S.B. Sinha, J.

1. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated September 3, 1979, passed by a learned single Judge of this Court whereby and where under the writ application filed by the Appellant herein was dismissed.

2. The Petitioner was a Development Officer and, thus, was a Class-II Staff within the meaning of the provision of Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 framed under Clauses (b) and (bb) of Sub-Section (2) of Section 49 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956.

3. Admittedly, the Zonal Officer was his disciplinary authority.

4. Allegedly, for absence of a period of 61 days a disciplinary proceedings was initiated against the Appellant. He filed his written statement, inter alia, contending that he was not on unauthorised leave and/or otherwise, he was also entitled to grant of leave which was due to him. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the Zonal Manager. The Zonal Manager called upon the Appellant to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from services where after the Appellant submitted his explanation. He also prayed for a personal hearing but without grant of such hearing, an order of termination was made on January 28, 1969. The Appellant made a number of representations to the Respondent No. 4 to revoke and/or withdraw and/or cancel the said order and re-instate him in service. He also prayed for his re-employment if the re-instatement was not possible.

5. The Petitioner's representation for re-employment was rejected on February 15, 1974. The Petitioner, it appears, had also filed an appeal before the Chairman on August 3, 1970. On January 8, 1974, he sent a reminder to which the following reply was sent by a letter dated February 15, 1974, stating:

With reference to your letter dated 9th January, 1974 we have to inform you that as per Regulation 12 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, on person who has been dismissed from the service of the corporation shall be reemployed. As such, we regret our nobility to accede to your request.
6. The learned trial Judge by a laconic order dismissed the application, inter alia, holding that the Petitioner is guilty of unreasonable delay without explaining the same. As regard the other findings, no reason has at all been assigned nor the contention of the Appellant to the effect that the Zonal Manager being the appellate authority, he could not have acted as a disciplinary authority had been taken into consideration.

7. There is no doubt that in terms of the aforesaid Regulations a memorial to the Chairman is permissible.

8. It is not in dispute that such memorial had been rejected only on February 2, 1974. It was, therefore, not a case where there was absolutely no explanation for the delay on the part of the writ Petitioner in approaching this Court.

9. In Sudersan Trading Com. v. Kelvin Jute Co. C.L.T. 1999(1) H.C. 108, a Division Bench of this Court was a member held that the Court may in a given case even may not ask the writ Petitioner to avail alternative remedy.

10. In Md. Jaheeruddin v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. A.I.R. 1994 A.P. 259, it was held:

From a reading of the above decisions the position that emerges is that in exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the paramount consideration for the High Court is to render justice; justice not only to the Petitioner but also to the parties to the petition. The altimeter question will be whether the delay or laches on the part of the Petitioner are such as to confer a right on the opposite party on account of such delay or laches. If so, would it be unjust to exercise the jurisdiction in favour of the Petitioner, so as to divest the other party of the right accrued to him on account of such delay or laches. This has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case.
11. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Dolly Das 1999(4) S.C.C. 450, was held:

So far as the contention regarding laches of the Respondent in filing the writ petition is concerned, delay, by itself, may not defeat the claim for relief unless the position of the Appellant had been so altered which cannot be retracted on account of lapse of time or inaction of the other party. This aspect being dependent upon the examination of the facts of the case and such a contention not having been raised before the High Court, it would not be appropriate to allow the Appellants to raise such a contention for the first time before us. Besides, we may notice that the period for which the option or renewal has been exercised has not come to an end. During the subsistence of such a period certainly the Respondent could make a complaint that such exercise of option was not available to the Appellants and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Court could be invoked even at a later stage. Further, the Appellants are not put to undue hardship in any manner by reason of this delay in approaching the High Court for a relief.
12. In an unreported decision in Sri swapan Kumar Basu v. Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority and Ors. (C.O./C.R. No. 2065(W) of 1993) disposed of on September 16, 1998, leave had been granted despite delay and laches on the part of the Petitioner.

13. Thus, there cannot be any doubt that delay by itself would be a ground for dismissing a writ application although the same may be one of the factors for not interfering with the impugned order. As indicated hereinbefore, the learned trial Judge had not assigned any reason whatsoever in support of his judgment. The writ application should have been allowed only on the ground that the appellate authority had acted as a disciplinary authority as a result whereof the Appellant had been deprived of from a right of appeal. Such a right of appeal which has been conferred upon the Appellant by reason of a statute could not have been taken away. This aspect of the matter is squarely covered by a decision of the Apex Court in Surjit Ghosh v. Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Ors. A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1053.

14. Keeping in view the aforementioned legal principles. We are of the opinion that it is not a case where the writ petition ought to have been dismissed.

15. The question, however, arises is to what relief the Appellant may be entitled.

16. The Appellant has in the meantime superannuated. He, therefore, cannot be directed to be re-instated in service. He even, on Respondent's showing was dismissed from service only on the ground that he was absent unauthorisedly. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, We are of the opinion that the interest of justice shall be sub served if the writ Petitioner-Appellant is disposed of with a direction that he shall be deemed to be continuing in service till his age of superannuation, and, would be entitled to the terminal benefits together with a sum of Rs. 25,000.00 to be paid to him by way of compensation.

17. The appeal is allowed with the observation made hereinbefore, but without any order as to costs.

M.H.S. Ansari, J.

I agree.

Appeal allowed.