(1) THE prayer in the writ petition is as follows :

". . . To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order or direction directing respondents 1 and 2 to provide adequate police protection to the petitioner. (a) to remove the articles set out in the Schedules A and B mentioned in the writ petition from its engineering unit at Tiruvottiyur, Madras 600019; and (b) to provide adequate security to the other employees and customers of the petitioner for their ingress and egress to the engineering unit at Tiruvottiyur; and (c) to give protection to the vehicles entering and coming out of the engineering unit of the petitioner at Tiruvottiyur. . . "

(2) THE petitioner-company has got four units; viz. :

(1) a sugar factory at Vijayawada, which crushes about 6,000 tonnes of cane per day to manufacture sugar; (2) a cement factory at Macherla, Andhra Pradesh; (3) an engineering unit called the Central Workshop situated at Tiruvottiyur; and (4) a sugar manufacturing unit at Lakshmipuram, Andhra pradesh.

(3) THE total number of workers employed by the petitioner is roughly 4,000 and the paid up capital of the petitioner is Rs. 11 crores and the shares are being held by over 3000 shareholders. It is alleged in the affidavit that the petitioner-company has earned foreign exchange of Rs. 30 crores on account of exports and has also on hand export orders for sugar and other machineries. The petitioner-company was carrying on manufacture of sugar at its factory at Lakshmipuram, Andhra Pradesh, and by order dated January 29, 1988, the said Challapalli Sugars Ltd. was amalgamated with the petitioner-company, after the petitioner-company investigated the matter under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act. It is also alleged in the affidavit that each unit is an independent unit by itself, that separate balance sheet and accounts are prepared for each of the units, that the engineering unit of petitioner-company at Tiruvottiyur, is engaged in the manufacture of sugar plants and also machineries, that the Lakshmipuram unit had placed an order with the engineering unit for expansion/modernisation of its existing plant to increase its capacity from 1250 TCD to 2500 TCD in or about February 1989, that the total cost of the order was Rs. 27. 40 crores, that the project is financed by various financial institutions, that the engineering unit had already supplied machineries, that the erection of the vital machinery, viz. , boiler is going on, that the engineering unit had manufactured almost all the parts of the said boiler and that the lower drum of the boiler and several other parts have been manufactured and are kept ready for despatch. The articles ready for despatch had been set out in Sch. A to the writ petition. It is also alleged in the affidavit that Messrs Sri Lanka Sugar Corporation of Colombo had placed an order on the petitioner-company for the supply of sugar factory machineries and equipment of two numbers, that centrifugals for its Sevenegala Sugar Development Project and the same was confirmed by the said Sri Lanka Sugar Corporation by its letter, dated June 19, 1990, that the total value of the order is over 1,60,000 US Dollars, that in accordance with the said order, the petitioner-company has to supply the items mentioned above, after manufacturing some of them and adding some bought-out items. It is further stated that the said Sugar Corporation had opened an irrevocable letter of credit on the Bank of Ceylon, that it had paid an advance of 10 per cent to the petitioner-company and the letter of credit is valid up to 28 February 1991, provided shipment of the machineries are completed on or before 30 December 1990. It is further alleged that the petitioner had undertaken the said order on pro rata basis and had completed the manufacturing/assembling of all the parts and the said items are ready for being shipped to Sri Lanka, that if the shipment is not completed within time, the petitioner-company would not only be faced with a claim of huge damages by the said Sugar Corporation but would also have to pay the said amount in foreign exchange, that if the damages are directed against the petitioner company, the same will also have to be paid in foreign exchange, that the delivery of the company would be instrumental for the nation getting a lump sum payment in foreign exchange, and that any delay in the shipment of the articles referred to will not only be damaging to the petitioner-company but also would be against the public interest. It is also stated that the articles ready for despatch has been described as Sch. B to the writ petition. It is further alleged in the affidavit that while so, the workers of the engineering unit a Tiruvottiyur, without any provocation, started adopting go-slow tactics from September 25, 1990, that the third respondent had some negotiations with the management about the bonus and charter of demands. It is also alleged in the affidavit that when conciliation proceedings were pending, the workmen, who are members of the third respondent herein, started indulging in acts of indiscipline and insubordination and that in view of that petitioner-company had no other option, for reasons of prevention of unnecessary bloodshed and loss of properties, to declare a lock-out on October 30, 1990. It is emphatically stated in the affidavit that the decision to lock-out the factory was taken only after the workers staged a four days stay-intooldown strike, in the workshop itself. It is also alleged in the affidavit that ever since the petitioner-company declared lock-out, the members of the third respondent union are squatting at the entrance of the workshop of the petitioner, there by preventing opening of the gate. It is also stated in the affidavit that in respect of the employees who are not covered by the lock-out, the members of third respondent union are preventing other employees from entering the workshop and also threatening them with physical injuries. In Para. 13 of the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the petitioner alleges that the union office-bearers are not entitled to provoke workmen to resort to violence or instigate them to commit crimes, and that the aforesaid factors were brought to the notice of the second and third respondents here-in and that they have not been taking any serious note of the complaints. It is further alleged that the police officials are under a public duty to prevent the members of the union from taking law into their hands and also to provide security to the property and personnel of the petitioner-company. It is further alleged in the affidavit that the engineering unit is not allowed to function by the members of the third respondent union, who are assembling everyday and squatting all round the premises. It is also stated that the members of the union would not permit access of the staff of the petitioner to the workshop. The petitioner further alleges in the affidavit that the project of Lakshmipuram unit has to be given top priority, that the said unit should go into production without any delay; that if there is any delay in implementing the project, there will be a chain reaction on the business of the petitioner-company and also on the lives of several thousands of canegrowers and workers engaged in the Lakshmipuram unit.

