daughters son Ravi Prakash Goel and it is nobodys case that Ravi Prakash Goel is running the business independent of the landlady. According to the landlady, her family consists of 7 persons i. e. herself, her widowed daughter, her grandson, granddaughter-in-law, two minor granddaughters and another minor grandson. The family of the widowed daughter is permanently residing with the landlady since long and not temporarily. Admittedly, the landlady has not sought ejectment of the tenant in this case for occupation of any member of her family i. e. the ground available to the landlady under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 which provide ground for seeking ejectment of a tenant when the landlord requires the building for occupation. by himself or any member of his family. It means that a landlord even can seek ejectment if he does not require the premises under occupancy of a tenant for himself he can still seek eviction if the premises are required for occupation of a member of his family. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner would have been relevant if Smt. Janki Devi, landlady had sought ejectment of Sumer Mai, her tenant, for the occupation of Ravi Prakash Goel, her grandson and not for herself. A reference to annexure-1, copy of her application under Section 21 (1) (a) would indicate that eviction has been sought by the landlady for extension in her business by installing a flour mill in the premises occupied by the tenant so as to maintain her family. The expression "occupation by himself appearing in Section 21 (1) (a) does not mean that the requirement for occupation by the landlord is con fined to his personal need only. In a similar situation this court in the case of Smt. Satya Misra and others v. IIAddl District Judge and others, 1978 U. P. Rent Control Cases (Suppl) page 738 observed:

"the expression for occupation by himself does not mean that the landlord should live in isolation. If the state of health of a landlord or his age is such that he cannot live alone and would need the company or assistance of any other per son, then the need of such other person whose assistance, he needs, would also be covered by this phrase. Similarly, if the landlord is invalid, an accommodation required for a helper may also be considered as a need of the landlord. . . . . . . . . A distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between two classes of cases where a landlord does not need an assistance of a man but still he wants to keep some one with him, in such a case the need for occupation would not be that of the landlord but of that other person. But where, as here, the landlord keeps his daughter and her son-in-law to look after his business and for his help, it will have to be held that the requirement of these persons to have an accommodation to live with the landlord is bonafide need of the landlord himself. "

10. In the instant case, there are more compelling reasons. It is not a case of son-in-law. The widowed daughter no doubt is covered under the definition of family, who, by nature of her status would fall back to her parents to live with them as member of their family and in case her son besides supporting her also supports her grandmother as well then the principle laid down in Smt. Satya Misra s case (supra) is fully applicable in this case as well.

11. In yet another case Smt. Rani Chaturvedi v. Shiv Narain and others, 1979 ARC 479 where daughters son and married daughter permanently resided with her widower father (landlord) to help him, this court similarly applied the principle that the need of the landlord even for the requirement of such family members can be considered for the release of the premises under tenancy. As already observed above, the circumstances of the case indicate that the landlady herself required the premises to start the business although through her grandson Ravi Prakash Goel because she feel that she alongwith her widowed daughter and her family members require more source for their livelihood and in fact she wants to extend her business. Such a plea cannot be rejected as not maintainable because every citizen is entitled to extend his business and increase his income and in such a situation if the premises are required for extension of the business considering other relevant materials, the accommodation can be made available by eviction of a tenant.

12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Harish Tandon v. Addl District Magistrate, Allahabad and others, 1995 SCO 723 to contend that the grandson of the landlady Ravi Prakash Goel cannot be said to be a member of the family and as such the application was not maintainable, la Harish Tandons case (supra) the question was of the deemed vacancy under Section 12 (2) and (4) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. The tenant in that case took his son-in-law as partner in his business in the shop in dispute and release of the shop was sought on the ground that he admitted a person who is not a member of his family as a partner and as such he deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. Honble Supreme Court in the circumstances held that son-in-law is not included in the expression family as defined under the Act and as such his admission in business as partner by the tenant, the shop would be deemed to be vacant under Section 12 (2) of the Act. It would be seen that the present case is on altogether different footing. There is no question of either seeking the eviction of the tenant for the occupation of the premises by the grandson nor it is a case where the grandson is to start business independently in the premises in dispute. Learned counsel also referred to the decision in Thakurdeen v. Smt. Hero Devi and others, (1984) 2 ARC page 117 wherein while interpreting the definition of the family as given in section 3 (g) of the Act, daughters-in-law were not held to be members of the family on the premise that daughter-in-law has no right of residence as against her mother-in-law though she undoubtedly has legal right of residence as against her husband. This case again was on different footing and was under Section 12 (3) of the Act which provides that if a tenant or any member of his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant site or gets vacated a residential building in the same city, the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy. In that case the landlady had sought ejectment of the tenant on the ground of requirement of her family members which included daughter-in-law and it was held that under the definition of family in section 3 (g), the expression "and includes, in relation to a landlord, any female haying a legal right of residence in that building" a daughter-in-law has no legal right of residence as against her mother-in-law and, as such, the landlady could not include the daughter-in-law in her family so far as requirement of accommodation is concerned. It would be seen that there is not much of relevance of the cited decision to the facts of the present case.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the decision in Smt. Rahman v. District Judge, Barabanki and others, 1994 (2) LCD 49. The said authority pertains to a case where the application for release of shop was moved by a landlord showing the need for occupation of the premises for the purpose of landlords grandson starting his own business and this court held that the grandson being not included in the category of persons contemplated by clause (d) of Rule 16 (2), his need cannot be considered. The aforesaid decision also is not much relevant in this case. As already observed above, the eviction has not been sought for the accommodation of the grandson for the purposes of his business rather the eviction has been sought by the landlady for herself showing bona fide need to extend her business for which she requires the premises in occupation of the opposite parties. The fact that she is to dip her business through her grandson by itself will not attract the definition of family under Section 3 (g) of the Act to make the application as not maintainable.

14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also pointed out that there are two rooms available on the ground floor to the landlady immediately behind wooden plat form from where Ravi Prakash Goel is selling household articles which rooms can be utilised for the purposes of extension of the business. Besides, it has also been pointed out that during the pendency of the case, another tenant vacated a room in his occupation which is also available to the landlady. The courts below have already considered this aspect of the case and it has been found that the two rooms on the ground floor are too small to accommodate the flour mill etc. , which the landlady in tends to start. Besides, the room

vacated during the pendency of the case is said to be on the upper floor which obviously can be of no use to the landlady for the purpose for which eviction of the tenant from the premises in his occupation was sought. There appears to be thus no reason to differ with or upset the concurrent findings of the courts below that the landlady bona fide required the premises in dispute for her use and occupation and the requirement being bona fide, the eviction order has rightly been passed.

15. There is no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed. The petitioners shall vacate the premises in their occupation within one month from today. The par ties are left to bear their own costs.

Petition dismissed.