Devan Ramachandran, J.The plaintiff in a suit filed for rendering of accounts of a partnership and for declaring that the partnership stands dissolved, is the appellant in this appeal.

2. The appellant alleges that a firm by name M/s Sealand Timbers was formed and constituted by him and respondents 2 and 3 herein, as per Ext.A1 partnership deed dated 25.02.2002. The specific averment of the appellant in the plaint was that the firm was constituted with a capital of Rs. 5,00,000/- which was contributed by the partners in the ratio of 20%, 30% and 50% between the appellant, second and third respondent herein respectively. He alleges that after the partnership was so constituted, the capital was invested for the purpose of establishment of the factory run by the firm and that, for the said purpose, the property belonging to the third respondent was taken on lease by the partnership under a lease agreement. The said lease agreement has been produced on record and marked as Ext.A2.

3. The appellant has a specific assertion that when the said property was entrusted to the firm, it was a paddy field which required large amount of filling and that a shed was thereafter constructed thereon, all with the funds contributed by the partners into the said firm. He says that machines like band-saw, resaw, cross cutter, drilling machine etc were purchased and installed in the shed constructed by the firm in the said land. The appellant alleges that the third respondent herein did not have any experience in timber business, whereas, he has had a great amount of expertise and familiarity in the said line of business. According to the appellant, when the business began to progress and flourish, the attitude of the third respondent began to change and reached a situation where the continuance of the business by the firm became difficult, which finally necessitated that the firm be dissolved. He alleges that the dispute between the partners was primarily on account of the influence of the father and brother of the third respondent herein and that the intention of the third respondent was to convert the partnership business as his own proprietary concern. He says that when matters became incorrigible between the partners, he requested the third respondent herein for dissolution of the firm, but that the said attempts did not yield any result. The cause of action that has been pleaded by the appellant in the plaint is that on 15.6.2004, the third respondent along with his father and brother threatened the appellant with bodily injuries and even fear of death, if he even entered the premises of the firm. On such allegations the suit was filed seeking that the firm be declared to be dissolved and also for rendition of the accounts.

4. A written statement was filed on behalf of the third respondent herein, being the third defendant in the suit, wherein it is specifically alleged that the firm had already been dissolved with effect from 31.3.2004 and that the accounts of the firm as on that day had been already settled between the parties and in fact approved. The third respondent specifically alleges that the appellant was not entitled to seek any relief in the suit because the firm had already been dissolved and that his attempt in filing the suit is to obtain the profits in the concern, which after the dissolution, has been run by the third respondent herein as a proprietary firm, as per the terms of the dissolution, and thus to obtain to himself undue enrichment by making a claim over the profits that the proprietary concern had made under the charge of the third respondent.

5. The second defendant who, the parties concede, was the Managing Partner of the firm, filed a written statement virtually admitting the plaint averments and supporting the appellant. This written statement was filed on behalf of the first defendant firm also because the second respondent, as its Managing Partner, is competent to represent it. The second respondent stated in the written statement that even though he was the Managing Partner of the firm, he is not in a position to attend to the affairs of the partnership on account of the threat meted out to him by the third respondent with the active support of his father and brother. The second respondent alleges that he had spend Rs. 20,00,000/- in the business and that he is, therefore, entitled to get Rs. 25,00,000/- as the share in profits. It is the specific case of the second respondent that the third respondent had manipulated the accounts of the firm for his convenience with the intention to make unlawful gain.

6. On the basis of these pleadings available on the record, the court below framed the following issues:

"1. Whether partnership firm is dissolved on 31.3.2004

2. If not, whether the firm is liable to be dissolved

3. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the accounting of the firm

4. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the injunction as prayed for

5. Reliefs and costs"

7. The suit was thereafter taken to trial during which the appellant herein examined himself as PW1 and two other witnesses were caused to be examined on his side as PW2 and PW3. Exts.A1 to A4 and Exts. C1 and C2 were marked by the court below on the side of the appellant/plaintiff. Defendants 2 and 3, respondents 2 and 3 herein, also gave oral evidence and caused themselves to be examined as DW1 and DW2 respectively. Another witness, DW3 was also examined on the side of the defendants. The third respondent herein marked Exts.B1 to B51 documents on his side.

