(Prayer: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records relating to the impugned order passed by the third respondent in Na.Ka.No.E1/2997/2008, dated 08.12.2011 and quash the same as illegal and consequently direct the respondents 2 and 3 to provide the petitioner an employment in any post in consonance with the petitioners educational qualification by considering the petitioners representation, dated 13.03.2012.)

1. Challenge in this Writ Petition is to the order, dated 08.12.2011, rejecting the request of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground and for a direction to the respondents 2 and 3 to give employment on compassionate ground, commensurate to his educational qualification.

2. The case of the petitioner is that his father, by name, V.Kannadichamy, while working as Office Assistant died, on 18.11.1992 in harness, leaving behind the petitioner, his mother, and sister. At the time of death of his father, the petitioner was a minor, studying sixth standard. Since his mother did not possess the required educational qualification, she could not apply for appointment on compassionate ground. After attaining majority and possessing required qualification, the petitioner submitted a representation, dated 21.03.2003, before the third respondent seeking appointment on compassionate ground. The third respondent, by the impugned order, dated 08.12.2011, rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the application was not made within a period of three years from the date of death of the employee. Challenging the same, the present Writ Petition has been filed.

3. The Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the family of the petitioner has been living in indigent circumstances. The mother of the petitioner being illiterate was ineligible to apply and the petitioner, after attaining majority, had submitted the application within three years. The learned counsel further contended that the same was not considered in view of the ban on appointment on compassionate grounds. The learned counsel further contended that as on the date of submission of the application, the letter, dated 10.10.1995, was in force, and therefore, the rejection of the application based on another subsequent letter is bad in law, and therefore, contended that the impugned proceedings has to be set aside with appropriate directions.

4. The learned counsel, in support of his contention, makes reliance upon the following Judgments:-

i. T.Meer Ismail ali Vs. The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, reported in 2004 (3) CTC 120 [LQ/MadHC/2004/635] ;

ii. B.Arun Kumar Vs. Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu, reported in 2011 (8) MLJ 457;

iii. C.Dilli Babu Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 2011 (7) MLJ 420 [LQ/MadHC/2011/4099] ;

iv. N.Komalavathi Vs. Director of Elementary Education, reported in 2013 (70 MLJ 653;

v. S.Preethi Vs.The Commissioner, Land Survey and Land Revenue Department, [W.P.No.11601 of 2012, dated 22.11.2013]

5. Per contra, relying on an order of this Court, in A.Vetrikumar Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu, [W.P.No.21279 of 2013, dated 02.08.2013, the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents submits that as the petitioner failed to submit application within three years from the date of death of his father, he is not entitled for the relief sought for, and therefore sought the dismissal of the Writ Petition.

6. I have considered the above submissions and perused the records carefully.

7. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has submitted the application within three years from the date of attaining majority. The application was also considered only after the ban on compassionate appointment was lifted. On the date of application, the earlier letter relaxing the three year period for employees who passed away before 26.06.1995 was in force. But, for the ban, the respondents would have considered the application and appointed the petitioner on compassionate grounds even before the Government Letter, dated 08.10.2007. Therefore, the petitioner, who submitted the application within 3 years from the date of attaining majority, cannot be faulted with. This Court is of the view that the limitation for a minor child can be applied from the date of his/her majority, for the simple reason that the object of providing employment to the family of the employee, who died in harness, must be treated with compassion and mercy.

8. In the Judgment in A.Vetrikumar Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu, [W.P.No.21279 of 2013, dated 02.08.2013, relied on by the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents, this Court declined to interfere with the order on the strength of the letter, dated 08.10.2007. Upon perusal of the order, it is clear that the application was made after 13 years and the representation was made after 10 years from thereon. It can only be inferred that the petitioner therein had not submitted the application within 3 years from the date of attaining majority and the petitioner had not even shown least interest in following the matters. The facts of this case are completely different and this Court is of the opinion that the said order cannot be made applicable to the preset facts of the case.

9. In the Judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in T.Meer Ismail ali Vs. The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, reported in 2004 (3) CTC 120 [LQ/MadHC/2004/635] , this Court has held as follows:

6. "I am, therefore, of the view that the petitioners case deserve consideration inasmuch as he had diligently made a claim once in the year 1997 and thereafter, immediately after attaining the age of 18, in the year 2000 and in such circumstances, rejection of his application on the ground that it was not made within three years was not justified."

