Chaudhuri, J.

1. The opposite party in this proceeding is one Mr. Brijnandban Sinha, Deputy Secretary to Political and Appointment Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, who has been asked to show cause as to why he should not be proceeded with contempt of Court. The proceeding was started on an application being made by the petitioner, Mr. Jyoti Narayan, Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector, residing at present in, mahalla Kadamkuan, one of the quarters of the town of Patna.

2. The petitioner is a member of the Bihar Judicial Civil Service, Executive Branch. It appears that the State Government received reports about serious misconduct and corrupt practices of Mr. Narayan in the discharge of his official duties while he was a Sub-divisional Officer at Auranga-bad & it was decided accordingly that an enquiry into the truth of the various charges against Mr. Narayan should be made under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act (No. 37) of 1950 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) and Mr. Anjani Kumar Saran, who was then an Additional District and Sessions Judge of Gaya and is now a District and Sessions Judge of that place, was appointed Commissioner under the Act for making the inquiry.

During the pendency of that inquiry, the opposite party wrote a confidential letter to the Commissioner on 26-12-1952, being D. O. No. II/30 306/52A-11614, which runs as follows :

"Dear Mr. Saran,

I am desired to refer to your memo No. 8266, dated 26-11-1952, and to say that Government are anxious not to allow Mr. Jyoti Narayan to adopt dilatory tactics and delay the progress of the inquiry against him. I am to request you to be vigilant against such tactics adopted by Mr. Narayan.

Yours sincerely,
Sd. B. N. Sinha."

It is alleged that the Commissioner in answer to that letter replied by his D. O. letter No. 244, dated 5-1-1953, stating that he would not allow Mr. Narayan to adopt any dilatory tactics to delay the progress of the inquiry against him.

On 2-2-1953, the petitioner filed a petition before the Commissioner stating, 'inter alia', that he had not been able to engage any lawyer or counsel for want of necessary papers and copies and prayed for an adjournment of the inquiry. He also prayed for starting a contempt of court proceeding against. Mr. B. N. Sinha, but the Commissioner rejected his both the prayers, namely, the prayer for adjournment as well as that for starting a contempt proceeding. According to the petitioner the conduct of Mr. B. N. Sinha amounted to a private-communication addressed to a court affecting the course of justice, and he had thereby committed contempt of court.

In these circumstances the petitioner filed an application to this Court for punishing, for contempt of court, the opposite party, Mr. B. N. Sinha, and two other persons against whom the application has been dismissed, and it is not necessary to refer here to the grounds on which the prayer for a proceeding for contempt of court as against those persons was made. A rule was issued only against Mr. B. N. Sinha.

3. According to Section 3. Contempt of Courts Act (No. 32 of 1952), every High Court has and exercises the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts-of itself except such contempt which is punishable by that subordinate court as an offence under the Indian Penal Code. In order, therefore, that this Court should take cognizance of the contempt alleged in this case, it has to be determined as a preliminary point, as argued by the Advocate-General on behalf of the opposite party, whether a Commissioner appointed under the Act is a court, and, if so, is a court subordinate to the High Court.

Under the Act the Commissioner after the close of the inquiry is required forthwith to report to Government the proceeding under the commission, and to send with the record thereof his opinion upon each of the articles of charge separately, with such observations as he thinks fit on the whole case, and it is for the Government to pass final orders thereon. Thus, it appears that the opinion of the Commissioner is not final, and is always subject to the approval or disapproval of the Government. It has, therefore, been argued by the learned Advocate-General that since the result of the inquiry made by the Commissioner has no binding authority on the parties, he is not a court within the meaning of Section 3, Contempt of Courts Act.

4. The expression "court" has not been defined in the Contempt of Courts Act. According to Section 3, Evidence Act, "court" includes all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence, and according to Section 4(m), Criminal P. C., "judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. Relying on these sections it has been argued by Mr. Ghosh on behalf of the petitioner that the Commissioner appointed under the Act, who is entitled to take evidence and to compel the attendance of witnesses and production of documents, is a court.

The definitions of the expressions "court" and "judicial proceeding" as given in those two Acts are, in my opinion, meant for the purposes of those Acts and it cannot be said as a general rule of law that every officer who is entitled to take evidence or to compel the attendance of witnesses and production of documents is necessarily a court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act.