8. The court below after consideration of all the materials available and the evidence let in by the parties, concluded that the partnership, namely, M/s Sealand Timbers, is to be deemed to have been dissolved as on 31.3.2004 and that the accounts of the firm, including its stock and finished goods, be taken on the basis that the firm had been dissolved as on 31.3.2004. It also ordered that the goodwill of the business of the firm and the stock-in-trade be sold within a period of six months from the date of the decree, on application of any of the parties, and that either of the parties is at liberty to bid at the same. The court below went on further direct that the accounts be taken and all other acts required to be done for such purpose be completed within a period of four months from the date of the judgment and decree and made available to the parties.

9. The appellant, being aggrieved by the finding and direction of the court below that the firm had been dissolved as early as on 31.3.2004 and that the accounts of the firm only upto that day be taken and rendered between the parties, has filed this appeal.

10. We also notice that a cross objection has been filed by the third respondent herein, being aggrieved by the finding of the court below in paragraph 16 of the impugned judgment that, "it is evident that the site was levelled for the construction of sheds and the machinery was installed by using the fund of the business."

The cross objection has been preferred on the premise that these findings are improper and unsustainable on the evidence and materials available and to declare that such construction and installation of the machinery was not made using the funds of the business.

11. We have heard Sri. B.K. Gopalakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in R.F.A.No.266 of 2009 and Sri. K. Jayakumar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri. N. Ajith, appearing on behalf of the third respondent in the appeal who has filed the cross objection.

12. As we have already recorded in our prefatory observations in the paragraphs above, the suit was instituted by the appellant herein seeking a decree of dissolution of the firm and for rendition of the accounts, thus with the claim for proportionate profits and share of the partnership property and profits. The third respondent specifically pleaded that the partnership has been dissolved as early as on 31.3.2004. On the basis of the minutes of the meetings of the partnership firm on certain earlier dates, the court below entered into a conclusive finding that the partnership was dissolved as on 31.3.2004 and decreed the suit, directing that the accounts be rendered as on that day, and drew up a preliminary decree on such lines. The appellant has impugned this judgment and decree on the ground that the finding of the court below that the partnership was dissolved on 31.3.2004 is not correct and is not tenable.

13. We are in this appeal, called upon essentially to consider whether the finding of the court below that the partnership was dissolved on 31.3.2004 is valid or otherwise. On this one issue would hinge all the others because, if the partnership firm has not been dissolved on that day, then there would be sufficient force in the contention of the appellant that the partnership will then have to be treated to be dissolved on a later date and accounts rendered accordingly.

14. On our examination of the issue as to whether the firm was dissolved as on 31.3.2004 or otherwise, we have intently referred to Ext.B11, which is the book of the minutes recorded by the firm of their meetings ever since the firm was constituted. We are aware that only two pages of the said book, marked as Exts.B11(a) and B11(b), relating to pages 2 and 8 thereof have been marked in evidence. However, we are also cognizant that the rest of the pages of the said minutes book have been marked as Exts. B4, B6, B7, B8, B1 and B3 in evidence, but that these pages were produced as photocopies and marked as such. However, since Ext.B11, the minutes book itself is available before us, we are of the view that we are justified in considering the entries in the minutes book with reference to the copies of the pages that have been marked as above.

15. From Ext.B11 minutes book, it is evident that the first meeting of the partnership firm was held on 20.2.2002. This is also discernible from Ext.B4, which is corresponding to page 1 of the minutes book. The second meeting was on 4.3.2002, wherein decisions were taken to fill up the paddy field taken on lease from the 3rd respondent as also to construct a shed on the said property. The property in question, as we have indicated above, belonged to the third respondent herein and it was leased out to the partnership firm by him under Ext.A2 lease deed. As per the minutes recorded in Ext.B5, namely during the meeting held on 4.3.2002, the partners decided to fill up the land to a height of 4 feet and to construct a shed with asbestos sheets for its roof, for the purpose of running an engineering workshop. The third meeting of the partnership firm was held on 8.5.2002, which is evident from Ext.B6 document and the fourth meeting on 12.7.2002, as is evidenced from Ext.B7. These meetings did not record or minute any dispute between the parties and the fifth meeting which was held on 31.3.2003 continued to record certain decisions taken by the firm in furtherance to the stated objectives of the business.

