Rahul Chaturvedi, J. - Heard Shri Dharmendra Singhal, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Sunil Singh and Shri Shivendra Raj Singhal leanred counsel for the applicant as well as learned A.G.A. and also perused the record.

2. After hearing the parties at length, this Court deems it proper to adjudicate this application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. at the threshold/admission stage itself.

3. The applicant Kailash Singh, by means of present application is invoking the extraordinary powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. targeting the validity and veracity of the order dated 26.11.2019 whereby learned Additional Session Judge-II/Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Kanpur Dehat (Ramabai Nagar) has turned down the request of the accused-applicant to hold a de-novo trial of the Special Session Trial No.28 of 2017, arising out of Case Crime No.368 of 2016, u/s 302/34, 307/34, 504, 506 I.P.C. and Section 3(2)(V) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Police Station-Rura, District-Kanpur Dehat, along with newly arrayed accused Pratap Singh Katiyar but to the contrary the trial court has disconnected and disassociated the trial of the newly arrayed accused Pratap Singh Katiyar vide the impugned order. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the present Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C., has been moved by the accused-applicant Kailash Singh.

4. Learned Senior Counsel. while addressing the Court, has strenuously argued that the impugned order dated 26.11.2019 is against the soul and spirit of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore, it is liable to be quashed.

5. Facts of the case :- The applicant along with accused Ashutosh Singh @ Anshu is facing criminal prosecution in the court of the II-Additional Session Judge/Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Kanpur Dehat by means of Special Session Trial No.28 of 2017 (State vs. Ashutosh Pratap Singh and others). The genesis of the case ignites from lodging of the F.I.R. by one Indra Pal Chamar on 16.11.2016 for the incident said to have taken place on 16.11.2016 at 9.00 A.M. of which the F.I.R. was got registered at 11.10 A.M. as Case Crime No.368 of 2016 at Police Station Rura, District-Kanpur Dehat (Ramabai Nagar), u/s 302, 307, 504, 506, 34 I.P.C. and Section 3(2)(5) of SC/ST Act against Ashutosh Singh @ Anshu Singh, Kailash Singh and Pratap Singh Katiyar, with the allegations that when the informant Indra Pal Chamar along with his father Ram Shankar (50 years old), went to his agriculture field, the accused persons, namely, Ashutosh Singh @ Anshu, his father Kailash Singh (applicant) with Pratap Singh Katiyar appeared at the place of occurrence and tried to take away their tractor over the standing crop of the informant forcibly. On resistance by them, the accused applicant Ashutosh Singh @ Anshu fired from his gun causing instant death of Ram Shankar, father of the informant. Thereafter, he again fired upon the informant but due to his lady luck the informant could save his life. The assailants after causing death, ran away from the spot hurling filthy abuses rebuking their caste. This incident was witnessed by many of the co-villagers. The post-mortem report of the deceased reveals that he received two gun shot injuries on his person. After holding an extensive and threadbare investigation, the Police has submitted report u/s 173(2) Cr.P.C. against Ashutosh Singh @ Anshu and Kailash Singh dropping the name of Pratap Singh Katiyar from the charge sheet under Sections 302/34, 307/34, 504, 506 I.P.C. and Section 3(2)(V) of SC/ST Act and against Bhanu Pratap Singh and Bhupendra Pratap Singh an additional charge sheet was also submitted u/s 201 I.P.C. However, a Bench of this Court by entertaining the Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. No.15196 of 2017 by order dated 14.9.2017 has directed that no coercive action shall be taken against Bhanu Pratap Singh and Bhupendra Pratap Singh. The file of Ashutosh Pratap Singh @ Anshu and Kailash Singh was disassociated and on 22.9.2018 the charges were framed against these named accused persons in the aforementioned sections of Indian Penal Code.