In -- 'Queen-Empress v. Tulja', 12 Bom 36 (A), it was held that the definition of "court" given in the Evidence Act was framed only for the purposes of the Act itself, and should not be extended beyond its legitimate scope. In -- 'Mt. Dirji v. Srimati Goalin' AIR 1941 Pat 65 (FB) (B), a Full Bench of this Court, while considering the definition of "court" given in the Evidence Act, held, following -- '12 Bom 36 (A)', that this definition was by no means exhaustive and that it was framed only for the purpose of the Act itself and should not be extended beyond its legitimate scope. The same view has been taken in -- 'The Bharat Bank, Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi' AIR 1950 SC 183 (C), where their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while referring to that section of the Evidence Act, has laid down that the definition was by no means exhaustive, and was framed only for the purposes of the Act.

The point has, therefore, to be investigated independently of the Indian Evidence Act or of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There can be no doubt, as pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case referred to above, that to be a court, the person or persons who constitute it must be entrusted with judicial functions, that is, of deciding litigated questions according to law, and before a person or persons can be said to constitute a court it must be held that they derive their powers from the State and are exercising the judicial powers of the State.

5. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the opposite party on the case of -- 'Shell Company of Australia Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation' 1931 AC 275 (D), wherein it has been held that the exercise of judicial power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action. On the authority of this case the learned Advocate-General has argued that since the Commissioner under the Act has no power to give a binding and authoritative decision, he does never exercise judicial power, and, as such, it is not a court at all.

The decision of that case depended on the construction of Sections 71 and 72 of the Constitution of Australia which run as follows:

"71. The judicial powers of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia, and in such other Federal Courts as the Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it invests with Federal jurisdiction........"

"72. The justices of the High Court, and of the other Courts created by the Parliament-- (i) Shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council; (ii) Snail not be removed except by the Governor-General in Council, on an address from both Houses of Parliament in the same session, praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity......."

Section 41 of the (Federal) Income Tax Assessment Act, 1922-24, created a Board of Appeal, the members of which were appointed for seven years. The British Imperial Oil Company, Ltd., was a company incorporated in Great Britain and carrying on in Australia 'the business of selling oil, petrol and petroleum products. The High Court of Australia in a case relating to certain assessment made upon the company held that the Board of Appeal created by Section 41 of the said Income Tax Assessment Act exercised the judicial power of the Commonwealth and was, therefore, a tribunal contrary to Sections 71 and 72 of the Constitution of Australia in that its members were to be appointed not for life but for a period of seven years, and that as the provisions establishing the Board were not severable from the rest of the Act the assessment was invalid.

But before this decision could be given, there was a subsequent assessment upon the company in March, 1924, in respect of the financial year 1924-1925. The company objected to the assessment, and, before any further proceeding thereon could be taken, the High Court of Australia delivered the judgment referred to above. Subsequent to the above decision, the commonwealth Parliament enacted the Income Tax Assessment Act, 1925, whereby the 1922-1924 Act was amended, and there was substituted for the Board of Appeal a Board of Review, with provisions as to its functions and procedure differing from those as to the Board of Appeal. The members of the Board of Appeal were, however, to become the members of the Board of Review, and appointments were, as theretofore, to be for seven years.

The objection of the company having been disallowed by the Commissioner, it was directed that they could request the Commissioner either to refer his decision to the Board of Review for review, or to treat their objection as an appeal and to forward it either to the High Court or the Supreme Court of the State. The company requested that their objection should be forwarded to the Supreme Court of Victoria. That court stated a special case for the opinion of the High Court of Australia. The objection raised by the company was the same as raised by them in respect of the previous assessment, namely, that the members of the Board of Review having been appointed only for a period of seven years, the constitution of Board was contrary to the Constitution of Australia, and, as such, the assessment was invalid.

It may be noted that the power of the Board of Appeal as conferred by the Income Tax Assessment Act prior to the amendment of 1925 was the judicial power and the order of the board was final and conclusive on all parties except in certain cases. But, the Board of Review constituted in the place of the Board of Appeal after the amendment had no such power. It has the power to review the assessments of the Commissioner and its decisions were to be deemed to be assessments, determination or decisions of the Commissioner. The High Court, therefore, held that the Board of Review had an administrative function and did not exercise judicial power of the Commonwealth, and it was, therefore, held that the Board of Review was not open to the same objections as had been successfully urged against the Board of Appeal and that the assessment was not invalid.