16. We see that the disputes between the parties appear to arise somewhere during November, 2003, an indication of which is available from Ext.B1, which corresponds to page 9 of Ext.B11 minutes book. In the meeting that was held on 8.11.2003, it is seen recorded that the appellant and the second respondent herein are not interested in continuing as partners in the firm and that they have taken a decision to retire on their own volition from the partnership. This was followed by the meeting held on 21.11.2003, recorded as Ext.B3 minutes which corresponds to page No.10 in Ext.B11 minutes book. The original page of the minutes book relating to this meeting is also marked as Ext.B11 (b). This minutes, which is recorded as above, is in our view the most crucial document in an evaluation of the dialectic claims of the parties.

17. The crucial meeting was held on 21.11.2003, wherein it appears that the parties had virtually agreed to dissolve the firm with effect from 31.3.2004. We say this because, the entries contained in Ext.B11(b), namely, the minutes of that day would show indisputably that the appellant and the second respondent did not intend to continue in the firm any day after 31.3.2004 and that a resolute decision was taken by them to have the firm dissolved and to have the accounts prepared and settled as on that day. What is relevant in the said document is that there is a mention of Rs. 8,50,000/-, being a liability that was upon the partnership, on account of a loan that was availed by it, which was agreed to be apportioned equally between the second and third respondent herein. The minutes is ineluctable that the second respondent herein, Sri. Jose, who is also the Managing Partner of the firm, would repay the entire loan amount to the bank and for that purpose, the third respondent herein, Sri. Dinto Jacob would pay Sri. Jose an amount of Rs. 4,25,000/- representing half of the value of the loan, so as to exonerate himself from all further liability of the firm. It is not merely that this was recorded as an agreement, but the subsequent entry in Ext.B11(b) would also show that Sri. Dinto, the third respondent herein, had actually delivered a cheque bearing No.670820 dated 21.11.2003, drawn on the South Indian Bank to Sri. Jose, the second respondent herein, for payment into the loan account for closure of the same. The question before us is whether, the entries in Ext.B11(b) namely, the minutes that was recorded on 21.11.2003, would guide us to an inference that the partnership was dissolved as on 31.3.2004.

18. It is pertinent that even in Ext.B11, which is the minutes book or in any of the other documents, there are no other minutes recorded which would indicate that the last of the meetings of the partnership firm was held on 21.11.2003 and never thereafter. When the minutes recorded on that day, namely Ext.B11(b) which corresponds to Ext.B3, show that the partners had unequivocally agreed to dissolve the firm as on 31.3.2004 and that for such purpose, Sri. Dinto, the third respondent herein, had delivered a cheque as mentioned above, towards the liability of the firm and for the closure of the loan availed by the firm on 21.11.2003 itself, we can find hardly any fault with the view taken by the court below that the firm should be deemed to have been dissolved and closed as on 31.3.2004.

19. Sri. Gopalakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, contests the conclusions of the court below that the firm was dissolved on 31.3.2004, primarily relying on Ext.A1 partnership deed. He refers to paragraph 18 of the said deed which reads as under:

"18. It is hereby agreed that no partner shall be retired from this partnership at least for a period of seven years from the date of this deed. In case of retirement, before the stipulated period, the amount due to the concerned partner in the net assets of the firm including goodwill adjusting the profit or loss up to the date of the event shall be ascertained and be settled only after the stipulated period of seven years. In case of loss the retiring partner shall pay the loss amount immediately after finalising the accounts."

His specific contention is that the partners, while entering into the partnership deed, had agreed that they shall not retire from the partnership for a period of at least 7 years. Sri. Gopalakrishnan contends that the decision of the appellant and the second respondent, recorded in Ext.B11(b) minutes dated 21.11.2003, to retire from the firm is in contravention of the provisions of Ext.A1 partnership deed itself and therefore, not legally tenable.

20. It is indubitable that paragraph 18 of Ext.A1 says that no partner shall retire from the firm at least for a period of seven years from the date of the deed. However, this is not an absolute inhibition, since the said paragraph continues to say that this is the normal condition and that if a partner desires to retire from the firm prior to the seven years, the profit or loss upto the date of the said event shall be ascertained and settled only after the stipulated period of seven years. It is, therefore, luculent that there is no absolute restriction even in the paragraph of Ext.A1 extracted above, for any partner to retire prior to the period of seven years. The only stipulation contained therein is that if a partner retires before the said seven years, his accounts will be settled only after that period.