6. During trial the testimony of Indra Pal, Munna and number of other prosecution witnesses were recorded. Thereafter, an Application No.17Kha was moved u/s 319 Cr.P.C. with the prayer to call upon Pratap Singh Katiyar (non-accused) to face the prosecution. Vide order dated 16.01.2019 the said application was allowed by the learned Trial Judge summoning Pratap Singh Katiyar under Sections 302, 307, 504, 506, 201, 34 I.P.C. and Section 3(2)(5) of SC/ST Act. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, newly arrayed accused Pratap Singh Katiyar preferred a Criminal Revision No.806 of 2019, which was allowed by this Court on 25.2.2019, quashing the order dated 16.01.2019 and remanding the matter to reconsider and revisit the entire issue and decide the same in the light of latest judgments of Honble Apex Court within a period of eight weeks. Pursuant to the order dated 25.02.2019, learned Session Judge again on 4.5.2019 passed a detailed reasoned order taking into account the guidelines laid down by Honble Apex Court in various judgments and summoned the non accused Pratap Singh Katiyar to face the trial. On the other hand, the co-accused Ashutosh Pratap Singh @ Anshu has preferred a Criminal Appeal No.3383 of 2017 challenging the order dated 9.5.2017, whereby the learned Additional Session Judge/Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Kanpur Dehat had rejected the Bail Application No.800 of 2017, arising out of Case Crime No.368 of 2016, under Sections 302, 307, 504, 506/34, 201 I.P.C. and Section 3(2)(5) of SC/ST Act, P.S.-Rura, District-Kanpur Dehat. The said appeal was dismissed by a bench of this Court by order dated 18.5.2018 with a direction to the court below to decide the trial within a period of nine months from the date of production of a certified copy of the order.

7. From the order impugned, it is being borne out that in Special Session Trial No.28 of 2017, in addition to all witnesses of fact, as many as nine witnesses were examined by the trial court and at that stage the application u/s 319 Cr.P.C. was moved. So practically speaking the trial has already reached to its pinnacle and after passing the order impugned, 26.11.2019 was the date fixed for recording the statement u/s 313 of Cr.P.C. At this juncture, it appears that it was prayed by the accused persons that they should be tried together with Pratap Singh Katiyar, the newly arrayed accused, which was turned down by the trial court and files of both were ordered to be segregated. Aggrieved by this order, the present application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. has been preferred.

8. To appreciate the controversy involved, it is imperative to critically analyze the provisions of Section -319 Cr.P.C. which reads thus :-

"319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence.

(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.

(2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid.

(3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed.

(4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub- section (1), then-

(a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re- heard;

(b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced."

9. For the purposes of present controversy the catch expression is "such person could be tried together with the accused" and in Section 319(4)(a) the proceedings in respect of "such person" shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses re-heard. Thus, on the plain reading of the Section 319 Cr.P.C., it is explicit and clear that this privilege of facing the trial afresh and witnesses be re-heard, is given to the newly arrayed accused. The accused persons who have already faced the trial and their trial is at the fag end, cannot take help of stalling the trial or in other words their trial can not be permitted to commence afresh. Therefore, disassociation of trial of newly impleaded accused Pratap Singh Katiyar from the rest of the accused persons, is perfectly just and valid and in consonance with the scheme and spirit of Section 319 Cr.P.C. In Section 319 Cr.P.C. "such person" is indicative of a person who is non-accused and has been summoned to face the prosecution in the midst of the trial in exercise of power u/s 319 Cr.P.C. In the instant case, the applicant Kailash Singh, who has already faced the trial and whose trial is about to reach to the logical conclusion, now is making application that he should be tried together with newly impleaded accused Pratap Singh Katiyar, which would amount to travesty of justice and against the provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. Moreover, when the Coordinate Bench of this Court has already given a direction to conclude the trial within nine months, this Bench should not pass any order which is tangent to or to nullify the aforementioned order of Coordinate Bench.

10. The second limb of argument advanced by learned senior counsel for the applicant is narrated in paragraph 14 of the petition that separating the trial would cause a serious prejudice to the applicant. Learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon certain paragraphs of Constitution Bench judgment of Honble Supreme Court given in the case of Hardeep Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 2 SCC(Cri) 86 , which are being quoted hereinbelow :

"105. Power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is a discretionary and an extra- ordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner.

106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court not necessarily tested on the anvil of Cross-Examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. In Section 319 Cr.P.C. the purpose of providing if it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence is clear from the words "for which such person could be tried together with the accused." The words used are not for which such person could be convicted. There is, therefore, no scope for the Court acting under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused."