10. In the decision in N.Komalavathi Vs. Director of Elementary Education, reported in 2013 (7 MLJ 653 [LQ/MadHC/2013/4271] , this Court, after considering Government letter, dated 08.10.2007, has held as follows:

"7. As stated supra, the right to apply for compassionate appointment accrued to the petitioner only after finalization of the civil suit, on 27.08.1997. The date of death of petitioners father being prior to 26.06.1995 as per Government Order issued in G.O.Ms.No.120, dated 26.06.1995, as clarified by letter of the Labour and Employment Department No.39924/Q1/95-1, dated 11.10.1995, three year period cannot be applied to the persons died prior to 26.06.1995. Without considering the said clarification issued by the Government and other relevant facts in this case, the impugned order was passed by the second respondent.

8. Similar issue was considered by the Division Bench of Madurai Bench in W.A.[MD].No.14 of 2012, dated 02.08.2013, wherein a person who was missing from 1987 was declared civil dead by order of the Civil Court, dated 17.12.1998, which was confirmed in A.S.No.209 of 1999, on 30.02.2001. The application submitted, on 07.05.2001, in that case was directed to be considered without reference to the objection regarding submission of application beyond three years from the date of missing and directed the department to appoint the said appellant on compassionate ground within two months as the right to apply to the appellant crystalized only on 30.02.2001.

9. Here, in this case, petitioners sister in no more and her mothe is also a cancer patient and she is taking treatment. The Tahsildar, Oothukottai, in his certificate, dated 23.08.2013, certified that no one in her family is employed and the annual income of the family through family pension is only Rs.67,080/-.

10. Taking into consideration all the above facts, particularly, on the basis of the certificate issued by the Revenue Official, dated 23.08.2013, I am of the view that the claim of the petitioner is bound to be considered by the second respondent without reference to the objection raised in the impugned order, i.e., not submitting application within three years from the date of death of petitioners father."

11. In the recent order in S.Preethi Vs.The Commissioner, Land Survey and Land Revenue Department, [W.P.No.11601 of 2012, dated 22.11.2013], this court has held as follows:

"From the above referred decisions passed by this Court in series of cases on the same ground, it is evident that the similar grounds raised by the respondents that the petitioner has not filed application seeking compassionate appointment within three years from the date of death of her father and that she has not completed 18 years of age within three years are not valid grounds to deny appointment on compassionate ground as no one in her family is employed and the family of the petitioner is in indigent circumstance even today as certified by the Revenue Officials. Petitioners mother and petitioner are prosecuting the matter before the respondents right from July 1992."

12. A Division Bench of this Court in the Judgment in Superintending Engineer, Madurai Electricity Distribution Circle v. V.Jaya reported in (2007) 6 MLJ 1011has held as follows:

"7. However, in a case of request for appointment on compassionate ground, however, the Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot ignore the very purpose of providing employment on compassionate ground to the dependant of an employee/government servant dying in harness in preference to anybody else as it is done so in order to mitigate the hardship to the family of the employee on account of his unexpected death while still in service. The concept of compassionate employment is intended to alleviate the distress of the family and it is for such purpose appointments are permissible and provided even in the rules and regulations and any rigid approach or too technical objections may defeat the very object of the scheme. It is for that purpose while considering the request for compassionate appointment, the authorities are expected to act as a Good Samaritan overlooking the cobwebs of technicalities.

8. What all the Court has to look into is whether the case of the writ petitioner comes under an exception for providing appointment on compassionate ground to mitigate the hardships due to the death of the bread-winner of the family would be smashed.

11. With this background, we find that the respondent had failed to adopt Good Samaritan approach ignoring the fact that she was constantly making a request for appointment to the suitable post, even if it is the lowest in the cadre, as early as from 15.11.2000 i.e. within 13 months from the date of death of her husband, which has not been dealt with in proper perspective as observed above.