Before the High Court it was also argued that since there was an appeal to that court from determination of the Board of Review, they must be held to be vested with judicial powers, but the High Court repelled that argument on the ground that the Parliament may have imposed upon the courts the duty of reviewing administrative determinations. In considering the correctness of that decision the Supreme Court made the observation, referred to in the beginning and on which reliance has been placed, as stated above, by the learned Advocate-General, that the exercise of 'judicial power' does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action.

In my opinion, the observation made by their Lordships was with reference to the law existing in the State. Before their Lordships there was a clear case for consideration that in view of the fact that the binding authority that had been given to the orders passed by the Board of Appeal having been taken away from the Board of Review, the latter did not exercise the judicial power. Their Lordships, however, relying on the case of -- 'Rex v. Electricity Commissioners' 1924 1 KB 171 (E); enumerated some negative propositions on the subject which are as follows: 1. A tribunal is not necessarily a court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision. 2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath. 3. Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. 4. Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects. 5. Nor because there is an appeal to a court, 6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body. Therefore, this case is no authority for the proposition under consideration in the present case.

Reference has been made on behalf of the opposite party to the observations made in the Full . Bench case of -- 'AIR 1941 Pat 65 (B)', where their Lordships quoted a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Volume 8, p. 526, which runs as follows :

"Many bodies are not courts, although they have to decide questions, and in so doing have to act judicially, in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality, such as assessment committees, guardians committees, the court of referees constituted under the Unemployment Insurance Acts to decide claims made on the insurance funds, the benchers of the Inns of Court when considering the conduct of one of their members, the General Medical Council, when considering questions affecting the position of a medical man"
and observed that the same remarks apply to some extent to commissions of enquiry whose duty is merely to report and not to decide matters referred to them. In that case, the question referred to the Full Bench was whether a Commissioner appointed under the Workmen's Compensation Act is a court and their Lordships held that the Commissioner appointed under that Act constitutes an independent tribunal and his function is to judge and decide and not merely to enquire and advice, & in judging or deciding the matters before him he has to proceed judicially and not arbitrarily. In short he satisfied all the main tests which, one has to apply for determining whether a tribunal is a court or not.

The position, however, of the Commissioner under that Act was different from the Commissioner who was only appointed for inquiry and report, and, therefore, the observation of their Lordships referred to above was mere 'obiter'.

In -- 'Satdeo Pandey v. Baba Raghav Das' AIR 1953 All 419 (F), the term "Court" as used in the Contempt of Courts Act has been held to have been used in a wide sense as including a tribunal, legally authorised to deal with a particular matter judicially. It is enough if the tribunal is entrusted with certain "judicial functions" which include the function of "deciding litigated questions according to law"--deciding them not arbitrarily, but according to certain rules and procedure which ensure that the person called upon to decide them acts with fairness and impartiality.

In -- 'Naloo Patra v. Emperor' 38 Cal 368 (G), the proceeding of a Deputy Collector under the Land Registration Act in an application for the registry of the applicant's name as proprietor was held to be a proceeding of a court. It was held in that case that the circumstances that Mr. collector had power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel them to give evidence & also compel the production of documents went to show that he was to act as a Court.

In -- 'Queen-Empress v. Munda Shetti' 24 Mad 121 (H), a Tahsildar when holding an inquiry as to whether a transfer of names in a land register should be made or not, was held to be a revenue court. It was observed there that the Tahsildar was authorised under Act III of .1869.... to receive evidence and decide whether the transfer should be made or not. There way, therefore, a tribunal empowered to deal with a particular matter and authorized to receive evidence bearing on that matter in order to enable him to arrive at a determination.

'In re, R. Nataraja Iyer' 36 Mad 72 (I), it was held that the test for deciding whether an officer was a court or not was if there was a 'lis' before that officer. In that case, however, it was also held that mere authority to receive evidence would not make the officer recording it a Court.