11. In order to buttress his contentions, learned Senior counsel submitted that the above observations made by Honble Sureme Court in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra) are being regularly followed in the latest judgments of the Honble Apex Court in the case of Labhu Ji Amratji Thakor vs. State of Gujrat, (2019) AIR SC 734.

12. On a careful reading of above excerpts of Hardeep Singhs judgment (supra) would speak about the satisfaction required to be recorded while the Court should exercise this power sparingly and under the circumstances if they warrant. It is very this extraordinary power where there is a definite, strong and cogent evidence is available on record against the person (non-accused), then only such power could be exercised and not in a casual or cavalier way. The expression of Section 319 Cr.P.C. is self revealing. The purpose and the object of providing if "it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence is clear from the words "for which such person could be tried together. Thus the words are not which such person tried together.

13. Learned counsel for the applicant has shown yet another authority of Honble Apex Court in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (1996) AIR SC 283. This case relates to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and deals with the Section 20(A) of the. Paragraph-7 of the judgment reads thus :

"7. A reading of Section 20- A clearly indicates that during the course of the trial for any of the offence under the alleged to have been committed by any person, if the evidence adduced before the Court discloses that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then the Court has been empowered, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of s.319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, the Code) to treat as if the manufacturer, distributor or the dealer is being proceeded against under Section 20 of the Act, as originally instituted thereunder. The concept of vendor and vendee is known to civil law and passing of the title in the goods is alien to the prosecution for an offence under the. It cannot, therefore, be introduced in a trial for the offence under the. The Act advisedly made a person who sells adulterated article of food liable to be prosecuted for the offence of adulteration of the article of food. During the trial when it comes to the notice of the Magistrate, from the evidence adduced, that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of that article of food, which is the subject matter of adulteration, is also concerned with the offence, then the court has been empowered to proceed against such manufacturer, distributor or dealer as if prosecution has initially been instituted against him under Section 20 of the. In fact, for general offences,SEction 319 (1) of the Code empowers the court where during the course of enquiry or trial of an offence, if it appears from the evidence that any person not being accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, to proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. In view of the language of Section 20-A of the Act, whatever is contained in sub-section (3) of Section 319 of the Code, would not stand in the way of the Magistrate to proceed at a trial against any person, i.e., the original accused and against others mentioned in Section 20- A. In other words, joint trial for the same offence is permitted. The object appears to be that in a case where common evidence discloses that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with the offence for which the prosecution was launched against a person from whom the article of food was purchased, to avoid multiplicity of prosecution and also keeping in view the doctrine of autrefois acquit the Legislature introduced s.20A to have joint trial."

14. While laying the stress upon the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for the applicant submits and tried to draw a parallel that the present accused should also be tried with newly impleaded accused as in the above case the accused was required to be tried along with the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, if the court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence. Learned counsel further submits that according to the Honble Apex Court the object appears to be that in a case where a common evidence discloses that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with the offence for which the prosecution was launched against a person from whom the article of food was purchased, to avoid the multiplicity of the prosecution and also keeping in view the doctrine of autrefois acquit, the legislature introduced Section 20A to have joint trial.

This Court has given its conscious consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the applicant but afraid to follow the aforesaid ratio in the present case, as in this case Laxmi Narayan the accused resident of Joura was found selling Vanaspati Ghee and on analysis it was found to be adulterated and in consequence of same Laxmi Narayan was prosecuted u/s 60 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Section 20A of the aforesaid Act empowers like this :-

"20A. Power of court to implead manufacturer, etc.--Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)] or in section 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under section 20."

15. Thus, Section 20A of theclearly indicates that the concept of vendor and vendee is known in civil law and passing of the title in the goods is alien to the prosecution for an offence under the. It cannot, therefore, be introduced under a trial of the offence under the. The facts of the aforesaid case is entirely distinct and different from the set of facts of the present case and to mind of this Court, it would not be of any help to the counsel for the applicant.