(4) IT is further stated that the petitioner-management by letter dated November 6, 1990, addressed to the first respondent herein, made a request to provide adequate police protection to open the engineering unit and to take away the abovementioned items, that a copy of the said request was also given to the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the second respondent herein, that no action had been taken so far and that by letter, dated November 17, 1990 the petitioner-company made another request to the first respondent herein to give protection in respect to the articles relating to Sri Lankan order, and that a copy of the said letter was also sent to the second respondent herein and that there is no action to that letter also. The petitioner further alleges that by letter, dated November 16, 1990 protection was sought for in relation to non-striking members and for that too, no reply was received. In view of these, the petitioner alleges that there is total silence on the part of the police authorities and as such, the petitioner has come up to this Court with the prayer stated (supra). The petitioner further alleges in the affidavit that in view of the decisions of the Court, the right of labour is only limited to go on strike but not to prevent the management from carrying on its legitimate business and not to indulge in any activity which will be considered criminal. The petitioner further alleges that the interest of the workers is fully protected and that if the workers succeed in their demands before the labour authorities, the petitioner-company has ample means to pay them the monetary benefits.

(5) NOTICE of motion has been ordered by me on December 27, 1990.

(6) A counter-affidavit has been filed by the third respondent stating that the writ petition seeking for a direction for direction for police protection for removal of materials is not at all maintainable. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the employees employed by the petitioner-compoany are paid wages far lower than other concerns, that in the petitioner-company there are about 525 permanent workers and there are about 200 casual employees who are taken in as apprentices, that in the year 1988-89, though the turn over of the petitioner-company crossed Rs. 23 crores, it declared a bonus at the rate of 8. 33 per cent, that the petitioner-company declared bonus at the rate of 13. 5 per cent during January 1990, that for the year 1989-1990 the petitioner-company declared bonus at the rate of 8. 33 per cent claiming that there was a net loss of Rs. 67 lakhs. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner-company was adamant and did not agree to the declaration of maximum bonus, that the negotiations continued throughout the first three weeks of October 1990, that under some pretext it declared an illegal "lockout" with effect from October 30, 1990 when the negotiations were continuing and the workers were reporting for work every day. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the third respondent union took up the matter with the Government Labour Department, that the petitioner management is not keenly interested in settling the matters amicably, that it had openly expressed before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour on October 31, 1990 that unless the issue of bonus and charter of demands are settled, the question of opening the factory does not arise, that conciliation meeting was thereafter adjourned to November 13, 1990 and then to November 23, 1990 and that the conciliation proceedings are still pending. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that at the time of lock-out of the petitioner-company factory, there were no finished goods, that the third respondent-union filed civil suit Original Suit No. 874 of 1990 before the District Munsif Court at Ponneri, restraining the petitioner-management from removing any article, goods, materials or machineries of any description from its engineering unit, notice was ordered in the said civil suit as well as in the Interim Application No. 3939 of 1990 filed by the union, that the petitioner management entered appearance and that they have filed a counter-affidait also. It is further claimed in the counter affidavit that though the petitioner-company factory is situated at Tiruvottiyur, within the jurisdiction of District Munsif Court at Ponneri, the petitioner-company and its so-called agents filed five different suits before the City Civil Court, Madras, and that the said suits were brought before four different Assistant City Civil Judges. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that in the aforesaid five suits, in the schedule to the plaints several articles including machinery, unfinished goods were mentioned, that on the strength of the injunction orders passed by the City Civil Court, Madras, the petitioner-management, with the help of police on November 23, 1990 removed a number of items from its factory, and that having obtained all the abovementioned reliefs in different forums in a collusive manner, the petitioner-company has come before this Court and filed the present writ petition seeking further reliefs. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the Schs. A and B of the writ petition related to some of the terms, which are subject-matter of the suits pending before the City Civil Court, Madras. It is further claimed that the petitioner-company did not mention any of those details in the affidavits even though it is party in those five suits and it has colluded in getting an injunction against the workers, that the Manager (Coordination) of the petitioner-company had sworn to the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition on November 19, 1990 whereas the injunction in the civil petition was granted as early as on November 13, 1990.