6. The case referred to above gives an indication of the various tests to be applied in deter-mining whether a particular officer is a court or not in order, however, to find whether a Commissioner appointed under the Act is a Court within the meaning of Section 3 Contempt of Courts Act, we may not have to travel beyond the Act itself. Section 8 of the Act runs as follows :

"The Commissioner shall have the same power of punishing contempts and obstructions to their proceedings, as is given to civil and criminal courts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and shall have the same powers for the summons of witnesses, and for compelling the production of documents, and for the discharge of their duty under the commission, and shall be entitled to the same protection as the Zila and City Judges, except that all process to cause the attendance of witnesses or other compulsory process, shall be served through and executed by the Zila or City Judge in whose jurisdiction the witness or other person resides, on whom the process is to be served, and if he resides within Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, then through the Supreme Court of Judicature thereto. When the commission has been issued to a Court, or other person or persons having power to issue such process in the exercise of their ordinary authority, they may also use all such power for the purposes of the Commission."
7. Thus, it appears that the Commissioners appointed under the Act have been given the power of punishing contempts and obstructions to their process as is given to civil and criminal courts by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 480, Criminal P. C., provides that when any such offence as is described in Sections 175, 178, 179, 180 and 223, Penal Code is committed in the view or presence of any Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court, the Court may cause the offender to be detained in custody and at any time before the rising of the court on the same day may, if it thinks fit, take cognizance of the offence and sentence the offender to fine not exceeding two hundred rupees, and, in default of payment, to simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, unless such fine be sooner paid.

Section 228, Penal Code lays down that whosoever Intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any public servant, while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term, which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. It is, therefore, clear that if any offence coming under Section 228, Penal Code is committed in the presence of the Commissioner appointed under the Act, he is entitled to punish for contempt of himself, and, for that purpose he is undoubtedly a court.

The learned Advocate-General has also conceded that the Commissioner is a court for that limited purpose. His argument, however, is that if the contempt is committed outside his presence, he is enticed to no protection under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and he is not a court within the meaning of that Act. I am unable to agree with this contention. I cannot imagine the Legislature to have thought of providing for punishing an offender for the contempt of the Commissioner appointed under the Act if the contempt is committed in his presence and not for the contempt of that officer committed outside his presence. The Commissioners have been given the powers for summoning witnesses and for compelling the production of documents. It has also been provided that when the commission has been issued to a person having power to issue such, process in the exercise of his ordinary authority, he may also use all such, power for the purposes of the commission.

The position, therefore, is clear that the Act itself contemplates that the Commissioner so appointed has and can exercise the power of a court and is, therefore, to be treated for all practical purposes as a Court.

Exactly a similar point arose in -- 'S. Kapur Singh v. L. Jagat Narain' (J), in which a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court held as follows:

"A Commissioner appointed to hold an inquiry under the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850, is a court as he is given all the powers of a court regarding the summoning of witnesses and other matters. The mere fact that he can give no final decision but has merely to draw up a report giving his finding on the charges which is to be forwarded to the Government is not sufficient to make him anything other than a Court."
In coming to that decision their Lordships relied on an earlier decision of the Lahore High Court in -- 'M. M. Khan v. Emperor' AIR 1931 Lah 662 (K). The facts of the Lahore case were that some Special Commissioner under the Act had been appointed to hold an inquiry against an officer in the Irrigation Department, and the question arose whether the Special Commissioner was a court for the purpose of filing a complaint under Section 195, Criminal P. C. regarding a document put in by that officer which was thought to be forged. 16 was held that the officers appointed as Special Commissioners under the Act to hold an inquiry regarding the conduct of a public servant constituted a court within the meaning of Section 195, Criminal P. C., &, therefore, a complaint by them was necessary. On consideration of the authorities and the various tests to be applied in the light of the provisions made in the Act in question itself, I am of opinion that a commissioner appointed under the Act of 1850 is a Court within the meaning of Section 3, Contempt of Courts Act.

8. The learned Advocate-General has also raised a point that the protection to which a Commissioner is entitled tinder the Act refers to the protection provided in the Judicial Officers' Protection Act (Act No. 18 of 1850), 1850. That Act contains only one section which runs as follows :

"No Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any civil court for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction. Provided that he at the time in good faith, believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of; and no officer of any court or other person, bound to execute the lawful warrants or orders of any such Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any civil court for the execution of any warrant or order, which he would be bound to execute, if within the jurisdiction of the person issuing the same."
This Act was passed a few months earlier than the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, and the argument of the learned Advocate-General is that the word "protection" used in the Act referred to the protection provided by the earlier Act. His further contention is that there was no contempt of Courts Act at the time when the Act was passed and, therefore, the Legislature could not be understood to have used the word "protection" to mean the protection given under the Contempt of Courts Act.

