1.The present challenge is directed against an order whereby the appellate court reversed an order of refusal of injunction and apparently granted a relief beyond that sought by the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 in the court below.

2.The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the trial court was justified in refusing injunction to the opposite party no. 1, since the relief sought for was in aid of performance of a contract of the nature of personal service and was debarred under Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act from doing so. The trial court further held that since the plaintiff herself has challenged the authority and existence of the school management committee, all the members of the committee ought to have been made parties and the committee in its individual capacity could not have been arrayed as defendants and, as such, the injunction has been refused. However, the appellate court went beyond its jurisdiction in directing that the penal steps taken against the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 by the petitioner were not valid and those were quashed. The school authority was given liberty to proceed according to law by taking any disciplinary action, if possible, after observing the principles of natural justice.

3.The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting opposite party no. 1 argues that the appellate court proceeded on a correct premise, since the suit was not confined to enforcement of a contract of personal service but also threw a challenge to the constitution of the school management committee itself. As such, the relief granted by the appellate court did not amount to granting the relief in the suit itself. It is further argued that the committee itself was constituted unlawfully and, as such, had no authority to pass the penal action taken by it against the opposite party no. 1.

4.Upon a consideration of the materials on record, it is evident that the appellate court, ex facie, overstepped its jurisdiction in granting reliefs beyond its jurisdiction. The plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 had prayed for an injunction in the trial court restraining the defendants and their men and agents from disturbing the plaintiff to do her daily duties in the school in any way or in any manner whatsoever. However, the appellate court quashed all penal actions taken against the plaintiff on the perception that such action was illegal. However, the entire approach of the appellate court was based on its own notions of duties of teachers, natural justice, role of school management committees and master servant relationship. The materials on record and the actual illegality, if any, committed by the present petitioner was not adverted to by the appellate court at all. As such, in any event, the appellate court’s order cannot stand a moment’s scrutiny.

5.Moreover, there was substance in the findings of the trial court as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the suit in its present form, in view of the same being in aid of implementation of a personal contract relating to service. Such point was never adverted to by the appellate court at all.

6.Since the frame of the suit is also not in representative capacity, nor are all the members of the school management committee arrayed as defendants, the trial court was also prima facie justified in holding that the plaintiff could not have filed the suit against the school management committee, the authority and existence of which was challenged by the plaintiff herself. These questions were also not touched by the appellate court at all while setting aside the order of the trial court.

7.It is submitted by both sides that subsequently the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 was terminated from her service by the petitioner/school and, as such, in any event, the prayer for injunction made by the opposite party no. 1 has now become infructuous. However, it is further submitted that the order of termination has been challenged in a writ petition before a co-ordinate bench of this court, which is now sub-judice.

8.As such, obviously, the fate of the petitioner as regards her service will depend on the result of such writ petition, the merits of which are not at all gone into by this court.

9.However, on the considerations as enumerated above, the impugned order of the appellate court suffers from patent jurisdictional error and has to be set aside.

10.Accordingly, the revisional application bearing C.O. 4350 of 2018 is allowed on contest thereby setting aside the judgment and order dated September 19, 2018 passed by the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court No. IV at Barrackpore, North 24-Paraganas, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 48 of 2017 and reviving the order No. 12 dated August 12, 2017 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Barrackpore in Title Suit No. 235 of 2016, whereby the injunction application of the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 was didmissed.

11.There will be no order as to costs.