16. Per contra learned A.G.A. while refuting the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the applicant has cited the judgment of Honble Apex Court, which touches the core issue of the present controversy, in the case of Shashi Kant Singh vs. Tarkeshwar Singh, (2002) 5 SCC 738 [LQ/SC/2002/546] , where the Honble Apex Court has lucidly explained the import of expression "could be tried together with the accused". The relevant paragraph 9 of the judgment is quoted herein below :

"9. The intention of the provision here is that where in the course of any enquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears to the court from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence, the court may proceed against him for the offence which he appears to have committed. At that stage, the court would consider that such a person could be tried together with the accused who is already before the Court facing the trial. The safeguard provided in respect of such person is that, the proceedings right from the beginning have mandatorily to be commenced afresh and the witnesses re-heard. In short, there has to be a de novo trial against him. The provision of de novo trial is mandatory. It vitally affects the rights of a person so brought before the Court. It would not be sufficient to only tender the witnesses for the cross-examination of such a person. They have to be examined afresh. Fresh examination in chief and not only their presentation for the purpose of the cross-examination of the newly added accused is the mandate of Section 319(4). The words could be tried together with the accused in Section 319(1), appear to be only directory. Could be cannot under these circumstances be held to be must be. The provision cannot be interpreted to mean that since the trial in respect of a person who was before the Court has concluded with the result that the newly added person cannot be tried together with the accused who was before the Court when order under Section 319(1) was passed, the order would become ineffective and inoperative, nullifying the opinion earlier formed by the Court on the basis of evidence before it that the newly added person appears to have committed the offence resulting in an order for his being brought before the Court."

17. From the above, it is clear that the mandate of law of fresh trial is mandatory whereas the mandate that a newly added accused could be tried together with the accused whose trial is at the fag end is directory. The words "could be tried together with the accused" in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. cannot be said to be capable of only one construction. If it was so, the approach to be adopted would be different since the intent of parliament is to be respected despite the consequences of interpretation. There is, however, a scope of two possible constructions. That being the position, a reasonable and a common sense approach deserves to be adopted and preferred rather than a construction that would lead to absurd results. Here in the instant case, accused persons Ashutosh Singh @ Ashu and Kailash Singh have already faced the trial and their trial is almost at the verge of culmination. Now accused-applicant Kailash Singh wants at this stage that a de novo trial may be ordered, keeping in view that Pratap Singh Katiyar, a non-accused, has been summoned in exercise of power u/s 319 Cr.P.C. This is not permissible under the law nor the provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. subscribe to this view.

18. Learned A.G.A. while refuting the submissions advanced on behalf of applicant has further relied upon another judgment of Honble Apex Court given in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Ganeshi Lal, (2008) AIR SC 690, wherein the Honble Apex Court has proceeded to observe :-

"11. Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judges decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See:State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors, (1968) AIR SC 647) and Union of India and Ors. vs. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 44 [LQ/SC/1996/1324] ). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem, (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides."

Thus, learned A.G.A. has submitted that the ratio laid down in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Ltd. (supra) is not applicable under the present scenario.

19. This Court has keenly perused the order impugned and found that by impugned order the file of newly added accused Pratap Singh Katiyar was ordered to be segregated. Merely separating the file of an accused for the reason that he failed to appear before the Court, is quite different from separating the case of an accused for other legal reasons. Former is a procedural matter while the latter is a legal one. In the instant case where a person is being summoned in exercise of power u/s 319 Cr.P.C., the accused persons the trial of whom, is at the fag end cannot claim parallelity with newly impleaded accused. However, where, to avoid the delay in trial, caused by continued long absence of any one or more accused persons, the file of absconded persons is separated as a matter of procedural convenience. Separating the file is not equivalent to separating the session trial. It is like two branches coming out of a same stem and an analogy can be drawn by following example. Where a person never appears before the court or has been added at the later stage, his file is separated, and therefore, this Court at the loss to appreciate the unfounded suspicion that the accused-applicant would suffer a serious prejudice, if file of the newly added accused Pratap Singh Katiyar is separated.

20. After thoroughly marshalling the law and the facts of the present case, I do not find any illegality or impropriety in the order impugned and as such present application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. being lacks merit is hereby dismissed.

21. It is given to understand that the trial of accused persons, namely, Ashutosh Singh @ Ashu and Kailash Singh is at the pinnacle and it is expected from the learned Trial Judge to conclude the same within a period of two months (maximum) from the date of production of certified copy of this order.