(1) THE Division Bench of this Court which heard the appeal, has referred to the Full Bench the following question: in an appeal under S. 110d of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, are crossobjections by a respondent maintainable

(2) IN Harthi Adirajaiah v. Savandamma, (1973) 1 Mys. L. J 247. and A. Rahman v. Wabber, (1973) 1 Mys. L. J 371. two Division Benches of this Court have taken the view that in an appeal under S. 110d of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the act), cross-oblections cannot be filed invoking the,"provisions of Order 41, Rule 22 CPC. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Collector, Varanasi v. Gaouri Shankar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 384 [LQ/SC/1967/247] . the Divn Bench which has referred the above question to a Full Bench, was of the opinion that the above rulings of this court require reconsideration.

(3) MR. B. P. Holla, learned Advocate for the first respondent, contended that in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in National sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Bros. LTd, AIR 1953 SC 357 [LQ/SC/1953/56] . and Collector, Varanasi v. Gaouri Shankar Mishra (3)the view taken by the Divn Benches of this Court in the, aforesaid two decisions is not correct. He urged that in the absence of any special procedure prescribed in the Act or the rules there under, the appeal must be regulated by the general practice and procedure of this Court in appeals. He therefore urged that by necessary implication the provisions of the CPC relating to, appeals to the High court are to be followed and that cross-objections filed in appeals under s. 110d of the Act are maintainable.

(4) ON the other hand, Mr. T. S. Krishna Bhat, learned Advocate for the, appellants, contended the right to file cross-objections is a substantive right which must be - conferred expressly by the statute and that in the absence of express conferment of such a right, cross-objections are not maintainable. He further contended that if the right to file cross-objections is permitted, it enlarges the period of limitation prescribed in the- Act for preferring appeals. Therefore, he urged that the cross-objections are not maintainable.

(5) BEFORE we proceed to consider the validity of the rival contentions- putforward by learned Counsel, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act and the rules made there under. The Act was radically amended by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Central Act 100 of 1956) which substituted S. 110 of the Act and added Ss. 110a to 110f. S. 110 of the Act as it stands now provides inter alia for constitution by the State Govt by a Notification in the. Official Gazette of Motor accidents Claims Tribunals in such areas as may be specified there under for the purpose of adjudication of claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death o| or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. S. 110d of the Act which provides for appeals after awards of claims tribunals reads as under. * * * * s. 111a of the. Act empowers the State Govt to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Ss. 110 to 110e and in particular such rules may provide for the form and the manner in which and the fees on payment of which an appeal. may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal.

(6) IN exercise of the power conferred by S. 111a and other enabling sections of the Act the Govt of Karnataka has framed Rules called the karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules 1963. The title of Chap. VII of those Rules is the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals Rules. Rule 363 prescribes that every appeal against the award of the Claims tribunal shall be preferred in the form of memorandum signed by the appellant or his Pleader end presented to the High Court or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf and that memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the award. It further provides that the memorandum shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads the grounds of objection to the award appealed from without any argument or narrative and such grounds shall be numbered consecutively.

(7) EXCEPT providing for an appeal to the High Court under S. 110d the act does not expressly lay down the procedure to be followed by the High court in dealing with appeals filed before it. The Karnataka Motor vehicles Rules also do not contain any provision as to such procedure. In union of India v. Narasiyappa, (1970) 1 Mys. L. J. 319. the question of maintainability of cross-objections in appeals filed under S. 11 of the Requisition and Acquisition of immoveable Property Act 1952 came up for consideration. A Divn Bench of this Court followed certain observations of the Supreme Court in hanskumar Kishan Chond v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 947 [LQ/SC/1958/93] . and said thus in paras 15 and 16 of the jugdment. " 15 There is no provision either in the Act or in any rules made under S. 22 there of providing for a cross-objection being presented by a respondent in an appeal presented under S. 11 of the Act. The cross-objection presented under R. 22 of Or. 41 of the CPC is clearly in the nature of appeal itself not only because the cross-objector is himself a person who could have appealed against the decree which is the subject of appeal but also because in recognition of the same the Code itself provides that even a withdrawal of the main appeal will not put an end to the cross-objection but that the same should be proceeded with heard and disposed of as if it were an independent appeal. 16. The principle therefore is that the right to file cross-objection is not different from the right to appeal which is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure. The right to appeal therefore has to be expressly conferred upon a party by the relevant statute and a right already conferred by a statute is not lost unless it is taken away by another statutory provision either expressly or by necessary intendnaent. It has to be held therefore that in appeials preferred under S. 11 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Improvable Property Act 1952 no cross-ejection by a respondent is possible. "

