"Considering the nature and most gruesome and beastly act perpetrated by the appellant, the appellant deserves no leniency. He had committed premeditated rape on a helpless child aged about six years and he had gone to the extent of strangulating her to death." *

"Although the conviction of the petition under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 rests on circumstantial evidence, the circumstantial evidence against the petitioner leads to no other inference except that of his guilt and excludes every hypothesis of his innocence. Apart from the circumstances brought out by the prosecution, each one of which has been proved, there is no extra-judicial confession which lends support to the prosecution case that the child had been raped by the petitioner and thereafter strangulated to death.

Failure to impose a death sentence in such grave cases where it is a crime against the society - particularly in cases of murders committed with extreme brutality - will bring to naught the sentence of death provided by Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. It is the duty of the court to impose a proper punishment depending upon the degree of criminality and desirability to impose such punishment. The only punishment which the appellant deserves for having committed the reprehensible and gruesome murder of the innocent child to satisfy his lust, is nothing but death as a measure of social necessity and also as a means of deterring other potential offenders. The sentence of death is confirmed." *

"(1) There was substantial non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, vitiating the imposition of the sentence of death

(2) Drawing strength on the dissenting judgment of P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab ( 1982 (3) SCC 24 [LQ/SC/1982/119] : 1982 SCC(Cri) 535 ) holding that Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code insofar as it provides for imposition of death penalty as an alternative to life imprisonment is ultra vires and void as being violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, since it does not provide any legislative guide-lines when life should be permitted to be extinguished by imposition of death sentence, Mr. Jain pleaded that the judgment of the majority in Bachan Singh case (Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 (2) SCC 684 [LQ/SC/1980/256] : 1980 SCC(Cri) 580 ) deserves to be reviewed by a larger bench in view of the fact that the said decision which upheld the death penalty was rendered in the context of a far more restrictive interpretation of Article 21 and, therefore, it is not only proper, but also just and necessary that the vires of Section 302 IPC has to be re-examined taking into account all subsequent decisions of this Court rendered in the context of Article 21, the dimensions of which have been truly expanded in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ( 1978 (1) SCC 248 [LQ/SC/1978/27] : 1978 (2) SCR 621 [LQ/SC/1978/27] ) and Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration ( 1978 (4) SCC 494 [LQ/SC/1978/223] : 1979 SCC(Cri) 155 : 1979 (1) SCR 392 [LQ/SC/1978/223] )(3) As there has been an undue delay in consideration of the mercy petitions submitted by the petitioner praying for clemency both to President as well as the Governor, the petitioner is entitled for commutation of the death sentence to one of imprisonment for life."

"Death sentence is constitutionally valid and permissible within the constraints of the rule in Bachan Singh (Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 (2) SCC 684 [LQ/SC/1980/256] : 1980 SCC(Cri) 580 ). This has to be accepted as the law of the land. We do not, all of us, share the views of every one of us. And that is natural because, every one of us has his own philosophy of law and life, moulded and conditioned by his own assessment of the performance and potentials of law and the garnered experiences of life. But the decisions rendered by this Court after a full debate have to be accepted without mental reservations until they are set aside." *

"In the face of this statutory provision which is consistent with Article 21 of the Constitution which enjoins that the personal liberty or life of an individual shall not be taken except according to the procedure established by law, we are unable to countenance counsels extreme submission of death in no case." *

"Making all reasonable allowance for the time necessary for appeal and consideration of reprieve, we think that delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke Article 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death." *

"Therefore, with respect, the fixation of the time limit of two years does not seem to us to accord with the common experience of the time normally consumed by the litigative process and the proceedings before the executive.

Apart from the fact that the rule of two years runs in the teeth of common experience as regards the time generally occupied by proceedings in the High Court, the Supreme Court and before the executive authorities, we are of the opinion that no absolute or unqualified rule can be laid down that in every case in which there is a long delay in the execution of a death sentence, the sentence must be substituted by the sentence of life imprisonment. There are several other factors which must be taken into account while considering the question as to whether the death sentence should be vacated. ... Therefore, it is understandable that a convict sentenced to death will take recourse to every remedy which is available to him under the law to ask for the commutation of his sentence, even after the death sentence is finally confirmed by this Court by dismissing his special leave petition or appeal. But, it is, at least, relevant to consider whether the delay in the execution of the death sentence is attributable to the fact that he has resorted to a series of untenable proceedings which have the effect of defeating the ends of justice. It is not uncommon that a series of review petitions and writ petitions are filed in this Court to challenge judgments and orders which have assumed finality, without any seeming justification. Stay orders are obtained in those proceedings and then, at the end of it all, comes the argument that there has been prolonged delay in implementing the judgment or order. We believe that the court called upon to vacate a death sentence on the ground of delay caused in executing that sentence must find why the delay was caused and who is responsible for it. If this is not done, the law laid down by this Court will become an object of ridicule by permitting a person to defeat it by resorting to frivolous proceedings in order to delay its implementation. And then, the rule of two years will become a handy tool for defeating justice. The death sentence should not, as far as possible, be imposed. But, in that rate and exceptional class of cases of this Court ought not to be allowed to be defeated by applying any rule of thumb."

"Undue long delay in execution of the sentence of death will entitle the condemned person to approach this Court under Article 32 but this Court will only examine the nature of delay caused and circumstances that ensued after sentence was finally confirmed by the judicial process and will have no jurisdiction to reopen the conclusions reached by the court while finally maintaining the sentence of death. This Court, however, may consider the question of inordinate delay in the light of all circumstances of the case to decide whether the execution of sentence should be carried out or should be altered into imprisonment for life. No fixed period of delay could be held to make the sentence of death inexecutable and to this extent the decision the decision in Vatheeswaran case ( 1983 (2) SCC 68 [LQ/SC/1983/55] : 1983 SCC(Cri) 342 ) cannot be said to lay down the correct law and, therefore, to that extent stands overruled." *