There seems to be no force in this argument. If the Legislature meant to limit the extent of the protection given, by Section 8 of the Act to one as provided by the Judicial Officers' Protection Act, it would have been clearly mentioned like that. In my opinion, the Commissioner under the Act is entitled to all protections that may be available to him at the time when the question of protection comes for consideration. Moreover, as observed by Wills, J. in -- 'Rex v. Davies' 1906 1 KB 32 (L), the principle upon which persons are punished for attacks upon courts is not for the purpose of protecting either the court as a whole or the individual Judges of the court from a repetition of them, but of protecting the public, and especially these who either voluntarily or by compulsion are subject to its jurisdiction, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the tribunal be undermined or impaired.

Reference may be made to the observations of Wilmot, C. J. in an undelivered judgment in 1765, according to which

"the real offence is the wrong done to the public by weakening the authority and influence of a tribunal which exists for their good alone."
Again, in -- Belmore v. Smith' 1886 35 Ch D 449 (M), it has been held that the object of the discipline enforced by the court in case of contempt of court is not to vindicate the dignity of the court or the person of the Judge, but to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice. In my opinion, therefore, this Court can take cognizance of the contempt of the Commissioner as being contempt of court even though the argument of the learned Advocate-General to the effect that he is not entitled to protection other than that given under the Judicial Officers' Protection Act be accepted.

9. It has next been contended on behalf of the opposite party that the appointment of Mr. Anjani Kumar Saran as Commissioner under the Act was a mere 'persona designata' and not as a court. Order No. II/C3-306/52A-5S23, dated 21-6-1952 of the Appointment Department to the Government of Bihar runs as follows :

"Whereas the Governor of Bihar is of the opinion that there are good grounds for making a formal and public inquiry into the truth of the imputations of misbehaviour, the substance of which has been drawn up, under the directions of the Governor, in seven articles of charges thereunder specified) against Mr. Jyoti Narayan, Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector, at present under suspension.

2. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Sections 2, 3 and 4, Public Servants' (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850), the Governor is pleased to direct that a formal and public inquiry be made into the truth of the aforesaid charges by Mr. Anjani Kumar Saran, Additional District and Sessions Judge at Gaya, who is hereby appointed Commissioner for the purpose and to him the inquiry, hereby ordered, is committed........"

It has been argued that the words "Additional District and Sessions Judge at Gaya" have been used as a description of Mr. Anjani Kumar Saran and not by way of an indication that he is appointed a Commissioner in his capacity as an Additional District and Sessions Judge at Gaya.

It appears that Mr. Saran at present is holding the post of the District and Sessions Judge at Gaya, and is holding the inquiry in question under the same appointment. It is, therefore, clear that the Government intended that the inquiry was to be made by Mr. Saran irrespective of the post that he might be holding and if the Government would have intended to have the inquiry made by the Additional District and Sessions Judge of Gaya, then after Mr. Saran became the District and Sessions Judge of that place, he would have ceased to have any authority to proceed further with that inquiry and it would have been made by the next Additional District and Sessions Judge of that place who might have been posted in place of Mr. Saran, or, the Government would have been required to make a fresh appointment of Mr. Saran as a District and Sessions Judge of the place to hold the inquiry.

Therefore, there seems to be much force in the argument of the learned Advocate-General that the appointment of Mr. Saran was a mere 'persona designata'. But, as pointed out in the Full Bench decision of this Court in -- 'AIR 1941 Pat 65 (B), there is no real antithesis between the expressions "persona designata" and "Court", or, in other words, even a 'persona designata' may be a court, and whether he is a court or not depends upon his powers and the functions which he has to discharge. As already discussed, Section 8 of the Act makes it clear that the Commissioner appointed for the purpose of an inquiry is a court and the latter part of the section makes it clear that if that person has the power to issue process in the exercise of his ordinary authority, he may use all such power I for the purposes of the commission. Therefore, in my opinion, the appointment of Mr. Saran, though, a mere 'persona designata', makes him a court within the meaning of Section 3, Contempt of Courts Act.

