Elipe Dharamarao, J.

The petitioner along with his wife, brother and brothers wife jointly own the property situated at old Door No.69/2, New Door No.65/2, Usman Road, T.Nagar, Chennai-17 and they are running a textile business at the above address in the name and style of M/s.Kalanthar Madeena Silks. By this writ petition, the petitioner is challenging the Notice issued under Section 56(2A) of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1971, dated 13.5.2010, issued by the first respondent/Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority (in short CMDA).

2. According to the petitioners, they have purchased the property in question in the year 2008 and after the purchase, they demolished the building which existed in the said property where a textile shop was being run by their predecessors-in-title. After obtaining planning permission for new construction in the said property, they have constructed a new building and put the same for use of running the textile business and the building was also assessed by the property tax by the Corporation of Chennai. According to the petitioners, during the course of construction, considering the locality and the entire neighbourhood being surrounded by shops of textiles, general merchants and jewellery, they have modified the construction with some variations from the original sanctioned plan and the property is situated in commercial area where both mixed residential and commercial activities are permissible under the Development Control Rules; that the original sanctioned plan is for stilt +2 floors and a head room in the terrace, they have constructed with modification, by utilizing part of the suit floor for their textile showroom business by providing set backspaces both in the front, rear and southern side (Venkatesan Street); that in the terrace of the building along with the headroom, they have put up A.C. plant room and there is no other construction in the terrace floor except the A.C. plant which is for common utility.

3. They would admit that even though the FSI (Floor Space Index) permissible for the extent of their property is 1.5 of the total plot extent, they have achieved only about 0.9 FSI in the construction. They would further submit that after completing the construction, they have commenced their business in the name of Kalanthar Madeena Silks at the said place on 13.9.2009 and the worth of the stocks insides their shop is about Rs. 4.75 crores; that on 11.9.2009, the officials of the first respondent issued a notice by calling upon the petitioner to produce the sanctioned plan and in response to the same, he produced the sanctioned plan issued by the Corporation of Chennai, by letter dated 17.9.2009, and on receipt of his reply dated 17.0.2009 along with the plan copy, the officials of the respondent by letter dated 25.9.2009 bearing No.EC2/14410/2009 issued a notice under Section 57 read with Section 85 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act (hereinafter referred to as the), stating that the construction put up by the petitioner is liable to be demolished along with locking and sealing besides directing that the petitioner should discontinue the use and occupation of the building and on receipt of the said notice, the petitioner submitted a reply on 29.9.2009, requesting the respondent to defer all further actions, as the petitioner was submitting a revised plan as per the site condition for regularization of the modifications and variations in constructions; that the petitioner submitted a revised plan to the first respondent on 7.10.2009 and the revised plan is within the development control norms issued by the respondents, which was refused by the order dated 11.11.2009 and aggrieved against the said order, he filed an appeal to the second respondent under Section 79 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act on 17.11.2009 and along with the appeal petition dated 17.11.2009, he also preferred a Stay Application to the second respondent under Section 79(5) of theand the second respondent by letter dated 10.12.2009 informed the first respondent as well as the petitioner that the appeal petition has been taken on file and the original records of the first respondent dated 11.11.2009, in rejecting his revised plan, are called for and it was further directed that status quo should be maintained with reference to the status of building as obtained at the time of filing of revised planning permission application till the final disposal of appeal; that on the date of submission of appeal petition, the building in existence was stilt +2 floors along with head room and A.C. plant in the terrace of the building.

4. According to the petitioner, the textile shop was opened on 13.9.2009 and the order passed by the second respondent on 10.12.2009, is categorical inasmuch as it makes clear that only if any further addition or alteration is made to the building under reference, the first respondent will be at liberty to take enforcement action as per law in the mater. It has been submitted by the petitioner that they have not put up any addition or alteration or any further construction, to the building as was noticed by the first respondent on 25.9.2009; that as per the order passed by the second respondent, only if there is any additional construction or alterations, the first respondent can take any enforcement action pending consideration of the appeal by the second respondent; that while the appeal petition to the Government under Section 79 of theis pending consideration and while the direction of the Government, in granting status quo, is in force, the officials of the first respondent without any notice and prior intimation, in consequence of the earlier notice issued on 25.9.2009, came to the shop premises at about 8.00 a.m. on 13.5.2010 before the shop opens and locked and sealed the same. Challenging the same, the petitioner has come forward to file this writ petition.