13. In yet another Judgment, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in J.Jeba Mary v. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board reported in 2011 (3) LLN 405 (Mad.), this Court has held as follows:

"12. (a) Similar issue as to whether an application seeking compassionate appointment can be rejected on the ground that the application was not submitted within three years from the date of death of the deceased employee and whether completion of 18 years within three years, is a mandatory requirement when earlier application submitted by other claimant is kept pending, was considered by this Court in the decision reported in T.Meer Ismail Ali v. The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 2004 (3) CTC 120 [F.M.Ibrahim Kalifullah,J (as he then was)]. In the said case the deceased Board employee died on 13.04.1993 and the application submitted by one of his daughter on 5.8.1997 was rejected on the ground that she had not completed 18 years of age and after completing 18 years of age when an application was made on 4.7.2000 which was rejected on the ground that the application was not made within three years from the date when the Board Proceedings dated 13.10.1995 was issued. This Court considering the technical plea raised by the respondent Board set aside the said order and remitted the matter to pass fresh orders without reference to the objections already raised by the Board. The said order of the learned single Judge was challenged by the TNEB in W.A.No.4008 of 2004 before the First Bench of this Court (consisting of the Honble Mr.Justice Markandey Katju,C.J. (as he then was) and N.V.Balasubramanian,J.) dismissed the writ appeal on 01.12.2004. The respondents herein filed SLP No.6387 of 2005 against the said order which was also dismissed on 01.04.2005 by the Honourable Supreme Court and consequently the said writ petitioner was given compassionate appointment.

(b) Another Writ Petition in W.P.No.41459 of 2005 was considered by me on the same set of facts. The said writ petition was allowed following the earlier order of the Division Bench of this Court made in W.A.No.4008 of 2004 dated 01.12.2004 and the said decision is reported in Selvi R.Anbarasi v. Chief Engineer (Personnel), TNEB, Chennai,2006 (2) MLJ 200. [LQ/MadHC/2006/862] Thesaid order was challenged by the TNEB before the First Bench in W.A.No.988 of 2006. However, the said petitioner was given appointment on compassionate ground by implementing the order and therefore the writ appeal was dismissed as infructuous on 15.09.2006 by recording the statement made by the Standing Counsel for the TNEB.

(c) In W.P.No.21512 of 2003 one Indiraniammal challenged the rejection of compassionate appointment on similar ground. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition by order dated 04.08.2003 against which the petitioner therein filed W.A.No.3050 of 2003 and the said writ appeal was allowed by the Division Bench (consisting of the Honble Mr.Justice P.Sathasivam (as he then was) & S.K.Krishnan,J) by order dated 08.03.2005 following the earlier judgments as well as the Supreme Court Judgment reported in Balbir Kaur v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.,(2000) 6 SCC 493 [LQ/SC/2000/900] . Against the said decision Civil Appeal No.2039 of 2006 was filed by the respondent Board herein which was dismissed by the Honourable Supreme Court on 30.03.2010.

(d) Dismissal of another W.P.No.775 of 2004 by order dated 29.01.2005 on the ground of delay was considered by the Division Bench (F.M.Ibrahim Kalifullah,J. (as he then was) & P.Murugesan,J) in W.A(MD).No.29 of 2006 and by order dated 27.6.2006 the Division Bench allowed the writ appeal and directed to give compassionate appointment to the younger son of the deceased Board employee, who died on 15.11.1996. The said order of the Division Bench was also challenged by the Board in SLP(C)No.15534 of 2007 which was also dismissed by the Apex Court on 08.04.2009.

(e) Three writ petitions were disposed of by me i.e., W.P.Nos.19914 of 2004, 32409 of 2004 and 10577 of 2005 by common order dated 24.7.2006 wherein similar issue was considered. In respect of the above three writ petitions, which were allowed, writ appeal was filed against one writ petition in W.A.No.1206 of 2006 while implementing the order in respect of other two cases. The said writ appeal was allowed by the Division Bench on 29.09.2006. The respondent in the writ appeal viz., J.Karthick filed review application which was also rejected by the Division Bench on 25.08.2008. Against the dismissal of the writ appeal as well as rejection of review application, the said J.Karthick filed SLP(C) No.2004-2005/2009 and on 23.02.2009 the SLPs were tagged along with Civil Appeal No.2039 of 2006 viz., Indiraniammal case. Subsequently the said SLP was numbered as Civil Case Nos.5068-5069 of 2009 which was allowed on 30.03.2010 and the said order reads as follows:

"Leave granted.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

These Appeals have been filed against the impugned judgment of the High Court of Madras dated 29th September, 2006 and subsequent order dated 25.8.2008 passed in the review application.