(8) IN Harathi Adiraiah v. Savandatmma (1)the question of maintainability of cross-objection in appeals filed before the High Court under S. 110d of the Act directly arose for consideration. The Divn Bench of this Court while dealing with that question followed the view taken in Union of india v. Narasiyappa (5) and observed ; ". . . . The schema of the law is to constitute Special Tribunals called the claims Tribunals and to oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Courts in regard to matters in respect of which jurisdiction has been conferred op the Claims Tribunals. Detailed provisions have been made in regard to the constitution of Claims Tribunals the applications for compensation and the period of limitation for presenting such applications as also for condonation of delay in presentation of such applications for the powers and procedure to be followed by the Tribunals and provision for appeals against the awards of the Claims tribunals. As the Act makes provision for constitution of Special tribunals ousting the jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Courts and further makes provision regarding the procedure and powers of such tribunals the necessary legal. implication is that the Special Tribunal which is created under a special enactment enjoys the powers specifically conferred by the Act and is enjoined to follow the procedure prescribed by that Act. The appellate authority under S. 110d of the act also functions as a Special Statutory Appellate Forum constituted under the Act. "

(9) THE same view was taken by another Divn Bench of this court in A Rahman v. Wabber (2). The ratio of the above decisions is that right of appeal is a substantive right which has to be expressly conferred by the relevant statute that cross-objections are in the nature of an appeal that the right to file cross-objections is not different from the right to appeal and therefore must be expressly conferred by the statute a. id is not a mere master of procedure and that the appellate authority under S. 110d of the Act functions as a special forum constituted under the Act and is enjoined to follow the procedure prescribed by the Act in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in notional Sewing Thread Co. v. James Chadwick and Bros (4)and Collector Varanasi v. Caoun Shankar Misra (3)to which we will presently refer the view taken by the Divn Benches of this Court relating to the maintainability of cross-objections in appeals to the High Court under S. 110d of the Act is in our opinion unsustainable.

(10) IN National Sewing Thread Co. s case (4) the question that arose for determination was whether a Letters Patent appeal would lie to a Divn bench of the High Court from an appellate judgment of a single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under the Trade Marks Act S. 76 of the Trade marks Act provided that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a decision of the Registry under that Act we the rules there under. The trade Marks Act did npt provide for a further appeal from a decision of a singly Judge of the High Court. Dealing with that question the Supreme court observed thus : " The Trade Marks Act does not provied or lay down any prccedure for the future conduct or career of that appeal in the Hign Court indeed S. 77 of the Act provides that the High Court can if it likes make rules in the matter. Obviously after the appeal had reached the High court it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court and in accordance with the provisions of the charter under which that Court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall he to a Court already established then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court. This rule was very succinctly stated by Viscount Haldane L. C. in National Tele Phone Co. Ltd v. Post Master General ((1913) AC 546 in these terms. When a question is stated to be referred to an established comwithout more it in my opinion imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches. " the same view was expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrashekhara Thevar (AIR 1948 PC 12)wherin it was said : " Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorised by such rules notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal. "

(11) AGAIN in Secy of State for India v. Chellikini Rama Rao (AIR 1916 PC 21)when dealing with the case under the Madras Forest Act their Lordships observed as follows : " It was contended on behalf of the appellant that all further proceedings in Courts in India or by way of appeal were incompetent these being excluded by the terms of the statute just quoted. In their lordships opinion this objection is not well-founded. Thedr view is that when proceedings of this character reach the Dist Court that court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country with regard to whose procedure orders and decrees the ordinary rules of the civil Procedure Code apply. "

(12) THOUGH the facts of the cases laying down the above rule were not exactly similar to the facts of the present case the principle enunciated therein is one of general application and has an apposite application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. S. 76 Trade Marks Act confers a right of appeal to the High Court and says nothing more about it. That being so the High Court being seized as such of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by s. 76 it has to exrecise that jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction and when such jurisdiction is exersed by a single Judge his judgment becomes subject to appeal. under C1. 15 of the Letters Patent there being nothing to the contrary in the Trade marks Act.