5. The first respondent/CMDA filed a detailed counter. According to them, the petitioner and three others obtained planning permission for the construction of Stilt Floor +2 floors residential building with two dwelling units and in deviation and violation of approved plans, the petitioner has constructed ground floor +2 floors +3rd floor part (AHU (Air Handling Unit) adjacent to the headroom); that as part of enforcement action, the Stop Work Notice/Notice calling for approved plan was issued in Notice No.0068, dated 11.9.2009 and at that time, the structure of ground floor +2 floors was completed and finishing work was in progress but not occupied and the locking and sealing notices were received by one Mr. Abu Becker, the Managing Director of Kalanthar Mathina and both the notices were pasted in the premises; that consequent to the action taken by this respondent, a D.O. letter dated 15.10.2009 was sent to the Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai to take necessary enforcement action under the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 and on receipt of thenotice, the writ petitioner has not stopped any work and during the subsequent inspection, it was found that without proper finishing, the building was hurriedly put into use for commercial purpose and also added 3rd floor and therefore, a notice was issued in Ref. No.EC2/14410/2009, dated 25.9.2009 for discontinuance of occupation of the premises and also the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and the MD, Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board were requested not to give power/water supply and sewage connection to the premises, and the MD, Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board his informed, by his letter dated 6.11.2009, that they have disconnected the water and sewer connection to the building on 2.11.2009.

6. It has further been stated that the petitioner was given one more opportunity by requesting to discontinue the use and vacate the premise within three days from the date of receipt of the notice and inform the office for locking and sealing the property, failing which the premises will be locked and sealed with the things and materials without further notice till the building is regularized and in response to the above notice, the petitioner, in his letter dated 9.11.2009 requested three months time to rectify the ground floor as stilt floor and in the meanwhile, the petitioner had submitted an application with revised plan for grant of Planning Permission that was refused by the first respondent vide letter No. BC 1/15273/2009, dated 11.11.2009 and the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Government under Section 79 of theagainst the refusal order and the appeal petition is under consideration of the second respondent/Government; that in response to the Locking and Sealing and discontinuance of occupation notices, the developer made representation on 9.11.2009 requesting to stop further enforcement action on locking and sealing and by the letter dated 16.11.2009, it has been replied that the request cannot be entertained and in response to the discontinuance of occupation notice dated 5.11.2009, the petitioner requested to allow a minimum of 30 days to shift the business from the existing area to other place and assured to demolish the deviated and unauthorised portion and restore it to stilt floor +2 floors.

7. It has further been submitted that as per the inspection report dated 20.4.2010, the petitioner has not made any alteration as assured by him and was carrying on his business; that the petitioner obtained planning permission for construction of residential building but converted it as commercial building with violations of excess floor, setbacks, usage, floor space index and parking as per the development regulation and the petitioner has scant respect to the notices and continued his business and hence, it became necessary for the first respondent to lock and seal the premises on 13.5.2010 and since the premises is a textile showroom, the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board was requested by the first respondent by the letter dated 13.5.2010 to disable the electricity connection temporarily from the point of view of public safety as preventive measure with reference to the possibility of any mishap because of the building and assessment of property tax does not make the building to become an authorized one; that the petitioner is at liberty to obtain revised approval, in case , he wanted to construct commercial building by submitting a revised plan satisfying the development regulations, meant for commercial building intended by the petitioner; that the appeal made under Section 79 of the Act, against the refusal order of CMDA, does not prevent CMDA to go ahead with Locking and Sealing operation under sub section (2-A) of Section 56 to ensure discontinuance of the building use in contravention of the building approved and the order of status quo referred by the petitioner pertains only from carrying out demolition of any part of the building not from carrying out locking and sealing. On such grounds, the respondents requested to dismiss the writ petition.