The Division Bench of the High Court has reversed the judgment of the learned single Judge only on the ground of delay who directed compassionate appointment to the appellant. The appellant was a minor at the time of the death of his father and since the mother of the appellant applied within time, we are of the opinion that the appellant after becoming major should have been granted compassionate appointment.

Accordingly, we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and restore the judgment of the learned single Judge. No costs."

(Emphasis Supplied)

From the perusal of the above order it is evident that the order passed by the Division Bench in writ appeal and in the review petition were set aside and the order of the single Judge dated 29.09.2006 was restored.

(f) In W.P.No.18575 of 2006 I had an occasion to consider similar issue and allowed the writ petition on 20.06.2006 by following earlier orders. The said order was also challenged by the respondent in W.A.No.42 of 2007 and the Division Bench (D.Murugesan,J & K.Venkataraman,J) dismissed the writ appeal on 02.07.2009. The Board filed SLP(C)No.8305 of 2010 which was also dismissed by the Honourable Supreme Court on 06.07.2010. The said candidate viz., P.Venkatesan was given compassionate appointment by order dated 18.8.2010.

(g) Again similar matter was considered by me in W.P.No.29059 of 2003 and relief granted by order dated 7.7.2006, against which also the Board filed W.A.No.1652 of 2006. The said writ appeal was dismissed by Division Bench (D.Murugesan,J. & S.Nagamuthu,J.) on 30.3.2009.

(h) W.P(MD).No.1335 of 2006 was disposed of by me on 10.8.2006. The said order was also confirmed by the Division Bench (consisting of the Honble Mr.Justice P.D.Dinakaran (as he then was) & P.R.Shivakumar,J.) in W.A.No.309 of 2007 on 8.8.2007 and the same is reported in Superintending Engineer, Madurai Electricity Distribution Circle v. V.Jaya, (2007) 6 MLJ 1011, and the said candidate viz., V.Jaya was given appointment order.

(i) Similar matter was again considered by me in W.P.No.4050 of 2006 and the said writ petition was allowed by order dated 29.6.2010 following the orders of the Division Bench and Supreme Court and the said judgment is reported in M.Uma v. Chief Engineer (Personnel), TNEB, Chennai, (2010) 7 MLJ 644. No appeal is filed against the said order.

13. From the above referred decisions passed by this Court in series of cases on the same ground, it is evident that the similar grounds raised by the respondents that the petitioner has not filed application seeking compassionate appointment within three years from the date of death of her father and that she has not completed 18 years of age within three years are not valid grounds to deny appointment on compassionate ground as no one in her family is employed and the family of the petitioner is in indigent circumstance even today as certified by the Revenue Officials. Petitioners mother and petitioner are prosecuting the matter before the respondents right from July, 1992.

14. The learned counsel for the petitioner also cited a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Maharaj Krishnan Bhatt v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2008) 9 SCC 24 [LQ/SC/2008/1575] , for the proposition that once a judgment had attained finality on a particular/similar issue, it could not be termed as wrong and its benefit ought to be extended to other similarly placed persons. Citing the said judgment the learned counsel contended that the earlier orders passed by this Court granting relief to similarly placed persons confirmed upto the Supreme Court and the said orders having been implemented by the Board, the petitioner cannot be discriminated in the matter of giving compassionate appointment as she is also similarly placed. In the said decision in paragraphs 19, 20 and 23 the Supreme Court held thus:

"19. ..... once a similar case of Abdul Rashid Rather came up for consideration before a Single Judge and his writ petition was allowed, a direction was issued to the authorities to appoint him as PSI by granting consequential benefits, the learned Single Judge could not be said to have committed any error of law in following the said decision, in allowing the writ petition filed by the present appellant-writ petitioners and in issuing similar directions to the State authorities. This was particularly true because the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge was confirmed by the Division Bench and even by this Court inasmuch as special leave petition was also dismissed.