10. It has not been seriously disputed that if it is held that the Commissioner under the Act is a court, it is subordinate to the High Court. When the Contempt of Courts Act speaks of courts subordinate to the High Court, it clearly refers to judicial subordination, vide, -- 'State v. Brahma Prakash' AIR 1950 All 556 . (N). According to Article 227, Constitution of India, every High Court has the power of superintendence over all courts and tri-bunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction except a court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed forces. Referring to the power of the High Court under this article a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in -- 'Girish Chandra Majhi v. Girish Chandra. Maity' AIR 1951 Cal 574 (O) held as follows:

"Where a tribunal has been set up under a Special Act, it is the duty of this court to see, in the exercise of its power of superintendence, that such tribunal acts within the limits of the Statute creating it, and applies correctly and properly the laws it is authorised to administer."
A Division Bench of this Court in -- 'Shah Mohammad Umair v. Ram Charan Singh' AIR 1954 Pat. 225 (P), has also taken the view that under this article the High Court can interfere judicially with the orders and judgments of the Courts and tribunals. The Division Bench case of the Punjab High Court in -- ' (J)', while dealing with the contempt of the Commissioner appointed under the Act construed Article 227, Constitution of India so as to hold that a Commissioner appointed to make an inquiry under the Act is a court subordinate to the High Court for the purposes of the Contempt of Courts Act. There is a single Judge decision of the Madras High Court in -- 'In re, Annamalai Muda-liar' AIR 1953 Mad 362 (Q), which, while construing this Article held:

"All agencies, whether courts or not, performing the duty of deciding disputed questions of right between parties on behalf of and under the sanction of the State and in accordance with State-made laws, are placed under the administrative and judicial control of the High Court."
Similarly, in -- 'Sukhdeo Balswar v. Brij Bhushan Misra' AIR 1951 All 687 (R), the Panchayati Adalats constituted under the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act (Act No. 26 of 1947) have been held to be courts within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act. It has been further held in that case that the High Court has now under Article 227 of the Constitution the same power of superintendence which it had up to the passing of the Government of India Act of 1935, and in exercise of it, it can check the assumption of excess of jurisdiction by Panchayati Adalats or compel them to exercise their jurisdiction and do their duty, and they are, therefore, judicially subordinate to the High Court.

Taking the same view of this Article a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in -- 'Haripada. Dutta v. Ananta Mandal' AIR 1952 Cal 526 (S), has held that the Bhagchas Conciliation Board and the Appellate Officer under the West Bengal Bargadars Act are both tribunals within the meaning of Article 227, and, as such, they are subject to the judicial superintendence of the High Court. It is therefore, clear that the Commissioner appointed under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 3, Contempt of Courts Act.

11. The next question is whether the writing in question amounted to a contempt of court. Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a Judge of the Court into con-tempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of court, vide -- 'The Queen v. Gray' (1900) 2 Q B 36 (T). Similarly, an act or writing which is calculated to obstruct or interfere with due course of justice or the lawful process of the court amounts to a contempt of court. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the letter sent by the opposite party to the Commissioner is calculated to bring a court or a Judge of the court into contempt, or to lower his authority, or to obstruct or interfere with due course of justice or the lawful process of the court.

In -- 'Rizwan-Ul-Hasan v. State of Uttar Pradesh ' AIR 1953 SC 185 (U) in a proceeding under Section 145, Criminal P. C. pending before the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Jalaun, the Secretary of the District Congress Committee wrote a recommendatory letter to the District Magistrate who was, therefore, convicted of the contempt of court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed, that the Congress Secretary had been rightly held guilty of contempt and punished.

In -- 'The State v. Radhagobinda Das' (V), the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Orissa (Enforcement Department) wrote a letter to the District Magistrate, Cuttack, to the effect that a prosecution report in a 'spectacular case' against a cloth dealer who had hoarded a large quantity of cloth 'by fabricating a false account of sale' was being sent to him and further requested him to ensure a speedy trial of the 'spectacular case' and intimate the results. The District Magistrate endorsed the letter to the Sub-divisional Magistrate 'for needful' who forwarded it to the trying Magistrate with a similar endorsement while transferring the case for trial. The trying Magistrate moved the High Court for contempt proceedings. It was held that the District Magistrate and the Sub-divisional Magistrate were guilty of contempt of court.

Referring to this case the learned Advocate-General has contended that in that case their Lordships held the two officers guilty of contempt not because of the request for its speedy trial, but for the fact that by that letter it was asserted that the dealer had hoarded a large quantity of cloth and had fabricated a false account.