8. A reply affidavit has been filed by the petitioner denying the allegations of the respondent and reiterating and emphasising that, against the order of the first respondent dated 11.11.2009, the petitioner has already preferred an appeal under Section 79 of thebefore the Government wherein an order of status quo has been passed, which has been strictly complied with by the petitioner and when such is the position, the respondents are not justified in resorting to the coercive action of passing the locking and seizure order. The petitioner has also filed M.P.No.3 of 2010, raising additional grounds and by allowing this petition, the additional grounds urged by the petitioner, being legal in nature, are also considered by us.

9. Sri V.T. Gopalan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would take us through various provisions of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 and reiterating the contents of the affidavit and reply affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, would argue that when the appeal preferred by the petitioner to the Government is pending consideration, with an order of status quo passed therein, the first respondent has acted in undue haste in passing the impugned order of locking and seizure despite the fact that there is no violation of the order of status quo by the petitioner, thus watering down the very purpose of granting the order of status quo by the appellate authority/the Government. The learned senior counsel would further argue that the State and its organs must act in all fairness and without any bias. In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel would rely on the following judgments of the Honourable Apex Court:

1. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992 Supp (2) SCC 651

2. Kailash Chandra v. Mukundi Lal AIR 2002 SC 829 [LQ/SC/2002/130] : (2002) 2 SCC 678 [LQ/SC/2002/130]

3. CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers AIR 2003 SC 3942 [LQ/SC/2002/1345] : (2003) 3 SCC 57 [LQ/SC/2002/1345]

4. Godawat Pan Masala Products I.P. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 2004 SC 4057 [LQ/SC/2004/810] : (2004) 7 SCC 68 [LQ/SC/2004/810] : (2004) 4 MLJ 67 [LQ/SC/2004/810]

5. Jai Vijai Metal Udyog (P) Ltd. v. CTT (2010) 6 SCC 705 [LQ/SC/2010/405]

10. In the first judgment cited above, Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (supra), the Honourable Apex Court has held in Para No.126 as follows:

126. The purpose of interlocutory orders is to preserve in status quo the rights of the parties, so that, the proceedings do not become infructuous by any unilateral overt acts by one side or the other during its pendency.

11. In the second judgment cited above, Kailash Chandra v. Mukundi Lal (supra), the Honourable Apex Court has held thus:

11. A provision in the statute is not to be read in isolation. It has to be read with other related provisions in the itself, more particularly, when the subject-matter dealt with in different sections or parts of the same statue is the same or similar in nature.

12. In the third judgment relied on by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (supra), the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows:

14. A construction which reduces the statute to a futility has to be avoided. A statue or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat i.e. a liberal construction should be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties. (See BROOMS LEGAL MAXIMS (10th Edn.), P.361, CRAIES ON STATUTES (7th Edn.), p.95 and MAXWELL ON STATUTES (11th Edn.), p.221.)

15. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure that object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. (See Whitney v. IRC (1926 AC 37) at p.52 referred to in CIT v. S. Teja Singh AIR 1959 SC 352 and Gursahai Saigal v. CIT AIR 1963 SC 1062)

16. The Courts will have to reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude n the language used. (See Salmon v. Duncombe (1886) 11 AC 627) at p.634, Curtis v. Stovin (1889) 22 QBD.513 referred to in S. Teja Singh case (CIT v. S. Teja Singh AIR 1959 SC 352 [LQ/SC/1958/139] ).

17. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction, based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of brining about an effective result. (See Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries ((1940) 3 ALL ER. 549) referred to in Pye v. Minister for Lands for NSW (1954) 1 WLR 1410 (PC)) The principles indicated in the said cases were reiterated by this Court in Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India (1992 supp (1) SCC 594)

18. The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.

19. The Court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. (See R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka (1992) 1 SCC 335 [LQ/SC/1991/525] ) Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is the duty of the Court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the same Act. (See Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand jain (1997) 1 SCC 373 [LQ/SC/1996/2145] ).

20. Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done to construe the provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. It should not be lightly assumed that Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with the other.

13. In the fourth judgment relied on by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, Godawat Pan Masala Products I.P. Ltd. v. Union of India (supra), the Honourable Apex Court relying on the above judgment in CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (supra), has held thus:

29. It is an accepted canon of construction of statutes that a statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the should be construed with reference to other provisions of the same Act so as to make a consistent, harmonious enactment of the whole statute. The Court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed, but to the scheme of the entire statute. The attempt must be to eliminate conflict and to harmonise the different parts of the statute for it cannot be assumed that Parliament had given by one hand what it took away by the other.