20. In our considered opinion, in the light of the facts and circumstances, the Government ought to have accepted and respected the decision of the learned single Judge without filing intra-Court appeal. No distinguishing feature had been brought to the notice of the Division Bench, nor the Division Bench set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge holding or observing that though Abdul Rashid Rather was granted the benefit and the learned Single Judge ordered extension of those benefits to the writ petitioners, they were not entitled because the case of Abdul Rashid Rather was different. Even before us, nothing special or extraordinary fact or circumstance was shown to distinguish the case of Abdul Rashid Rather and of the present appellants. In our opinion, therefore, the learned single Judge was wholly justified in allowing the writ petition and the Division Bench ought not to have interfered with the said decision.

21. ..................

22. ..................

23. In fairness and in view of the fact that the decision in Abdul Rashid Rather had attained finality, the State authorities ought to have gracefully accepted the decision by granting similar benefits to the present writ petitioners. It, however, challenged the order passed by the single Judge. The Division Bench of the High Court ought to have dismissed the letters patent appeal by affirming the order of the single Judge. The letters patent appeal, however, was allowed by the Division Bench and the judgment and order of the learned single Judge was set aside. In our considered view, the order passed by the learned single Judge was legal, proper and in furtherance of justice, equity and fairness in action. The said order, therefore, deserves to be restored."

The said Judgment of the Supreme Court was followed by the Division Bench of this Court (consisting of the Honble Mr.Justice S.J.Mukhopadhaya & V.Dhanapalan,J.) in W.A.(MD)Nos.64 & 111 to 126 of 2007, Judgment dated 14.11.2008. In paragraphs 28 and 29 the Division Bench held thus:

"28. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Maharaj Krishnan Bhatt v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2008) 9 SCC 24 [LQ/SC/2008/1575] ,, the issue regarding the extension of benefit to similarly situated persons was dealt with and thoughthe proposition of law was accepted that wrong decision in one case could not be extended to others, on facts, it was held that once a judgment had attained finality, it could not be termed as wrong and its benefit should be extended to other similarly situated persons.

29. The above decision of the Apex Court is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, as in this case, Mamundiraj and others, who were similarly placed like that of the workmen, were given permanent status by the management, but it was not done in the case of the workmen herein, thereby violating the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India."

15. The issue i.e., to consider similarly placed persons equally if the issue is identical was considered by me in the decision reported in N.S.Balasubramanian v. Food Corporation of India, New Delhi, 2006 WLR 327 : (2006) 2 MLJ 572. [LQ/MadHC/2006/1088] Paragraphs 16 and 17 reads as follows:

16.(a) The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner cited the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in K.C.Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 3588 [LQ/SC/1997/1033] , wherein in para 6 it is held as under:

"6. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that this was a fit case in which the Tribunal should have condoned the delay in the filing of the application and the appellants should have been given relief in the same terms as was granted by the Full Bench of the Tribunal. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is set aside, the delay in filing of O.A.No.774 of 1994 is condoned and the said application is allowed. The appellant would be entitled to the same relief in the matter of pension as has been granted by the Full Bench of the Tribunal in its judgment dated December 16, 1993 in O.A.Nos.395-403 of 1993 and connected matters. No order as to costs."

(b) In another decision cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner reported in State of Karnataka and others v. N.Parameshwarappa and others, (2003) 12 SCC 192 [LQ/SC/2002/1061] in paragraphs 8 and 9 the Supreme Court held as under:

"8. ...we do not find any reasonable justification to confine the relief to only such of the teachers who approached the Court and having regard to the fact that relief related to the revision of scales of pay, every one of that class of teachers who approached would be entitled to the benefit, notwithstanding that they have not approached the Court. We are in equal agreement with the Division Bench in denying the payment of interest at compounded rates which, in our view, cannot be justified at all on the facts and circumstances of the case wherein a serious and genuine doubt existed about the applicability of the government order dated 30.3.1990, as raised in the proceedings.

9. For all the reasons stated above, the appeals filed both by the State as well as by the private respondent teachers fail and shall stand dismissed. Our declaration to extend the benefits of the judgments to others who have not approached the Court, but similarly placed is to do complete and substantial justice. No costs."