(7) THE third respondent-union claimed in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner had thus suppressed the vital information in its affidavit and as such the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner-company did not mention anything about the civil suit Original Suit No. 874 of 1990 before the District Munsif Court, Ponneri, filed by the respondent union in its affidavit, that before the Munsif Court it has filed a petition that a writ petition is pending this Court and as such the District Munsif should not proceed with the trial of the suit, and that the petitioner is not entitled to get any relief in view of suppression of vital information to this Court. The allegation of the petitioner that there are many valuable finished articles manufactured lying inside is denied by the respondent-union. It is further claimed that this is not a common case of workers resorting to strike but the management deliberately declared lock-out in order to force the workmen and to deprive them of their legitimate rights conferred by statutes. It is also claimed in the counter-affidavit that it is always open to the petitioner-company to reopen the factory and resolve the issues in an amicable manner without indulging in coercive tactics. It is also claimed that the respondent-union believes in non-violent form of protest and that it is why the bonus issue was taken up before the Industrial Tribunal and that the affidavits secured from the security staff of the petitioner-company are false. The allegations made in paras 13 to 15 of the affidavit filed by the petitioner are denied in the counter-affidavit. It is further claimed that the respondent-union never provoked any workers to indulge in any violent acts, that it is the petitioner-company which makes the workmen to starve for the past 40 days without paying their legitimate dues and that the incentive payment to the workmen for the month of October had not been paid which would approximately work out to Rs. One lakhs. It is further stated that the writ petitioner with the police help with its collusive orders obtained from the Civil Courts, removed machineries as early as November 23, 1990 and that no single police complaint has been lodged before appropriate authorities and no complaint has been registered. It is further claimed that the writ petitioner is not entitled for any issuance of writ of mandamus or any police protection since it is already having such protection.

(8) A reply affidavit has been filed by the petitioner-company, stating that with regard to bonus, the matter is now dealt with by the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Conciliation I. Madras, and that if and when a proper decision is taken, the matter would be disposed of. It is further stated in the affidavit that no organisation can entertain indiscipline, insubordination and violence, and that in the larger interest it was decided to lock-out only on account of violent attitude of the members of the third respondent-union. With regard to the filing of civil suit in Original Suit No. 874 of 1990 on the file of District Munsif Court, Ponneri, it is stated in the reply affidavit that nowhere the third respondent union made a reference to the stay-in and tool-down strike, though it had admitted the same in the abovementioned suit and as such no question of suppression of vital information of this Court will arise. It is further stated that the third respondent-union was not willing to give an undertaking that its members would observe discipline, and that there was plenty of finished goods at the time of lock-out of the unit. In para 12 of the reply affidavit it is stated that the deponent of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition were not aware of the filing of Original Suit No. 874 of 1990, since the notice therein was received by the petitioners counsel only on November 23, 1990 whereas the affidavit was handed over to the counsel on November 19, 1990 itself. It is further stated that the petitioners counsel filed the writ petition only on November 23, 1990 though the deponent of the affidavit was under the belief that the writ petition was filed even on November 21, 1990 and as such the petitioner was not in a position to mention about Original Suit No. 874 of 1990 in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. It is further stated that there is no suppression of facts at all. With regard to the allegation that collusive steps were taken, it is denied in the reply affidavit.

