1. Defendant in O. S. No. 230 of 1989 on the file of the Court of Munsiff of Vaikom is the appellant. Suit is for eviction with arrears of rent.

2. Plaint schedule property belonged to second plaintiff. With the permission of second plaintiff, first plaintiff constructed a building and lean to in the suit property. Defendant took the same on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/- agreeing to pay rent regularly or in default to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum and to give vacant possession on demand. According to plaintiffs, an amount of Rs. 11,442.81 is due from defendant as arrears and interest and notice charges.

3. During the pendency of the suit, plaintiffs 1 and 2 assigned the building and lean to and five cents of property wherein the building is situated along with the right to collect arrears of rent due to plaintiffs 1 and 2 from defendant in favour of plaintiffs 3 and 4 and in I.A. No. 589 of 1990, they were impleaded as additional plaintiffs.

4. A preliminary objection was raised by defendant challenging the maintainability of the suit. Defendant contended that the suit is not maintainable in view of Section 69 of Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. The court below overruled the preliminary objection and held that the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Aggrieved by the said order, the defendant has filed this revision petition.

5. The question to be considered is whether the suit is hit by Section 69 of Kerala Cooperative Societies Act. According to learned counsel for petitioner, the suit is not maintainable in view of Section 69 barring jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts.

6. In order to appreciate the contentions of learned counsel, it is necessary to prefer to Sections 69 and 100 of Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. Section 100 reads as follows:

"No civil or revenue court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any matter for which provision is made in this Act."

It is clear from the above provision that no suit lies in a civil court in respect of any matter for which provision is made in the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act.

7. Section 69 deals with disputes to be referred to the Registrar. Section 69(1)(f) says that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if a dispute arises, between the society and a person other than a member of the society who has been granted a loan by the society or with which the society has or had business transactions or any person claiming through such a person, such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute. The expression dispute has been defined in Section 2(1). It reads as follows:

"Disputes means any matter touching the business, constitution, establishments or management of a society capable of being the subject of litigation and includes a claim in respect any sum payable to or by a society, whether such claim be admitted or not."

So, in order to bring the case within the ambit of Sections 69 and 100 of Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, the dispute must be one touching the business, constitution, establishment or management of society.

8. This takes me to the question whether letting out of the building and collection of arrears of rent would fall within the expression any matter touching the business. There cannot be any doubt that if a society is established for construction of buildings and letting out such buildings, such transaction would squarely fall within the expression any matter touching the business of the society.

9. Bye-law (2) of Ext.B1 Bye-laws of the society makes it clear that the objects of the society are production and marketing of milk, improvement of varieties and health of catties and production and improvements of milk. Learned counsel for petitioner vehemently contended that the expression used is touching the business and not affecting the business and as such definition contained in Section 2(i) is wide enough to take in activities involved in this case, namely letting out of building and collection of rent, though such an object is not mentioned in the bye-law.

10. I am unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for petitioner. In Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Dalichand Jugraj Jain, : AIR 1969 SC 1320 [LQ/SC/1968/253] , the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the expression dispute touching the business of the society used in Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. Considering the question, the Supreme Court observed thus (at page 1324):

"The sentence, namely "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force" clearly ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Courts if the dispute falls squarely within the ambit of Section 91(1). Five kinds of disputes are mentioned in Sub-section (1); first, disputes touching the constitution of a society; secondly, disputes touching election of the office bearers of a society; thirdly, disputes touching the conduct of general meetings of a society; fourthly, disputes touching the management of a society and fifthly disputes touching the business of a society. It is clear that the word business in this context does not mean affairs of a society because election of office-bearers, conduct of general meetings and management of a society would be treated as affairs of a society. In this sub-section, the word business has been used in a narrower sense and it means the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the society which the society is authorised to enter into under the and the Rules."

"The question arises whether the dispute touching the assets of a society would be a dispute touching the business of a society. This would depend on the nature of the society and the rules and bye-laws governing it. Ordinarily, if a society owns buildings and lets out parts of buildings which it does not require for its own purpose it cannot be said that letting out of those parts is a part of the business of the society. But it may be that it is the business of a society to construct and buy houses and let them out to its members. In that case letting out property may be part of its business. In this case, the society is a cooperative bank and ordinarily a co-operative bank cannot be said to be engaged in business when it lets out properties owned by it. Therefore, it seems to us that the present dispute between a tenant and a member of the bank in a building which has subsequently been acquired by the bank cannot be said to be a dispute touching the business of the bank, and the appeal should fail on this short ground" (at page 1326):

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"One other limitation on the word "dispute" may also be placed and that is that the word "dispute" covers only those disputes which are capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee. It seems to us very doubtful that the word "dispute" would include a dispute between a landlord society and a tenant when the landlord society has not been set up for the purpose of constructing or buying and letting out houses. In the presence of various Rent Acts which give special privileges to tenants it would be difficult to say that such disputes were intended to be referred to the Registrar."

The Supreme Court in a later decision, followed the above decision in Hingorani v. Pravinchandra Kantilal Shah, : AIR 1972 SC 2161 [LQ/SC/1972/302] .

