1. Leave granted.

2. The challenge herein is to the Order of the High Court by which the Order of the learned trial Court dismissing the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ' the') filed by the respondents has been reversed by the High Court in an appeal under Section 37 of the. Consequently, the Award passed in favour of the appellants by the learned Arbitrator has been set aside.

3. The contours of the power of the Court under Section 34 of theare too well established to require any reiteration. Even a bare reading of Section 34 of theindicates the highly constricted power of the Civil Court to interfere with an arbitral award. The reason for this is obvious. When parties have chosen to avail an alternate mechanism for dispute resolution, they must be left to reconcile themselves to the wisdom of the decision of the arbitrator and the role of the Court should be restricted to the bare minimum. Interference will be justified only in cases of commission of misconduct by the arbitrator which can find manifestation in different forms including exercise of legal perversity by the arbitrator.

4. In the present case, we have considered the award of the arbitrator and the order of the learned trial court refusing to set aside the same in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the.

5. The jurisdiction of the High Court in appeal under Section 37 of thewould naturally be limited to what has been conferred under Section 34 of theinsofar as an appeal against an order setting aside or refusing to set aside the award is concerned.

6. A reading of the materials placed on record, including the award and the order passed under Section 34 of the Act, would disclose that the view taken by the arbitrator is on a consideration of the evidence and materials placed before him and the conclusion that the respondents are liable to compensate the appellants is a possible and reasonable conclusion. This is precisely what has been held by the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the. If that is so, we do not see how in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, the High Court could have reappreciated the evidence to come to a contrary finding. The High Court was not sitting in appeal over the award of the arbitrator but it is the order passed under Section 34 of the Act, which was the subject matter of challenge before the High Court. The High Court seems to have missed the subtle difference between the two jurisdictions and thereby committed an error which would require to be corrected in this appeal.

7. We, accordingly, set aside the order of the High Court and affirm the award and the order passed by the learned trial court under Section 34 of the. The appeal, consequently, is allowed.

8. We have been informed at the Bar that while this appeal had remained pending, in pursuance to the order of the High Court, the amount covered by the award has been realised from the appellants by the respondents. If that be so, the appellants would be entitled to restitution of the amount which would be paid to them forthwith.