14. In the fifth and the last judgment relied on by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner Jai Vijai Metal Udyog (P) Ltd. v. CTT (supra), the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows:

30. Interim order is passed on the basis of prima facie findings, which are tentative. Such order is passed as a temporary arrangement to preserve the status quo till the matter is decided finally, to ensure that the matter does not become either infructuous or a fait accompli before the final hearing. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainly were resolved in his favour at the trial (vide Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad (2001) 5 SCC 568 [LQ/SC/2001/1269] and State of Assam v. Barak Upatyaka D. U. Karmachari Sanstha (2009) 5 SCC 694 [LQ/SC/2009/576] ).

31. Grant of an interim relief in regard to the nature and extent thereof depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case as no straitjacket formula can be laid down. There may be a situation wherein the respondent-defendant may use the suit property in such manner that the situation becomes irretrievable. In such a fact situation, interim relief should be granted (vide M. Gurudas v. Rasaranjan (2006) 8 SCC 367 [LQ/SC/2006/825] and Shridevi v. Muralidhar (2007) 14 SCC 721 [LQ/SC/2007/1290] ). Grant of temporary injunction is governed by three basic principles i.e. prima facie case; balance of convenience; and irreparable injury, which are required to be considered in a proper perspective in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. But it may not be appropriate for any Court to hold a mini-trial at the stage of grant of temporary injunction (vide S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd. (2000) 5 SCC 573 [LQ/SC/2000/941] and Anand Prasad Agarwalla (2001) 5 SCC 568 [LQ/SC/2001/1269] )).

15. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent would argue that the petitioner has obtained the building permission for a residential one, but has made it a commercial one that too with many violations and following all the procedures contemplated under law, the impugned action of locking and seizure has been resorted to on the part of the first respondent. He would further argue that the order of status quo passed by the Government in the appeal preferred by the writ petitioner, does not at all prohibit the first respondent from acting in the manner known to law and that there is no violation of any procedure contemplated under law by the first respondent in resorting to the impugned action.

16. The undisputed fact is that the petitioner has obtained residential planning permission from the first respondent and has raised the construction with deviations from the approved plan and put the building for commercial purpose. Owing to the deviations and additional constructions without permission, a notice under Sections 56 and 57 read with Section 85 of thehas been issued to the petitioner by the first respondent on 11.9.2009, ordering to stop the construction work, by which time, even according to the contents of the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent, the structure of ground floor +2 floors was completed and finishing work was in progress but not occupied and according to the petitioner, the building was put to use, with a textile showroom, on 13.9.2009. To prove that the building was put into use by opening the textile showroom, the petitioner has produced the xerox copy of the invitation card in the typed set of papers, which has been commented on the part of the first respondent that the building was hurriedly put into use, suspecting legal action by the first respondent. Subsequently, another notice for locking, sealing and demolition, under Section 57 read with Section 85 of thewas issued by the first respondent on 25.9.2009 along with the notice for discontinuation of occupation of the premises, for which the petitioner has sent a reply dated 28.9.2009, admitting the deviations, but submitting that the deviations are not major and that a revised plan is being submitted for regularizing the building put up and accordingly, he submitted a revised plan to the first respondent on 7.10.2009. By the communication dated 5.11.2009, the petitioner was required to discontinue the use and vacate the premises within three days from the date of receipt of the said notice, under Section 56(2A) of the Act, in order to lock and seal the property, for which the petitioner, by the letter dated 9.11.2009 has requested three months time to rectify the deviations made in the building to the approved plan, after making necessary alternative arrangement. However, by the order dated 11.11.2009, the said revised plan submitted by the petitioner was rejected by the first respondent. While on one hand, the petitioner has preferred an appeal before the second respondent/Government as against the said order dated 11.11.2009, he has also submitted a letter dated 21.11.2009 on a stamped paper to the first respondent stating as follows:

I am very sorry to inform that I have converted the slit portion into commercially by raising side walls around. Already I got planning permission from Corporation. After receiving notice from CMDA, I have decided to demolish the wall raised around and restore the Building as per planning permission granted i.e., Slit +2 floors. In the meanwhile, I request to allow me minimum 30 days to shift my business from the existing area to other place. I once again assure that I will demolish the side wall of slit and restore as slit +2 floor.