(c) In yet another decision reported in Govind Ram Purohit and another v. Jagjiwan Chandra and others, 1999 SCC (L&S) 788, in para 3 the Honourable Supreme Court held thus,

"3. It was lastly contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that whereas the petition had been filed by only Respondent 1, the High Court while finally concluding the matter has given a direction to promote all those who were senior to the appellants even though they were not parties to the petition. Once the High Court had placed a particular interpretation on the Rules, the benefit of that interpretation had to go to all those who qualified under the seniority-cum-merit rule. There was no point in waiting for each and every person to file a petition. Therefore, we do not see any reason why we should entertain such a technical plea when the High Court has done substantial justice to all concerned."

From the analysis of the judgments cited above, it is beyond doubt and clear that once the point is decided in favour of a group of persons, there is no further point in waiting for each and every person to file petition and pray for the same relief. As held by the Honourable Supreme Court, the benefit of the judgment is equally applicable to similarly placed persons to do complete and substantial justice.

17. The Law Department as well as the Finance Department of the respondents/Corporation considered the similarity of the issue involved and recommended to the respondents to pay the recovered amount to the petitioners as well. Hence the denial of the said benefit to the petitioners is unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The decisions cited by the learned Additional Advocate General reported in State of Karnataka v. G.Halappa, AIR 1996 SC 2890 [LQ/SC/1995/1345] and State of Karnataka v. G.Halappa, AIR 2002 SC 2427 [LQ/SC/2002/555] , have no application to the facts of this case because of the submission that Circular No.13 dated 9.7.1997 was wrongly applied by the respondents while stepping up of the pay. The said contention was raised before the Kerala High Court and before the Honourable Supreme Court and the same was not accepted. Hence it is not open to the respondents to raise the said plea in this writ petition as they were parties to the proceedings before the Kerala High Court."

The said decision is confirmed in W.A.No.956 of 2006 by the Division Bench by Judgment dated 30.10.2006. SLP(C)No.677 of 2007 filed against the same was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on 23.4.2007.

16. Having regard to the abovesaid facts as well as the undisputed facts regarding the claim of the petitioners mother made in July, 1992 i.e., within one year from the date of death of petitioners father and no final order having been passed rejecting the claim of the petitioners brother as per the petitioners mothers request, respondents are not justified in passing the impugned order.

17. Applying the above referred judgments to the facts of this case the impugned order is set aside with direction to the respondents to consider the claim of the petitioner treating the application submitted by the petitioner on 11.4.2005 as a continuation of application submitted by the petitioners mother on 31.7.1992 in the light of the income certificate issued by the Tahsildar, Vilavancodu, dated 15.3.2005 and pass fresh orders, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order, without reference to the objections raised in the impugned order."

14. In yet another decision, a Division Bench of this Court in P.Sathiaraman v. Secretary to Government reported in (2013) 8 MLJ 190 [LQ/MadHC/2013/3486] , after analyzing various Apex Court Judgments, has held as follows:

"7. We have carefully considered the rival submissions of either counsel and perused the materials available on record and the impugned order of the learned Single Judge.

8. In T.Meer Ismail Ali v.The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai, 2004 (3) CTC 120 [LQ/MadHC/2004/635] : LNIND 2004 MAD 57 [LQ/MadHC/2003/1158] : (2004) 4 MLJ 238 [LQ/MadHC/2004/635] , this Court held as under:-

"I am, therefore, of the view that the petitioners case deserve consideration inasmuch as he had diligently made a claim once in the year 1997 and thereafter, immediately after attaining the age of 18, in the year 2000 and in such circumstances, rejection of his application on the ground that it was not made within three years was not justified."

9. The decision of this Court in MEER ISMAIL ALI (cited supra) was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.48 of 2004 dated 01.12.2004. Subsequently, the SLP filed against it was also dismissed by the Honble Apex Court vide its judgment in C.A.No.6387 of 2004, dated 04.04.2005.