(9) SRI C. Harikrishnan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner company, refers to two items, especially : (1) an order on the petitioner-company by Sri Lanka Sugar Corporation of Colombo; and (2) an order placed with the Challapalli Sugars Ltd. , at Lakshmipuram unit.

(10) THE learned counsel contends that the order of the Sri Lanka Sugar Corporation of Colombo is fetching foreign exchange and the other order is to supply to sick undertaking for a sugar mill at Lakshmipuram unit. He further contends that the petitioner-company had made representations on November 6, 1990, November 16, 1990, November 17, 1990 and November 18, 1990 seeking police help to remove the goods to comply with the said orders, but no action was taken. He further contends that with regard to Sri Lanka Sugar Corporation order, though letter of credit was dated February 28, 1989, shipment has to be made on December 30, 1990 and as such it is necessary to remove the goods mentioned in schedule to the writ petition, with police help. He further contends that with regard to the supply of goods to sick undertaking, it is a question of public interest notwithstanding the interest of workers in dispute and as such this Court has to give protection at least to remove the finished goods with police help. The learned counsel refers to a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Coimbatore Periyar District Motor Transport Munnetra Sangam (by President) v. Sivakumar Transports, Tiruppur and others 99-LW-409 with regard to the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to give directions for police protection. He also refers to a judgment of Sri Srinivasan, J. , in an application pending a civil suit, which is in Audco India Ltd. v. Audco India Employees Union and others 1989 - II - LLJ - 200. Sri C. Harikrishanan, the learned counsel, also refers to an unreported judgment of M. Srinivasan in Coromandal Prodorite (P.) Ltd. , Madhavaram v. Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Chengalput Range and others Writ Petition No. 2714 of 1990, dated March 16, 1990 in which the learned Judge considered the issue of a writ of mandamus in such matters. He also refers to a judgment of S. Mohan, J. , (as he then was) in Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd. (by its Law Officer and constituted, Attorney N. K. Mandal) v. Superintendent of Police, Madras 1987 - II - LLN -294, with regard to the powers of this Court to issue a writ of mandamus in such matters. Relying upon the abovementioned judgments the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner-company is entitled to get the police protection, in view of the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the petitioner and the contentions raised therein.

(11) SRI K. Chandru, the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent union on the other hand contends that no writ can be issued on the facts of this case because no complaint has been filed with local police. He further contends that the affidavit does not disclose any cognizable offence or facts so as to enable the police to take action. Sri K. Chandru, the learned counsel, further contends that it is a case of lock-out and not a case of strike by workers and that a civil suit had been filed by the respondent-union before the District Munsifs Court, Ponneri. Referring to the civil suits filed by the petitioner-company the learned counsel for the respondent-union contends that the petitioner-company has made suppression of facts and that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on that short ground. He further refers to a decision in George v. Circle Inspector of Police, Mannarghat 1990 (1) KLT. 741 and contends that there is no averment made in the affidavit with regard to any denial of personal liberty in this case, and that if the Court interferes at this juncture in this writ petition filed by the petitioner-management, it will only demoralise the workmen who are ready to work. The learned counsel also refers to another judgment of Kerala High Court which is in C. Kannan v. Superintendent of Police, Cannanore 1974 - I - LLJ -83 and also refers to various provisions under Sections 22 (2), 25 (2), 26 (2) and Sch. V of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sri K. Chandru, the learned counsel for the third respondent-union, vehemently contends that what the petitioner-company is doing is illegal lock-out and unfair labour practice and that this Court should not exercise the discretionary power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

(12) I have carefully considered the arguments of Sri. C. Harikrishanan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-company, and of Sri K. Chandru, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-union. The facts of the case are very simple. In this case, we are concerned with two consignment of articles which are referred to as Schedules A and B in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. As I have already stated, those articles are concerned with - (1) Sri Lanka Sugar Corporation of Colombo; and (2) Challapalli Sugars Ltd. , at Lakshmipuram unit.

(13) THE question before me is whether the abovementioned articles referred to in Schs. A and B of the affidavit, can be ordered to be removed with police protection.