11. A Division Bench of this Court considered a similar question in K.C. Varkey v. The Director of Industries and Commerce, Trivandrum, ILR 1978 Ker 143. In that case, the claim put forward by the society was for recovery from the petitioner therein of an amount said to have been deposited with the petitioner by way of advance rent and allegedly wrongly adjusted by the petitioner towards rent for the room on the second floor of the building for the period subsequent to the intimation given by the society of its intention to vacate that portion. The question to be considered was whether such a claim would fall within the scope of Section 69 of Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, so as to confer jurisdiction on the Registrar to entertain and dispose of an arbitration suit in respect of the same, and to oust the jurisdiction of the civil court. The respondents therein contended that the jurisdiction of the Registrar has been invoked by the society only under Clause (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 69 and the Registrar also has purported to entertain the arbitration suit only under that provision. The society was formed for the purpose of doing business in handicraft articles and it was not the business of the society to take buildings on rent, although for the purpose of its business the society may have incidently to take on lease premises for its use. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Deccan Merchants Cooperative Banks case (supra), the Division Bench held that the claim put forward by the society was not covered by Section 69 and that respondents 1 and 2, the Director of Industries and Commerce, Trivandrum and the Senior Co-operative Inspector attached to the Industries Office, Ernakulam, have acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the said claim and proceeding to dispose of the matter as if it were an arbitration suit maintainable under Section 69 of the.

12. A Full Bench of this Court also had occasion to consider the scope of Section 69(1)(f) in Meeran Unni v. Kottayam District Cooperative Bank, (: AIR 1985 Ker 189 [LQ/KerHC/1985/115] ) : 1985 Ker LT 384. The defendant therein was a society registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and the plaintiff was not a member of the society. Plaintiff was carrying on trade in a room on the ground floor of a building belonging to the defendant society on a monthly rent. The defendant society with a view to reconstruct the building requested the plaintiff to surrender possession of the shop room in his occupation. It was agreed between the parties that after the reconstruction, plaintiff will be put in possession of a shop room on the ground floor of the reconstruction building having more or less an equal area as was in his occupation. Plaintiff surrendered possession of the shop room, but on reconstruction of the building, defendant declined to put the plaintiff in possession of a shop room for his trade even though other tenants who had also vacated on the request of the plaintiff were allotted rooms in the reconstructed building. As per the agreement the rent payable in respect of the shoproom in the reconstructed building was to be fixed afresh plaintiff claimed damages of Rs. 25,000/- in case it was found that the agreement between the parties could not be specifically enforced. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred under Sections 69(1) and 100 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. Construing the scope of Section 69(1), the Full Bench observed as follows (at page 191 (of AIR)):

"Construction of buildings and letting out the same to tenants do not fall under any of the objects mentioned in bye-law 2. The society is engaged in the business of banking, and its objects relate principally to banking with a view to develop the co-operative movement. There is a residuary object to do such other work as will be conducive or incidental to the objects of the society and generally to promote the cause of cooperation. On a perusal of the bye-laws Ext.B6, we are clear in our minds that construction of buildings and letting out the same to tenants do not form part of the business of the society."

Reversing the decree, the Full Bench found that the civil court has jurisdiction and the matter was remanded for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

13. Learned counsel, however, brought to my notice a decision of a single Judge of this court in Kochu Pillai Achari Raman Achari v. Krishnan Achari Paramu Achari, 1957 KLT 362 where the court had to consider the expression disputes touching the business of a society contained in Section 56(1) of Travancore Co-operative Societies Act (Act V of 1112 Travancore) and Section 60 ofX of 1952. The learned Judge observed that the words used in those sections are very general and would include not only disputes directly affecting the business of a society, but also disputes which have some reference or relation to the business of the society. On the facts of that case, learned Judge held that the dispute between the two members of a co-operative society, who were sureties for a loan taken from the society by another member, as to their rights and liabilities inter se in regard to a claim for contribution on account of the discharge of the debt by one of them is a dispute touching the business of a society falling under Section 56(1)(a). That case has no application whatsoever to the facts of this case.

14. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed before me another decision of a single Judge of this court reported in Sekharan v. State of Kerala, 1976 KLT 137. [LQ/KerHC/1976/133] This decision has been considered by the Division Bench in K.C. Varkeys case (supra), in which the learned single Judge, who decided Sekharans case was also a party and also in the Full Bench decision in Meeran Unnis case (supra). Both the Full Bench and the Division Bench distinguished the decision on the ground that the society involved in that case was engaged in the business of constructing and letting out godown and that therefore the dispute between the society and the contractor had relation to the business of the society. Therefore, this decision is also of no help to the petitioner.

15. Lastly, learned counsel for petitioner invited my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in O.N. Bhatnagar v. Smt. Kukibai Narsindas, : AIR 1982 SC 1097 [LQ/SC/1982/84 ;] ">AIR 1982 SC 1097 [LQ/SC/1982/84 ;] [LQ/SC/1982/84 ;] . In this case also Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 91(1) of Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act (Act 24 of 1961) and the expression "touching the business of the society" used in that section, Supreme Court held that the society involved in that section is a tenant co-partnership type housing society formed with the object of providing residential accommodation to its co-partner tenant members and that therefore it logically followed that whatever the society did in the normal course of its activities such as by initiating proceedings for removing an act of trespass by a stranger from a flat allotted to one of its members could but be part of its business. The court observed (at page 1104 of AIR):

".............a claim by the society together with such member for ejectment of a person who was permitted to occupy having become a nominal member thereof, upon revocation of licence, is a dispute falling within the purview of Section 91(1) of the."

The Supreme Court has noticed and approved the decision in Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank (supra) but has only distinguished it on peculiar facts of the case. Therefore, this decision also will not be of any assistance to the petitioner.

16. In the instant case, as indicated above, the society was established for production and marketing of milk, improvement of varieties and health of catties and production and improvement of milk, and letting out of the building and collection of rent has no connection whatsoever even remotely with the avowed object of the society enumerated in the bye-law mentioned above.

The above discussion would show that the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. No other point has been raised by learned counsel for petitioner in the C.R.P. There is no merit in the C.R.P. and it is accordingly dismissed.