17. It is seen from the materials on record that while entertaining the appeal filed by the petitioner, the second respondent/Government, by the order dated 10.12.2009 has ordered status quo. Since this order of status quo is having a bearing for further discussion of the case argued on either side and for easy reference, we extract hereunder the said order:

I am directed to inform you that your appeal 2nd cited has been taken on file and the original records pertaining to the order 1st cited are called for from the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority. You are hereby directed to maintain status quo with reference to the status of your building as obtained at the time of filing of Planning Permission Application till the final disposal of your appeal. If it is noticed that any further addition or alteration is made to the building under reference, the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority will be at liberty to take enforcement action as per law in the matter.

18. While things stood thus, by the impugned order dated 13.5.2010, the premises of the petitioner was locked and scaled by the first respondent, which is under challenge in this writ petition.

19. Since Mr. V.T. Gopalan, the learned senior counsel would advance arguments solely based on the power of the first respondent to invoke Section 56(2A) when admittedly, an interim order passed in an appeal filed under Section 79 of theis in existence, the question that would arise for consideration isrwhen admittedly the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner is pending consideration before the appellate authority/Government, whether the first respondent is justified in invoking the provision of Section 56(2A) of the Act, which gives the sealing power to the CMDA and we shall now proceed to discuss and dissect the said legal question.

20. For easy understanding, we shall now extract Section 56(2A), which has been inserted into by Act 61 of 2008, w.e.f., 15.12.2008.

If the owner or occupier, as the case may be, of land or building has not discontinued, the use of such land or building as required in the notice served under sub-section (1) within the time specified therein, the appropriate planning authority if prima facie satisfied, may take action to discontinue the use of such land or building by locking and sealing the premises in such manner as may be prescribed irrespective of pendency of any application under Section 49 or appeal under Section 79 or any litigation before Court. The owner or occupier, as the case may be, of such land or building shall provide security for such sealed premises.

21. This sub-section has been inserted into by Act 61 of 2008, w.e.f. 15.12.2008 and no doubt, this provision vests inherent powers on the first respondent to discontinue the use of building by locking and sealing, irrespective of pendency of any application under Section 49 or appeal under Section 79 or any litigation before Court, if the occupier or the owner of the premises has not complied with the requirement of the notice issued by the Planning Authority to stop using the premises. But, an ancillary question that would follow this situation is, as to whether the said power can be used by the CMDA, even in cases where the orders of injunction or stay or status quo have been passed by the appellate authority or a revisional authority or a judicial or quasi-judicial body.

22. The purpose of granting interim injunctions or interim orders is to safeguard the interest of the parties pendent lite. When the itself is contemplating the relief of appeal to the aggrieved parties to the appellate authority, vesting the power of passing interim orders on such authorities, the other way of looking into the legal position is quite impermissible. An appeal remedy is provided for to the prescribed authority as against the decision or order of the planning authority under section 49 or sub-section (1) of Section 54 by the aggrieved person. Under Section 79(5) of the Act, the prescribed authority has been vested with the power to pass interlocutory orders, pending the decision on such appeal. In the case on hand, the petitioner has availed the appeal remedy available to him under Section 79 and the appellate authority has also passed an order of status quo with cautious wordings, as has been extracted supra. The order of status quo though put the entire burden of maintaining the status quo of the structure on the petitioner/land owner, it has also made it clear that the enforcement action contemplated under the could be invoked by the CMDA, in case of any further addition or alteration is made by the petitioner. It is not at all the case of the first respondent himself that after the passing of the said status quo order by the Government, the petitioner has made any further addition or alteration, so as to say that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the order of status quo, further paving way for CMDA to initiate enforcement action. The only argument advanced on the part of CMDA is that they are not restrained by the Government from initiating such an enforcement action, which we are unable to accept, in view of any material on record to show that the petitioner has made any further addition or alteration to the premises, necessitating the action under Section 56(2A). No doubt, the powers of the CMDA under Section 56(2A) of theare very wide, to be exercised irrespective of pendency of any application under Section 49 or appeal under Section 79, but the said power cannot be mean to over-stretch and bypass the judicial orders passed by the competent authorities in those matters. Had it been the intention of the legislature to extend this power granted to CMDA to bypass the interim orders passed in the appeal under Section 79 by the competent authority, either the Legislature would have nullified the power of the Government under Section 79(5) to pass the interlocutory orders or would have worded accordingly and appropriately in the amended Section 56(2A). No ambiguity of any such sort has been created in the inserted Section 56(2A).