(14) BEFORE dealing with the issue, it is necessary to refer to the case-law, with regard to the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as to whether in such matters, this Court can issue a writ of mandamus for police protection. A judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Coimbatore Periyar District Motor Transport Munnetra Sangam (By President) v. Sivakumar Transports, Tirupur and others (supra), is worth mentioning. After referring to certain decisions in that case, the Division Bench has held as follows : ". . . The ratio of the judgments, in our opinion, is that if the preventing of removal of the goods would involve only the monetary interest of the management and no public interest is involved, the Court may consider not helping the management and not interfering in the dispute by way of any injunction orders. However, if the facts and circumstances are such as that it is just and necessary to permit the goods to be removed in order to prevent any waste or loss of goods, or that the acts in relation to which injunction is prayed for will have no effect on public interest, then, injunction against interference with the removal of goods shall not be granted. If not granting an injunction will tantamount to affecting public interest, the Court is duty bound to give such protection as is needed. Therefore, each case will have to depend on facts. . . . "

(15) IN Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd. (by its Law Officer and Constituted Attorney, N. K. Mandal v. Superintendent of Police, St. Thomas Mount, Madras (supra), (Mohan, J. as he then was), has gone into the question elaborately with regard to the directions that can be given by this Court in regard to Police-protection in such matters, observed as follows-Para. 5, at page 299 : "strikes, lock-outs, satyagrahas and demonstrations are nothing new in our county. Promotion of social justice over the past few decades was, to a considerable extent, due to militant and agitational approach of the workmen and not, to any appreciable degree, due to condescension by the management. It is but true that in the process of securing to the workmen more amenities and privileges and better conditions of service, the Industrial Tribunals, Labour Courts, and the Courts of this country have played a vital role. A negative approach to lawful agitation by the working class to secure higher wages and better living conditions cannot be justified by resort to the plea of maintaining law and order in the industrial sector. "

(16) THOUGH the abovementioned case arose in a petition filed by a customer, I am of the view that the principle enunciated in that case equally applies to the facts of the case on hand. It is seen that this judgment has been affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in Binny Beach Engineering Workers Union (represented by its General Secretary) v. Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd. , Durgapur (represented by its Law Officer and Constituted Attorney, N. K. Mandal) and others Writ Appeal No. 11226 of 1987, dated July 27, 1987 though the judgment is in one line "dismissed". A special leave petition was also dismissed on July 29, 1987, by the Supreme Court.

(17) SRI M. Srinivasan, J. in an unreported decision in Balaji Fabricators (P) Ltd. Madras (represented by its Managing Director) v. Inspector of Police, Thiruvanmiyur, Madras and others, Writ Petition No. 221 of 1990, dated March 28, 1990, while dismissing the writ petition, states thus : ". . . . What I have said above is sufficient to hold that the petitioner is not entitled to get any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the circumstances of the case. I refuse to exercise my discretion in favour of the petitioner. . . "

(18) ON a perusal of the abovementioned Judgment, I could see that an argument was advanced before the learned Judge, that the judgment in Coimbatore Periyar District Motor Transport Munnetra Sangam (by President) v. Sivakumar Transport, Tirupur and others (supra) has been stayed by the Supreme Court, but ultimately it was found that the said appeal was dismissed as infructuous on December 8, 1989. As such, it should be seen that the ratio laid down by the Division Bench in the abovementioned case still holds the field, so far I could see. Apart from that, that judgment is not relevant for deciding the issue before me. Another unreported judgment in Coromandel Prodorite (P.) Ltd. , Madhavaram (represented by its Production Manager) v. Deputy Inspector General of Police, Chengleput Range and others (supra) was also referred to. In that decision, the learned Judge, issuing a writ of mandamus, held as follows : ". . . When it is a question of promoting the national interest, the rights of few workers cannot be put on an higher pedestal. The interests of the nation are more important than that of handful of workers. If the preventing of despatch of finished goods would involve only the financial interest of the management and does not affect anybody else, the Court may not help the management and interfere in the dispute. If the facts and circumstance are such that the non-despatch of the finished goods would affect the interest of the nation as a whole, it is the duty of this Court to interfere and prevent the workers from obstructing such despatch. It cannot be contended that the workers right to strike would go to the extent of authorising them to harm the interests of the nation. . . . . "

(19) ANOTHER judgment of Srinivasan, J. in Audco India Ltd. v. Audco India Employees Union and others (supra), is a case granting injunction against a union, pending a suit. I do not think it is necessary to refer to that judgment in detail for the purpose of this case. It is worthwhile to refer to a judgment in B. R. Singh and others v. Union of India and others 1989 - II - LLJ -591, wherein the Supreme Court has held that the right to strike is not absolute under industrial jurisprudence, but subject to restrictions. The Supreme Court in that case, has further held that strike is a form of demonstration and that right to demonstrate (strike) is an important weapon in the armoury of workers. So far as this case is concerned, we are not concerned with a strike, but a lock-out. In fact, the abovementioned judgment of the Supreme Court has been referred to by Srinivasan, J. , in the unreported decision in Coromandel Prodorite (P.) Ltd. , Madhavaram (by its Production Manager) v. Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Chengal-put Range and others (supra).