10. (a) Another Division Bench of this Court in Selvi R.Anbarasi v. Chief Engineer (Personnel), T.N.E.B., Chennai, (2006) 2 MLJ 200 [LQ/MadHC/2006/862] , held as follows:-

"The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a similar issue, rejecting the compassionate ground appointment on the ground that the application was submitted beyond three years and the same was rejected earlier on the ground that the petitioner therein has not completed 18 years of age, was considered by this Court in W.P.No.1584 of 2011 and this Court held that the applications having been made within a period of three yeas and the same having not been considered on the ground that the petitioner therein was not 18 years of age at that time, the subsequent application cannot be rejected on the ground that the application was submitted within three years. The learned Judge directed the respondents not to treat the second application as an application for compassionate appointment, but it is to be treated as continuation of the application originally submitted. The said judgment is reported in T.Meer Ismail Ali Vs. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board through its Chairman, and others, (2004) 3 C.T.C. 120. This Court, ultimately, directed the respondents to give compassionate appointment to the petitioner therein."

(b) In W.P.No.21512 of 2003 one Indiraniammal challenged the rejection of compassionate appointment on similar ground. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition by order dated 4.8.2003 against which the petitioner therein filed W.A.No.3050 of 2003 and the said writ appeal was allowed by the Division Bench (consisting of the Honble Mr.Justice P.Sathasivam (as he then was) & S.K.Krishnan,J) by order dated 8.3.2005 following the earlier judgments as well as the Supreme Court Judgment reported in Balbir Kaur v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 1596 [LQ/SC/2000/900] : (2000) 6 SCC 493 [LQ/SC/2000/900] : LNIND 2000 SC 828 [LQ/SC/2000/236] : 2000-II-LLJ-1. Against the said decision Civil Appeal No.2039 of 2006 was filed by the respondent Board herein which was dismissed by the Honourable Supreme Court on 30.03.2010.

(c) Dismissal of another W.P.No.775 of 2004 by order dated 29.01.2005 on the ground of delay was considered by the Division Bench (F.M.Ibrahim Kalifullah,J. (as he then was) & P.Murugesan,J) in W.A(MD).No.29 of 2006 and by order dated 27.6.2006 the Division Bench allowed the writ appeal and directed to give compassionate appointment to the younger son of the deceased Board employee, who died on 15.11.1996. The said order of the Division Bench was also challenged by the Board in SLP(C)No.15534 of 2007 which was also dismissed by the Apex Court on 8.4.2009.

(d) Three writ petitions were disposed of by one of us (NPVJ) i.e., W.P.Nos.19914 of 2004, 32409 of 2004 and 10577 of 2005 by common order dated 24.7.2006 wherein similar issue was considered. In respect of the above three writ petitions, which were allowed, writ appeal was filed against one writ petition in W.A.No.1206 of 2006 while implementing the order in respect of other two cases. The said writ appeal was allowed by the Division Bench on 29.9.2006. The respondent in the writ appeal viz., J.Karthick filed review application which was also rejected by the Division Bench on 25.8.2008. Against the dismissal of the writ appeal as well as rejection of review application, the said J.Karthick filed SLP(C) No.2004-2005/2009 and on 23.2.2009 the SLPs were tagged along with Civil Appeal No.2039 of 2006 viz., Indiraniammal case. Subsequently the said SLP was numbered as Civil Case Nos.5068-5069 of 2009 which was allowed on 30.3.2010 and the said order reads as follows: "Leave granted.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

These Appeals have been filed against the impugned judgment of the High Court of Madras dated 29th September, 2006 and subsequent order dated 25.8.2008 passed in the review application.

The Division Bench of the High Court has reversed the judgment of the learned single Judge only on the ground of delay who directed compassionate appointment to the appellant. The appellant was a minor at the time of the death of his father and since the mother of the appellant applied within time, we are of the opinion that the appellant after becoming major should have been granted compassionate appointment.

Accordingly, we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and restore the judgment of the learned single Judge. No costs."

(Emphasis Supplied)

From the perusal of the above order it is evident that the order passed by the Division Bench in writ appeal and in the review petition were set aside and the order of the single Judge dated 29.9.2006 was restored.