In this connection, however, the observation of Das, c. J. (as he then was) may profitably be quoted :

"Even the request for a speedy trial emanating from a Deputy Secretary to the Government to the District Magistrate, and intended to be communicated to the trial Magistrate, might well be a source of serious embarrassment to the trial Magistrate and affect the judicial discretion that he may be called upon to exercise when one or other of the parties to the case feel the necessity to ask for adjournments. The proper course to adopt in such situations, where a speedy trial was called for, is to instruct the prosecutor to apply in court, openly and formally, rather than to move through the executive machinery."
In -- 'AIR 1953 All 419 (F)', the contemner had sent a letter to the S. D. O. of Salimpur in the district of Deoria with reference to a proceeding for correction of entries then pending in his court. It was held that the letter was not only intended to work up the mind of the S. D. O. but had at least a tendency to create that effect, and the contemner was, therefore, held to be guilty of contempt of court.

The letter in question in the present case has already been quoted 'in extenso'. On reading it I have no doubt in my mind that it was clearly asserted that Mr. Jyoti Narayan was adopting dilatory tactics for delaying the progress of the inquiry against him and that a request was made not in open court through the proper channel but by a confidential letter asking the Commissioner to be vigilant against such tactics adopted by Mr. Narayan. In my opinion, it might well be a source of serious embarrassment to the Commissioner and affect his judicial decision that he may be called upon to exercise when Mr. Narayan may feel the necessity to ask for adjournments. That being so, the conduct of the opposite party in writing the letter as he did, amounted to a contempt of court.

12. No doubt, as laid down in -- '1900 2 Q B 36 (T)', the jurisdiction for proceeding with contempts of courts is to be exercised with scrupulous care and to be exercised only when the case is clear and beyond reasonable doubt. It is also true that the jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice and that the purpose of the court's action is a practical purpose and it is reasonably clear on the authorities that the court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety, vide, -- 'AIR 1953 SC 185 (U).

In -- 'Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh', AIR 1954 SC 10 (W). certain members of the Executive Committee of the District Bar Association at Muzaffarnagar within the State of Uttar Pradesh passed certain resolutions on 20-4-1949, to the effect that in their considered opinion Mr. Kanhaya Lal, Judicial Magistrate, and Mr. Lalta Prasad, Revenue Officer, are thoroughly incompetent in law, do not inspire confidence in their judicial work, are given to stating wrong facts when passing orders and are over bearing and discourteous to the litigant public and the lawyers alike. They were proceeded with for contempt of court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the resolutions did not amount to a contempt of court, and the contempt, if any, was of technical nature.

In the present case, however, the confidential letter addressed to the Commissioner, in my opinion, is calculated to have a serious effect on the mind of the petitioner and the public, and it thereby tended to interfere with the administration of justice. Where literate persons holding respectable posts address a written communication to a court which might tend to influence it, I do not think their conduct amounts to a contempt of technical nature. In my opinion, it is a serious matter and no one, specially the executive officers of the Government, should be permitted to communicate with, the court on any matter which is pending before it, and we cannot allow such conduct to go unnoticed.

13. It has been argued on behalf of the opposite party that he never intended to influence the Commissioner and all that he did was to bring it to his notice that the inquiry should be proceeded with speedily. The intention or motive of the contemner, however, is not essential part of the contempt, vide, -- '(V)'.

In -- 'Demibai Gengji v. Rowji Sojpal' AIR 1937 Bom 305 (X), it was Held that the intention of the writer might often be of secondary importance, that the question was always what would be the effect of the articles, if they would tend to distract and interfere with due and proper course of administration of justice.

In -- 'P. S. Tuljaram Rao v. Governor of Reserve Bank of India' AIR 1939 Mad 257 (Y).' Leach, C. J. observed as follows :

"To comment on a case which is 'sub judice' or to suggest that the court should take a certain course in respect of a matter before it undoubtedly constitutes contempt and honesty of motive cannot remove it from this category..... The criterion is not whether the court will be influenced, but whether the action complained of is calculated to prejudice the course of justice."
It has also been contended that from the order of the Commissioner rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for starting a proceeding for contempt it appears that the Commissioner himself did not find anything in the letter from which it could be inferred that the contemner intended to influence him in the exercise of his judicial function and that all that he meant by writing the letter was that the inquiry should be expedited, and, therefore, the writing in question did not tend to affect or influence the Commissioner. But, it is not necessary that there must have been actual interference with the administration of justice. It is enough if it is likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law, vide'  AIR 1954 SC 10 (W)'.

14. Lastly, it has been contended by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the opposite party that the petitioner obtained a rule in the present case on making a representation by falsely misquoting the letter. From the petition filed in this Court, by Mr. Narayan the impugned letter appears to have been quoted verbatim as follows:

"Confidential

Government of Bihar
Political & Appointment Department
D. O. NO. 11/C-3-30G/52A-11614.
Patna, dated the 28th Dec. 52.