23. The power under Section 56(2A) can be exercised by the first respondent only in normal course of pending an application under Section 49 or appeal under Section 79 or any litigation before the Court. No doubt, Section 56(2A) is silent about the action to be taken by the first respondent in case of any interim order passed after entertaining the appeal under Section 79 or in any litigation pending before the Court by the competent authorities. That does not mean that the legislature thought it fit to nullify even the interlocutory orders passed in such proceedings by the appropriate and competent authorities. Therefore, in normal course, after entertaining the appeal under Section 79 or any litigation by a Court, if an interlocutory order has been passed by such authorities, it amounts to restraining the first respondent from exercising the power conferred under Section 56(2A) till such time the interim order is modified, reviewed or vacated. In the case on hand, as against the order of refusal to regularise the construction by the planning authority dated 11.11.2009, the petitioner has already filed an appeal before the Government on 17.11.2009, by invoking the appellate remedy available to him under Section 79 and the Government/2nd respondent also, by exercising the powers conferred under Section 79(5) to pass interim orders, has passed an order of status quo on 10.12.2009. Therefore, as seen from the records, it is within the knowledge of the first respondent about the pendency of appeal before the second respondent/Government and therefore, the first respondent should not have invoked the power under Section 56(2A). Therefore, we hold that when an interim order is passed in the appeal filed under Section 79, the first respondent/CMDA cannot invoke the power under Section 56(2A). If, as contended by the learned standing counsel for the first respondent, the CMDA is allowed to exercise such a power conferred on it under Section 56(2A), irrespective of the fact that already an interim order has been passed and is in operation, there is no meaning in the providing the legal remedies available under Section 79 of theconferring powers on the appellate authority to pass interim orders to safeguard the interest of the litigants pendente lite. But, in the absence of any interim order in the appeal under Section 79, the first respondent can invoke the power under Section 56(2A) of the Act, automatically, but not in the matters where the interim orders are passed and subsisting. If at all, the first respondent should have approached the Government for vacating the order of status quo instead of over-stretching its powers and overlooking the order of status quo passed by the appellate authority/the Government in toto. When the first respondent is a subordinate to the Government/second respondent, he should not have superseded the power of the Government.

24. A harmonious way of reading into the provisions of the is required and no provision of any Act or status can be read in isolation of the other provisions of the same Act or Statutes. In the case on hand, the first respondent has resorted to the coercive action of locking and sealing, ignoring the status quo order passed by the appellate authority, in spite of the fact that there is no violation of any condition thereof by the petitioner. The argument advanced on the part of the first respondent that they were not restrained from initiating enforcement action cannot be accepted in view the fact that there is no violation of status quo condition by the petitioner. Further, by such an argument, a friction has been sought to be created between Sections 79 and 56(2A) of theby the first respondent, which is nowhere in existence and if such an argument advanced on the part of the first respondent is accepted, it will amount to permitting to water down the judicial and quasi judicial orders passed by the appropriate legal for by the executive authorities. This legal issue is decided accordingly.

For all the foregoing reasons, the impugned notice issued by the first respondent dated 13.5.2010 is quashed and this writ petition stands allowed. Consequently, the first respondent is directed to break open the lock and seal of the premises of the petitioner immediately and put the petitioner in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same and await the result of the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner before the second respondent/Government under Section 79 of the. The petitioner and the first respondent are directed to strictly comply with the order of status quo passed by the second respondent/Government, dated 10.12.2009, pending appeal before the Government under Section 79 of the. No costs. Consequently, M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2010 are closed.

Petition allowed.