21. In any event of the matter, we also notice that the 2nd clause in Ext.A1 is that the duration of the firm shall be "AT WILL". When the stipulation in the agreement is clear that the duration of the firm will be At Will, there is absolutely nothing which can legally stop the partners from causing dissolution of the firm at their own Will, since the law is absolutely clear in this point that when a partnership is constituted at Will, its existence will depend on the intention of the partners and their volition to continue to function as a firm or otherwise.

22. In the case at hand, as we have already alluded to above, the minutes that were recorded on 8.11.2003 and 21.11.2003, which are Exts. B1 and B3 respectively, would show that the parties had, even as early as in November 2003, decided to part ways amicably. No dispute of any manner can be even seen or traced from the minutes that are recorded as above. In fact, we see from the minutes that the partners had decided to part as friends and to ensure that the losses or liability of the firm were to be settled in a particular manner as we have already seen above. We, therefore, cannot find sustenance for the submission of Sri. Gopalakrishnan that, by the terms of Ext.A1, specifically paragraph 18 thereof extracted above, it should be deemed that the partnership cannot be dissolved.

23. Further, we notice from the judgment of the court below, which is impugned in this appeal, that the third respondent herein had raised a contention that on account of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, (hereinafter referred to as the for short), the suit is not maintainable since the firm is not registered. We see that the fact that Ext.A1 partnership deed is not registered, is not contested by any party and on the contrary it is expressly conceded. So, the question before us is whether a suit of this nature, which is instituted for the purpose of dissolution of a firm or for rendition of accounts of a dissolved firm would be maintainable.

24. Before we move forward, we feel it will be apposite to read Section 69, Sub Clauses (1), (2) and (3) of theto engage its full import and for such reason we extract it as under:

"Sec.69. Effect of non-registration:- (1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.

(2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.

(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect, -

(a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or

(b) the powers of an official assignee, receiver or Court under the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909) or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920) to realise the property of an insolvent partner.

(4) This section shall not apply,-

(a) to firms or to partners in firms which have no place of business in the territories to which this Act extends, or whose places of business in the said territories, are situated in areas to which, by notification under section 56, this Chapter does not apply, or

(b) to any suit or claim of set-off not exceeding one hundred rupees in value which, in the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in section 19 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), or, outside the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in the Second Schedule to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (9 of 1887), or to any proceeding in execution or other proceeding incidental to or arising from any such suit or claim."

We have no doubt in our mind that sub section 3 of Section 69 of themandates that the provisions of sub sections (1) and (2) thereof shall apply to a claim of set off or other proceedings, but shall not affect the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for the accounts of a dissolved firm. In the case at hand, the appellant wants the firm to be declared to be dissolved and for the accounts to be rendered. We do not find any jurisdictional constraint for the court below in having considered the suit on its merits and we are of the definite view that Section 69 of thewould not in any manner impede the consideration of the claim as has been contended by the appellant. We, therefore, repel those contentions more so since, even in the cross objections, these findings of the court below have not been specifically challenged by the third respondent herein.

25. On the question as to whether the firm should be deemed to have been dissolved with effect from 31.3.2004, we must also point out that the various documents produced on behalf of the third respondent herein would limpidly show that the stock, available in the firm subsequent to 31.3.2004, which are evident from Exts. B35 to B42, can only relate to stock that was purchased or maintained by the third respondent in his capacity as a surviving partner and therefore, the sole proprietor. We find so because, even in Ext.B11(b) minutes, the partners who are retiring, namely the appellant and the second respondent herein, permitted the third respondent to continue as the sole proprietor of the business after 31.3.2004. In fact, the intention of the parties, as is very clear from Exts.B1 and B3/B11 (b), was that the firm would stop business as a partnership on 31.3.2004 and that the third respondent would continue the same on his own as a sole proprietor. The appellant and the second respondent have been sufficiently protected by the terms of the said minutes which provide that they will not be liable or responsible for any loss or liability that is occasioned after 31.3.2004.