(13) IN Collector Varanasis case (3) the Supreme Court has explained that its earlier decision in Hanskumars case (6) proceeded on the premise that the High Court to which an appeal was provided under S. 19 (1) (f) of the defence of India Act 1939 functioned as a designated Authority and not as a Court. The Supreme Court dissented from the view in Hanskumars case (6) and held that while acting under S. 19 (1) (f) the High Court functioned as a Court and not as a designated person. In Collector Varanasis case (3) the Supreme Court reiterated the proposition laid down in National sewing Thread Co. s case (4). Hegde J who spoke for the Court said thus: "we were informed that neither the Act nor the rules framed thereunder prescribe any special procedure for the disposal of appeals under S. 19 (1) (f). Appeals under the provision have to be disposed of just in the same manner as other appeals to the High Court. Obviously after the appeal had reached the High Court it had to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court. The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court. "

(14) FROM the rulings of the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Co. s case (4) and the Collector Varanasis case (3) it is clear that when a special statute merely prescribes that an appeal shall lie to the High Court without prescribing the procedure to be followed by the High Court such appellate jurisdiction has to be exercised in the same manner as the High court exercises its general appellate jurisdiction and that the appeal so filed must be regulated by the practice and procedure of the High Court. It is true that the enunciation of law by the Supreme Court is with reference to the provisions of the Trade Marks Act in the one and those of the Defence of India Act in the other which merely provided for appeals to the High Court. But the law so enunciated by the Supreme Court is of general application.

(15) IN Union of Indias case (5) this Court relied upon the decision of the supreme Court in Hanskumars case (6) in coming to the conclusion that cross-objections are incompetent when the statute provides for an appeal to the High Court. But as the Supreme Court has in Collector Varanasis case (3) dissented from its earlier view in Hanskumars case (6) the view expressed by the Divn Bench of this Court in Union of Indias case (5)following the decision of the Supreme Court in Hanskumars case (6) is no longer good law.

(16) IN the light of the elucidation of the law by the Supreme Court in national Sewing Thread Co. s case (4) and the Collector Varanasis case (3) we hold that the rulings of the Divn Benches of this Court in Harathi adirajaiahs case (1) and A. Rahimans (2) as to the maintainability of cross-objections in appeals filed to the High Court under S. 110d of the act are not correct. Order 41 Rule 22 CPC provides that any respondent thqugh he may not have appealed from any part of the decree may not only support the decree on any of the grounds decided against him in the court beolw but take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal provided that he filed such objection to the appellate court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal or within such further ton as the appellate Court may see fit to allow. The above rule is apparently a special provision which gives a respondent who in the first Instance is satisfied with partial success in the Court below another opportunity of challenging that part of the decree which. has pone against him ut> on his opponent preferring an appeal. In the appeal filed from any part of the decree before this Court the procedure laid down in Or. 41 R. 22 cpc has to be followed by this Court. Therefore we are of the view that cross-obi ectiong are maintainable in appeals that lie to the High Court under S. 110d of the Act.

(17) MR. Krishna Bhat contended that if it is held that cmss-oblections are maintainable in anneals to the High Court under S. 110d of the Act the respondent who has not himself nreferred an anneal within the period prescibed in that section. will have further time to prefer cross-obiections and that there by the period nf limitation prescribed in S 110d of the Act for preferring appeals would be enlarged. Such a consequence is nothing pecuuliar to cross-obiections filed in appeals under S. 110d of the Act. The Second Divn of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. 1963 prescribes several periods of limitation for various categories of appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure In all such anneals the respondents who prefer cross-objections will have further time as provided in Or 41 R. 22 CPC That a respondent will have such further time for preferring cross-obiertions cannot be a ground for holding that cross-objections are not maintainable in appeal under S. 110d of the Act. "for the reasons stated above onr answer to the question referred to the Full Bench is : in an appeal under S. 110d of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 cross-objections by a respondent are maintainable.