(e) In W.P.No.18575 of 2006 one of us (NPVJ) had an occasion to consider similar issue and allowed the writ petition on 20.6.2006 by following earlier orders. The said order was also challenged by the respondent in W.A.No.42 of 2007 and the Division Bench (D.Murugesan,J & K.Venkataraman,J) dismissed the writ appeal on 2.7.2009. The Board filed SLP(C)No.8305 of 2010 which was also dismissed by the Honourable Supreme Court on 6.7.2010. The said candidate viz., P.Venkatesan was given compassionate appointment by order dated 18.8.2010.

(f) Again similar matter was considered by one of us (NPVJ) in W.P.No.29059 of 2003 and relief granted by order dated 7.7.2006, against which also the Board filed W.A.No.1652 of 2006. The said writ appeal was dismissed by Division Bench (D.Murugesan,J. & S.Nagamuthu,J.) on 30.3.2009."

11. In E.RAMASAMYs case (supra), as argued by the learned counsel for the respondents, the Division Bench negatived the request of the writ petitioner, who was a minor when his father died in harness and who subsequently, applied for appointment on compassionate ground, however, within 3 years of his attaining majority. It is pertinent to note that this decision has been overturned by the Honble Apex Court. This has been noted in Mohanambal v. Director, Land and Survey Department, LNIND 2010 MAD 4946 : (2011) 2 MLJ 47. [LQ/MadHC/2010/6729] (Also see Syed Khadim Hussain v. State of Bihar, (2006) 9 SCC 195).

12. By relying upon various decisions of Division Bench and the Honble Supreme Court, the very same issue has been dealt with elaborately by one of us (N.Paul Vasanthakumar, J.) in the following cases :

1. Mohanambal v. Director, Land and Survey Department (supra).

2. J.Jeba Mary v. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, (supra)

3. G.Saravanakumar v. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai, 2011 (2) CWC 83 : LNIND 2011 MAD 1961.

4. R.Prasath v. The Secretary, Labour And Employment Dept., Chennai, W.P.No.3078 of 2006, dated 17.06.2010.

5. M.Uma v. The Chief Engineer (Personnel) Chennai, W.P(MD)No.4050 of 2006, dated 29.06.2010.

After analyzing the above said case laws, it was held that within 3 years of death of her husband, when the widow applied for appointment on compassionate ground, and due to bar of age etc., when she could not be appointed and the request for appointment has been followed by her son/daughter, who have then not attained majority and subsequently, applied within three years of their attaining majority, the request could be considered as continuation of their mothers application and the application given by him/her during the minority also could be considered as continuation of such earlier application and it cannot be denied on the ground that the application has been presented beyond 3 years of death of the father. It is not the case of the respondents that the family of the appellant is not in indigent status as on today.

13. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the learned Single Judge made in W.P.(MD)No.13980 of 2009 dated 13.09.2010 is liable to set aside.

14. Accordingly, this writ appeal is allowed and the order of learned Single Judge dated 13.09.2010 made in W.P.(MD)No.13980 of 2009 is set aside. The appellant herein is directed to produce a Certificate from the competent authority to the effect that his family is in indigent circumstances as on today, within four weeks and submit the same before the third respondent herein along with a copy of this Judgment. On receipt of the same, based on the representation of the appellant dated 22.12.2009, the respondents shall appoint him in any suitable post within two weeks therefrom. No costs."

15. The above Judgments are squarely applicable to the present case. Admittedly in the present case, the application seeking appointment for the petitioner was submitted within 3 years after attaining majority. Nothing is brought before this Court to show that the family is not in indigent circumstances and this court is also of the view that when a person cannot be employed in government services before the completion of 18 years, he could not make an application seeking appointment during his period of minority. Therefore as stated above, the period of three years for a minor son/daughter can commence only after he/she attains majority. Therefore, for all the reasons stated above, the application made by the petitioner cannot be treated as time barred. In the result, the impugned proceedings of the respondent dated 08.12.2011 is set aside. The petitioner is directed to produce a certificate from the competent authority to the effect that his family is in indigent circumstance as on today, within four weeks and submit the same before respondents 2 and 3 and on receipt of the same, the second respondent shall pass appropriate orders appointing the petitioner, in any suitable post, within a period of two weeks therefrom.

16. In the result the Writ Petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.