Dear Mr. Sharan,

I am to address you regarding the inquiry against Jyoti Narayan under the Public Servants' (Inquiries) Act. I am to request to see that no time is granted to Mr. Narayan and he is not allowed to adopt dilatory tactics or to delay the inquiry and to be on your guard against such tactics of Mr. Narayan.

Yours sincerely,
Sd. B. N. Sinha."

It is contended that the opposite party never requested the court that no time should be granted to Mr. Narayan. The letter which he sent, as already quoted, does not speak of granting or non-granting of time, and the proceeding should be thrown out on this ground alone. I do not think there is any substance in this contention.

It is contended by Mr. Ghosh on behalf of the petitioner, and in support of his contention he has shown to us a certified copy of the order passed by the Commissioner, that he was not given copies of the letter written by the opposite party and the reply to that letter sent by the Commissioner, and all that he quoted in the petition was from the memory of the petitioner who had seen those letters in the record of the case. To repel this argument our attention has been drawn to the statements made in the petition filed by the petitioner before the Commissioner on 2-2-1953, which do not show that any request was made by that letter for not allowing adjournments to the petitioner, but as has rightly been contended by Mr. Ghosh, the petitioner had only given the gist of the letter in that petition. Be that as it may, the contents of the letter which is admittedly alleged to have been sent to the Commissioner, leave no room for doubt, as already held, that they did tend to influence the mind of the Commissioner and to interfere with the due administration of justice, and in my opinion, therefore, the proceeding cannot be thrown out merely on the ground that the contents of the letter given in the petition were not accurately quoted.

15. Then remains the question of sentence. As already observed, the conduct of the opposite party in writing the letter is one of which a serious notice should be taken. His intention or motive, if any, not to influence the mind of the Commissioner cannot be taken to be a circumstance in considering the question of sentence favourably towards him. A letter No. 9/17/42-E3TS. from the Home Department of the Government of India, dated 27-5-1943, was issued to all Provincial Governments for expeditious disposal of disciplinary cases against Government servants. That letter related to the amendment of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, and had nothing to do with the inquiry to be held under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act.

The Commissioner, however, was feeling difficulty in communicating his orders to the petitioner. He attempted to have his orders communicated to the petitioner at Motihari through the District Magistrate of Motihari, but as the petitioner had left Motihari without giving his address to the District Magistrate, the orders could not be communicated to him. The Commissioner-thereupon pointed out to the Government the difficulties experienced by him in getting his orders communicated to Mr. Narayan. On 24-11-1952, the Commissioner passed an order calling upon the parties to attend the hearing of the proceedings on 8-12-1952, and forwarded a copy of his order to the opposite party by his memo No. 8266, dated 26-11-1952, for communication to Mr. Narayan. On 18-12-1952, the Commissioner holding the inquiry passed an order recording that he was feeling great difficulty in contacting Mr. Narayan and in communicating his orders to him, and he observed that this was a highly undesirable state of affairs and that it was necessary that his orders should be communicated to Mr. Narayan as quickly as possible.

A copy of this order was forwarded to the opposite party along with a letter dated 20-12-1952, for information and (sic) needful. After having received this letter, the opposite party sent a reply to the previous letter of the Commissioner dated 26-11-1952, and that is the letter which is the subject matter of the present proceeding. It is clear, therefore, that by the time when this letter was written by the opposite party, he had already received the other letter from the Commissioner dated 20-12-1952, from which the Government formed an opinion that the petitioner was adopting dilatory tactics and in those circumstances the opposite party wrote the letter in question, purposely with a view to give an indication to the Commissioner to be reluctant in giving adjournments to the petitioner. In his show cause petition the opposite party has attempted to justify his conduct and has persisted in justifying it throughout the hearing of the case. In spite of the opportunities he has never thought of tendering any apology. On being questioned by us as to what attitude the opposite party wanted to take if we held that what he did amounted to con-tempt of court, the learned Advocate-General simply stated that in that case his client will be very sorry. This may amount to regret, but it is not an apology.

16. Considering all these facts and circumstances I hold that the opposite party is guilty of contempt of court, and I accordingly sentence him to pay a fine of Rs. 250 to be paid within two weeks from today, and, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month.

Sinha, J.

17. I agree entirely and have nothing to add.