26. Once we thus hold that the firm was dissolved on 31.3.2004, the question is that whether the appellant would be entitled to seek accounts after that day, as has been claimed by him on the allegation that the stock and the materials available in the firms erstwhile premises which is owned by the third respondent, belonged to the firm. We are afraid that the submissions of Sri. Gopalakrishnan in this direction would not hold water in the face of Exts.B19 to B21, which are the stock registers of the year 2002-2003, 2003-2004 and the closing stock statement as on 5.7.2004 respectively. As we have already found earlier, the firm had been dissolved as on 31.3.2004, and obviously therefore, B19 and B20 stock registers, for the year 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 respectively, would show the position of the stock of the firm as on the date of dissolution and Ext.B21, being the stock statement as on 5.7.2004 would indicate the closing stock thereafter. A comparison of these two would, to a great extent, show the stock balance of the firm as on 31.3.2004. Further, Ext.B12 is the balance sheet as on 31.3.2004, which, though was not audited, is based on the daily books and the ledger. This balance sheet has been prepared by the auditor and we do not see any challenge being mounted against it by the appellant in any proceeding including this suit. In the absence of any such contest, we are certain in our mind that we will have to offer sufficient credibility to Ext.B12 balance sheet, which is as on 31.3.2004. The firm having been dissolved as on 31.3.2004, the balance sheet as on that day would reflect the complete health of the partnership, including its assets and liabilities.

27. However, what is interesting and pertinent to see from Ext.B12, is that the liability of the firm to the extent of Rs. 8,50,000/-, which was the loan amount to be repaid to a bank and against which the third respondent had issued a cheque as has been recorded in Ext.B11(b), has not been mentioned therein. The appellant has not contributed in any manner, concededly, in discharge of any amount due under such loan and the entire liability was taken over by the second and third respondents herein. We say this, more for the reason that the second respondent is the Managing Partner of the firm and he travels along with the appellant in the suit and before this Court. He has filed the written statement, as we already noticed above, conceding to the plaint claim and agreeing to all the allegations made by the appellant. The appellant does not have a case that the second respondent had made payments of the amount mentioned in Ext.B11(b) under duress or under any misrepresentation. The partners had agreed clearly in the minutes, that was recorded on 21.11.2003, that the liability of the firm, subject to audit to be done later, would include an amount of Rs. 8,50,000/- to be paid to the bank. The appellant did not contribute to that, as we have already found above. His contribution to the capital of the firm is only to an extent of 20% as recorded in Ext.A1. We do not, therefore, see any prejudice having been caused to the appellant by the court below entering into a finding, which we find to be justified, that the partnership firm was dissolved as on 31.3.2004.

28. The court below after having so entered into a conclusion went on to decree that the accounts of the firm, the properties belonging to it and the receivables owing to it will have to be accounted as on 31.3.2004 and that it will have to be distributed among the partners in the proportion of their shares as is reflected in Ext.A1. This is the singular effect of the decree and this is how the accounts have been ordered to be taken and renditioned.

29. We notice that the specific case of the appellant is that since the firm was not dissolved as on 31.3.2004, he should be entitled to the rendition of accounts even thereafter. For such purpose he had also filed I.A.No.2770 of 2004, Wherein he had sought for an injunction restraining the third respondent from dealing with the raw materials, stock and the finished articles available in the premises of the erstwhile firm. We also see that the court below had, on 26.6.2004, issued an order prohibiting the third respondent from removing any such articles from the premises. After the said order was issued, the appellant filed I.A.No.2769 of 2004, seeking the appointment of an Advocate Commissioner, which was allowed by the court below. The Advocate Commissioner so appointed visited the premises on 29.6.2004 and he filed Ext.C1 report wherein, we are forced to point out, there is no proper inventory, but he says that there was some record of stock that was maintained by the third respondent in his premises.

30. On the allegation that the third respondent had violated the order of injunction, the appellant sought that the Advocate Commissioner visit the premises again, for which he filed I.A.No.4360 of 2004. Another Advocate Commissioner was deputed by the court below to visit the premises of the third respondent and to cause an inspection, leading to Ext.C2 report dated 24.11.2004, filed by the said Advocate Commissioner. The second Advocate Commissioner visited the premises of the third respondent on 4.10.2004. In Ext.C2 report, the learned Advocate Commissioner reported that certain items of timber were found in the premises and he has also caused an inventory of the same to be attached along with the said report. Both Exts.C1 and C2 were prepared by the learned Advocate Commissioners after 31.3.2004, being the date on which the firm stood dissolved.