(20) ANOTHER judgment of Kerala High Court in George v. Circle Inspector of Police, Mannarghat (supra), was cited before me. In that case, the writ petition was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner failed to make out a prima facie case. In that case, the Division Bench has considered the question of pleading in a writ petition praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus and held that material facts having not been stated in the petition, no writ could issue under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In that case, the Kerala High Court considered the powers of this Court for the issue of a writ of mandamus. After discussing the entire caselaw cited therein, the Division Bench in the abovementioned case, has refused to grant the relief on the ground that in the said petition, the details as to persons who obstructed the petitioner therein and as to why police did not give protection were absent in that pleadings. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court dismissed the petition giving reasoning in para. 10 of the judgment. It is seen from that, the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has not been ruled out by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court. So, the ratio laid down by the Division Bench of this Court which has been referred to (supra), holds the field and as such in my view each case has to be decided on the facts of the case.

(21) THE principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Coimbatore Periyar District Motor Transport Munnetra Sangam (by its President) v. Sivakumar Transports, Tirupur and others (supra), is very clear on this aspect, viz. if the preventing of removal of the goods would involve only the monetary interest of the management and no public interest is involved, the Court may consider not helping the management and not interfering in the dispute by way of any injunction orders, and that if the facts and circumstances are such as that it is just and necessary to permit the goods to be removed in order to prevent any waste or loss of goods, or that the acts in relation to which injunction is prayed for will have no effect on public interest, then, injunction against interference with the removal of goods should not be granted. I am of the view that if not granting an injunction will tantamount to affecting public interest, the Court is duty bound to given such protection as is needed. I am entirely in agreement with the judgment of Mohan. J. (as he then was) that police protection, if ordered, might crush lawful and peaceful strikes and demonstration. I am of the view that the order of this Court for police protection if available in the hands of unscrupulous management, should not be allowed to suppress the legitimate agitations. The Supreme Court in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V. R. Rudani and others 1989 - II - LLJ 324 has recently considered the scope of issuance of a writ of mandamus and observed as follows in para 22, at page 331 : ". . . The judicial control over the fast expending maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. . . "

(22) WITH regard to the contention raised by Sri K. Chandru, the learned counsel for the third respondent-union, that this is a case of suppression of facts, it is true that a suit has been filed before the filing of this writ petition and it came up for hearing. But it is seen that this writ petition has been presented on November 26, 1990 and the reasoning given in the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner-company for non-mentioning about the suits is quite convincing. As I have already stated that the reliance made by Sri K. Chandru, the learned counsel for the third respondent-union, in George v. Circle Inspector of Police, Mannarghat (supra) is not helpful to him since the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has not laid down the proposition that no writ of mandamus would lie. Whether it is a lock-out or a strike, it is not for this Court to decide the issue in this writ petition, which may affect the case of the petitioner-management as well as the respondent-union.

(23) CONSIDERING the issue in this case, I am of the view that with regard to the order of Sri Lanka Sugar Corporation of Colombo, the non-despatch of the articles would affect the interest of the nation, especially the international market. So also, with regard to the despatch of the articles to the Challapalli Sugars Ltd. , at Lakshmipuram unit, (I am of the view) the interest of the nation and industrial growth are more important than the interest of handful of workers. Taking the view that the request made in this case would come within the reasoning of the Division Bench of this Court, cited supra, I am of the opinion, that the police protection should be ordered. I could see various requests made by the petitioner-company to the police authorities and it seems no action has been taken by them. I am of the view that they are duty bound to give protection for the removal of the articles mentioned in Schs. A and B in the petition. As such, a direction is to issue to respondents 1 and 2 herein to give police protection and the articles mentioned in Schs. A and B in the petition would be removed in the presence of the representatives of the third respondent-union to verify whether the articles to be removed are concerned with the orders placed with (1) Sri Lanka Sugar Corporation of Colombo and with (2). The Challapalli Sugars of India Ltd. , at Lakshmipuram unit. With regard to weighment the drawings will show the weighment.

(24) IN the result, the petition stands allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.