31. We are not sure how Exts. C1 and C2 would come to the aid of the appellant, since even assuming that certain stock was available on the premises of the third respondent on those days, we cannot enter into any other inference than that the said stock and the timber so found available in the premises, belonged to the third respondent in his capacity as the sole proprietor of the concern. The other partners, namely, the appellant and the second respondent had retired from the firm and had caused dissolution of the firm with effect from 31.3.2004 and the stock that was available in the premises thereafter cannot be claimed by the erstwhile partners as their property, unless we are in a position to be told by the appellant that the stock shown in Exts. C1 and C2 are exactly the same that was available as on 31.3.2004. There is nothing on record to show this and there is no material produced by the appellant to even suspect that there was any stock available in the firm as on 31.3.2004. This is precisely why we have referred earlier to the stock register and the closing stock register namely Exts B19 to B21 respectively. The extent of the stock and the nature of the articles available in the premises of the firm as on 31.3.2004 can only be reflected from the stock registers and the closing stock referred to above. It is also pertinent that Exts.B22 to B26 are the stock statements from October, 2004 till the financial year 2005-2006. No material is available before us to show that anything contained in these statements could be construed to be the property belonging to the firm as on 31.3.2004.

32. We do not intend to say anything further on this, because we see that these are matters which will have to be decided and adjudicated at the time when final decree is passed, for the purpose of rendition of account between the parties. We are referring to these factors only because we are now called upon to answer a contention raised by the appellant that the respondents have acted in violation of the orders of injunction granted by the court below. This submission is made on the basis of the injunction order granted by the court below on 26.6.2004. As we already said above, the said injunction order restrained the third respondent from dealing with or removing the articles available in his premises as on that date. However, we must immediately point out that the articles that were available in the premises of the third respondent as on that date has not been properly ascertained in Ext.C1, nor is there a proper and complete inventory in Ext.C2. However, notwithstanding that and even assuming that there was some stock available as determined by the Commissioner, we are of the definite view that this may not visit the third respondent with any consequence, because, these articles, as we have already said, cannot be in any manner construed to be that of the firm as on 31.3.2004, subject to further proof. Of course, if the appellant is able to prove, from the available material and the stock registers that any of the articles and stock that was found by the learned Commissioners in Exts.C1 and C2 at the time when the inspection was conducted in the premises of third respondent, to be those that were owned by the firm as on 31.3.2004, he would be entitled to raise such contentions at the stage of final decree proceedings.

33. In such view of the matter and in a conspectus of what we have stated above, we do not see that the court below has, in any manner, misdirected itself or that the judgment and decree that is impugned in this appeal is in any nature perverse or illegal. We have no other option, therefore, but to confirm the same and to dismiss this appeal with costs to the respondents.

34. Coming to the cross objections, in view of our findings above and since we have already held that the firm has been dissolved as on 31.3.2004, the only question that is to be decided in this cross objection is whether the amount expended for the purpose of filling up of the paddy field and for the construction of the sheds in the said property would be the property owned by the firm or whether it should be treated to be that which was spend by the third respondent alone.

35. The third respondent/cross objector contends that there is no evidence to show that the amounts invested for the purpose of filling up of the paddy field and construction of the shed have been spend by the firm. We are afraid that these submissions cannot be countenanced for the simple reason that in Ext.B5, which is the same as Ext.B11(a), the minutes of the firm held on 4.3.2002, the partners are seen to have resolved to fill up the paddy field upto a height of four feet and also to construct a shed with asbestos roofing with a measurement of 70 ft x 32 ft. In view of this specific minutes, which pertinently has been produced by the third respondent himself, we cannot find any reason to disturb the finding of the court below that the firm had invested the amounts and that this will also have to be accounted in the firm, to which the partners would be entitled to their share, when the accounts are rendered and when the proportionate shares are alloted.

36. We, therefore, see no cause to entertain the cross objections or to approve the contentions of the cross objector and we dismiss the same in view of the specific endorsements contained in Ext.B11(a) minutes dated 4.3.2002.